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THE  GENIUS  OF  NAVAL  WARFARE 


THE  GENIUS 

OF 

NAVAL   WARFARE 

I 

STRATEGY 

SECOND  EDITION  OF 

A  STUDY  OF  NAVAL  STRATEGY 


BY 

RENE  DAVELUY 

COMMANDER,     FRENCH     NAVY 
Translated  by  PHILIP  R.  ALGER,  Professor,  U.  S.  Navy 


Annapolis,  Md. 
The  United  States  Naval  Institute 

1910 


BALTIMORE,   MD.,  U.  S.   A. 


103 


FOREWORD. 


When,  some  ten  years  ago,  I  decided  to  give  to  the  pubHc  a 
popular  presentation  of  naval  questions,  I  had  formed  a  plan  all 
the  more  extensive  from  the  fact  that  it  still  existed  only  in  my 
imagination.  I  proposed  to  divide  my  work  into  three  distinct 
parts :  Strategy,  Tactics,  Organisation.  These  three  parts  were 
to  form  a  whole  under  the  title:     The  Genius  of  Naval  Warfare. 

It  did  not  take  long  for  me  to  perceive  that  I  had  undertaken  a 
task  beyond  my  strength,  and  that  a  very  long  time  would  elapse 
before  I  should  be  capable  of  realizing  my  program  ;  moreover,  the 
title  I  had  chosen  seemed  to  me  to  be  pretentious,  although  it 
exactly  expressed  my  idea.  I  therefore  renounced  the  composi- 
tion of  a  complete  work  and  limited  my  pretensions  to  bringing  out 
separate  studies,  without  connecting  them  by  a  general  title. 

Under  these  conditions  A  Study  of  Naval  Combat  was  published 
in  1902,  followed  by  A  Study  of  Nazfal  Strategy  in  1905.  These 
two  works  were  the  first  two  parts  of  my  original  design.  As  for 
the  third  part,  it  was  sacrificed  to  the  publication  of  The  Struggle 
for  Command  of  the  Sea;  and  since  then  I  have  not  had  time  to 
bring  it  out. 

A  new  edition  of  the  two  studies  that  have  already  appeared 
having  become  necessary,  I  decided  to  take  up  again  my  first 
project,  inclusive  of  its  general  title,  which  I  hope  will  be  more 
readily  pardoned  for  the  ten  years  that  have  passed. 

I  therefore  offer  to-day  to  the  criticism  of  my  comrades  Volume 
I  of  The  Genius  of  Naval  Warfare:  Strategy,  which  is  merely 
a  revision  of  A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

It  is  very  rare  for  authors  not  to  have  something  to  add  to  their 
works,  and  I  have  not  escaped  the  common  law.  I  have  therefore 
seized  the  opportunity  to  reconstruct  or  develop  some  chapters. 
In  others  I  have  merely  made  trifling  corrections ;  but  my  readers 
will  thank  me  for  having  abbreviated. 

Volume  II,  Tactics,  is  about  to  appear  and  will  be  the  new 
edition  of  A  Study  of  Naz'o.l  Combat. 

Finally,  I  hope  very  soon  to  complete  Organisation,  which  will 
form  Volume  III  of  The  Genius  of  Naval  Warfare. 

R.  Daveluy. 
Contre-Torpilleur  Faiicon, 

La  Tude,  Crete,  July,  1909. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

Introduction   I 

FIRST  PART. 
The  Principles  of  Naval  Strategy. 

I.  General   Considerations    7 

II.     Aim  and  Means  of  War lo 

III.  The   Principal   Objective 22 

IV.  Concentrations     26 

V.     Interior  Lines   33 

VI.     The  Policy  of  Guarantees 36 

VII.     Alliances   40 

SECOND  PART. 

The  Elements  of  Naval  Strategy. 

I.     Offensive  and  Defensive 45 

II.     Geography    51 

III.  Secrecy  of  Operations 57 

IV.  Information  and  Communications 59 

V.     Bases  of  Operations 68 

VI.     The  Radius  of  Action 73 

VII.     Speed   79 

VIII.     Homogeneity    84 

THIRD  PART. 

Operations. 

I.     The  Attack  and  Defense  of  Coasts 89 

II.     The  Conquest  of  Over-Seas  Territory 142 

III.  Commerce  Destroying IQI 

IV.  Blockades 219 

V.     Passages  by  Main  Force 229 

FOURTH  PART. 
The  Auxiliaries  of  Str.\tegy. 

I.     The  Plan  of  Campaign 237 

II.  Public  Opinion   241 

III.  Preparation    244 

IV.  The  Doctrine 248 

V.     Grand  Maneuvers 257 

VI.     The  War  Game 260 


Table  of  Contents.  viii 

FIFTH  PART. 

Examples. 

I.  The  War  of  American  Independence 263 

II.  Napoleon's  Naval  Strategy 274 

III.  The  American  Civil  War 283 

IV.  The  War  between  Chile  and  Peru 286 

V.  The  Spanish-American   War 289 

Conclusion  of  Volume  1 295 


INTRODUCTION. 

The  study  of  history  leads  us  to  the  somewhat  disconcerting 
conclusion  that,  though  many  people  have  made  war,  very  few 
have  understood  it.  The  same  faults,  the  same  errors,  reproduce 
themselves  with  almost  mathematical  regularity. 

Upon  reflection,  there  is  nothing  unnatural  in  this.  It  is  with 
the  military  profession  as  with  other  professions :  the  ideas  neces- 
sary to  apply  its  letter  are  easily  acquired,  but  it  is  not  given  to 
everyone  to  grasp  its  spirit.  It  is  not  sufficient  to  be  a  doctor 
to  diagnosticate,  to  play  an  instrument  to  be  a  musician,  to  cover 
canvasses  with  colors  to  be  a  painter. 

Likewise  there  will  never  be  but  a  small  number  of  men  having 
a  clear  comprehension  of  the  afifairs  of  war ;  the  rest,  however, 
though  they  cannot  set  the  seal  of  personality  upon  their  opera- 
tions, will  nevertheless  avoid  many  mistakes  by  studying  the 
conditions  of  war  and  by  letting  themselves  be  guided  by  the  laws 
that  govern  it. 

For  a  long  time  people  fought  without  other  rule  than  to  follow 
the  impulse  of  the  moment.  But  instinct  is  our  worst  adviser : 
all  of  life  is  passed  in  avoiding  the  snares  that  it  sets  for  us.  It  is 
always  spying  on  us,  seeking  to  entice  us  into  the  wrong  road. 

Let  a  vessel  run  upon  reefs,  and  instinct  urges  us  to  leap  into 
the  sea,  when  the  most  prudent  course  is  to  remain  on  board. 

Let  a  torpedo  explode  ahead  of  a  ship  which  is  going  through 
a  passage,  and  the  first  impulse,  that  which  instinct  guides,  is  to 
put  the  helm  over  so  as  not  to  pass  over  the  place  of  the  ex- 
plosion, when  it  is  there,  on  the  contrary,  that  there  is  the  least 
chance  of  being  struck  by  another  torpedo. 

When  reverses  have  beaten  down  courage  and  darkened  coun- 
sel, there  appear  those  desperate  resolutions  that  posterity  looks 
upon  with  contempt :  it  is  instinct  which  stifles  the  voice  of  duty 
and  retakes  control. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Instinct,  then,  must  not  be  our  guide ;  we  must  learn  warfare. 

The  study  of  mihtary  questions  is  relatively  recent;  it  is  sub- 
sequent to  standing  armies  and  dates  only  from  the  period  when 
the  first  military  schools  were  founded. 

The  different  methods  of  teaching  that  have  been  put  in  prac- 
tice can  be  reduced  to  three.  The  first,  which  is  called  the 
rational  method,  claims  to  be  founded  upon  logic  and  good  sense ; 
the  second  makes  of  war  an  exact  science ;  the  third  looks  to  his- 
tory for  guidance. 

Which  to  choose? 

All  the  conceptions  whose  weakness  and  falsity  have  been 
revealed  by  the  event  were  considered  reasonable  by  their  authors. 
Most  frequently  they  had  been  submitted  to  the  deliberations  of 
a  council  and  studied  under  their  different  aspects  ;  their  execu- 
tion was  prepared  with  careful  foresight.  Nevertheless  a  flash 
of  genius  sufficed  to  make  them  go  to  pieces,  and  it  is  the  means 
employed  by  the  adversary  that  at  first  sight  seem  to  us  to  be 
irrational ;  only  in  the  light  of  events  do  they  appear  to  us  as 
they   truly   were. 

This  is  because  the  system  of  deductions,  which  forms  the  basis 
of  the  rational  method,  leads  us  despite  ourselves  in  a  way  marked 
out  in  advance,  without  showing  us  the  obstacles  with  which  it 
is  sown. 

As  for  the  scientific  method,  that  is  always  held  in  honor 
during  the  long  periods  of  peace.  War  tends  to  take  on  a  con- 
ventional character  when  for  a  long  time  we  have  ceased  to  have 
examples  before  our  eyes.  It  is  no  longer  seen  as  it  is,  but  as 
we  conceive  it,  that  is,  freed  from  reflex  actions  and  independent 
of  all  the  elements  which  at  every  moment  change  its  aspect. 
It  presents  itself  then  under  the  form  of  a  succession  of  particu- 
lar facts  each  of  which  constitutes  a  special  problem.  To  solve 
these  problems  we  are  led  to  give  fixed  values  to  factors  essen- 
tially variable ;  and  we  do  this  with  so  much  the  more  assurance 
as  the  enemy  is  not  on  hand  to  bring  matters  back  to  reality ; 
he  becomes  a  term  in  an  equation.  That  is  why  the  mathematical 
method  ends  in  solutions  that  are  mathematically  false.  We  shall 
have  several  occasions  to  show  this. 

War  gives  birth  to  too  many  unexpected  things  to  conform  to 
the  rigidity  of  a  formula  and  to  be  contained  in  the  narrow  frame- 
work of  an  exact  science.     Actualities  must  be  present  in  our 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

minds  at  every  instant  in  order  to  show  us  things  under  their 
true  aspect,  and  not  under  that  which  we  shall  be  tempted  to 
attribute  to  them. 

History  alone  can  give  us  this  exact  understanding. 

History  is  the  experience  of  nations.  Men  are  transient,  and 
they  draw  from  the  heritage  of  the  past  materials  to  supplement 
their  incomplete  ideas. 

In  spite  of  their  genius,  the  great  captains  have  not  thought 
that  they  could  neglect  the  lessons  of  the  past.  We  have  seen 
the  general  of  brigade  Bonaparte  profiting  by  the  leisure  forced 
upon  him  by  the  distrust  of  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety  in 
1795  to  devote  himself  to  the  study  of  the  campaigns  of  the 
great  Frederick.  Later,  become  Emperor,  he  said :  "  Knowledge 
of  the  high  parts  of  war  can  only  be  acquired  by  experience  and 
by  the  study  of  history  and  of  the  battles  of  great  captains." 

If  the  masters  have  judged  it  necessary  to  turn  to  history  for 
enlightenment,  what  right  have  we  to  pretend  to  free  ourselves 
from  it  and  to  undertake  to  invent  war  ? 

It  was  through  the  historic  method,  adopted  in  Prussia  at  the 
fall  of  the  first  Empire,  that  the  Prussians  beat  us  in  1870;  and 
it  is  only  since  that  fatal  date  that  the  French  army  has  remem- 
bered that  it  was  commanded,  sixty  years  before,  by  the  man 
who  incarnated  the  genius  of  war.  So  it  is  that  every  nation 
has  to  pass  through  a  period  of  reverses  before  discovering  the 
true  basis  of  military  education. 

In  spite  of  these  examples,  the  system  that  consists  of  seeking 
in  previous  struggles  for  guidance  in  future  ones  is  little  honored 
in  the  French  navy.  Yet  the  navy,  too,  has  had  its  Jena  and  its 
Sedan:  demoralized  by  the  battle  of  the  13th  Prairial,  it  under- 
went a  first  disaster  at  Aboukir,  and  was  definitely  destroyed  at 
Trafalgar.  Unhappily,  it  did  not  learn  the  lessons  that  defeat 
should  have  taught  because  Trafalgar  did  not  reach  the  nation's 
heart.  The  country,  deprived  for  several  years  of  its  over-sea  com- 
merce, had  found  new  outlets  in  the  territorial  expansion  of  the 
Empire.  At  the  same  period  a  new  era  of  conquests  began.  The 
cannon  shots  which  resounded  over  the  Danube's  shores  drowned 
the  dying  groans  of  the  navy.  Ulm  and  Austerlitz  were  the  flowers 
that  the  army  cast  upon  the  navy's  tomb. 

Then   the   Empire   crumbled   away.      All   was   forgotten,   and, 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

with  the  Restoration,  began  a  long  period  of  peace  which  has 
not  since  been  troubled  except  by  minor  operations. 

Little  by  little,  material  and  armament  changed.  Steam,  giving 
freedom  of  movement  to  the  ship,  introduced  a  new  factor,  and, 
since  the  modern  navy  no  longer  had  any  relation  to  the  navy 
of  sailing  ships,  it  seemed  necessary  to  wipe  out  the  past  and 
begin  over  again  on  a  new  basis.  Truth  to  tell,  for  a  long  time 
no  advance  was  made  beyond  fixing  upon  an  order  of  battle,  and 
attention  was  given  rather  to  methods  of  navigation  than  to  meth- 
ods of  fighting.  There  were  then  but  two  navies  worthy  of  the 
name.  The  policy  of  the  Second  Empire  made  them  our  allies, 
and  the  eventuality  of  a  naval  war  was  so  remote  that  it  seemed 
useless  to  consider  it. 

After  our  disasters  of  1870,  the  view  was  accepted  in  France 
that  a  navy  w-ould  be  useless  in  a  conflict  with  Germany.  The 
foundation  upon  which  this  theory  rested  was  the  fact  that  our 
enemy  had  reduced  us  to  impotence  without  the  aid  of  his  fleet, 
while  our  fleet  had  not  been  of  the  least  use  to  us.  Without 
here  discussing  the  fallacy  of  such  an  opinion,  we  may  declare 
that  those  who  advocated  eflfacing  the  navy  were  short-sighted 
politicians.  The  life  of  nations,  like  that  of  men,  is  full  of  vicis- 
situdes ;  they  have  their  days  of  trial  which,  if  they  are  tenacious, 
help  them  to  rise.  But  the  Franco-German  War  is  only  an  epi- 
sode in  our  history,  and  France  was  given  a  role  little  accordant 
w'ith  her  past  when  she  was  made  to  neglect  her  navy  and  sub- 
ordinate everything  to  a  revenge  from  which  we  draw^  back 
more  and  more.  Events  were  soon  to  demonstrate  this,  and  to-day 
we  are  bearing  the  consequences  of  so  narrow  a  policy. 

The  state  of  neglect  in  which  the  navy  was  left  during  the 
years  that  followed  the  war  could  not  but  have  an  evil  influence 
on  the  minds  of  the  officers.  Losing  sight  of  the  prospect  of  a 
naval  war,  their  education  took  a  wholly  peaceful  turn.  It  seemed 
then  that  France  had  only  kept  her  ships  for  appearance  sake — 
like  those  princes  to  whom  the  revolutions  of  Europe  have  left 
but  a  nominal  sovereignty,  and  who  try  to  conserve  the  illusion 
of  power  by  surrounding  themselves  with  guards  of  honor.  Many 
officers  still  can  recall  the  time  when  our  Mediterranean  Squadron 
cruised  majestically  along  the  shores  without  other  care  than 
precision  and  regularity  of  movement ;  that  was  the  time  w^hen 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

target  practice  was  considered  a  wearisome  burden  to  be  gotten 
over  with  as  quickly  as  possible. 

As  cruising  could  not  fully  occupy  the  activity  of  officers,  the 
education  of  the  naval  school  became  more  and  more  scientific ; 
more  and  more  the  officer  tended  to  become  an  engineer,  elec- 
trician, mechanician,  and  forgot  to  be  a  military  man. 

Such  was  the  situation  when  Germany  and  Italy  built  up  for 
themselves  a  navy  whose  importance  ceased  to  be  negligible. 
Those  who  had  admitted  that  a  fleet  was  unnecessary  in  a  war 
with  Germany  alone  were  less  willing  to  allow  that  the  Mediter- 
ranean ought  to  be  abandoned  to  the  united  forces  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.  At  the  same  time  England,  faithful  to  her  traditions, 
took  advantage  of  our  helplessness  on  the  seas  to  increase  her 
colonial  domain,  and  since  for  our  part  we  had  sought  in  coloniza- 
tion a  compensation  for  our  territorial  losses,  the  points  of  contact 
of  the  two  countries  multiplied,  and  with  them  the  occasions  of 
conflict. 

But  while  the  English,  consistent  with  themselves,  increased 
their  fleet  and  multiplied  their  advanced  bases  progressively  with 
the  development  of  their  colonial  power,  we  limited  ourselves 
to  annexing  territories  without  concerning  ourselves  about  having 
a  navy  to  defend  them.  The  danger  of  so  rash  a  policy  soon  made 
itself  seen. 

In  short,  this  concatenation  of  circumstances  drew  attention 
to  the  affairs  of  war ;  and  then  became  manifest  the  effect  of  a 
scientific  education  which  had  not  been  tempered  by  the  study 
of  history.  War  was  studied  by  mathematics,  and  certain  works 
cannot  be  read  without  recalling  that  phrase  of  von  der  Goltz 
which  characterizes  a  period  already  old :  "  The  tactical  and 
strategical  writings  of  this  period  have  for  the  most  part  an  odd 
resemblance  to  a  course  in  geometry."  Which  proves  that  often 
innovators  do  but  republish  old  ideas,  and  that  in  attacking  tra- 
ditions they  only  revive  them. 

Here  we  must  do  justice  on  that  theory  which  consists  of 
denying  all  the  teachings  of  the  past  under  the  pretence  that  times 
have  changed. 

If  respect  for  traditions  consists  in  clinging  to  the  letter  of 
institutions  or  to  the  materiality  of  facts,  let  us  cast  it  off  without 
hesitation,  for  manners  change  and  methods  differ.  But  if  we 
neglect  the  letter  to   see  only  the   spirit  that  inspires  it,   if  we 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

seek  in  events  the  causes  that  brought  them  forth,  the  past 
supphes  us  with  an  inexhaustible  mine  of  teachings.  So  far  as 
war  is  more  particularly  considered,  who  does  not  see  the  im- 
portant part  that  the  moral  state  of  men  plays  in  it?  But  men 
have  not  changed.  Who  could  deny  that  arms  have  been  but 
the  instruments  of  the  thought  of  a  leader,  and  that  this  thought 
still  remains  true? 

Such  are  the  arguments  that  have  determined  our  method.  It 
alone  can  make  us  seize  the  spirit  of  ivar  and  bring  out  the  laws 
that  govern  it. 


THE  PRINCIPLES  OF  NAVAL  STRATEGY. 

I. 

General  Considerations. 

In  the  beginning-,  war  was  the  conflict  of  two  peoples  who 
rushed  against  each  other  and  fought  until  one  of  the  two  reduced 
the  other  to  slavery  or  drove  them  out  of  their  territory. 

When  the  conquering  races  had  taken  possession  of  the  soil, 
they  grouped  themselves  about  common  interests  and  formed 
nations.  Then  frontiers  came  into  existence.  War  was  no  longer 
waged  in  quest  of  new  territories  but  for  self-preservation  and 
advancement.  Regular  troops  took  the  place  of  armed  mobs, 
thus  diminishing  the  number  of  combatants  and  increasing  their 
worth.  Each  people  has  its  neighbors ;  this  contact  engenders 
conflicts  ;  the  weaker  combine  to  crush  the  stronger  ;  the  fields 
of  operations  become  more  numerous.  Then  strategy  appears 
upon  the  scene. 

In  face  of  the  impossibility  of  fighting  everywhere  at  once, 
some  men,  more  talented  than  the  rest  in  the  afifairs  of  war, 
supply  the  place  of  numbers  by  activity ;  they  oppose  successively 
to  each  adversary  almost  the  entire  body  of  their  forces,  contenting 
themselves  with  putting  obstacles  in  the  path  of  the  others ;  thus 
they  beat  their  enemies  in  detail  and  overwhelm  them  with 
numbers. 

Next  the  ambition  of  the  conquerors  increases  with  their  suc- 
cess ;  they  conceive  still  higher  aims  and  wish  to  strike  quicker 
and  harder.  They  then  attack  their  enemies  at  the  very  heart  of 
their  power  and  finish  the  war  at  a  single  blow.  Such  were  the 
Napoleonic  wars. 

The  different  elements  of  strategy  have  thus  come  into  exist- 
ence under  the  impulsion  of  the  various  needs  of  the  moment : 
they  were  not  developed  methodically.  For  the  art  of  war  is 
not  the  fruit  of  the  experience  of  centuries,  it  was  brought  forth 
by  the  genius  of  a  few  men  who  were  unwilling  to  subordinate 
their  designs  to  the  weakness  of  their  means.  And  thus  it  may 
be  said  that  the  characteristic  of  strategy  is  to  get  the  best  of 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

it  with  feeble  resources,  or  at  the  least  to  obtain  the  greatest 
return  from  such  resources/ 

If  now  w-e  seek  in  the  operations  of  fleets  an  analog-y  with 
what  took  place  on  land,  we  shall  have  difficulty  in  finding  it. 
This  is  because  there  is  no  naval  warfare  in  the  exclusive  sense  of 
the  word.  People  make  war:  the  army  and  the  navy  are  its 
instruments ;  they  ought  to  lend  mutual  support  to  one  another 
in  attaining  a  common  object.  Many  wars  have  been  seen  on 
land  not  necessitating  naval  intervention ;  but  it  would  be  vain 
to  seek  for  a  single  naval  war  which  has  not  necessitated,  to  a 
greater  or  less  extent,  the  intervention  of  the  army.* 

This  diflference  proceeds  from  the  environment  of  each  element : 
the  army  destroys  the  forces  of  the  enemy  and  occupies  his  terri- 
tory ;  the  navy  can  only  prepare  the  way  for  the  army,  since  it 
operates  upon  ground  common  to  all.  The  operations  in  which 
it  acts  for  its  own  account,  although  important,  do  not  lead  directly 
to  the  objects  of  the  war.  A  maritime  power  all  of  whose  naval 
forces  had  been  destroyed  would  probably  give  up  the  fight,  with- 
out waiting  for  an  invasion  of  its  own  soil  or  of  its  colonies ;  but 
it  will  only  yield  in  face  of  the  impossibility  of  defending  itself, 
which  involves  the  co-operation  of  the  army. 

In  order  that  an  exclusively  naval  action  may. put  her  existence 
in  peril,  it  has  been  necessary  that  one  nation,  England,  should 
accumulate  upon  the  sea  gigantic  interests  whose  loss  would  be 
a  fatal  blow  to  her.  She  is  an  exception  therefore  to  the  common 
law,  without,  however,  being  sheltered  from  combined  military 
and  naval  operations,  which  might  reduce  her  in  a  not  less  effi- 
cacious manner. 

The  navy  has  played  a  more  or  less  preponderant  part,  accord- 
ing to  circumstances ;  but  it  has  often  followed  the  general  trend 

^Let  us  note  in  passing  that  the  war  of  1870,  by  forcing  the  continental 
nations  to  arm  all  their  citizens,  will  result  in  bringing  war  back  to  its 
primitive  form ;  and  it  seems  as  though  future  struggles  would  resemble 
the  encounters  of  ancient  peoples.  Strategy  will  then  lose  the  artistic 
character  that  it  had  when  armies  were  less  numerous  and  more  mobile. 

'  At  first  sight  the  wars  of  American  Independence  and  of  the  Empire 
might  appear  exclusively  naval.  Nevertheless,  in  the  former,  the  land 
operations,  in  the  West  Indies  and  in  America,  had  a  considerable  in- 
fluence upon  events,  and  in  the  latter  the  movements  of  fleets  were  inti- 
mately connected  with  the  project  of  the  invasion  of  England. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

of  warfare  and  thus  has  not  been  able  to  operate  in  its  own 
sphere.  Under  Louis  XIII  and  during  the  minority  of  Louis 
XIV,  in  a  period  when  war  is  merely  a  succession  of  sieges,  the 
fleet  lends  its  support  to  the  army  in  the  investment  of  maritime 
places :  Sourdis  blockades  Fontarabia  and  Tarragona ;  the  cam- 
paigns of  Breze  on  the  coasts  of  Catalonia  and  Italy  have  for 
their  object  to  support  the  army ;  later  the  battles  of  StromboH, 
Agosta  and  Palermo  are  the  consequence  of  the  occupation  of 
Sicily. 

In  the  wars  with  England  the  navy  played  the  principal  part, 
and  she  it  was  that  gave  direction  to  the  operations.  The  vast 
field  that  spread  before  her  could  give  rise  to  many  combinations ; 
yet,  until  the  Empire,  strategy  seems  to  have  chiefly  had  in  view 
to  equalize  the  forces  as  much  as  possible  on  each  field  of  battle, 
by  recommending  to  chiefs  of  squadrons  the  avoidance  of  fighting 
when  they  found  themselves  for  the  moment  in  a  state  of  inferior- 
ity. Besides  this  concern,  we  see  many  projects  of  invasion 
whose  unsuccess  shows  a  defective  preparation  or  an  error  of 
principle.  Nowhere  appear  unity  of  control  and  concentration 
of  efforts. 

The  absence  of  strategical  manoeuvers  may  be  attributed  to 
the  fact  that,  in  the  navy,  our  great  seamen  had  no  part  in  the 
conception  of  the  plans  of  campaign ;  their  genius  found  its  em- 
ployment only  upon  the  fields  of  battle,  and  they  were  often 
compelled  to  carry  out  the  plans  of  people  having  no  knowledge 
of  naval  matters.'  The  only  one  who  escaped  from  this  rule,  by 
paying  no  attention  to  the  orders  that  he  had  received,  was 
Suffren ;  and  it  cannot  be  denied  that,  in  a  narrow  theater,  he 
showed  himself  a  fine  strategist.  In  land  warfare,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  great  leaders  have  been  chiefs  of  the  State,  and  they 
have  had  the  power  to  conceive  and  to  execute.  Thus,  when 
Napoleon  takes  charge  of  naval  operations,  they  assume  a  char- 
acter of  absolute  resemblance  to  the  principles  that  he  applied 
on  land. 

^  It  is  well  known  that  Tourville  was  obliged  to  demonstrate  to  the 
Minister  that  his  instructions  were  impossible  to  execute. 


II. 

The  Aim  and  Means  of  War. 

Wars  break  out  for  the  most  various  and  often  the  most  trivial 
causes ;  but  the  political  considerations  which  determine  them 
should  not  have  any  influence  upon  military  action.*  The  latter 
has  but  one  aim — to  reduce  the  adversary  to  a  state  of  impotence. 
This  end  attained,  the  settlement  of  the  conflict  will  always  be 
easy. 

To  reduce  the  enemy  to  impotency,  it  is  necessary  to  disarm 
him  ;  that  is,  to  destroy  the  constituted  forces  that  are  the  guar- 
antee of  his  power.  Undoubtedly  many  wars  have  ended  before 
all  the  enemy's  means  of  defense  were  destroyed,  but  prior  vic- 
tories have  shown  him  the  impossibility  of  continuing  the  struggle 
with  success,  and  have  induced  him  to  lay  down  his  arms. 

The  necessity  of  attacking  the  adversary's  constituted  forces 
leads  directly  to  battle. 

The  potency  of  battle  is  beyond  discussion :  it  makes  itself 
manifest  by  results.  The  history  of  conquests  is  but  a  long  recital 
of  battles,  and  whether  we  consider  Napoleon  or  Frederick,  Nel- 
son or  Sufifren,  we  always  find  in  all  their  acts  anxiety  to  meet 
the  enemy.  Thus  the  question  which  arises  is  not  whether  fighting 
is  justifiable,  but  whether  it  is  possible  to  do  without  it. 

Let  us  first  observe  that  a  country's  naval  forces  are  designed 
to  protect  all  the  interests  that  either  closely  or  remotely  concern 
maritime  affairs.  By  attacking  these  forces  we  directly  menace 
all  the  interests  that  they  protect ;  and  if,  in  a  given  region,  we 
succeed  in  destroying  them,  all  the  operations  that  proceed  from 
naval  warfare  become  easy,  since  there  is  nothing  to  oppose  them. 
Moreover  the  building  at  great  expense  of  engines  of  destruction 
with  the  intention  of  using  them  as  little  as  possible-  is  repugnant 
to  common  sense. 

The  real  error  of  many  naval  writers  is  that  they  see  in  naval 
warfare  only  particular  cases.  Some  claim  that  the  purpose  of 
the  navy  is  to  insure  the  safety  of  the  coast  and  to  attack  the 

*  Policy  has  sometimes  directed  operations  without  any  attention  to  the 
military  art.     This  error  of  principle  has  always  had  doleful  consequences. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

enemy's  coasts  ;  others  tell  us  that  its  role  is  to  destroy  commerce  ; 
still  others  wish  to  use  it  to  assure  the  success  of  an  invasion. 
Very  well,  then !  destroy  the  enemy  and  you  will  secure  all  these  >  / 
results  at  once :  the  protection  of  the  coast  will  be  assured  and    ' 
you  will  be  able  to  conclude  successfully  whatever  operation  the 
circumstances  demand. 

Fighting  issues,  therefore,  from  the  very  nature  of  war  and 
from  the  means  prepared  to  make  war  with.  Any  system  which 
tends  to  relegate  it  to  the  second  place,  instead  of  making  it  the 
end  and  aim  of  war,  can  only  be  regarded  as  an  expedient. 

Nevertheless,  the  idea  of  fighting  did  not  at  once  impress 
itself  upon  the  minds  of  the  first  seamen  as  being  the  very  founda- 
tion of  naval  warfare.  In  the  beginning  the  interests  that  trav- 
ersed the  seas  were  inconsiderable  and  no  one  thought  of  attack- 
ing them  ;  ships  were  only  a  means  of  transporting  troops  to  the 
hostile  shores,  where  they  pillaged  and  burned  towns  and  villages. 
Battles  were  merely  a  consequence  of  these  expeditions ;  but 
they  were  not  sought,  since  the  ships  were  not  specially  armed 
with  a  view  to  fighting  one  another. 

With  colonization  maritime  commerce  developed  and  it  soon 
became  important  enough  for  its  capture  to  seriously  injure  those 
who  carried  it  on,  and  at  the  same  time  to  enrich  its  captors. 
Naval  operations  then  took  on  another  character.  Spain,  then 
at  the  height  of  her  power,  was  the  first  to  undergo  the  test  of 
this  new  kind  of  warfare  during  the  eighteen  years  that  her 
struggle  with  England  lasted ;  but,  as  usually  happens,  the  new 
problem  that  arose  did  not  immediately  receive  its  true  solution. 
The  English  at  first  attacked  commerce  directly.  Spain,  taken 
unawares,  suffered  important  losses  through  the  capture  of  her 
American  galleons,  which  periodically  returned  to  Europe  in 
company ;  but  having  in  her  ports  naval  forces  immensely  supe- 
rior to  those  of  England,  she  had  only  to  equip  war  fleets  stronger 
than  those  of  the  enemy  to  compel  him  to  abandon  the  field.  Then 
it  was  that  the  true  conception  of  naval  war  germinated  in  the 
minds  of  a  few  English  seamen,  such  as  Monson  and  Raleigh:  i, 
they  perceived  that  the  best  way  to  reach  commerce  was  not!  [ 
to  attack  it  directly,  but  first  to  destroy  the  forces  that  defended!  \ 
it.  These  celebrated  seamen  felt,  though  still  vaguely,  that, 
though  the  fabric  constituted  by  the  maritime  greatness  of  a 
nation  rests  upon  its  commercial  traffic  and  on  the  prosperity  of 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

its  colonies,  this  fabric  is  sustained  only  by  military  forces,  and 
is  undermined  by  attacking  those  forces.' 

This  truth  was  brought  more  clearly  into  relief  in  the  following 
century  by  the  fifty  years  of  war  that  England  sustained  against 
Holland,  a  struggle  whose  sole  object  was  to  decide  to  which 
of  the  two  nations  the  commercial  monopoly  of  the  world  should 
belong. 

At  the  end  of  this  truly  heroic  period,  England  had  reached  a 
definite  comprehension  of  the  influence  of  battle,  and  thereafter 
she  made  it  the  principal  objective  of  her  military  combinations. 

The  importance  of  battle  did  not  reveal  itself  to  the  same  de- 
gree to  other  maritime  nations.  Spain,  especially,  for  centuries 
carried  on  war  on  the  sea  without  the  least  comprehension  of  it, 
without  her  experience,  dearly  bought  by  an  uninterrupted  series 
of  reverses,  succeeding  in  tearing  away  the  veil  that  darkened 
the  sight  of  her  statesmen  and  her  seamen.  France  had  some 
glimpses  of  the  truth ;  but,  in  a  general  way,  she  was  more  ready 
to  seek  her  special  object  than  encounter  with  the  military  forces 
of  the  enemy. 

This  difference  in  the  lines  of  conduct  of  the  three  great  mari- 
time nations  had  tangible  results :  Spain,  with  an  immense  material 
afloat,  fails  in  all  her  enterprises ;  at  war  with  England,  she  en- 
riches her  with  her  spoils  ;  in  a  struggle  with  France,  she  gives 
her  her  finest  victories  and  writes  for  her  .the  most  glorious  pages 
of  her  naval  history ;  allied  with  us,  she  compromises  us  and 
brings  failure  to  enterprises  that  offer  the  greatest  chance  of 
success ;  finally  she  disappears  from  the  concert  of  maritime  na- 
tions because,  during  four  centuries,  she  can  almost  be  said  not 
to  have  registered  a  single  victory ;  and  the  reason  why  she  has 
I  always  been  beaten  is  because,  not  recognizing  the  necessity  of 
■battle,  she  was  never  ready  to  confront  it. 

France,  with  Tourville,  with  Duquesne,  and  with  Suffren,  in- 
termittently gets  hold  of  the  true  concept  of  war,  and  then  her 
navy  shines  with  brilliant  lustre ;  but  as  soon  as  she  falls  back 
into  the  old  ways  her  naval  power  disappears.  An  energetic 
nation,  she  labors  in  times  of  peace  to  build  for  herself  a  colonial 
domain  which  she  regularly  loses  in  times  of  war  because  she 
is  unwilling  to  employ  the  true  means  of  defending  it. 

'  See  Colomb,  Naval  Warfare,  Chapter  I. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

England,  on  the  contrary,  has  done  nothing  but  expand.  Poor, 
she  has  taken  away  from  the  rich  their  colonies ;  rich  herself, 
she  has  been  able  to  keep  them  and  to  grow  greater :  to-day  she 
reigns  over  the  seas. 

If,  after  having  set  forth  what  the  influence  of  fighting  has 
been  upon  the  greatness  of  maritime  powers,  we  seek  the  effects 
which  its  refusal  has  had  upon  the  details  of  operations,  we  see 
that  it  has  given  birth  to  useless,  absurd,  or  incomprehensible 
combinations. 

All  seamen,  in  reading  history,  are  struck  by  the  fact  that, 
during  the  war  of  American  Independence,  the  French  always 
received  the  attack  to  leeward,  excepting  in  the  East  Indies, 
where  Sufifren  was  in  command.  It  may  well  be  supposed  that 
it  was  not  chance  alone  that  gave  the  English  the  constant  ad- 
vantage of  the  windw^ard  position.  The  cause  is  that,  despite  a 
marked  superiority  in  a  majority  of  encounters,  we  never  sought 
battle :  we  always  submitted  to  it.  The  explanation  of  this  sin- 
gular conduct  is  given  us  by  this  phrase  of  Ramatuelle :"  "  The 
French  Navy,"  said  he,  "  has  always  preferred  the  glory  of  secur- 
ing or  preserving  a  conquest  to  that,  more  brilliant  perhaps  but 
certainly  less  substantial,  of  capturing  a  few  ships ;  and,  in  this, 
it  has  come  nearer  to  the  true  aim  of  war." 

This  reasoning  is  a  mere  sophism ;  when  the  conquest  of  a 
territory  can  only  be  made  by  sea,  its  possession  is  not  definitely 
assured  until  the  hostile  fleet  has  been  reduced  to  a  state  of 
harmlessness. 

We  shall  see  to  what  paradoxical  operations  the  application  of 
an  erroneous  doctrine  can  lead. 

The  promenade  that  the  great  combined  fleet  made  along  the 
shores  of  England,  in  1779,  deserves  only  passing  mention,  be- 
cause it  has  not  been  clearly  shown  whether  d'Orvilliers  was 
unable  or  unwilling  to  meet  the  English  fleet,  inferior  by  nearly 
half  to  that  of  the  Allies.  We  can,  however,  draw  the  conclusion 
that  this  immense  armament,  which  entailed  a  great  expenditure 
of  time  and  money,  remained  unproductive  for  the  sole  reason 
that  it  did  not  receive  the  sanction  of  battle. 

But,  two  years  afterwards,  this  same  fleet,  under  the  command 

'M.  de  Ramatuelle  was  a  lieutenant  during  the  war  of  American  Inde- 
pendence; under  the  Consulate  he  published  a  book  on  naval  tactics. 

13 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

of  a  Spanish  admiral,  has  the  good  fortune  to  corner,  in  the  bay 
of  Torbay,  Derby's  squadron,  that  has  but  thirty  ships  to  oppose 
to  fifty.  The  AlHed  fleet  disdains  the  combat  and  withdraws 
into  its  ports.  What  benefit  resulted  from  this  cruise?  History 
does  not  tell  us.  In  revenge,  if  we  do  not  see  what  the  combined 
fleet  gained,  what  it  lost  is  only  too  apparent.  Derby's  squadron 
was  the  sole  force  that  the  English  could  oppose  to  the  Allies  in 
the  Channel.  That  squadron  destroyed,  England's  existence  was 
imperilled  ;  but  it  was  necessary  to  fight ! ! ! ' 

Here  is  something  stranger.  Twice  this  extraordinary  occur- 
rence took  place :  two  hostile  squadrons  clinging  to  the  flanks  of 
a  single  island  and  landing  a  part  of  their  artillery  to  entrust  to 
the  disembarked  troops  the  task  of  deciding  to  whom  the  island 
shall  belong. 

On  December  13,  1778,  d'Estaing  learned  at  Martinique  that 
Admiral  Barrington  was  attacking  St.  Lucia.  On  the  14th  he 
makes  sail  with  twelve  ships,  and  on  the  15th  arrives  off  the 
island  only  to  learn  that  the  English  are  in  possession.'  He 
anchors  then  in  the  bay  of  Choc  and  disembarks  his  troops,  while 
Barrington,  who  had  only  seven  ships,  moors  head  and  stern  in 
the  bay  of  Cul-de-sac,  ready  to  receive  an  attack. 

On  January  11,  1782,  the  Count  de  Grasse  anchors  at  St. 
Christophers  in  the  bay  of  Salines  with  twenty-six  ships.  The 
Marquis  de  Bouille  is  at  once  landed  and,  with  his  customary 
ardor,  he  soon  had  the  English  garrison  shut  up  in  the  fortified 
position  of  Brimstone  Hill.  As  soon  as  Admiral  Hood,  who  was 
at  the  Barbadoes,  learned  of  our  movements,  he  made  sail  with 
twenty-two  ships  to  carry  assistance  to  the  island.  De  Grasse 
goes  to  meet  him  and  manoeuvers  so  well  that  on  the  25th  Hood 
takes  the  anchorage  that  we  quitted  the  evening  before.  De  Grasse 
did  not  dare  to  attack  him  there  and  satisfied  himself  by  firing  a 
few  shells  at  him  from  long  range ;  then  he  anchored  again  and 
disembarked  the  artillery  of  the  Cato  to  support  the  troops  on 
shore.  Admiral  Hood  could  thus  withdraw  without  being  dis- 
turbed after  he  had  ascertained  that  he  could  not  get  reinforce- 
ments into  the  garrison. 

'  We  shall  take  up  this  lamentable  episode  with  more  detail  in  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  war  of  American  Independence. 

*The  garrison  still  held  out;  it  j'ielded  after  the  departure  of  the 
squadron. 

14 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

In  these  two  attacks  the  error  committed  is  manifest.  Each 
time  the  French  fleet  had  numerical  superiority  over  the  enemy 
and  neglected  to  profit  by  it.    What  were  the  consequences  ? 

At  St.  Lucia,  the  troops  were  repelled,  the  expedition  failed,  and 
a  month  later  Byron  came  to  reinforce  the  English  squadron. 
D'Estaing  thus  lost  the  advantage  of  numbers  and  he  could  then 
reflect  upon  the  letter  that  Sufifren  had  written  to  him  on  that 
occasion,  in  which  he  said:  "Let  us  destroy  this  squadron  (the 
English  squadron)  ;  the  troops,  lacking  everything,  in  a  bad  coun- 
try, will  certainly  have  to  surrender ;  let  Byron  come  afterwards 
and  he  will  be  welcome." 

At  St.  Christophers,  the  invasion  succeeded ;  but  three  months 
afterwards  de  Grasse  was  beaten  at  Dominica  by  the  very  same 
English  fleet  that  he  had  neglected,  and  that  had  been  reinforced 
by  fifteen  ships  brought  from  England  by  Rodney.  The  French 
admiral  had  forgotten  that  in  war  an  opportunity  lost  does  not 
recur  again ;  when  one  has  the  means  of  fighting  the  enemy  to 
advantage  and  does  not  profit  by  it,  later  one  finds  him  again 
on  another  field  of  battle  under  less  favorable  conditions. 

After  these  useless  or  absurd  operations,  we  shall  see  two  others 
that  from  the  same  cause  are  incomprehensible.  They  took  place 
during  the  war  of  the  Revolution. 

On  September  23,  1796,  Admiral  Don  Juan  de  Langara  left 
Cadiz  with  nineteen  ships.  After  having  cleared  the  Strait  of 
Gibraltar  he  met,  on  October  i,  at  daybreak,  seven  English  vessels 
under  the  command  of  Rear-Admiral  Mann,  and  allowed  them  to 
escape.  The  Spaniards  put  into  Carthagena  where  there  were 
seven  ships  of  the  line.  Don  Juan  de  Langara  thus  found  himself 
in  command  of  twenty-six  ships. 

The  Spanish  fleet  cruised  in  the  waters  between  the  coast  of 
Spain  and  Corsica.  Towards  the  end  of  October  it  got  word 
of  the  English  Squadron,  then  anchored  in  the  bay  of  St,  Florent. 
This  squadron  was  completing  the  embarkation  of  the  men  and 
material  of  the  corps  of  occupation  (of  Corsica).  Since  the  de- 
parture of  Rear-Admiral  Mann,  whom  the  Spaniards  had  un- 
successfully chased,  Sir  John  Jervis'  squadron  was  reduced  to 
fifteen  ships.  Admiral  Don  Juan  de  Langara  had  a  very  great 
superiority  over  the  English.  Instead  of  profiting  by  this  situa- 
tion to  attack  them,  he  separated  himself  from  them.  We  may 
well  ask  why  this  admiral  did  not  attempt  to  destroy,  with  his 

IS 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

twenty-six  ships,  the  fifteen  ships,  encumbered  with  troops  and 
munitions,  of  his  adversary. 

"  If  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Spanish  fleet  had  decided 
to  fight  the  English  in  the  bay  of  St.  Florent,  he  would  have  had 
the  good  fortune  to  surprise  them,  in  disorder,  in  a  roadstead 
that  was  not  protected  on  the  landward  side  ...."" 

The  Spanish  fleet  withdrew  to  Toulon  and  let  Jervis  escape ; '" 
four  months  afterwards  the  latter  met  the  same  fleet,  then  com- 
manded by  Don  Jose  de  Cordova,  ofif  St.  Vincent,  but  the  cir- 
cumstances were  no  longer  the  same.  Instead  of  their  surprising 
the  enemy,  it  was  the  Spaniards  who  were  surprised,  divided 
in  two  parts ;  and  they  expiated,  on  February  14th,  the  error 
committed  in  the  preceding  month  of  October. 

On  March  25,  1799,  Bruix,  taking  advantage  of  the  absence 
of  the  English  fleet  that  blockaded  Brest,  puts  to  sea  with  twenty- 
five  ships.  He  very  skilfully  deceives  the  English  as  to  his  desti- 
nation, and,  while  Lord  Bridport  went  in  search  of  him  along  the 
Irish  coast,  he  steers  for  Cadiz. 

Lord  Keith  was  cruising  off  that  port  with  fifteen  ships,  watch- 
ing a  Spanish  fleet  of  seventeen  ships  that  was  there.  On  May 
4th  Bruix  appears  ofif  Cadiz.  The  weather  being  unfavorable, 
he  abandons  the  plan  of  joining  the  Spaniards  and  enters  the 
Mediterranean  without  endeavoring  to  fight  the  English.  This 
was  a  first  error.  Lord  Keith's  squadron  formed  the  most  im- 
portant part  of  the  English  forces  stationed  in  that  region.  This 
squadron  put  out  of  action,  the  sixteen  English  vessels  which 
were  distributed  at  Minorca,  Palermo,  Naples,  Malta  and  Alex- 
andria would  be  wholly  powerless  to  prevent  the  junction  of  the 
allied  fleets ;  and  before  the  Admiralty  would  have  time  to  send 
a  new  fleet  to  the  Mediterranean  irreparable  events  could  occur. 

Yet  Bruix  proceeds  to  Toulon  where  he  anchors  on  May  14th. 

Jervis  was  then  at  Gibraltar,  where  he  was  detained  by  ill  health. 
The  entry  of  a  French  fleet  into  the  Mediterranean  made  him 
fear  an  attack  upon  Minorca,  which  was  only  defended  by  four 
ships  under  Duckworth ;  he  therefore  at  once  recalled  Lord  Keith. 

Mazarredo,  who  commanded  the  Spanish  fleet  at  Cadiz,  took 

"  Chevalier,  History  of  the  Frencli  Navy  under  the  First  Republic. 
"  There  were  then  at  Toulon  twelve  French  ships  that  would  have  been 
able  to  join  the  Spanish  fleet. 

16 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

advantage  of  the  departure  of  the  EngHsh  blockading  force  to 
leave  port  on  May  14th ;  on  the  20th  he  entered  Carthagena. 

Bruix  leaves  Toulon  on  May  26th,  convoys  some  vessels  laden 
with  wheat  to  Genoa,  and  anchors  at  Vado  on  June  4th.  He 
sets  out  again  on  the  8th  to  make  junction  with  the  Spaniards 
at  Carthagena.  During  this  passage,  the  French  fleet  passed 
within  a  short  distance  of  the  English  fleet,  then  composed  of 
twenty  ships  (through  the  meeting  of  Keith  and  Duckworth), 
which  was  endeavoring  to  intercept  it.  Bruix  then  had  only 
twenty-two  ships,  and  a  meeting  with  the  English  no  longer 
ofifered  him  the  same  chances  of  success  as  before.  But  it  was 
written  that  fortune  should  favor  the  French  to  the  end  without 
their  dreaming  of  taking  advantage  of  it.  Bruix  arrived  without 
hindrance  at  Carthagena,  and  set  forth  again  on  June  25th,  at  the 
head  of  forty  ships.  Once  more  he  found  himself  in  the  vicinity 
of  Lord  Keith,  who  had  returned  to  Mahon  and  had  but  twenty 
ships  to  oppose  him  with."  He  preferred  to  ignore  him  and 
kept  on  his  course  to  Brest  where  the  combined  fleet  anchored 
on  August  8th,  after  having  put  in  at  Cadiz. 

Thus  this  long  cruise  of  three  and  a  half  months  served  for 
nothing  more  than  to  bring  the  Spanish  fleet  into  the  Channel. 
Was  that  of  any  use?  As  soon  as  they  arrived  the  Allies  were 
blockaded  by  Lord  Bridport,  reinforced  by  ships  which  had  there- 
tofore been  engaged  in  watching  the  Spanish  squadron  at  Cadiz. 
Nothing  then  was  altered,  except  that  the  English  had  but  one 
point  to  keep  watch  over  instead  of  two. 

Nevertheless,  the  movements  of  Bruix  had  not  been  useless; 
Lord  Bridport's  fleet  had  remained  immobilized  on  the  Irish  coast, 
the  blockade  of  Brest  and  that  of  Cadiz  had  been  raised,  and  all 
the  English  forces  in  the  Mediterranean  had  found  themselves 
compromised,  and,  with  them  the  possession  of  Minorca.  The 
orders  and  counter-orders  of  Jervis,  the  detachment  that  he  sent 
to  Nelson  at  the  moment  when  he  himself  feared  being  over- 
whelmed by  numbers,  everything  shows  his  apprehensions.  To 
take  advantage  of  this  situation,  it  was  necessary  to  make  an 
encounter  with  the  enemy  the  principal  objective,  otherwise  the 

"  A  reinforcement  of  five  ships  really  arrived  at  Minorca  on  July  7th, 
that  is  at  the  moment  when  the  Allies  had  already  gone  out  of  the  Med- 
iterranean. It  is  then  that  Lord  Keith  started  in  pursuit  of  them  with 
thirty-one  ships. 

17 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

English  must  sooner  or  later  be  reinforced  and  the  fruits  of  the 
campaign  were  lost.     That  is  what  happened. 

If  Bruix  had  profited  by  the  two  chances  that  he  had  to  carry 
off  an  easy  victory,  his  cruise  would  appear  to  us  one  of  the 
best-conceived  strategic  operations.  As  it  was  carried  out,  we 
cannot  comprehend  it  at  all.  During  three  months  everything 
was  in  confusion;  all  the  plans  of  the  Admiralty  were  upset; 
then,  little  by  little,  everything  settled  back  into  the  same  position, 
or  an  equivalent  one.  And  so  it  will  be  every  time  that  no  event 
happens  to  break  the  equilibrium  of  forces. 

If  the  French  navy  had  always  sought  battle,  as  the  English 
did,  it  would  have  seen  brighter  days ;  not  recognizing  the  effi- 
cacy of  fighting,  it  got  itself  beaten  because  it  engaged  in  the 
contest  with  defective  instruments  that  were  not  prepared  to 
brave  it. 

Because  of  not  having  perceived  the  necessity  of  attacking  the 
military  forces  of  the  adversary  there  was  undertaken,  under 
the  Revolution  and  Empire,  that  long  series  of  expeditions  which 
almost  all  failed  miserably  because  their  only  chance  of  success 
lay  in  avoiding  the  enemy.^"  Certainly  it  is  possible  to  pass  un- 
perceived  across  a  sea  which  is  guarded,  but  to  do  so  cannot  be 
made  a  condition  of  success.  War  is  not  a  game  of  hazard,  and 
even  though  chance  does  play  a  part,  the  destinies  of  the  country 
cannot  be  trusted  to  it.  The  miscarriage  of  all  our  enterprises 
at  this  epoch  proves  that  force  is  the  sole  logical  base  of  all 
military  conceptions ;  it  proves  likewise  that  an  encounter  is 
with  difficulty  avoided  when  the  enemy  has  decided  to  bring  it 
about.    The  best  thing  to  do,  therefore,  is  to  prepare  for  it. 

The  only  exceptions  to  this  rule  result  from  special  conditions 
or  from  temporary  circumstances  that  we  shall  consider  later  on. 

A  nation  which  fears  to  stand  up  against  an  adversary  superior 
in  numbers  will  always  have  a  tendency  to  be  sparing  of  its 
material.  It  will  allow  itself  to  be  easily  led  astray  by  a  delusive 
vision,  and  then  it  is  that  those  specious  theories  appear  which 
pretend  that  a  nation  can  be  subjugated  by  raising  the  cost  of 
insurance. 

"  Anyone  who  reads  attentively  the  history  of  Ganteaume's  cruise  in 
the  Mediterranean  (1801)  will  see  that  it  was  fear  of  meeting  the  enemy 
that  made  the  expedition  fail. 

18 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy, 

Those  who  imag-ine  that  war  can  be  made  in  this  way  without 
encountering  the  enemy  have  allowed  themselves  to  be  led  away 
by  the  attraction  of  more  or  less  ingenious  combinations,  but  they 
never  take  account  of  the  fact  that  the  enemy  has  forces,  and 
that  he  will  make  use  of  them  precisely  for  the  purpose  of  de- 
molishing all  these  speculations  in  which  he  is  taken  no  account  of. 

To  justify  their  system,  they  argue  from  our  reverses  and 
draw  the  conclusion  that  battle  is  ineffective.  Why,  say  they, 
recommence  a  policy  that  has  brought  our  worst  disasters  upon 
us  ?    This  reasoning  will  convince  nobody. 

In  the  operations  of  war,  all  previsions  are  founded  upon  suc- 
cess. There  is  not,  and  there  could  not  be,  a  plan  of  campaign 
which  in  advance  discounts  defeat.  It  is  quite  natural,  therefore, 
that,  each  time  when  we  have  been  beaten  at  sea,  our  naval  power 
should  have  undergone  the  consequences.  This  result,  on  the 
contrary,  only  confirms  the  greatness  of  the  moral  and  material 
effects  of  battle ;  for  if,  at  Trafalgar  and  Aboukir,  fortune,  aided 
by  the  genius  of  a  leader  and  the  valor  of  his  men,  had  declared 
in  our  favor  and  had  given  us  a  triumph  as  complete  as  that 
which  the  English  obtained,  the  situation  would  have  been  re- 
versed. It  is  not  the  system  of  war  in  itself,  therefore,  that  can 
be  incriminated :  defeat  alone  is  guilty. 

And  why  were  we  defeated? 

When  we  were  inferior  in  numbers,  the  explanation  is  already 
found,  although  the  English  have  demonstrated  to  us  that  one 
can  conquer  without  superiority  of  numbers,  and  we  shall  make 
an  explanation  on  the  subject  further  on;  but  at  Trafalgar  we 
were  superior  in  numbers,  on  other  occasions  there  was  equality, 
and  none  the  less  we  were  crushed.  Is  this  reason  for  giving 
up  in  despair?  Surely  not,  for  the  causes  of  this  impotence  are 
not  endemic:  they  can  be  remedied.  Just  now  we  have  been 
able  to  see  that,  disposing  of  the  same  means  as  our  adversaries 
in  the  American  war,  we  used  them  in  quite  a  different  manner, 
and  it  is  to  that  that  we  must  attribute  the  sterility  of  our  efforts. 
Under  the  Revolution  it  was  the  disorganization  of  our  navy, 
both  as  regards  material  and  personnel,  that  made  our  ships  in- 
capable of  facing  an  encounter,  no  matter  what  the  conditions. 

Let  us  have  good  officers,  good  crews,  good  ships ;  let  us  know 
how  to  fight;  and,  in  our  turn,  not  only  will  we  be  victors,  but 
we  will  gather  from  victory  the  same  fruits  as  the  English. 

19 


1 


1^" 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

>  As  for  indecisive  battles,  evidently  they  are  unfruitful :  when 
two  adversaries,  disposing  of  identical  means  and  knowing  how 
to  use  them,  both  expend  the  same  amount  of  energy,  they  hold 
themselves  in  check  and  between  them  the  balance  rests  even. 
There  is  then  a  disposition  to  seek  another  combination  which  may 
break  the  equilibrium ;  but  this  is  not  a  reason  for  believing  that 
fighting  is  not  still  the  best  solution,  and  that  any  other  would 
not  be  a  worse  one."  That  one  who  first  shall  have  sought  to 
escape  from  it,  to  pursue  another  objective,  will  be  forced  to 
come  back  to  it  after  having  been  well  beaten.  That  is  precisely 
the  spectacle  oflfered  us  by  the  Dutch  wars.  The  French  navy 
obeyed  a  sentiment  of  the  same  kind  after  the  wars  in  which  it 
tried  commerce  destroying;  disillusion  with  an  impotent  method 
and  return  to  the  direct  attack  were  signalized  by  an  outburst  of 
ship  building. 

Against  fighting,  then,  there  is  but  a  single  plausible  objection: 
inferiority  of  number.    This  is  serious. 

Number,  on  condition  that  at  the  same  time  it  represents  force, 
is  the  principal  lever  of  war,  but  it  is  not  the  only  one.  What  was 
the  Electorate  of  Brandenburg  in  comparison  with  the  German 
Empire?  What  did  the  English  navy  amount  to  in  comparison 
with  that  of  Spain,  under  Elizabeth?  None  the  less  Prussia  has 
absorbed  the  Empire,  and  none  the  less  the  English  navy  beat  the 
Spanish  navy. 

Number,  therefore,  is  not  the  ultima  ratio  of  war.  On  the  sea, 
it  carries  with  it  many  burdens  that  reduce  its  absolute  value ; 
the  nation  which  has  the  most  powerful  navy  is  also  the  one  which 
has  the  most  interests  to  safeguard,  and  which,  therefore,  has  not 
the  power  to  set  in  motion  its  forces  to  the  same  extent  as  its  ad- 
versary. As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  English  navy  has  never  had,  on 
the  field  of  battle,  a  manifest  numerical  superiority.  Setting  aside 
the  battle  of  La  Hogue,  which  was  the  result  of  a  political  aberra- 
tion, the  forces  have  been  sensibly  equal  in  the  majority  of  en- 
counters. There  have  been  some  occasions  where  the  dispropor- 
tion of  forces,  without  being  so  excessive  as  at  La  Hogue,  was 
nevertheless  evident ;  but  the  balance  inclined  in  our  favor  as  often 
as  in  favor  of  the  English. 

"  It  is  already  quite  a  good  deal  to  hold  one's  position  and  not  to  allow 
one's  self  to  be  overrun. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

It  is  possible,  then,  to  have  effective  forces  less  numerous  than 
those  of  the  enemy,  and  yet  not  be  driven  to  disproportionate  com- 
bats ;  but  yet  it  is  certain  that,  below  a  certain  limit,  no  amount 
of  skill  can  supply  the  want  of  numbers ;  and  then  disaster  is  un- 
avoidable. It  does  not  result  from  this  that  attack  on  the  enemy's 
forces  is  not  a  necessity  from  which  there  is  no  escape,  whether 
we  will  or  no ; "  at  the  most  we  can  conclude  from  it  that  France 
must  choose  between  the  following  two  solutions:  either  to  give^ 
up  the  idea  of  being  a  naval  power,  or  to  take  upon  herself  the 
burdens  necessary  in  order  to  carry  on  war  to  advantage. 

It  is  the  more  important  to  be  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  battle 
because  this  conviction  has  a  direct  effect  upon  the  nature  of  mili- 
tary preparations.  Unless  a  preponderant  role  is  ascribed  to 
battle,  we  shall  be  led,  as  we  have  been,  to  give  to  the  naval  forces 
a  heterogeneous  composition,  corresponding  to  diverse  conceptions. 
We  may  then  find  it  impossible  to  face  an  encounter,  not  because 
we  lack  means  absolutely,  but  because  the  means  are  not  suited  to 
the  end. 

"  Otherwise  there  would  be  no  advantage  in  being  the  stronger,  since 
strength  would  be  of  no  use.  We  shall  see,  moreover,  further  on,  that 
there  is  not  a  single  sort  of  maritime  operation,  not  even  commerce  de- 
stroying, that  does  not  lead  to  the  direct  attack  upon  the  military  forces 
of  the  enemy. 


III. 

The  Principal  Objective. 

From  the  fact  that  battle  is  the  principal  means  of  warfare  it  is 
not  necessary  to  conclude  that  we  should  always  throw  ourselves 
blindly  upon  the  enemy.  It  is  evident  that  nothing  is  ever  gained 
by  the  useless  sacrifice  of  ships,  and  when  one  is  sure  to  be  van- 
quished it  is  better  to  try  to  avoid  the  contest.  In  such  a  case,  be- 
tween two  evils,  the  least  is  to  be  chosen.  Therefore,  when  it  is 
stated  that  before  all  else  battle  should  be  sought,  it  must  be  under- 
stood by  this  that  the  strategic  effort  ought  to  aim  at  bringing  upon 
the  field  of  battle  the  greatest  force  possible.  We  are  now  to  ex- 
amine into  the  methods  that  can  be  employed  to  attain  this  object. 

At  first  sight  it  seems  wholly  natural  to  oppose  to  each  fraction 
of  the  hostile  forces  a  fraction  of  one's  own.  Many  wars  have 
been  conducted  without  any  other  strategic  rule. 

This  is  a  simple  method  when  one  possesses  superiority  of  num- 
bers. It  may  even  be  alleged  that  powers  whose  riches  are  de- 
pendent upon  the  sea  are  obliged  to  adopt  this  strategy,  because 
they  cannot  abandon  to  the  enterprises  of  the  enemy  any  one  of 
their  interests  without  exposing  themselves  to  serious  loss.  They 
must,  therefore,  ever3'where  oppose  to  the  enemy  forces  at  least 
ecjual  to  his  in  order  to  prevent  him  from  doing  harm. 

With  equality  of  forces,  the  system  becomes  less  efficacious; 
in  such  a  case  the  war  would  take  on  the  character  of  a  succession 
of  separate  combats,  and,  unless  one's  adversary  were  badly  or- 
ganized, it  would  be  rash  to  assume  to  have  the  advantage  every- 
where. What  was  gained  at  one  point  might  well  be  lost  at 
another. 

Finally,  in  a  struggle  with  an  enemy  of  manifest  superiority, 
and  one  who  is  not  completely  disorganized  (as  our  navy  was 
under  the  Revolution  and  the  Empire),  there  is  every  chance  of 
being  beaten. 

Yet,  if  it  is  no  longer  possible  to  confront  the  enemy  from  the 
moment  that  we  are  numerically  inferior  to  him,  we  must  suppress 
the  most  glorious  pages  of  our  history,  we  must  cease  to  admire 

22 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

those  men  who  have  refused  to  yield  to  numbers  and  have  been 
victors.  What,  then,  was  their  secret?  It  consisted  in  discerning 
at  what  point  it  was  necessary  to  strike  in  order  to  make  the 
adversary's  whole  power  crumble  at  a  single  blow,  and  in  neglect- 
ing the  rest  of  his  forces,  so  as  to  be  the  stronger  at  the  principal 
point.  And  thus  the  partial  successes  that  the  enemy  could  secure 
became  fruitless.  That  is  why  military  strategy  teaches  to  attack 
the  principal  army  first. 

It  is  the  same  upon  the  sea. 

The  characteristic  of  naval  war  between  two  nations  having 
colonies  is  that  it  extends  over  an  immense  area.  The  points  of 
contact  between  the  belligerents  are  numerous,  and  they  occur 
particularly  in  regions  where  the  two  parties  have  common  inter- 
ests. But  the  influence  that  the  attack  or  abandonment  of  these 
interests  can  exercise  upon  the  final  result  is  not  the  same  every- 
where. Nations,  like  men,  have  a  heart  and  members.  If  it  is 
possible  to  strike  at  the  heart,  it  is  useless  and  even  hurtful  to 
expend  one's  energy  in  cutting  off  legs  and  arms.  It  is  the  heart, 
therefore,  that  must  be  aimed  at. 

Nevertheless  there  is  a  reluctance  to  attack  the  principal  center 
of  resistance  of  the  enemy.  It  is  often  thought  preferable  to 
pursue  several  objectives  at  the  same  time,  because  of  unwilling- 
ness to  abandon  anything;  thus  one's  forces  are  employed  in  dis- 
connected attacks  and  a  decisive  result  is  nowhere  obtained  be- 
cause nowhere  is  a  sufficient  effort  made.  Sometimes  one  is  led 
astray  by  the  temptation  of  any  easy  prey,  and  then  successes  are 
won  which  are  equivalent  to  defeats.'^ 

As  the  enemy  always  accumulates  his  chief  means  of  defense 
in  the  region  where  he  is  most  vulnerable,  there  is  usually  hesita- 
tion to  attack  him  there,  and  a  solution  is  sought  which  is  appar- 
ently more  simple.  This  is  to  draw  back  for  a  better  leap ;  for 
an  eccentric  operation  that  leaves  untouched  the  enemy's  principal 

"  It  is  easy  to  show  that  a  victory  is  not  always  worth  winning.  When 
the  Spanish  government  made  Admiral  Camara  start  for  the  Philippines 
with  the  last  naval  reserves  it  made  an  impotent  effort.  The  crux  of  the 
situation  was  in  Cuba ;  it  was  there  only  that  it  was  important  to  be  the 
victor;  every  ship  drawn  away  from  that  field  of  battle  compromised  the 
issue  of  the  war,  even  if  it  won  successes.  This  was  finally  recognized, 
and  Admiral  Camara  was  recalled  from  Suez;  but  it  would  have  been 
much  better  to  have  reflected  before  starting  him  off  in  a  wrong  direction. 

23 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

forces  does  not  take  from  him  the  abihty  to  retrieve  the  situation, 
and  there  is  always  risk  of  losing  what  has  been  gained.  On  the 
contrary,  when  the  resistance  at  the  decisive  point  has  been  over- 
come, the  detachments  that  are  operating  elsewhere  find  them- 
selves wholly  compromised,  and  the  source  of  their  supplies  is 
dried  up.  Moreover,  the  weakness  of  these  detachments  prevents 
their  being  dangerous,  and  their  dispersion  prevents  them  from  be- 
coming a  serious  menace  by  getting  together. 

This  is  above  all  true  in  naval  wars  where  the  communications 
are  often  cut  and  where  the  distances  from  one  point  to  another 
are  considerable. 

The  main  fleet  of  the  enemy,  therefore,  constitutes  the  principal 
objective.  This  objective  is  generally  easy  to  determine.  Yet 
there  may  be  a  doubt  about  it  when  the  enemy  has  very  numerous 
forces  at  his  disposition.  In  this  case  it  is  a  question  of  judgment, 
but  it  should  not  be  lost  sight  of  that  the  importance  of  a  naval 
force  does  not  depend  solely  upon  the  region  in  which  it  operates, 
as  we  shall  see  when  discussing  the  influence  of  geography. 


24 


IV. 

Concentrations 

When  the  principal  army  of  the  enemy  has  been  determined, 
all  the  resources  of  strategy  should  be  employed  to  attack  it  under 
favorable  conditions.  How  is  this  to  be  done?  Is  it  necessary 
to  concentrate  in  advance  all  one's  forces  face  to  face  with  the 
objective  one  has  in  view? 

We  shall  try  to  demonstrate  that  concentrations  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war^"  are  only  advantageous  for  one  who  is  the 
stronger  both  upon  land  and  on  the  sea. 

Two  cases  may  arise :  the  two  sides  are  of  about  equal  force, 
or  one  of  the  two  has  a  marked  superiority  over  the  other. 

In  the  first  case,  a  general  concentration  on  one  side  will  pro- 
voke a  similar  operation  on  the  other.  This  is  inadequate,  for  a 
struggle  with  equal  arms  affords  no  serious  chance  of  annihilating 
the  enemy,  unless  one  is  engaged  with  a  disorganized  adversary; 
he  may  be  vanquished  but  he  is  not  reduced  to  helplessness.  But 
it  is  not  enough  to  be  the  victor;  it  is  further  necessary  that  the 
enemy  be  so  much  punished  that  it  becomes  possible  to  benefit 

"  The  word  concentration  evokes  the  idea  of  a  grouping  of  forces ;  we 
believe,  in  fact,  that  war  cannot  be  waged  without  grouping  ships  in  squad- 
rons or  fleets.  This  necessity  is  denied  by  certain  persons  who,  having 
noticed  that  our  naval  disasters  have  been  caused  by  the  defeat  of  our 
squadrons,  have  thence  deduced  with  inexorable  logic  that  removing  the 
cause  will  be  all  sufficient  to  suppress  the  effect.  "  If  there  no  longer  are 
any  squadrons,  it  is  clear  that  they  cannot  be  destroyed." 

It  is  almost  beneath  one's  dignity  to  refute  such  absurdities;  yet  it  is 
necessary  to  do  so,  since  the  public,  ignorant  of  the  aff'airs  of  war,  accepts 
in  good  faith  everything  that  tends  to  furnish  it  with  a  method,  as  simple 
as  it  is  infallible,  of  conquering  the  enemy. 

It  may  well  be  wondered  at  that  the  idea  of  preventing  defeats  by  doing 
away  with  armies  did  not  sooner  germinate  in  the  minds  of  the  famous 
military  leaders  of  the  past,  and  that  ever  since  wars  began  there  has 
been  such  an  obstinate  determination  to  collect  troops  together  in  armies. 
It  is  above  all  to  be  regretted  that  we  did  not  employ  this  new  procedure 
in  1870,  and  thus  avoid  the  surrender  of  Metz  and  Sedan. 

Perhaps  it  is  because  nothing  else  can  be  done.     In  fact,  the  war-ship, 

25 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

by  his  defeat.  This  stands  out  very  clearly  from  all  the  wars 
in  which  a  situation  of  this  kind  has  occurred.  In  examining 
them,  we  shall  likewise  see  what  the  causes  are  that  have  led  the 
belligerents  to  meet  upon  a  single  battle  field. 

The  most  remarkable  examples  of  general  concentrations  are 
furnished  to  us  by  the  English-Dutch  wars.  What  strikes  us  at 
the  very  first,  in  these  wars,  is  the  confined  area  of  the  theater 
of  operations.  Except  for  a  few  filibustering  expeditions  to  far- 
off  colonies,  which,  moreover,  had  no  connection  with  the  conduct 
of  the  war,  the  fleets  of  the  two  countries,  collected  in  two  enor- 
mous masses,  invariably  meet  in  that  narrow  strip  of  sea  which 
separates  England  from  Holland.  This  peculiarity  is  easily  ex- 
plained. From  the  numerical  point  of  view  the  forces  were  about 
equal ;  yet  the  importance  of  their  commerce  was  a  cause  of  in- 
feriority in  the  Dutch,  while  England  found  in  the  extent  of  her 
territory  military  resources  that  were  lacking  to  her  rivals.  On 
the  other  hand,  though  the  maritime  interests  of  both  countries 
are  wide-spread,  all  those  of  Holland  and  the  greater  part  of  those 
of  England  converge,  in  the  form  of  merchant  ships,  upon  the 
North  Sea.  Concentration  is  necessary  for  Holland,  for  if  she 
diverts  a  part  of  her  fleets  to  protect  her  commerce,  she  exposes 
her  frontier ;  while  by  massing  all  her  ships  in  the  North  Sea  she 
covers  at  once  her  territory  and  the  point  of  convergence  of  her 
convoys.  England  is  obliged  to  act  in  the  same  way  in  order  not 
to  find  herself  in  a  state  of  inferiority  in  this  same  region ;  she  like- 

which  is  the  tool  with  which  war  is  made  on  the  sea,  exercises  a  threat 
wherever  it  goes.  In  order  to  escape  from  the  damages  of  every  sort 
that  it  can  cause,  it  must  be  suppressed.  Another  ship  will  therefore  be 
opposed  to  it,  and  to  be  more  certain  of  having  the  advantage,  two  will 
be  opposed,  if  possible.  The  first  ship  will  then  have  to  withdraw  (unless 
it  is  destroyed)  until  it  can  return  with  a  reinforcement;  in  order  not  to 
be  beaten,  the  side  to  which  it  belongs  will  have  to  lessen  the  dispersion 
of  its  forces  so  as  to  increase  their  resistance,  and  the  other  side  will  have 
to  do  the  same.  Thus,  little  by  little,  the  anxiety  to  be  the  stronger 
leads  each  side  to  diminish  the  number  of  its  objectives  and  to  concen- 
trate its  forces  in  a  few  regions  where  there  are  vital  interests  to  be  safe- 
guarded. If  one  cannot  thus  be  the  stronger,  at  least  one  is  as  little 
weak  as  possible. 

The  composition  of  naval  forces  in  divisions,  squadrons  and  fleets  re- 
sults therefore  from  the  fact  that  war  is  an  act  of  force;  and  those  who 
pretend  that  war  can  be  made  without  grouping  one's  forces  not  only 
commit  an  error  but  state  an  absurdity. 

26 


I 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

wise  has  to  cover  the  mouth  of  the  Thames  and  to  protect 
Chatham,  which  at  this  period  is  her  great  war  port." 

Concentration,  therefore,  was  forced  upon  hoth  sides.  This 
necessity  did  not  make  itself  clear  at  the  first ;  the  solution  of  war 
problems  is  much  more  the  fruit  of  experience  than  the  result  of 
reasoned  calculations.  Thus,  during  the  first  war,  other  systems 
were  tried,  such  as  the  direct  protection  of  commerce  and  the 
attack  upon  that  of  the  enemy ;  but  the  danger  of  this  line  of  ac- 
tion quickly  revealed  itself,  and  from  the  beginning  of  the  second 
war  the  concentrations  are  complete. 

The  war  that  Holland  had  to  sustain  against  the  united  forces 
of  France  and  England  presents  the  same  character:  the  same 
causes  produce  the  same  effects. 

What  were  the  results  of  these  tremendous  gatherings?  Us- 
ually the  victory  is  in  doubt,  each  side  claims  for  itself  the  award : 
which  indicates  that  there  was  no  great  profit  from  the  encounter. 
There  were  some  battles  that  resulted  in  a  marked  advantage  for 
one  side,  but  the  vanquished  one  retained  sufficient  strength  to 
prevent  being  annihilated,  and  the  victor  was  only  able  to  profit 
momentarily  by  his  victory.  Both  sides  would  be  obliged  to  re- 
enter port  to  make  repairs ;  the  one  that  came  out  again  first  would 
capture  a  few  convoys,  make  some  landings  of  no  particular  im- 
portance; then  he  would  be  forced  to  cease  his  depredations  on 
account  of  the  reappearance  of  the  enemy. 

With  equal  forces,  therefore,  the  chances  of  subduing  the  enemy 
are  not  sufficient;  victories  then  merely  give  satisfaction  to  one's 
vanity,  and  they  cost  too  dear  to  make  it  possible  to  derive  benefit 
from  them.  In  such  a  case  concentration  is  not  advantageous. 
When  circumstances  make  of  it  a  necessity  (as  in  the  Dutch  wars) , 
an  attempt  must  be  made  to  break  the  balance  of  forces  by  a  rapid 
mobilization,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  oppose  the  junction  of  the 
hostile  squadrons,  and  to  overwhelm  one  of  them.  This  first  suc- 
cess can  then  become  the  point  of  departure  for  others  of  more 
importance.'* 

Twice  the  English,  following  this  plan,  placed  themselves  bc- 

"  Occurrences  showed  that  this  port  was  not  then  safely  protected  from 
a  sudden  attack. 

"This  is  precisely  what  the  Japanese  did  at  the  beginning  of  their  war 
with  Russia,  when  they  ignored  the  Russian  division  at  Vladivostok  to 
concentrate  their  efforts  against  the  Port  Arthur  squadron. 

27 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

tween  the  fleets  of  Holland  and  of  Zealand,  in  the  wars  already 
cited,  but  the  manoeuver  failed  for  reasons  that  do  not  concern 
us  here.  On  the  other  hand,  this  method  of  procedure  brought 
about  the  victory  of  Beachy  Head.  At  this  period  fleets  only  went 
to  sea  during  the  season  of  good  weather.  Counting  upon  a  respite 
until  the  end  of  the  winter,  the  English  and  Dutch  had  not  yet 
accomplished  their  concentration.  A  part  of  the  Dutch  ships  had 
not  assembled ;  Shovel  was  guarding  the  Irish  coast  and  Killigrew 
was  delaying  at  Gibraltar.  It  was  then  that  Tourville  attacked 
with  seventy  ships  the  fleet  of  Torrington,  which  formed  the  prin- 
cipal force  of  the  enemy,  and  beat  it. 

The  era  of  concentrations  did  not  close  with  the  campaign  of 
1688,  but  the  subsequent  attempts  made  by  the  French  either  did 
not  result  in  an  encounter  or  were  failures.  We  shall  only  refer 
to  them,  therefore,  to  bring  out  the  fact  that  the  threat  of  them 
kept  all  the  enemy's  forces  in  the  vicinity  of  the  English  coasts. 
After  1689,  moreover,  they  occurred  under  unfavorable  conditions, 
since  we  were  already  the  inferior  in  numbers.  In  fact,  it  is  evi- 
dent that  a  concentration  on  the  part  of  the  w^eaker,  effected  at 
the  beginning  of  a  war,  provokes  a  sirhilar  movement  from  the 
enemy,  who,  being  threatened  only  at  a  single  point,  has  no  reason 
to  divide  his  forces.  Under  these  conditions,  the  issue  can  only  be 
disastrous  to  the  one  who,  as  a  foregone  conclusion,  puts  himself 
in  a  state  of  inferiority.  On  the  field  of  battle,  the  energy  of  the 
combatants,  the  skill  of  the  leaders,  may  furnish,  as  at  La  Hogue, 
matter  for  a  brilliant  page  of  history,  but  they  cannot  obviate  the 
consequences  of  an  unequal  struggle. 

In  order  that  an  initial  concentration  may  be  advantageous,  one 
must  be  at  the  same  time  the  stronger  on  land  and  on  sea  (which 
rarely  happens  in  maritime  wars).  In  fact,  naval  power  being 
a  function  of  maritime  wealth,  a  nation  which  brings  all  its  forces 
together  at  the  same  point  abandons  its  commerce  and  its  colonial 
domain  to  the  enterprises  of  the  enemy.  To  scorn  the  damage 
that  it  risks  incurring  from  this  fact,  a  country  must  have  the 
means  of  terminating  the  war  at  a  single  blow  by  invading  the 
enemy's  territory.  But  this  requires  superiority  on  land  and  sea. 
If  the  superiority  exists  only  on  the  sea,  a  concentration  will  not 
bring  about  that  of  the  adversary,  who  will  have,  on  the  contrary, 
every  inducement  to  divide  his  forces  to  attack  the  points  left 
without  defense.    It  may  be  said,  therefore,  that  the  concentration 

28 


A  Study  of  Nav/xl  Strategy. 

of  the  weaker  determines  that  of  the  stronger,  but  that  the  opposite 
is  not  true.  Actually,  from  the  moment  that  France  gave  up  the 
concentrations  which  she  practiced  up  to  Quiberon,  the  theater 
of  operations  is  seen  to  enlarge  more  and  more  in  proportion  with 
the  growth  of  England's  colonial  power.  The  latter,  not  being 
able  to  attempt  anything  against  our  territory,  and  solicited  on 
all  sides  by  her  multiple  interests,  more  and  more  divides  her 
forces  when  she  is  no  longer  threatened  with  invasion ;  at  the 
end  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV,  the  war  extends  to  the  Mediter- 
ranean ;  under  Louis  XV,  it  involves  the  colonies  which,  till  then, 
had  been  visited  only  by  flying  squadrons  or  by  expeditions  under- 
taken by  private  interests ;  finally,  under  Louis  XVI,  fighting  is 
going  on  at  once  in  the  Atlantic,  in  the  Mediterranean,  in  the 
West  Indies,  in  the  East  Indies,  and  on  the  coasts  of  America. 
It  is  very  nearly  the  same  during  the  wars  of  the  Revolution  and 
Empire.  It  can  be  observed,  moreover,  that  it  was  always  the 
distribution  of  our  forces  that  regulated  the  apportionment  of 
the  English  forces,  because  there  came  a  time  when  maritime 
wealth  formed  the  principal  element  of  our  rival's  prosperity  and 
was  so  closely  bound  up  with  his  existence  that  he  was  obliged  to 
provide  protection  ever^^where  before  thinking  of  seizing  anything. 
Thus  it  is  the  weaker  who  chooses  the  field  of  battle,  when  he  does 
not  adopt  a  passive  attitude.  Wherever  he  is,  he  constitutes  a 
menace  and  draws  the  enemy  to  him,  and  the  latter  is  compelled 
to  have  forces  everywhere  where  he  has  them. 

Furthermore,  the  nation  which  is  the  more  powerful  on  the 
sea  will  always  seek  to  take  preventive  measures ;  it  will  station 
forces  in  regions  where  it  has  numerous  interests  to  protect,  with- 
out waiting  for  them  to  be  attacked ;  the  weaker,  on  the  contrary, 
finds  advantage  in  neglecting  a  part  of  these  forces  which  do  not 
tlireaten  him,  in  order  to  concentrate  all  his  efforts  against  others. 

Since  initial  concentrations  give  no  result,  it  should  not  be  laid 
down  as  a  principle  never  to  divide  one's  forces,  for  that  is  the 
only  way  to  oblige  the  enemy  to  divide  his.  Colomb  remarks  " 
that  the  English  were  never  so  free  from  anxiety  as  when  our 
squadrons  were  brought  together,  because  they  then  had  but  a 
single  force  to  keep  watch  over. 

'^  Naval  Warfare. 

29 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

But  the  dividing  up  of  forces  ought  to  be  done  with  discern- 
ment. To  compel  the  enemy  to  divide,  each  separate  fraction  must 
by  its  strength  and  its  position  constitute  a  threat,  and  the  different 
fractions  must  not  be  so  close  together  as  to  enable  a  single  force 
to  look  after  them."* 

Centers  of  action  are  thus  established,  similar  to  those  that 
were  formed  in  our  naval  wars ;  and  it  is  then  only  that  it  can 
be  hoped  to  bring  about  an  unexpected  concentration.  If  the 
sliips  that  operate  in  one  or  several  of  these  centers  succeed  in 
suddenly  disappearing,  and  are  lost  in  the  immensity  of  the  seas, 
thev  will  be  able  to  appear  unexpectedly  at  another  place  where 
they  will  furnish  to  the  forces  already  there  the  addition  needed 
to  give  superiority. 

Such  is  the  principle  of  concentration ;  but  the  application  is 
by  no  means  so  simple  a  matter.  Success  depends  greatly  on  the 
distance  from  the  point  of  departure  to  the  point  of  arrival,  and 
on  the  uncertainty  that  prevails  regarding  the  destination  of  the 
ships  whose  trace  has  been  lost.  If  the  latter  have  but  a  single 
possible  objective  and  only  a  short  distance  to  traverse  to  reach  it, 
the  enemy  will  immediately  rush  in  their  pursuit,  and  will  be 
able  to  arrive  before  their  presence  has  produced  any  effect.  On 
the  contrary,  if  the  enemy  is  obliged  to  choose  between  several 
possibilities,  he  may  start  upon  a  false  scent,  as  Colpoys,  Nelson 
and  Bridport  did,  or  may  remain  where  he  is  in  fear  of  an  offen- 
sive return. 

^°  For  example,  it  would  be  an  error  to  divide  our  Mediterranean  squad- 
ron into  two  parts,  distributed  between  Toulon  and  Bizerta.  In  so  narrow 
a  sea,  the  enemy  can  hold  the  two  forces  in  check  without  himself  divid- 
ing, and,  since  they  can  do  nothing  before  making  a  junction,  their  initial 
separation  compromises  them  uselessly  by  exposing  them  to  the  chance 
of  being  beaten  in  detail.  If,  instead  of  two  centers,  one's  forces  are 
distributed  between  three  or  four,  the  consequences  are  still  graver:  the 
enemy,  by  remaining  concenrrated,  has  such  great  chances  of  interfering 
with  a  junction  that  he  can  afford  to  oppose  to  all  these  detachments  only 
one  central  force  inferior  to  their  sum. 

It  is  also  an  error  to  station  a  division  of  the  Northern  squadron  at 
Brest  and  another  at  Cherbourg.  By  itself  each  is  too  weak  to  be  dan- 
gerous ;  all  that  results  therefore  is  the  anxiety  of  bringing  them  together, 
which  is  always  a  risky  operation. 

30 


I 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

We  have  already  seen  a  concentration  of  this  sort  in  the  case 
of  Bruix's  cruise  in  the  Mediterranean ;  we  shall  see  a  still  more 
striking  example  of  it  in  Napoleon's  great  strategic  operation. 
From  these  trials  it  stands  forth  clearly  that  the  number  and 
amplitude  of  the  combinations  to  which  displacements  of  forces 
give  rise  depend  upon  the  importance  and  dispersion  of  the 
adversary's  maritime  interests.  The  weaker  side  will  here  find, 
therefore,  if  not  compensation,  at  least  an  attenuation  of  his 
numerical  inferiority. 

The  conditions  of  navigation  under  sail  were  a  hindrance  to  a 
system  of  operations  requiring  a  certain  concordance  of  move- 
ments ;  great  elasticity  had  to  be  given  to  plans  in  order  to  allow 
for  difficulties  and  delays  which  the  strength  and  direction  of 
the  wind  might  create.  The  regularity  of  movement  of  steam 
vessels,  in  conjunction  with  the  precision  of  navigation,  should 
partly  do  away  with  these  obstacles.  But  we  find  others  of  a 
different  sort:  rightly  or  wrongly,  modern  navies  have  in  different 
regions  ships  of  different  types  whose  union  would  form  a  hetero- 
geneous assemblage,  and  they  are  also  encumbered  with  a  whole 
class  of  ships  whose  small  radius  of  action  is  not  adapted  to  any 
strategic  conception.  These  causes  do  not  permit  giving  to  opera- 
tions the  development  they  might  have.  Nevertheless,  advantage 
can  be  derived  from  concentrations  in  some  well-defined  cases, 
and  particularly  by  providing  for  co-operation  between  our  foreign 
stations. 

The  preceding  considerations  can  only  be  applied  to  nations  that 
have  world-wide  maritime  interests,  which  multiplies  points  of 
contact  with  the  enemy  and  in  time  of  peace  causes  a  certain 
scattering  of  naval  forces.  But,  when  the  conflict  is  localized  in 
a  narrow  theater,  either  by  reason  of  its  very  nature  or  on  account 
of  the  feeble  forces  of  the  belligerents,  there  is  no  occasion  to  go 
far  afield  with  complicated  combinations ;  it  is  then  always  best  to 
concentrate  in  order  to  offer  the  maximum  resistance.  This  solu- 
tion may  not  be  very  good,  but  it  will  certainly  be  the  least  bad. 
It  frequently  happens  so,  in  military  question,  that  one  is  obliged  to 
be  content  with  the  lesser  ill. 

If,  at  the  beginning  of  the  late  war,  the  Russians,  in  pursuit 
of  I  know  not  what  deep  laid  schemes,  had  not  divided  their  forces 

31 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

between  Port  Arthur  and  Vladivostok,  they  would  have  been  in 
a  better  position  to  assume  the  offensive  in  the  month  of  May. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Japanese,  concentrating  their  forces  in 
the  Yellow  Sea  and  ignoring  the  Vladivostok  division,  were  good 
strategists. 


32 


V. 

Interior  Lines. 

The  available  means  are  not  always  sufficient  for  an  attack 
upon  the  main  army  of  the  enemy.  When  the  disproportion  of 
forces  is  too  great,  this  must  be  renounced.  It  then  becomes  neces- 
sary to  seek  to  beat  him  in  detail.  The  method  which  seems  most 
attractive  is  that  which  utilizes  interior  lines.  "  Interior  lines  of 
operation  are  those  that  an  army  constitutes  for  itself  when  facing 
a  hostile  army  having  several  lines  of  operations,  and  to  which 
is  given  a  direction  such  that  the  different  corps  can  be  brought 
together  and  their  movements  co-ordinated  with  a  view  to  com- 
mon action  before  the  enemy  can  oppose  to  them  a  greater 
force."  ^ 

In  the  navy,  operations  by  interior  lines  present  themselves  in 
a  much  more  simple  form  ;  we  operate  by  interior  lines  when  we 
place  the  whole  of  our  forces  between  two  hostile  squadrons  in 
order  to  beat  them  one  at  a  time.  This  is  called  the  method  "  of 
interior  lines  "  because  the  position  chosen  places  the  central  body 
at  a  less  distance  from  each  hostile  fraction  than  that  which  sep- 
t^es  them  one  from  the  other. 

We  have  seen  that  on  two  occasions  the  English  established 
their  entire  fleet  off  the  Texel  to  prevent  the  junction  of  the 
squadrons  of  Holland  and  Zealand  in  1788.  In  the  same  manner 
the  English  squadron  stood  on  and  off  before  Ouissant  to  inter- 
cept Tourville  bringing  the  Mediterranean  contingent  into  the 
Channel.  When  Jervis  wished  to  prevent  Bruix  from  reaching 
Carthagena,  where  the  Spanish  fleet  was,  he  stationed  Keith  at 
Cape  St.  Sebastian.  These  three  examples  show  us  three  different 
applications  of  interior  lines,  and  we  shall  have  occasion  to  cite 
others,  for  they  are  frequently  made  use  of. 

The  employment  of  interior  lines  affords  a  convenient  means 
of  making  up  for  inferiority  of  number ;  yet  the  advantages  that 
can  be  derived  from  it  are  not  always  positive ;  they  depend 
greatly  on  the  ratio  between  the  central  body  and  the  sum  of 

"  Jomini. 

3  33 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

the  two  others.  When  this  ratio  is  near  unity,  one  should  always 
seek  to  utilize  interior  lines.  If  the  operation  succeeds,  a  decisive 
victory  is  won  in  the  first  encounter,  thanks  to  the  disproportion 
of  forces,  and  the  chance  is  good  of  not  being  too  much  used  up 
to  enter  upon  a  second  battle.  If  the  operation  fails,  and  the 
enemy  manages  to  concentrate,  nothing  is  compromised. 

When  the  two  squadrons  against  which  one  is  acting  are  of 
unequal  force,  preference  should  be  given  to  engaging  first  the 
stronger,  because,  if  the  enemy,  after  a  defeat,  seeks  to  avoid 
a  second  encounter,  the  means  at  his  disposition  are  no  longer 
of  importance. 

The  most  favorable  circumstances  for  the  utilization  of  interior 
lines  occur  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  under  the  conditions  that 
we  have  already  considered  apropos  of  concentrations,  that  is 
when  the  forces  of  the  two  opponents  are  sensibly  equal. 

In  the  case  where  the  central  body  is  but  slightly  superior  to 
each  of  the  other  two,  it  finds  itself  in  a  situation  which  it  may 
be  necessary  to  accept,  but  which  should  never  be  sought.  If  the 
hostile  forces  succeed  in  joining  each  other,  it  finds  itself  in  a 
desperate  situation.  But  the  eventuality  of  a  junction  is  one  of 
those  that  must  always  be  reckoned  with,  since  interior  lines  offer 
a  good  chance,  rather  than  the  certainty,  of  interfering  with  i 
all  the  geometrical  combinations  that  can  be  made  to  prevent  it 
go  to  pieces  in  the  presence  of  mobile  forces  free  to  choose  what- 
ever route  pleases  them.  The  uncertainty  that  results  from  this 
often  leads  to  the  blockading  of  one  of  the  forces  in  a  port  and 
opposing  the  entry  of  the  other  force.  This  manner  of  acting 
ofifered  advantages  in  the  days  of  sailing  ships,  because  the  wind 
that  favored  access  to  the  port  at  the  same  time  prevented  the 
exit  of  the  ships  that  were  within  it.  To-day  this  obstacle  has 
disappeared ;  and  the  blockading  squadron  would  scarcely  have 
begun  its  fight  with  the  enemy  coming  from  without  when  it 
would  become  necessary  to  meet  the  one  that  it  was  holding  in 
confinement.  The  best  that  can  happen  will  be  to  encounter  one 
of  the  hostile  divisions  before  the  other  can  come  to  succor  it ; 
which  can  only  happen  through  the  aid  of  a  conjunction  of  lucky 
chances.  The  operation  will  then  have  fully  succeeded ;  but  what 
will  be  its  result?  The  disproportion  of  forces  will  not  be  suffi- 
cient for  the  first  victory  not  to  have  been  dearly  bought,  and 
it  will  be  found  impossible  to  dare  a  second  encounter.    Thereupon 

34 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

the  division  of  the  hostile  forces  which  did  not  fight  will  remain 
mistress  of  the  sea." 

To  sum  up,  it  seems  that,  when  the  body  which  acts  by  interior 
lines  has  not  a  force  equal  to  that  of  the  other  two  combined, 
the  advice  of  von  der  Goltz  can  be  accepted :  he  says  on  this  sub- 
ject: "  It  is  a  mistake  to  speak  in  a  general  way  of  the  advan- 
tages of  interior  lines,  for  the  general  situation  of  the  one  who 
is  upon  the  interior  line  is  almost  always  very  critical.  .  .  .  All 
that  can  be  said  is  that  this  situation  would  be  still  more  critical 
if,  for  any  reason,  freedom  of  movement  to  and  fro  between  the 
different  hostile  groups  was  lost." 

There  are  cases  in  which  one  finds  himself  on  interior  lines 
by  force  of  circumstances,  and  without  having  sought  that  posi- 
tion. The  greatest  fault  that  can  then  be  committed  is  to  divide 
one's  forces  to  oppose  a  detachment  to  each  of  the  enemy's  de- 
tachments ;  yet  this  is  a  frequent  error,  so  natural  is  the  sentiment 
that  urges  us  to  face  in  all  directions  at  once.  In  the  second 
Dutch  war,  the  English  had  detached  Rupert  with  some  twenty 
ships  to  await  along  the  southern  coast  of  England  the  Duke  of 
Beaufort's  squadron,  which  was  to  make  a  junction  with  the 
Dutch.  The  danger  incurred  by  the  English  fleet  owing  to 
Rupert's  departure  was  perceived  too  late ;  and  when  the  latter 
rejoined  Monk,  the  Four-Days'  battle  had  been  going  on  for  two 
days.  In  1805,  Cornwallis  was  ofif  Brest  watching  Ganteaume, 
and  had  just  been  reinforced  by  a  part  of  Nelson's  squadron  and 
by  that  of  Calder,  when  he  learned  that  Villeneuve  was  on  the 
Spanish  coast.  He  then  separated  his  forces  in  two  and  sent 
Calder  to  the  south,  which  Napoleon  characterized  by  saying  it 
was  the  height  of  imbecility .^^ 

We  have  seen  that  the  Japanese  were  very  careful  not  to  commit 
this  error  before  the  attack  of  P'ebruary  8th. 

^This  is  what  would  result  if  our  Mediterranean  squadron  placed  itself 
at  Bizerta  to  prevent  the  junction  of  the  English  Mediterranean  squadron 
that  is  stationed  at  Malta  and  the  Channel  squadron  that  would  come  by 
way  of  Gibraltar.  After  a  first  action,  the  English  would  remain  in  com- 
mand of  the  sea. 

^  There  are  still  other  examples  of  interior  lines,  but  they  do  not  bear 
upon  the  subject  we  are  considering. 


35 


VI. 

The  I'or.iCY  of  Guarantees. 

We  have  already  said  that  it  is  always  necessary  to  endeavor 
to  attack  the  principal  hostile  army,  and  we  have  discussed  the 
different  methods  that  have  been  employed  to  come  upon  the  field 
of  battle  in  superior  force.  But  the  method  last  referred  to,  that 
of  interior  lines,  is  only  good  under  special  circumstances  that  may 
very  well  be  absent ;  and  the  first  one  needs  to  be  favored  by  geo- 
graphical conditions.  In  short,  it  is  not  always  possible  to  bring 
the  main  effort  to  bear  at  the  most  sensible  point." 

Recourse  is  then  had  to  what  an  officer  of  high  rank  has  hap- 
pily called  "  the  policy  of  guarantees  " :  this  consists  of  seizing 
securities,  the  possession  of  which  does  enough  harm  to  the  enemy 
to  induce  him,  in  the  impossibility  of  recovering  them,  to  give 
up  the  struggle.  From  the  day  when  the  Americans  got  a  foot- 
hold in  Cuba,  the  Spaniards,  bereft  of  a  navy,  despaired  of  being 
able  to  drive  them  out  and  began  to  negotiate  for  peace. 

The  policy  of  guarantees  is  particularly  suitable  to  naval  war- 
fare because  the  coveted  points  are  generally  colonies,  to  attack 
which  requires  the  aid  of  the  fleet.  The  impulse  to  practice  it 
is  irresistible  when  engaged  in  a  contest  with  a  colonial  power: 
it  appears  that  the  required  effort  will  thus  be  lessened,  which 
is  not  always  true,  as  we  shall  see  in  connection  with  the  war 
of  American  Independence.  It  was  one  of  the  characteristics  of  our 
numerous  wars  with  England,  and  it  must  be  recognized  that  it 
was  a  forced  condition  of  the  respective  situations  of  the  two  op- 
posing countries :  England,  unable  to  land  troops  in  France  with- 

'*  Thus  it  is  not  easy  to  see  how,  in  the  Spanish-American  War,  the 
Americans  could  have  recruited  and  carried  across  the  Atlantic  a  sufficient 
army  to  penetrate  to  the  heart  of  Spain :  the  effort  would  have  been  out  of 
proportion  to  the  risks  to  be  run  and  the  result  to  be  gained.  On  her 
side,  Spain  no  longer  had  soldiers  available  for  attempting  the  same  opera- 
tion ;  her  army  was  insufficient  and  the  state  of  her  finances  did  not  per- 
mit of  any  more  large  expenditures.  It  would  have  been  useless  therefore 
for  either  of  the  belligerents  to  carry  the  war  to  the  immediate  neighbor- 
hood of  the  enemy's  coasts  with  a  view  to  preparing  the  way  for  an 
army  of  invasion. 

36 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

out  affording  us  upon  land  the  favorable  field  of  battle  which  we 
did  not  find  at  sea,  was  drawn  by  the  lure  of  our  colonies ;  the 
squadrons  that  she  kept  on  the  coasts  of  Europe  had  no  other  pur- 
pose but  to  guarantee  her  against  invasion.  The  instant  that 
danger  disappeared,  in  consequence  of  our  defeats,  she  carried  the 
whole  effort  of  the  war  to  the  colonies ;  and,  in  the  impossibility 
of  doing  anything  else,  we  were  obliged  to  follow  her  example. 

Two  conditions  are  necessary  in  order  that  the  policy  of  guar- 
antees may  lead  to  the  end  proposed. 

The  first  is  that  suitable  dispositions  be  taken  to  prevent  the 
enemy  from  doing  on  his  side  what  we  are  doing  on  ours :  in 
carrying  out  the  line  of  conduct  adopted,  we  must  be  able  to 
attack  the  enemy's  places  without  immobilizing  our  squadrons 
to  defend  our  own.  Naval  forces  can  only  provide  colonies  with 
indirect  protection  by  hastening  in  pursuit  of  the  hostile  ships  in 
order  to  fight  them ;  they  thus  deprive  the  adversary  of  his  means 
of  transport  and  open  the  way  to  the  offensive.  While  the  squad- 
rons seek  the  enemy  afloat,  the  colonies  are  abandoned  provision- 
ally to  their  own  resources;  they  ought,  therefore,  to  have  a 
sufficient  strength  of  resistance  to  be  safe  from  a  sudden  raid."' 
If  the  precaution  has  not  been  taken  to  garrison  them  strongly, 
an  exchange  of  guarantees  is  all  that  results.  That  is  what  hap- 
pened during  the  war  of  American  Independence:  we  took  from 
the  English  Dominica,  St.  Vincent,  Grenada,  Tobago,  St.  Christo- 
phers, Trincomalee  and  Florida,  while  the  English  took  from  us 
St.  Pierre  and  Miquelon,  St.  Lucia,  St.  Eustatius,  St.  Martin  and 
Pondicherry.  Hostilities  might  thus  have  been  indefinitely  pro- 
longed. If  France,  which  (for  the  first  time  perhaps)  had  her 
whole  army  available,  had  increased  her  garrisons  (which  England 
at  this  time  could  not  do  to  the  same  extent),  and  if  above  all  she 
had  begun  by  subordinating  every  other  enterprise  to  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  enemy's  fleet,  the  presence  of  which  always  renders  any 
new  conquest  precarious,  the  result  would  have  been  different.^ 

The  second  condition  imposed  by  the  policy  of  guarantees  is 
a  judicious  choice  of  the  securities  which  it  is  proposed  to  seize. 

"  It  is  important,  moreover,  to  note  that  it  is  the  garrison  of  the  col- 
onies that  is  drawn  upon  to  attack  hostile  colonies,  when  sea  communica- 
tion is  free. 

^'  The  almost  complete  abandonment  of  the  colonies  during  the  peace 
interfered  with  all  the  operations.     From  the  beginning  of  the  war,  con- 

37 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy.' 

An  error  of  appreciation  in  the  value  of  the  guarantee  may 
lead  to  a  result  diametrically  opposed  to  the  one  sought,  and  play 
the  game  of  the  adversary  against  whom  we  exhaust  ourselves 
in  fruitless  struggles. 

It  was  this  error  that  made  the  war  between  France  and  China 
drag  out  so :  faithful  to  her  naval  traditions,  France,  not  wishing 
to  involve  herself  deeply,  sought  to  secure  possession  of  a  guar- 
antee which  she  had  no  intention  of  retaining,  but  by  means  of 
which  she  expected  to  bring  pressure  to  bear  upon  the  Celestial 
Empire.  She  resolved,  therefore,  to  occupy  Keelung  and  Tamsui. 
Let  us  observe  at  the  very  beginning  that  these  two  places  form 
but  an  insignificant  part  of  Formosa,  and  that  the  size  of  that 
island  furnished  the  enemy  with  means  of  resistance  out  of  all 
proportion  with  the  small  number  of  troops  that  it  was  desired 
to  devote  to  the  expedition.  When  it  is  only  meant  to  make  an 
eiifort  limited  in  advance,  a  country  whose  local  resources  are 
a  constant  support  to  the  enemy  must  not  be  attacked.  That  was 
a  first  error. 

The  second  consisted  in  the  geographic  position  of  the  guaran- 
tee, which  was  much  too  far  removed  from  the  center  of  affairs 
to  have  an  influence  upon  the  issue  of  the  war.  Admiral  Courbet, 
as  is  well  known,  went  to  Formosa  unwillingly ;  in  his  despatches 
he  maintained  that  it  was  needful  to  strike  closer  to  the  head, 
and  he  proposed  the  blockade  of  rice  and  the  taking  of  Port 
Arthur.  A  partial  adoption  of  his  views  sufficed  to  bring  the 
Chinese  to  submit;  but  the  efiforts  fruitlessly  expended  at  For- 
mosa did  not  permit  our  being  exacting,  and  the  self-esteem  of 
the  Son  of  Heaven  had  scarcely  at  all  to  suffer  from  the  condi- 
tions of  the  peace. 

To  sum  up,  the  policy  of  guarantees  requires  great  certainty 
of  judgment  and  means  properly  related  to  the  end.  As  it  is 
usuallv  adopted  to  avoid  too  great  sacrifices,  this  latter  considera- 

voys  had  to  be  formed,  which,  Hke  all  passive  forces,  can  escape  the  enemy 
only  on  condition  of  not  meeting  him,  because,  the  force  of  escort  being 
usually  known,  it  is  easy  to  oppose  to  it  superior  forces ;  the  ships  allotted 
to  the  conduct  of  convoys  diminished  by  just  so  much  our  squadrons.  See, 
in  this  connection,  the  battle  of  Cape  Finisterre  (May  3,  I747),  and  that 
of  M.  de  I'Etenduere  (October  14,  1747)- 

38 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

tion  is  of  importance,  because  the  tendency  is  to  provide  too 
slenderly."'  In  itself  it  does  not  constitute  a  moral  expedient ; 
often  it  even  amounts  to  causing  more  fright  than  harm.  It  is 
necessary,  therefore,  to  estimate  correctly  the  moral  force  of 
the  adversary. 

This  system  will  be  employed  only  in  case  nothing  else  can 
be  done,  and  then  without  too  great  faith  in  its  absolute  efificacy. 
It  must  not  be  lost  sight  of,  however,  that,  if  the  adversary 
possesses  naval  forces,  the  policy  of  guarantees  presents,  in  a 
narrow  field,  the  same  characteristics  as  naval  operations  which 
threaten  directly  the  vital  interests  of  the  belligerents.  It  has  an 
absolute  advantage  only  in  case  the  position  of  the  guarantee 
permits  collecting  there  forces  superior  to  those  of  the  enemy, 
which  can  happen  when  the  desired  possessions  are  at  once  far 
separated  from  the  center  of  the  enemy's  power  and  near  the 
great  bases  of  operations  at  one's  own  disposal.^' 

On  the  other  hand  it  can  be  made  use  of  advantageously  as 
a  means  of  compelling  the  enemy  to  fight  in  a  determined  zone 
where  he  is  inferior  in  forces ;  when  the  mission  of  ships  is  to 
protect  a  region,  threatening  a  single  point  is  sufficient  to  make 
them  hasten  there.  Most  battles  have  no  other  cause,  and  it  is 
for  this  reason  that  almost  all  have  taken  place  near  the  coast  line. 

"^  It  was  the  anxiety  to  limit  expense  which  gave  rise  to  the  method  of 
taking  half  measures,  the  fatal  consequences  of  which  are  borne  in  mind 
by  all  who  took  part  in  the  Tonkin  and  Dahomey  campaigns,  and  the  first 
Madagascar  expedition.  Much  more  was  expended,  a  little  at  a  time, 
than  would  have  been  necessary  to  end  those  wars  at  a  single  blow. 

^  This  was  the  case  for  the  Americans  in  their  last  war :  Cuba  was 
near  their  coasts  and  too  far  from  Spain  for  her  to  be  able  to  bring  all 
her  forces  into  the  theater  of  operations.  When  the  war  was  declared, 
comparisons  between  the  effective  forces  of  the  two  countries  were  made 
by  all  writers;  not  one  took  account  of  the  geographic  situation. 


39 


VII. 

Alliances. 

Maritime  alliances  usually  have  not  had  the  fortunate  results 
expected  from  them.  The  everlasting  recriminations  that  the 
allies  are  not  sparing  of  between  themselves  stand  out  most 
cons])icuously  from  them. 

In  1666,  the  Dutch  complain  of  being  deserted  by  the  French  ; 
and,  considering  the  slowness  with  which  the  Duke  of  Beau- 
fort moved,  the  reproach  appears  well  founded.  Some  years  later, 
the  French  find  themselves  allied  with  the  English  in  two  con- 
secutive campaigns,  and  the  latter  make  such  accusations  against 
the  Count  d'Estrees  that  Louis  XIV  orders  an  investigation.  In 
1676  the  Dutch  do  not  appear  to  have  been  satisfied  with  the 
help  of  the  Spaniards  when  they  were  united  against  Duquesne. 

At  Beachy  Head,  France  was  avenged  for  the  attacks  which 
the  English  had  made  upon  her:  the  Dutch  loudly  accused  Tor- 
rington  of  having  let  them  be  crushed  by  Tourville's  van.'"' 

All  these  reproaches  were  ill  founded:  it  frequently  happens 
in  a  battle  that  one  part  of  the  line  has  to  endure  more  than 
another  part,  but  that  does  not  show  that  there  is  any  defection ; 
the  enemy  alone  is  guilty ;  when  allies  distrust  one  another,  they 
cry  treason  the  moment  that  fortune  abandons  them. 

During  the  whole  reign  of  Louis  XIV,  the  Dutch  continued  to 
make  common  cause  with  the  English  ;  but  it  seems  that  at  this 
time  there  was  complete  harmony. 

Then  came  the  French-Spanish  alliances.  At  the  battle  of 
Toulon,  de  Court  extricates  the  Spaniards  by  a  skilful  manoeuver, 
and,  for  his  thanks,  Admiral  Navarro,  who  behaved  in  a  shameful 
manner,  complains  bitterly  of  him.'" 

During  the  American  war,  the  two  allied  governments  have 
great  difficulty  in  agreeing.  Each  draws  the  cover  to  its  own 
side  and  wishes  the  alliance  to  serve  only  its  own  interests.    Then 

^  It  was  apropos  of  this  that  it  was  written :    "  In  this  battle,  victory  was 
for  the  French,  glory  for  the  Dutch  and  shame  for  the  English." 
^He  was  made  Due  de  la  Victoire,  while  de  Court  fell  into  disgrace. 

40 


A  Study  of  Naval  Stkategy, 

a  middle  course  is  adopted,  and  war  is  waged,  sometimes  in  tiie 
north  for  the  account  of  France,  sometimes  in  the  south  to  the 
profit  of  Spain.  The  result  is  what  might  be  expected :  nothing. 
The  combined  fleets  are  no  more  than  disorderly  mobs.  I  refrain 
from  mentioning  the  conflicts  for  precedence, 

Holland  is  also  our  ally  in  this  war:  she  keeps  ofif  by  herself. 

Under  the  Empire,  there  could  be  no  question  of  Spain's  dis- 
cussing with  Napoleon  on  a  footing  of  equality.  Her  navy  had 
to  content  itself  with  being  purely  and  simply  in  tow  of  ours ; 
but  it  was  only  a  burden  upon  us.  Villeneuve  does  not  get  over 
having  Spanish  ships  in  his  squadron. 

In  short,  naval  alliances  would  have  displayed  their  impotence 
more  than  anything  else  if  the  battle  of  Navarino  had  not  come 
to  demonstrate  that  emulation  sometimes  prevails  over  prejudices. 

In  the  beginning,  the  only  object  of  alliances  was  to  carry 
on  war  cheaply ;  each  party  stipulated  the  number  of  ships  he 
would  furnish,  and  the  responsibility  of  doing  more  was  left 
to  the  other,  if  he  judged  it  opportune.  Great  care  was  taken  to 
do  nothing  in  the  way  of  drawing  the  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire. 

The  treaty  likewise  mentioned  the  claims  of  each  party,  and 
it  was  promised  not  to  make  peace  except  in  common,  after 
having  won  success.  Naturally,  as  soon  as  fortune  became  un- 
favorable, all  promises  were  forgotten,  and  each  treated  as  best 
he  could. 

This  way  of  regulating  the  efifort  of  each  ally  was  evidently 
a  permanent  cause  of  misfortune,  since  there  was  no  plan  of 
putting  new  life  into  the  war,  while  the  designation  of  the  ob- 
jects to  be  sought  gave  a  wholly  wrong  direction  to  the  operations  : 
it  was  never  possible  to  make  Spain  comprehend  that  the  keys 
to  the  citadel  of  Gibraltar  were  to  be  found  in  London. 

As  the  character  of  warfare  has  changed,  so,  too,  has  the 
character  of  alliances :  henceforth  each  will  pledge  all  his  forces 
without  restrictions  and  without  bargaining.  But  the  elaboration 
of  the  plan  of  campaign  may  give  rise  to  serious  difficulties. 

There  are  almost  always,  in  a  war,  a  certain  number  of  dis- 
agreeable operations  which  yield  more  trouble  than  honor.  Such 
as  these  nobody  cares  for.  Moreover,  each  nation  sees  things 
from  its  own  particular  point  of  view,  in  a  special  perspective ; 
and  agreement  is  hard  to  establish. 

This  first  difficulty  overcome,  the  question  of  the  supreme  com- 

4  41 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy, 

mand  forms  a  new  source  of  friction.  If  it  is  possible,  without 
compromising  the  issue  of  the  war,  to  make  each  ally  act  on  a 
separate  battle  field,  this  solution  will  always  be  preferable. 

Failing  this,  it  will  be  necessary  to  form  special  units  of  the 
forces  of  each  nationality,  and  to  leave  them  under  the  command 
of  their  own  chiefs.  The  error  will  thus  be  avoided  which  we  fell 
into  when   we   intermingled   the    Spanish   ships   and   our   own.'' 

It  will  remain  true  none  the  less  that  an  allied  fleet  will  always 
be  less  redoubtable  than  a  fleet  of  the  same  force  composed  of 
elements  of  a  single  nationality.  The  Commander-in-Chief  will 
not  be  able  to  handle  the  different  units  in  his  own  way ;  each 
navy  has  a  manner  of  manoeuvering  peculiar  to  itself ;  it  has  its 
own  ideas  and  traditions.  The  question  of  signals  will  be  equally 
difficult  to  settle.  Thus  there  are  several  causes  of  inferiority 
for  which  superior  number  is  the  only  compensation.  If  the 
enemy  is  not  of  almost  equal  force,  this  will  be  much ;  otherwise 
it  will  be  insufficient. 

Since  we  may  hope  in  the  future  not  to  find  ourselves  alone 
facing  the  naval  enemy,  let  us  wish  that  everything  may  be  done 
a  long  time  in  advance  to  remove  all  the  obstacles  that  have  so 
often  impeded  the  progress  of  allied  navies,  and  that,  when  the 
time  of  struggle  comes,  there  may  survive  no  other  sentiment  than 
that  of  emulation,  which,  on  the  field  of  battle,  accomplishes  great 
things. 

'^  It  is  true  that  this  was  done  with  the  object  of  preventing  their  playing 
the  part  of  Cleopatra's  galleys  at  the  battle  of  Actium. 


SECOND   PART 


THE  ELEMENTS  OF  NAVAL  STRATEGY 


1. 

Offensive  and  Defensive. 

After  having  passed  in  review  the  methods  that  strategy  has  at 
its  disposal,  we  have  to  consider  what  the  elements  are  that 
strengthen  or  weaken  its  action.  These  elements  are  of  a  very 
variable  nature,  and  first  among  them  are  found  the  offensive 
and  the  defensive. 

The  offensive,  it  is  said,  is  the  weapon  of  the  strong;  the  de- 
fensive, that  of  the  weak.  This  is  true  on  land :  armies,  in  propor- 
tion as  they  separate  themselves  from  their  bases  to  penetrate  into 
the  hostile  country,  distribute  along  the  route  a  part  of  their  forces 
to  keep  guard  over  the  safety  of  their  communications.  It  is 
natural,  consequently,  that  the  weaker  side  should  prefer  to  remain 
in  its  own  territory  in  order  to  have  the  whole  of  its  forces  avail- 
able. Its  numerical  inferiority  is  further  compensated  by  the 
defensive  works  that  it  will  have  been  wise  enough  to  accumulate 
in  the  path  of  invasion.  With  the  aid  of  these  obstacles,  it  will 
arrest  the  enemy's  progress  long  enough  to  ascertain  the  situation 
and  to  mass  its  troops  at  the  desired  point  with  the  help  of  its 
interior  network  of  railroads. 

This  system  of  operations  is  justifiable  if  it  leads  to  battle. 
If  the  contest  turns  to  the  advantage  of  the  weaker,  he  destroys 
the  cohesion  of  his  adversary ;  demoralizes  him,  takes  from  him 
prisoners,  who  are  pledges.  He  can  thus  restore  the  balance 
of  numbers  and  in  his  turn  assume  the  offensive. 

The  naval  defensive  is  quite  a  different  affair.  A  fleet  can 
scarcely,  at  the  present  time,  make  up  for  its  numerical  inferiority 
by  supporting  itself  with  fixed  defenses.  It  only  secures  the  assist' 
ance  of  coast  batteries  in  the  interior  of  roadsteads  or  in  the  chan- 
nels that  give  access  to  them ;  but  roadsteads  and  channels  are  not 
fields  of  battle  that  can  be  highly  regarded  in  a  naval  war.  More- 
over, defense  in  this  sense  falls  within  the  scope  of  tactics,  and  it 
is  not  apparent  how  strategy  can  force  the  enemy  to  accept  combat 
under  such  conditions.'' 

^^  Fixed   defences   have  often    furnished   material   assistance   to   fleets   of 
sailing  ships.     When  these  ships  found  themselves  compelled  to  fight  near 

•^5 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

On  the  sea  the  defensive  is  rather  a  question  of  words  than  one 
of  fact.  This  is  the  consequence  of  the  rather  peculiar  character 
of  naval  forces. 

The  army  to  which  we  were  alluding  has  to  assure  the  safety  of 
its  territory  and  to  impose  upon  the  enemy  the  law  of  the  stronger ; 
it  has  attained  its  double  object  when  it  has  invaded  the  territory 
of  its  adversary,  taking  from  him  thus  every  means  of  continuing 
the  contest. 

The  navy,  for  its  part,  cannot  take  possession  of  the  land ;  it  has 
been  created  to  guard  maritime  interests,  whether  those  that  pass 
to  and  fro  over  the  seas  or  those  that  have  gathered  in  ports. 
When  a  war  breaks  out,  the  role  of  the  navy  becomes  very  com- 
plex. It  always  retains  the  mission  of  protecting  wealth  that  is 
afloat,  a  mission  so  much  the  more  imperative  as  this  wealth  forms 
a  greater  part  of  the  national  capital ;  but  besides  this,  it  must  keep 
guard  over  the  seas  to  prevent  every  attempt  at  invasion  of  the 
home  country  or  her  colonies.  This  latter  is  the  defensive  part  of 
its  task.  But  not  all  of  it :  the  struggle  having  been  entered  upon, 
it  is  necessary  to  strive  to  get  the  upper  hand,  and  this  leads  to 
attacking  in  the  adversary's  country  the  interests  that  one  protects 
in  his  own.  This  is  the  offensive  side.  The  navy  thus  has  very 
diverse  problems  to  solve ;  it  is  pulled  about  by  multiple  necessities. 
Not  being  able  to  make  headway  everywhere  at  once,  it  is  obliged  to 
choose  between  the  protection  of  its  own  interests  and  the  attack 
upon  those  of  its  adversary,  and,  according  as  it  has  more  to  lose 
or  to  gain,  it  adopts  the  defensive  or  the  offensive.  Considering 
things  from  this  very  broad  point  of  view,  it  may  be  concluded  that 
it  is  the  weaker  power  which  attacks  and  the  stronger  which  de- 
fends itself,  since  naval  power  is  proportional  to  the  magnitude  of 
maritime  interests.  This  is  just  what  happened  in  our  struggles 
with  England :  she  only  assumed  the  offensive  against  our  colonies, 

a  coast,  they  anchored  near  the  shore  or  ran  themselves  aground,  and  dis- 
embarked a  part  of  their  artillery  to  defend  the  two  ends  of  the  line.  A 
squadron  thus  supported  was  considered  to  hold  a  very  strong  position,  and 
the  enemy  rarely  risked  attacking  it  (see  the  maneuver  of  Harrington  and 
of  Parker  at  St.  Lucia,  and  that  of  Linois  at  Algeciras).  Suffren  did  not 
share  this  opinion.  Considering  the  short  range  of  artillery  at  that  time, 
it  is  probable  that  the  effect  of  such  improvised  batteries  was  of  a  purely 
moral  order.  At  Aboukir,  as  is  well  known,  Brueys  supported  the  head  of 
his  line  with  a  battery  of  two  mortars  and  four  12-pounder  guns,  whose 
shot  did  not  reach  the  English  ships  that  doubled  the  line. 

46 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

which    were    all    she    coveted,    after    she    had    defended    herself 
victoriously.^ 

But  when  we  inquire  how  this  theoretical  defensive  has  been 
put  into  effect,  we  learn  that  it  has  led  directly  to  the  offensive 
against  the  hostile  squadrons,  the  sole  means  of  taking  away  from 
the  adversary  the  possibility  of  doing  harm.  This  sort  of  defen- 
sive is,  therefore,  of  political  rather  than  military  order. 

Of  what  then  does  consist  the  defensive  properly  so  called,  that 
which  furnishes  to  those  who  practise  it  a  compensation  for  their 
numerical  inferiority  ? 

Does  it  consist  of  shutting  oneself  up  in  harbors,  according  to  a 
system  that  has  had  numerous  partisans  in  recent  years  ? 

Such  a  method  of  procedure  has  no  connection  with  any  defen- 
sive system — it  leads  simply  to  inaction.  It  is  only  justifiable  if 
it  procures  advantages  for  those  who  make  use  of  it.  But  what 
are  those  advantages  ? 

The  force  that  immobilizes  itself  inside  of  a  harbor  is  inevitably 
blockaded ;  if  the  relative  situations  of  blockader  and  blockaded  are 
examined,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  former  has  all  the  advantage. 
He  secures  freedom  of  the  seas  behind  him :  according  to  the 
English  saying,  he  carries  the  frontier  of  his  country  to  the  shores 
of  the  enemy,  and,  within  this  frontier,  security  is  absolute. 
Therefore,  the  blockader  reaps  a  positive  reward. 

The  blockaded  does  no  harm  to  the  enemy,  and  he  does  not  pre- 
vent the  latter  from  doing  harm ;  he  assures  his  own  existence 
without  safeguarding  the  interests  which  he  is  charged  to  defend. 
It  is  true  that  he  immobilizes  forces  equal  or  superior  to  his  own, 
but  what  is  the  good  of  that  when  he  derives  no  benefit  from  it? 
Therefore,  he  secures  from  his  inaction  only  a  negative  result. 
Moreover,  many  will  think  that  it  is  better  not  to  build  the  costly 
and  complicated  machines  called  warships,  if  they  are  not  to  be 
utilized. 

^  This  characteristic  of  our  naval  wars  is  very  marked :  in  the  war  of  the 
League  of  Augsburg,  the  attacks  upon  our  colonies  only  become  serious 
after  the  battle  of  La  Hogue;  under  Louis  XV,  the  taking  of  Canada  and 
of  our  East  Indian  possessions  follow  the  disaster  of  Quiberon ;  under 
the  Revolution  and  Empire,  the  loss  of  our  last  colonies  is  subsequent  to 
Trafalgar. 

We  do  not  speak  of  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  because  that  was 
one  of  those  in  which  politics  constantly  directed  operations,  and  in  which 
the  movements  of  fleets  were  subordinated  to  those  of  armies. 

47 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Doubtless  there  are  circumstances  under  which  a  naval  force  is 
obliged  to  shut  itself  up  in  port  to  escape  from  certain  destruction ; 
but  then  it  obeys  an  imperious  necessity.  In  such  a  case  we  can- 
not consider  that  it  has  gained  the  advantages  that  it  should  prop- 
erly derive  from  a  true  defensive  system.  Those  who  advocate 
withdrawal  within  harbors  forget  thrt  it  was  forced  upon  us 
despite  ourselves  from  1793  to  1814  and  that  it  never  led  to  any- 
thing advantageous  except  for  the  enemy ;  England  was  anxious 
only  when  one  of  our  squadrons  became  active  again  bv  getting 
out." 

Does  the  defensive  consist  in  the  act  of  devoting  oneself  ex- 
clusively to  protecting  the  coast?  Without  at  present  discussing 
the  amount  of  money  and  the  naval  forces  that  would  be  necessary 
to  assure  directly  the  defense  of  the  coast,  it  may  be  perceived  that 
colonial  nations  would  get  only  losses  from  a  policy  which  made 
that  the  sole  objective  of  naval  warfare.  Its  immediate  conse- 
quence would  be  the  abandonment  of  the  high  seas  to  the  enemy's 
enterprises  and  the  stoppage  of  all  maritime  commerce.  Moreover, 
admitting  the  colonies  to  be  strongly  enough  garrisoned  to  resist 
attack  (which  would  require  a  deployment  of  forces  comporting 
ill  with  a  defensive  system),  communications  with  the  mother 
country  would  be  interrupted  and  far  distant  possessions  left  to 
their  own  resources.  A  situation  of  this  sort  could  not  last  long 
without  bringing  about  disturbances  in  the  economic  life  of  the 
mother  country.  But  what  would  put  an  end  to  it?  The  enemy 
would  suffer  no  damage  either  in  his  constituted  forces  or  in  his 
interests;  the  war  would  not  be  a  serious  burden  for  him,  and  he 
would  have  every  advantage  in  prolonging  it.  Moreover,  one  can- 
not enter  upon  a  contest  wthout  possessing  any  means  of  putting 
an  end  to  it  by  the  injury  done  to  one's  adversary.  Protection  of 
the  coast  does  not  furnish  this  means. 

Finally  a  third  defensive  system  can  be  envisaged  consisting  of 
awaiting  the  enemy  at  home  in  order  to  utilize  all  one's  resources 
of  whatever  nature.  If  the  two  belligerents  are  separated  from  one 
another  by  a  wade  extent  of  sea,  this  kind  of  defensive  is  advan- 
tageous for  the  weaker  side.    It  can  bring  to  bear  the  totality  of  its 

"What  advantage  did  the  Russians  gain  by  shutting  themselves  up  in 
Port  Arthur?  That  of  delaying  the  moment  when  they  were  obliged  to 
destroy  their  own  ships ;  but  the  Japanese  availed  themselves  of  it  to  land 
in  Manchuria. 

48 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

means  of  action,  while  its  adversary  in  going  to  attack  it  must 
deprive  himself  of  all  his  ships  of  small  radius  of  action. 

Unfortunately,  these  favorable  circumstances  never  occur  in 
practice.  It  may  happen  that  two  nations  separated  by  wide 
stretches  of  sea  make  war  upon  one  another,  but  between  them  are 
found  disputed  interests  whose  possession  usually  is  the  object  of 
the  strife.  Thenceforth,  one  is  no  longer  free  to  adopt  a  defensive 
attitude ;  it  is  necessary  to  carry  the  war  wherever  the  enemy 
carries  it ;  for  to  defend  oneself  is  not  to  let  oneself  be  beaten  with- 
out doing  anything. 

The  Spanish-American  war  affords  us  an  example  of  this  kind. 
If  Spain  had  not  possessed  Cuba  and  Porto  Rico  in  the  neighbor- 
hood of  the  American  coast,  there  would  not  have  been  any  con- 
flict.^ When  it  broke  forth,  the  Spaniards  would  have  had  all  the 
more  advantage  in  awaiting  the  enemy  at  home,  because  the 
American  Navy  was  burdened  with  coast-defense  ships  that  could 
not  cross  the  Atlantic ;  but  they  were  not  free  to  choose  their 
theater  of  operations,  nor  to  adopt  the  kind  of  warfare  that  suited 
them.  The  force  of  events  led  them  to  the  other  side  of  the 
Atlantic.  Thus  it  was  the  weaker  side  that  had  to  deprive  itself 
of  a  part  of  its  forces."*" 

When  the  two  adversaries  have  common  sea  frontiers,  the  weaker 
no  longer  has  an  interest  in  waiting  near  his  own  coast  for  the 
enemy,  since  he  no  longer  can  prevent  almost  the  whole  of  the 
hostile  forces  from  coming  to  fight  him  there.  AVe  shall  even  see, 
by  studying  operations  in  detail,  that  taking  station  along  the 
coast,  far  from  compensating  for  a  numerical  inferiority,  only 
aggravates  it. 

In  short,  the  naval  defensive,  under  whatever  form  it  presents 
itself,  offers  only  disadvantages ;  one  may  be  obliged  to  submit  to 
it,  but  should  never  seek  it.  On  the  one  hand  as  on  the  other,  we 
are  led  to  assume  the  offensive,  that  is,  to  seek  the  enemy  to  fight 
him.  But  the  two  sides  do  not  carry  out  this  purpose  in  the  same 
way. 

The  stronger  will  always  rush  to  meet  the  dififerent  squadrons 
of  the  adversary  to  destroy  them  as  soon  as  possible,  before  they 

"  Just  as  our  difficulties  with  China  began  after  the  taking  of  Cochin 
China  and  were  kept  up  by  the  occupation  of  Tonkin. 

**  Which  proves  that  one  ought  not  to  have  several  kinds  of  fighting 
ships,  since  it  is  not  known  what  sort  of  war  one  will  be  obliged  to  enter 
upon. 

49 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

have  had  time  to  do  harm.  The  weaker  will  seek  first  to  make  the 
adversary  lose  touch  with  him  in  order  to  rearrange  his  forces  and 
create  an  unexpected  situation ;  then  he  will  seek  to  draw  his  ad- 
versary onto  a  favorable  field  of  battle  where  his  weaker  units  can 
be  brought  into  action.  So  long  as  this  contest  lasts,  and  so  long 
as  a  decisive  battle  has  not  inclined  the  balance  one  way  or  the 
the  other,  both  sides  will  abandon  the  aspirations  that  brought  on 
the  struggle ;  for  it  is  upon  the  field  of  battle  that  their  fate  will  be 
decided. 

Who  will  be  the  victor?  The  most  active,  the  most  skilful,  the 
most  tenacious,  the  one  who  has  the  material  best  suited  to  the 
needs  of  the  war. 

The  ofifensive  will  secure  decisive  results  particularly  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  If,  by  impetuosity  of  attack,  the  projects 
of  the  adversary  are  anticipated,  a  fixed  direction  is  given  to  the 
operations ;  a  menace  is  created  which  upsets  all  the  enemy's  pre- 
visions, which  paralyzes  him  so  long  as  he  does  not  succeed  in 
disentangling  himself  by  a  victory.  But  the  single  fact  of  having 
placed  him  in  an  unexpected  situation  puts  him  in  a  state  of  in- 
feriority and  prevents  him  from  recovering  when,  on  the  contrary, 
his  adversary  has  himself  been  able  to  use  his  forces  to  the  best 
advantage. 

The  characteristic  of  the  offensive  is  to  impose  the  attack,  in- 
stead of  submitting  to  it :  it  has  manifested  itself  in  history  by  the 
fact  that  almost  all  victories  have  been  won  on  the  enemy's  coast. 


50 


II. 

Geography. 

Geographical  conditions  have  weighed  upon  opciations  in  all 
wars,  and,  unhappily,  they  have  not  been  favorable  to  France. 

It  is  often  said  that  our  country,  placed  astride  of  two  seas, 
occupies  a  privileged  position.  This  assertion  is  correct  as  far  as 
our  economic  development  is  concerned :  France  has  owed  to  her 
coast  of  Provence  the  predominance  she  has  long  exercised  in  the 
Mediterranean  as  well  as  her  African  domain,  while  her  ocean 
shores  furnish  her  with  outlets  for  trade  with  the  two  Americas. 
This  cause  of  prosperity  becomes  a  source  of  weakness  during 
war:  it  determines  the  splitting  up  of  our  naval  forces  into  two 
great  bodies,  far  removed  one  from  the  other,  and  which  are 
unable  to  unite  without  passing  under  the  Caudine  Forks  of 
Gibraltar." 

So  long  as  England  had  no  permanent  fleet  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean, France  was  obliged  to  go  to  fight  her  in  the  Atlantic  and 
the  Channel.  Every  war,  therefore,  began  by  the  despatch  of  the 
forces  of  Toulon  to  the  north,  and  geographic  conditions  con- 
stantly interfered  with  this  movement ;  the  distance  caused  delays 
or  gave  the  enemy  an  easy  means  of  opposing  the  junction. 

When  the  Toulon  detachment  was  slow  to  arrive,  operations 
had  to  be  begun  without  it,  if  circumstances  demanded.  Thus  it 
was  that  the  Dutch  had  to  fight  the  Four  Days'  Battle  before  the 
arrival  of  the  Duke  of  Beaufort,  and  that  Tourville  began  the 
battle  of  La  Hogue  before  he  had  been  reinforced  by  d'Estrees. 

To  oppose  the  junction  of  our  forces,  the  English  proceeded  in 
two  different  ways :  either,  profiting  by  the  temporary  weak- 
ness of  our  Brest  squadron,  they  took  station  off  Ouessant  to  await 
the  detachment  from  Toulon ;  or  they  sent  superior  forces  to 
Gibraltar  to  intercept  it  on  the  way.''* 

"The  nation  which,  from  the  geographic  point  of  view,  enjoyed  the  same 
advantages  as  France,  without  suffering  from  the  inconveniences,  was 
Spain.    This  was  the  origin  of  her  greatness. 

^This  second  solution  is  open  to  criticism:  England  would  have  found 

SI 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Tourville  succeeded  once  in  taking  eighteen  ships  into  Brest  in 
sight  of  the  EngHsh  fleet,  and  Chateau-Renault,  the  following  year, 
escaped  Killigrew,  Avho  pursued  him  after  his  exit  from  the 
strait." 

The  danger  that  these  two  admirals  incurred  shows  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  enterprise,  and  proves  that  the  operation  is  of  those 
that  logically  ought  not  to  be  attempted.  In  fact,  Tourville  and 
Chateau-Renault  were  the  only  ones  who  succeeded  and  all  the 
other  attempts  failed ;  among  them  that  of  M.  de  la  Clue,  which 
brought  on  the  disaster  of  Lagos  and  had  its  after-effect  at 
Quiberon. 

It  must  be  recognized  that  the  method  employed,  under  Louis 
XIV  and  Louis  XV,  was  not  of  a  nature  to  lessen  the  disadvan- 
tages of  an  unfavorable  geographical  situation.  The  vessels  that 
were  sent  from  Toulon  to  the  north  approached  the  center  of 
English  power  and  ran  into  danger.  It  would  have  been  more 
reasonable  to  perform  the  opposite  maneuver,  and  to  bring  about 
the  junction  as  far  as  possible  from  the  principal  hostile  fleet. 
This  would  have  required  the  Brest  squadron  (the  stronger)  to 
start  for  the  south  at  the  period  when  that  of  Toulon  was  accus- 
tomed to  set  forth  (that  is,  a  little  before  the  beginning  of  the  com- 
paign,  in  March  or  April).  It  would  have  passed  the  straits, 
joined  the  Toulon  ships,  and  at  once  gone  north  again.  The  worst 
that  could  have  happened  would  have  been  the  English  fleet's  fol- 
lowing it ;  but  it  is  better  to  flee  from  danger  than  to  go  to  meet  it. 

During  the  war  that  Louis  XIV  and  Charles  II  sustained 
against  Holland,  in  1672,  the  junction  of  the  French  and  English 
squadrons  was  accomplished  in  accordance  with  these  principles. 
The  bulk  of  the  English  forces  was  at  Chatham  with  the  Duke  of 
York ;  d'Estrees'  thirty  ships  armed  at  Brest.  The  point  of  con- 
centration was  fixed  at  Saint  Helens.  Ruyter,  who  commanded 
the  Dutch,  planned  to  separate  the  allies  by  stationing  himself  in 
the  Strait  of  Dover.    As  soon  as  the  Duke  of  York  learned  that  the 


more  advantage  in  leaving  at  Gibraltar  only  frigates  to  watch  the  passage, 
and  in  concentrating  all  her  forces  in  the  north ;  she  w^ould  thus  have  been 
more  favorably  situated  whatever  happened. 

*'  During  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  the  English  even  placed  all 
of  their  forces  at  Cape  St.  Vincent  to  oppose  the  contrary  operation,  the 
passage  of  the  Count  of  Toulouse  from  the  north  to  the  south. 


52 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Dutch  squadron  was  directing  its  course  from  the  Texel  towards 
the  strait,  he  hastened  to  leave  the  Thames,  leaving  behind  the  ves- 
sels that  had  not  completed  arming,  and  succeeded  thus  in  getting 
ahead  of  Ruyter.  The  junction  was  then  accomplished  without 
hindrance  at  the  designated  place ;  then  the  allied  fleet,  returning 
to  the  east,  took  on  the  way  the  ships  that  had  remained  in  the 
Thames.  The  situation  would  have  been  entirely  different  if  the 
Duke  of  York  had  remained  where  he  was,  waiting  for  the  French 
contingent.*" 

During  the  war  of  American  Independence,  each  time  that  the 
combined  fleet  cruised  in  the  Channel,  the  junction  was  previously 
accomplished  in  Spain,  sometimes  at  Ferrol,  sometimes  at  Cadiz, 
that  is  to  say,  far  from  the  enemy's  coasts.  It  is  probable  that  the 
French  government,  in  adopting  this  line  of  conduct,  obeyed  con- 
siderations of  a  political  rather  than  a  strategical  order.  Whatever 
the  causes  were,  the  result  was  none  the  less  favorable  to  the 
concentration. 

The  Mediterranean,  through  the  construction  of  the  Suez  Canal, 
came  to  cut  the  route  of  commerce  between  England,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  India  and  the  Far  East  on  the  other.  Geography  would 
then  have  turned  to  our  side  if,  by  his  foresight,  our  rival  had  not 
known  how  to  reserve  to  himself  the  possession  of  Malta  and 
Gibraltar. 

The  Mediterranean,  in  fact,  was  never  a  favorable  field  of  battle 
to  the  English  fleets  until  the  day  when  they  could  make  use  of  the 
.ports  of  Italy,  Sardinia  and  Sicily.  Until  then,  they  were  too  far 
separated  from  their  base  to  maintain  themselves  there  perma- 
nently ;  and  though  England  could  keep  Gibraltar,  which  is  self- 
defensive,  she  twice  lost  Minorca. 

In  the  Anglo-Dutch  wars,  geography  was  still  favorable  to  Eng- 
land. All  the  shores  of  Holland  were  watched  by  a  part  of  those 
of  England,  and  not  a  Dutch  merchant  ship  could  reach  port  with- 
out traversing  the  theater  of  operations.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
greater  part  of  the  English  coast  was  completely  outside  of  the 
zone  of  action  of  the  fleets,  and  ships  could  take  refuge  there  while 
awaiting  a  favorable  opportunity  to  enter  the  Thames.  The  result 
was  that  Holland  had  to  interdict  all  transit  while  hostilities  lasted, 

^This  maneuver  is  not  mentioned  in  naval  histories;  it  appears  in  the 
report  of  the  Count  d'Estrees. 

53 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

and  little  by  little  she  ruined  herself  without  having  had  a  marked 
inferiority  at  sea. 

It  seems  useless  to  point  out  the  preponderant  part  that  geog- 
raphy played  in  the  Spanish-American  conflict.  It  is  sufficient  to 
look  at  a  map  to  become  aware  of  it. 

In  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  geography  was  doubly  against  the 
Russians :  ist,  their  forces  were  at  the  two  extremities  of  the  earth 
when  the  war  broke  out ;  2d.  in  the  theater  of  operations,  Japan 
occupied,  in  relation  to  Russia's  two  bases  (Port  Arthur  and 
Vladivostok),  a  central  position  that  was  favorable  to  her.  This 
situation  enabled  the  Japanese  always  to  have  numerical  superior- 
ity on  the  battlefield. 

When  geography  is  in  one's  favor,  advantage  must  be  taken  of  it, 
but  too  much  must  not  be  made  of  it.  There  is,  in  fact,  a  tendency 
to  be  led  astray  by  the  advantages  that  a  geographic  position  can 
eventually  procure,  and  thus  to  come  to  attribute  more  importance 
to  this  position  than  to  the  hostile  forces.  In  a  conception  of  this 
sort  there  is  a  vicious  circle.  The  objective  is  always  the  enemy 
afloat;  geographic  positions,  therefore,  have  no  value  in  them- 
selves ;  they  have  value  only  in  so  far  as  they  favor  the  action  of 
naval  forces  against  the  enemy. 

To  fix  our  ideas,  let  us  take  for  example  the  Strait  of  Dover, 
truly  the  most  perfect  type  of  the  geographic  position.  We  have, 
then,  stationed  at  Dunkirk,  a  powerful  flotilla  with  the  avowed 
object  of  commanding  the  passage.  But  what  part  can  this  flotilla 
play  ?  It  will  perhaps  be  less  brilliant  than  one  would  be  tempted 
to  believe. 

The  operations  will  have  a  different  character,  according  as  the 
English  coast  is  hostile  or  neutral. 

In  the  former  case,  our  flotilla  which  is  based  upon  Dunkirk 
and  Calais  will  find  itself  opposed  to  a  hostile  fleet  based  upon 
Dover  and  the  mouth  of  the  Thames  ;  and  as  numbers  will  not  be 
on  our  side,  it  is  not  very  apparent  what  we  could  undertake*\vith 
success.  If  our  torpedo-boats  remain  cautious  and  avoid  engaging, 
they  will  in  effect  leave  the  enemy  master  of  the  strait.  It  seems 
preferable,  therefore,  to  employ  them  in  another  region,  and  they 
are  out  of  place  in  the  Strait  of  Dover.  It  would  only  be  worth 
while  for  them  to  appear  there  when  they  had  a  chance  of  driving 
off  the  hostile  flotilla. 

In  the  second  case,  that  is  if  the  English  coast  is  neutral,  nothing 

54 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

will  prevent  France  from  commanding  the  passage,  and  this  time 
at  least  it  might  be  thought  that  the  presence  of  a  flotilla  at  Dun- 
kirk was  justifiable.  But  it  is  not  at  all  so.  If  the  flotilla  in- 
cludes a  considerable  number  of  submarines,  it  will  doubtless  be  a 
sufficient  menace  to  take  away  from  the  enemy  the  desire  of  risk- 
ing himself  in  the  strait ;  but  that  does  not  constitute  a  positive 
result.  The  enemy  will  be  embarrassed  in  his  movements,  but  he 
will  not  suffer  any  diminution  of  strength.  On  the  other  hand,  we 
shall  have  immobilized  a  numerous  flotilla  with  no  resulting  gain. 
It  cannot  be  too  often  repeated  that  naval  forces  are  made  to  play 
an  active  part.  To  condemn  them  to  stand  stock  still,  waiting  for 
events  that  may  never  happen,  is  equivalent  to  giving  the  enemy  a 
force  equal  to  the  one  thus  withdrawn  from  the  theater  of  opera- 
tions. The  day  when  a  hostile  fleet  is  seen  appearing  in  the  At- 
lantic, after  having  passed  to  the  westward  of  England,  it  will  be 
recognized  that  the  position  of  the  Strait  of  Dover  has  not  an  abso- 
lute value. 

None  the  less  geographical  positions  have  an  indisputable  strate- 
gic importance  that  has  been  clearly  brought  out  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  war ;  and  yet  the  Japanese  never  thought  of  permanently 
immobilizing  forces  in  Pescadores  Channel  and  the  Korean  Strait," 
nor  in  the  Straits  of  Tsugar  and  la  Perouse,  since  these  forces 
would  have  been  wanting  in  the  Yellow  Sea.  They  profited  by  the 
advantages  that  certain  of  these  positions  procured  under  deter- 
mined circumstances ;  but  they  did  not  seek  to  make  them  yield 
more  than  they  could  give. 

"  The  preceding  considerations  do  not  apply  to  straits  alone ;  they 
are  true  for  whole  regions.  It  is  evident,  for  example,  that  the 
Channel  would  be  an  excellent  field  of  action  for  our  flotillas,  which 
are  composed  in  greater  part  of  units  of  small  size.  But  we  must 
not  let  ourselves  be  so  attracted  by  this  advantage  as  to  assign  the 
Channel  in  advance  to  our  torpedo-boats  as  a  theater  of  opera- 
tions ;  for  so  long  as  the  enemy  did  not  present  himself  there  they 
would  have  nothing  to  do  there. 

"  Some  torpedo-boats  had  Takechiki  for  base,  but  they  were  few  in  num- 
ber and  could  not,  on  account  of  their  small  size,  take  part  iil  the  opera- 
tions in  the  Yellow  Sea.  Their  presence  in  the  Korean  Strait,  moreover, 
seems  to  be  attributable  much  less  to  anxiety  to  guard  the  passage  (which 
they  were  incapable  of  doing)  than  to  the  purpose  of  aiding  the  passage  of 
transports  through  the  channel. 

55 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

In  the  same  order  of  ideas,  the  pubhc  ought  to  become  con- 
vinced that  our  squadrons  are  by  no  means  intended  to  operate  in 
one  region  rather  than  in  another,  in  spite  of  the  official  designa- 
tions that  seem  to  assign  them  specially  to  the  guard  of  fixed  re- 
gions. They  have  been  created,  at  great  expense,  to  destroy  the 
enemy,  whatever  be  the  place  where  he  is  to  be  found.  If  he  does 
not  come  to  them,  they  must  go  to  him.  Besides,  where  there  is 
no  enemy  our  interests  are  not  threatened,  and  we  do  not  have 
to  protect  them. 


56 


III. 

Secrecy  of  Operations. 

If  there  had  never  been  anything  unforeseen  in  the  composition 
and  movements  of  forces,  the  brilHant  combinations  that  we  admire 
would  have  been  reduced  to  nothingness,  and  the  great  leaders 
would  have  been  deprived  of  one  of  their  most  powerful  means  of 
action. 

There  do  not  seem,  however,  to  have  been  many  mysteries  in 
naval  wars ;  and  although  previsions  were  often  found  faulty  as  a 
consequence  of  fortuitous  circumstances,  we  generally  knew  the 
English  armaments,  and  the  English  knew  ours.  Doubtless  it  did 
not  enter  into  the  manners  of  the  time  to  conceal  from  officers 
their  destination,  so  that  the  enemy  was  informed,  not  only  of  the 
preparations  that  were  made,  but  also  of  their  object.  It  is  per- 
haps for  this  reason  that,  on  all  seas,  the  forces  always  tended  to 
reach  a  state  of  balance  so  far  as  the  means  at  the  disposal  of  each 
side  allowed. 

Napoleon,  on  the  contrary,  always  took  care  to  envelop  his  naval 
operations  in  uncertainty.  It  is  known  that  the  secret  of  the  expe- 
dition to  Egypt  was  well  kept,  and  that  it  resulted  in  the  success 
of  his  landing.  Further  on  we  shall  see  in  what  manner  the 
Emperor  turned  aside  the  attention  of  the  English  government  in 
his  great  strategic  undertaking.  The  efficacy  of  the  dispositions 
adopted  is  proven,  since  Missiessy  was  not  followed  to  the 
Antilles  and  Nelson  lost  a  month  before  hastening  in  pursuit  of 
Villeneuve. 

It  is  almost  impossible  to  conceal  the  warlike  preparations  that 
go  on  in  ports  ;  the  enemy  will  even  often  have  enough  perspicacity 
not  to  accept  without  reservation  all  the  rumors  which  circulate 
in  respect  to  them,  nor  to  take  seriously  all  the  preparations  that 
seem  to  confirm  them.  Nevertheless,  he  will  not  be  able  to  scorn 
them  and  to  neglect  to  take  account  of  them;  for  his  not  taking 
the  measures  called  for  by  the  avowed  projects  of  the  enemy  would 
suffice  to  render  their  accomplishment  possible. 

Secrecy  of  operations  gives  birth  to  doubt ;  and  there  is  no 
worse  counsellor  for  those  who  have  the  responsibility  of  directing 

57 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

the  movements  of  fleets  than  doubt.  It  often  leads  to  the  adop- 
tion of  a  mistaken  course  and  to  an  ill-advised  division  of  forces. 
We  have  already  seen  examples  of  this,  and  the  Americans  have 
quite  recently  furnished  a  new  proof  of  it:  when  the  Spanish 
squadron  left  the  Cape  de  Verde  Islands,  uncertainty  as  to  its 
objective  led  the  Navy  Department  to  divide  its  forces  into  two 
groups,  neither  of  which,  theoretically,  had  a  marked  superiority 
over  the  Spanish  cruisers.  A  junction  was  only  effected  after  it 
was  learned  in  what  region  the  enemy  was  to  be  found. 

One's  projects,  therefore,  must  never  be  made  known,  even 
those  which  seem  to  be  a  necessity ;  it  is  astonishing  to  see,  in  read- 
ing history,  how  much  the  enemy  is  disposed  always  to  believe  in 
the  most  complicated  solution  when  he  is  obliged  to  divine  the 
objective  of  an  armament. 

With  the  means  of  communication  now  available,  it  seems  diffi- 
cult to  deceive  the  enemy  long  as  to  one's  movements.  Neverthe- 
less, the  Japanese,  by  means  of  a  strict  censorship,  succeeded  in 
keeping  their  adversaries  in  almost  absolute  ignorance  of  their 
movements.  It  would  be  premature,  therefore,  to  consider  that,  on 
account  of  the  development  of  telegraphy — with  or  without  wires 
— secrecy  of  operations  must  be  renounced. 


S8 


IV. 
Information  and  Communications. 

The  object  of  the  service  of  information  is  to  penetrate  the  de- 
signs of  the  enemy  in  spite  of  the  precautions  that  he  takes  to  con- 
ceal them.  A  thorough  knowledge  of  the  adversary  in  itself  fur- 
nishes precious  indications ;  history  shows  what  his  aspirations 
are,  and  the  means  that  he  has  employed  in  previous  wars  to  realize 
them.  By  combining  these  data  with  the  economic  situation  of  the 
country  and  the  ideas  that  are  current  there,  we  bring  together  a 
certain  number  of  presumptions  which  give  an  impression  as  to 
the  trend  that  he  will  give  to  operations. 

War  declared,  it  is  above  all  important  to  know  the  number, 
composition  and  movements  of  the  adverse  forces. 

To  this  end  all  governments  maintain  agents,  who  keep  them 
informed  regarding  the  warlike  preparations  of  the  ports  and  the 
rumors  that  circulate ;  but  all  these  informations  should  only  be 
tentatively  accepted,  since  those  who  furnish  them  are  often  not  to 
be  depended  upon  and  rarely  have  an  exact  understanding  of  the 
business.  In  any  event,  as  agents  are  actuated  by  an  interested 
motive,  they  are  much  more  concerned  to  furnish  information  than 
to  see  that  it  is  exact,  and,  to  earn  their  pay,  they  have  a  tendency 
always  to  exaggerate. 

Searching. — When  the  hostile  squadrons  put  to  sea,  their  des- 
tination can  be  known  and  their  projects  opposed  only  by  getting 
touch  of  them.  The  service  of  information  then  devolves  upon 
fast  vessels ;  in  its  modern  form  it  is  known  under  the  name  of 
"  searching." 

Seaching  consists  of  finding  the  enemy  without  other  datum 
than  his  point  of  departure.  The  inventors  of  the  process  advocate, 
for  the  solution  of  this  problem,  the  use  of  so-called  strategical 
curves.  On  paper,  these  curves  give  rise  to  amusing  recreations ; 
carried  into  the  field  of  action,  executed  by  real  ships,  they  give 
nothing,  because,  in  order  to  use  them,  it  is  necessary  to  base 
the  strategic  problems  upon  false  or  conventional  data."    So  that 

"  The  difference  assumed  between  the  speed  of  the  chaser  and  that  of  the 
chased  is  too  great;  the  points  of  departure  are  nearer  together  than  they 

S9 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

it  may  well  be  asked  whether  strategical  curves  were  brought 
forth  by  anxiety  to  find  the  enemy,  or  whether  they  were  not  ap- 
plied to  that  purpose  in  order  to  find  a  use  for  them.  However 
this  may  be,  whenever  it  has  become  a  question  of  practice,  one 
has  inevitably  been  led  to  sweeping  with  a  line  of  cruisers  the 
segments  of  the  sea  in  which  it  is  supposed  that  the  enemy  ought 
to  be  found. 

For  a  number  of  years  the  application  of  the  principle  of  search- 
ing furnished  the  theme  of  all  our  exercises,  without  giving  very 
conclusive  results.  As  we  contented  ourselves  with  seeking  to 
discover  the  enemy,  without  bringing  in  the  data  that,  in  time  of 
war,  will  limit  the  uncertainty  as  to  his  position,  and  without  tak- 
ing account  of  the  reaction  of  the  development  of  cruisers  upon  the 
force  of  the  line  of  battle,  everybody  said  that  our  squadrons 
hadn't  enough  cruisers.  And  it  could  not  be  otherwise,  for  we 
aimed  at  giving  an  absolute  solution  to  a  problem  which,  in  itself, 
does  not  admit  of  one,  except  in  special  cases. 

Moreover,  the  importance  attributed  to  this  scouting  cavalry  led 
to  the  supposition  that  the  enemy  w^oukl  use  the  same  means,  and 
that  before  being  able  to  reach  the  main  body  of  his  forces,  to 
ascertain  their  number  and  position,  it  would  be  necessary  to  drive 
back  the  opposing  forces.  It  is  then  no  longer  a  light  cavalry  that 
should  precede  squadrons,  but  a  heavy  cavalry,  armored  cruisers  ; 
the  light  ships  are  no  longer  good  for  anything  but  connecting  the 
scouting  line  with  the  command  by  an  uninterrupted  service  of 
expresses. 

It  would  only  be  advantageous  to  endow  our  squadrons  with  a 
cloud  of  cruisers,  if  the  consequence  of  so  doing  was  not  to  dimin- 
ish correspondingly  the  line  of  battle.  Certainly  lines  of  cruisers 
will  furnish  means  of  getting  information  as  to  the  force  of  the 
enemy  in  time  to  escape  in  case  of  being  inferior ;  this  inferiority, 
however,  must  not  be  due  to  an  exaggerated  development  of 
auxiliary  ships.  But,  in  certain  maneuvers,  the  total  tonnage  of 
these  latter  reached  50  per  cent  of  the  tonnage  of  all  the  armored 
ships,  and,  now  that  cruisers  of  12,500  tons  and  more  have  come 
into  service,  the  total  displacement  of  our  so-called  light  vessels 
approaches  that  of  the  armored  ships. 

would  be  in  reality  in  order  to  permit  solving  the  problem  during  the 
period  of  daylight;  finally  the  enemy  is  prohibited  from  changing  course, 
which  seems  rather  too  much. 

60 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Whither  does  this  tend? — since,  in  fact,  such  a  diminution  of 
our  effective  fighting-  ships  can  only  be  admitted  on  condition  that 
the  elements  that  weaken  them  are  indispensable.  But  the  design 
of  ships  devoted  to  searching  is  open  to  criticism  as  well  as  search- 
ing itself. 

The  object  of  the  vessels  that  attend  the  squadrons  is  not  to 
fight ;  it  is  to  furnish  information.  The  combats  that  they  may 
have  to  sustain  in  the  accomplishment  of  their  mission  are  only 
accidents  ;  if  they  are  stronger  than  the  enemy,  they  drive  him 
back;  if  they  are  weaker,  they  withdraw.  But  it  is  the  idea  of 
making  our  cruisers  fight  that  has  determined  the  increase  of  their 
displacement,  with  the  solicitude  always  to  do  better  than  other 
nations.  The  cruiser  must  thus  inevitably  approximate  more 
and  more  to  the  battleship ;  which  is  contrary  to  reason.  Actually 
our  new  cruisers  are  as  large  as  our  armored  cruisers  and  their 
speed  is  but  little  greater.  It  is  no  doubt  difficult  to  allow  that 
we  should  have  a  type  of  light  vessel  inferior  to  that  of  the 
enemy ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  theory  of  lines  of  cruisers 
does  not  rest  on  any  experimental  datum,  and  nothing  proves  that, 
in  reality,  things  will  happen  according  to  prediction.  It  may 
very  well  be,  on  the  contrary,  that  from  the  beginning  of  a  war, 
the  whole  system  will  crumble,  since  it  has  not  received  the  sanc- 
tion of  experience. 

Henceforth,  in  fact,  we  may  expect  many  disappointments  in  this 
quarter.  In  the  exercises  of  our  squadrons,  the  problem  has  never 
been  attacked  very  closely ;  the  greater  part  of  the  themes  are  con- 
ceived with  a  view  to  assuring  a  successful  conclusion,  so  as  not  to 
risk  expending  fuel  for  nothing.  In  spite  of  that,  the  conclusions 
that  can  be  drawn  from  our  maneuvers  are  scarcely  consoling :  the 
first  part  of  the  program,  that  which  consists  of  discovering  the 
enemy,  succeeds  sometimes,  thanks  to  rigorous  conventions  which 
war  will  refuse  to  admit;  in  revenge,  the  maintenance  of  contact 
and  the  service  of  information  have  always  functioned  pretty  badly. 
These  results  are  of  a  nature  to  awaken  our  suspicions  as  to  the 
efficacy  of  scouting  lines. 

The  services  that  are  demanded  of  them,  moreover,  are  not 
obligatory  to  the  same  degree  upon  both  sides.  The  stronger, 
after  having  assured  itself  of  numerical  superiority,  can  think  of 
increasing  the  number  of  auxiliaries  accompanying  squadrons 
in   order  to   enhance   its   chances   of  meeting  the  enemy.     The 

6i 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

weaker,  on  the  contrary,  will  never  have  any  trouble  in  provoking 
an  encounter ;  but,  in  order  to  risk  one,  will  try  to  bring  about  its 
reinforcement  with  other  units ;  and,  to  assemble  them,  it  has 
nothing  to  gain  by  extending  the  area  it  covers ;  it  will  concentrate, 
on  the  contrary,  so  as  to  occupy  the  least  space  possible." 

The  number  and  kind  of  vessels  intended  to  maintain  the  service 
of  information  and  communications  ought  not  to  be  fixed  in  an 
abstract  fashion;  the  way  in  which  the  development  of  auxiliary 
ships  may  react  upon  the  general  conditions  of  the  war  should  be 
taken  into  account."  Give  to  a  chief  of  squadron  the  task  of  seek- 
ing another  squadron  in  the  midst  of  the  seas,  as  a  needle  is  looked 
for  in  a  truss  of  hay.  This  admiral,  seeing  only  his  immediate 
objective,  will  find  that  he  is  always  lacking  in  light  vessels ; 
double,  triple  their  number,  and  he  will  not  complain  of  it.  Sup- 
pose now  that  this  same  chief  of  squadron  commands  in  time  of 
war,  and  that  upon  the  result  of  his  encounter  with  the  enemy 
depend  the  destinies  of  the  country.  At  this  critical  moment  his 
solicitude  will  not  be  for  light  vessels,  but  for  fighting  ships.  It  is 
those  that  he  will  insistently  demand.  And,  if  he  could  be  left 
free  to  dispose  as  he  saw  fit  of  the  tonnage  represented  by  the 
whole  of  the  so-called  light  vessels,  there  are  nine  chances  out  of 
ten  that  he  would  change  the  greater  part  of  them  into  solid  battle- 
ships, because  there  is  never  too  much  force  to  insure  victory. 
This  admiral  will  without  doubt  consider  that,  before  thinking  of 
meeting  the  enemy,  it  is  first  necessary  to  be  able  to  contend  with 
him,  and  that  there  is  no  instance  of  adversaries  not  having  ended 
by  meeting.'^ 

**!£,  during  the  maneuvers  of  1901,  Squadron  B  had  not  deployed  its 
cruisers,  it  would  have  had  a  better  chance  of  slipping  through. 

"  "  If  my  heart  were  opened,"  wrote  Nelson  when  he  was  searching  for 
Brueys'  squadron,  "  there  would  be  found  written  on  it  '  more  frigates.'  " 
Without  doubt  he  was  right.  But  if  the  Admiralty  had  replaced  ships  by 
frigates,  there  could  have  been  read  in  Nelson's  heart  "  more  fighting 
ships." 

"Let  us  inquire  what  have  really  been  the  determining  causes  of  naval 
battles.  They  can  be  arranged  in  two  classes.  The  first  comprises  all 
actions  where  the  adversaries  have  deliberately  gone  to  meet  one  another  to 
decide  to  which  the  empire  of  the  sea  shall  belong.  In  this  category 
belong  the  battles  known  under  the  following  names :  Lowestoft,  the  Four 
Days'  Battle,  North  Foreland,  Solebay,  Schoneveldt,  Beachy  Head,  Malaga, 
Ouessant.*     The  second  category  comprises  battles  that  were  the  conse- 

*  This  is  the  French  name  for  Keppel's  action  off  Brest  in  1778.— P.  R.  A. 

62 


« 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

He  will,  therefore,  keep  only  the  indispensable  number  of 
scouts,  and  these,  representing  but  a  small  part  of  the  tonnage  of 
the  whole  squadron,  will  not  materially  diminish  his  strength.  In 
a  word,  he  will  adopt  the  solution  that  will  give  him  the  best 
return." 

We  are  thus  led  to  consider  how  information  was  obtained  at 
the  period  when  the  seas  were  not  raked  with  cruisers. 

At  the  very  start  we  are  struck  by  the  quantity  of  news  fur- 
nished by  neutral  vessels  "  and  by  prizes  taken  from  the  enemy. 

quence  of  operations  undertaken  by  one  of  the  belligerents  and  which  the 
other  attempted  to  obstruct :  Stromboli,  Agosta  and  Palermo  are  con- 
nected with  the  French  occupation  of  Sicily ;  Bantry  was  the  result  of  a 
landing  in  Ireland ;  La  Hogue  of  a  threat  to  invade  England ;  Mahon  of 
the  siege  of  that  city ;  Quiberon  is  merely  a  repetition  of  La  Hogue. 

Almost  all  the  encounters  of  the  war  of  American  Independence  in  the 
West  Indies  and  on  the  American  coast  had  their  origin  in  land  operations; 
the  same  is  true  of  part  of  Suffren's  battles ;  finally  Trafalgar  is  the  last 
act  of  the  attempt  to  land  in  England. 

Steam  does  not  alter  the  character  of  encounters ;  Lissa,  the  Yalu  and 
Santiago  have  a  certain  likeness  to  Bantry. 

As  for  accidental  meetings,  they  are  in  a  very  small  minority,  and  should 
be  put  down  to  the  account  of  the  profit  and  loss  of  war. 

"The  increase  of  the  size  and  armament  of  cruisers  will  lead  to  their 
being  regarded  as  ships  of  the  line.  Thus  we  shall  have  poor  fighting  ships 
that  we  shall  not  even  be  sure  of  bringing  into  action,  for  they  may  very 
well  be  at  a  great  distance  from  the  main  body  at  the  moment  of  encounter- 
ing the  enemy. 

^''Examples. — -A  neutral  vessel  informs  the  Spaniards  of  the  departure  of 
Derby  with  a  convoy  for  Gibraltar  (1781)  ;  Derby  himself  is  advised  by  a 
neutral  of  the  capture  by  La  Motte-Picquet  of  the  convoy  from  St.  Eustatius 
and  detaches  eight  ships  to  try  to  retake  it  (1781).  Madeira  fishermen  in- 
form Suffren  of  the  passage  of  Johnstone;  the  latter  was  steering  for  the 
Cape  of  Good  Hope  when  he  learned  from  a  neutral  of  the  preparations 
that  made  his  expedition  useless  (1781).  A  merchant  ship  informs  Suff- 
ren  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  East  Indian  English  squadron  (1782). 
Lord  Howe  meets  neutrals,  who  inform  him  of  Villaret-Joyeuse's  position 
(1794).  During  the  voyage  of  the  expedition  to  Egypt,  a  brig  meets 
Nelson's  squadron  at  sea  and  carries  the  news  to  Toulon,  whence  two 
despatch  vessels  are  hastened  to  Brueys  (1798).  On  June  22,  the  English 
speak  a  vessel  that  had  passed  through  the  midst  of  Brueys'  fleet  (1798). 
Brid'port  learns  from  several  merchant  ships  that  Brueys'  fleet,  set  out 
from  Brest,  is  proceeding  to  the  southwest  (1799).  A  Ragusan  vessel 
informs  Villeneuve  that  Nelson  is  to  the  southward  of  Sardinia  (1805). 
The  latter  learns,  in  his  turn,  that  Villeneuve  was  south  of  Cape  Gata  on 
March  7,  etc. 

63 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

The  squadron  that  gets  news  communicates  it,  if  it  is  necessary, 
to  other  squadrons  and  to  the  seat  of  government.  The  latter,  for 
its  part,  sends  to  the  squadrons  all  the  information  that  is  of  a 
nature,  to  interest  them.  Thus  there  is  established  between  the 
squadrons  and  the  shore,  and  between  the  squadrons  themselves, 
a  permanent  exchange  of  communications  by  means  of  light  ves- 
sels.'^ All  the  news  that  reaches  the  chiefs  of  squadrons  only  fur- 
nishes them  with  indications  from  which  they  judge  what  is  prob- 
able. Then  they  send  scouts  in  fixed  directions  to  see  if  their 
conclusions  are  well-founded. 

This  system  of  communications  was  not  created  outright,  as 
ours  is.  It  was  the  result  of  the  experience  of  centuries,  and 
nothing  proves  that  the  needs  to  which  it  responded  are  not  as 
exacting  to-day  as  they  used  to  be.  It  is  not  practised  during 
maneuvers  and  exercises  because  the  very  statement  of  the  theme 
takes  its  place ;  but  in  time  of  war  it  is  very  possible  that  we  shall 
be  obliged  to  re-establish  it  suddenly.  We  shall  then  find  our- 
selves stripped  of  light  vessels  because,  on  the  one  hand,  the  prac- 
tice of  searching  has  given  the  auxiliary  divisions  a  composition 
not  at  all  suited  to  this  kind  of  service,  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
there  is  no  sign  of  a  provision  of  scouts  distributed  in  all  ports  for 
the  use  of  the  central  government.  In  the  old  navy,  the  despatch- 
boats  were  little  vessels  (frigates,  corvettes,  brigs),  whose  small 
cost  permitted  an  increase  of  number  without  diminishing  too 

*^  Examples. — D'Estaing  sends  the  Flore  to  the  Spanish  coast  to  keep  the 
minister  informed  regarding  his  position  (1778).  The  frigate  Concorde 
learns  at  Martinique  the  news  of  the  declaration  of  war  (1778).  The 
corvette  Diligente  carries  to  France  the  news  of  the  taking  of  Grenada 
and  the  battle  of  July  6  (1779).  De  Ternay  sends  a  vessel  to  France  to  ask 
for  reinforcements  (1780).  De  Grasse  asks  Barras  to  send  him  despatch 
vessels  with  Rochambeau's  despatches  (1781).  The  i^/ne  carries  to  Mauritius 
and  the  Cape  the  plans  of  the  government  (1781).  The  Consolante  goes  to 
the  Cape  to  give  Suffren  the  order  to  return  to  Mauritius  (1781).  Suffren 
sends  a  ship  to  France  to  announce  the  battle  of  Praya  (1781).  The 
Argus  goes  to  Europe  to  carry  the  news  of  the  departure  of  the  Count 
d'Orves  (1781).  Hotham  is  warned  by  an  express  from  Genoa  of  the 
sortie  of  Admiral  Martin  (1795).  The  Cuneux,  sent  by  Nelson  to  Europe, 
meets  Villeneuve's  fleet  (1805).  The  Arethuse  meets  two  French  divisions 
at  sea;  she  sends  a  despatch  boat  to  Cornwallis,  a  corvette  to  Ferrol  and' 
to  Cadiz  to  warn  the  English  fleets  (1805).  Admiral  Duckworth  sends  a 
frigate  to  England  to  carry  information  to  the  Admiralty  as  to  the 
strength  and  course  of  a  French  squadron  he  has  met  (1805). 

64 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

much  the  effective  force  of  ships  of  the  Hne.  These  vessels  were 
distributed  in  all  the  ports  so  as  to  be  always  sure  of  being  able  to 
send  one  of  them  from  a  region  not  watched  by  the  enemy ;  if  the 
news  to  be  communicated  was  very  important,  two  or  three  were 
sent  at  the  same  time  from  different  places.  The  messengers 
coming  from  the  squadrons,  for  their  part,  took  care  not  to  make 
the  land  in  quarters  where  the  enemy  was  cruising,  and  they 
entered  by  preference  commercial  ports. 

If  the  modern  navy  has  to  undertake  the  same  service,  it  will 
have  only  big  cruisers  to  do  it  with ;  it  would  need  a  swarm  of 
scouts  of  900  to  1000  tons,  which  will  have  the  advantage  of  being 
numerous  without  costing  much,  and  under  very  many  circum- 
stances simple  torpedo-boat  destroyers  will  suffice  for  this  task  by 
virtue  of  their  great  speed. 

If,  moreover,  we  refer  back  to  the  three  last  naval  wars — the 
Chinese-Japanese,  the  Spanish-American  and  the  Russo-Japanese 
wars — we  find  no  evidence  that  they  could  have  furnished  occa- 
sion for  the  employment  of  searching.  In  the  first,  the  Japanese 
had  no  need  whatever  to  play  with  search  rakes  in  order  to  obtain 
knowledge  of  the  enemy's  force  and  position.  In  the  second,  scout- 
ing lines  would  have  proved  themselves  manifestly  powerless  to 
discover  in  the  midst  of  the  Atlantic  the  Spanish  division,  set  out 
from  the  Cape  de  Verde  Islands  with  an  unknown  destination. 
Had  the  Americans  transformed  their  entire  fleet  into  scouts,  to 
the  extent  of  having  not  one  fighting  ship  to  oppose  to  Admiral 
Cervera,  their  search  rake  would  have  covered  an  insignificant 
part  of  the  surface  of  the  sea.  It  must  be  admitted  that  there  are 
occasions,  on  land  as  well  as  on  the  sea,  when,  to  know  where  the 
enemy  is,  it  is  necessary  to  wait  for  him  to  show  himself,  which 
usually  is  not  long  delayed.  Above  all,  it  is  necessary  to  avoid 
losing  precious  time  and  dispersing  without  any  gain  at  all  no  less 
precious  ships,  for  the  pleasure  of  doing  kinematics.  Finally,  in 
the  third  war,  we  know  very  well  the  use  that  was  made  or  could 
have  been  made  of  light  vessels ;  but  it  surely  was  not  in  the  con- 
ventional shape  that  we  have  created. 

Is  this  to  say  that  it  will  never  be  necessary  to  have  recourse  to 
scouting  lines  ?  Not  at  all ;  but,  instead  of  using  them  regularly, 
as  we  now  do,  they  will  only  be  used  in  special  cases,  and  during 
short  intervals  of  tim.e,  when  operations  are  undertaken  in  very 
narrow  seas  such  as  make  them  perfectly  efficient.    But  it  will  not 

65 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy, 

be  necessary  to  depend  upon  vessels  specially  built  for  this  service ; 
it  will  be  enoiig-h  to  collect  for  the  occasion  all  the  light  vessels 
available  in  the  region  and  to  suspend,  while  the  operations  last, 
communications  with  the  shore  and  between  squadrons. 

As  to  encounter  between  cruisers  thrown  out  ahead  by  each  side 
— as  to  this  encounter  the  contingency  of  which  has  given  us 
armored  cruisers — it  has  not  yet  taken  place,  despite  three  suc- 
cessive wars.  From  which  we  may  be  permitted  without  pre- 
sumption to  infer  that  a  general  conclusion  has  been  lightly  drawn 
from  what  will  never  be  anything  but  an  exceptional  case. 

It  may  be  asked  what  influence  the  nets  of  telegraph  wires 
that  cover  the  earth  will  have  upon  the  service  of  information. 
Judging  from  the  Spanish-American  war,  the  advantages  of  in- 
stantaneous communications  have  been  tempered  by  some  draw- 
backs. Cruisers  have  derived  an  evident  benefit  from  them  by 
going  to  the  end  of  a  cable,  instead  of  traversing  great  dis- 
tances ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  American  government  was  over- 
whelmed with  the  most  contradictory  news. 

In  any  event,  the  cutting  of  cables  must  be  anticipated  and  its 
consequences  prepared  for. 

Scouting. — It  is  not  considered  sufficient  to  send  out  cruisers 
ahead  of  squadrons  to  discover  the  enemy ;  it  is  also  pro- 
posed that  naval  forces  should  have  in  their  immediate  vicinity  a 
screen  of  sentinels  to  preserve  them  from  any  surprise.  At  first, 
scouting  in  cross  was  tried,  which  is  still  the  regulation  method; 
then  it  was  agreed  that  polygonal  scouting  was  preferable,  which 
assures  an  equal  protection  in  all  directions  if  the  fighting  body  is 
allowed  to  fall  back  to  the  rear  of  the  center  of  figure  in  relation  to 
the  direction  of  advance. 

Without  wishing  to  undervalue  the  merits  of  tactical  scouting, 
even  were  it  hexagonal,  it  may  be  said  that  it  derives  from  an 
idea  that  is  more  seductive  than  practical. 

Supposing  the  main  force  to  be  12  miles  from  the  furthest 
scout  (which  is  a  maximum)  and  a  velocity  of  approach  of  24 
knots  (which  is  a  minimum  speed  of  12  knots),  the  safety  interval 
is  increased  by  half  an  hour. 

Five  or  six  scouts  cannot  be  immobilized  for  this  scant  benefit. 
It  would  be  dangerous  to  substitute  battle-ships  for  them ;  they 
might  not  have  time  to  concentrate,  if  they  were  surprised  by  an 
enemy  breaking  through  at  full  speed.     Only  convoys  remain, 

66 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

therefore,  to  which  to  apply  close  scouting,  and  their  ships  do  not 
possess  sufficient  means  of  communication  to  perform  this  service. 

Usually,  it  will  be  known  when  the  enemy  is  near  and  there  is  a 
chance  of  meeting  him.  Then  a  more  sustained  watchfulness 
will  take  the  place  of  scouting. 

Chasing. — Since  cruisers  entered  into  the  composition  of  squad- 
rons, problems  of  chasing  have  developed  so  that,  with  searching, 
they  seem  to  be  the  embodiment  of  naval  war.  Here  we  have  a 
new  proof  of  the  exaggerated  importance  attributed  to  the  acces- 
sory in  derogation  of  the  principal. 

Certainly  chasing  will  render  real  service ;  but  it  will  perhaps 
not  be  in  the  form  that  is  given  to  it.  Much  ingenuity  has  been 
exercised  to  find  in  it  an  excuse  for  solving  triangles ;  in  order 
to  give  it  this  trigonometrical  form,  it  has  been  necessary  to 
attribute  absolute  values  to  unknown  quantities,  such  as  the 
course,  the  speed  and  sometimes  even  the  position  of  the  chased. 
These  precautions  being  still  insufficient,  there  has  been  added, 
for  the  chased,  the  obligation  of  conforming  to  strict  rules  which 
it  is  his  most  elementary  duty  not  to  follow. 

The  day  when  these  peaceful  distractions  are  changed  to  opera- 
tions of  war,  sines  and  cosines  will  be  obliged  to  give  way  to  clear- 
sightedness and  resolution.  Would  it  not  be  better  to  develop 
these  qualities  in  times  of  peace,  instead  of  substituting  geometrical 
constructions  for  them  ? 

When  a  conflict  shall  have  brutally  brought  us  to  the  true  con- 
cept of  naval  war,  there  will  be  good  cause  for  astonishment  that 
we  have  been  able  thus  to  substitute  fictions  for  reality. 

The  different  methods  studied  for  the  solution  of  problems  of 
chasing  find  their  application  in  the  stationing  of  scouts  among 
themselves  or  with  respect  to  the  squadron ;  all  the  data  are  then 
known  and  furnish  an  exact  point  of  departure.  But  strategy 
is  not  concerned  with  this,  nor  even  is  tactics ;  these  methods 
are  simply  useful  in  cruising,  just  as  the  determination  of  the 
position  is ;  they  ought,  therefore,  to  form  part  of  the  general 
instruction  of  young  officers. 


67 


V. 
Bases  of  Operations. 

It  is  useless  to  define  a  base  of  operations :  the  necessity  is  self- 
evident  of  having  sheltered  places  in  which  to  prepare  forces 
before  they  are  sent  out  to  fight,  to  repair  and  resupply  them  after 
battle.  But  the  number,  position  and  utilization  of  these  bases  give 
rise  to  differences  of  opinion. 

The  first  condition  that  advanced  bases  ought  to  fulfil  is  to  suf- 
fice to  themselves,  that  is  not  to  require  the  assistance  of  mobile 
forces.  If  bases  of  operations  are  made  to  protect  ships,  ships 
cannot  have  the  protection  of  bases  of  operations  for  their  objec- 
tive. The  English  have  always  regarded  them  in  this  light,  and 
events  have  proved  that  they  are  right :  the  Admiralty  was  never 
solicitous  about  the  attacks  upon  Gibraltar  after  that  place  had 
once  been  put  in  a  state  of  defense ;  they  abandoned  the  garrison 
to  itself,  contenting  themselves  with  revictualing  it  from  time  to 
time.  The  Russians  adopted  exactly  the  opposite  solution  at  Port 
Arthur;  and  what  it  cost  them  to  sacrifice  the  armament  of  their 
fleet  to  the  defense  of  Port  Arthur  is  well  known. 

The  more  advanced  bases  a  country  puts  at  the  disposition  of  its 
fleets,  the  greater  the  development  that  strategy  can  attain.  There- 
fore, there  would  be  advantage  in  multiplying  them,  if  the  financial 
sacrifices  that  they  necessitate  (as  much  for  their  creation  as  for 
the  normal  functioning  of  their  services)  did  not  diminish  corres- 
pondingly the  power  of  the  active  forces  for  which  they  are 
created.     Their  number  is,  therefore,  limited.*' 

There  is  general  agreement  in  locating  bases  only  in  positions 
that  have  a  strategic  value,  but  there  is  more  difficulty  in  arriving 
at  a  common  understanding  as  to  what  constitutes  the  strategic 
value  of  a  given  point.  Certain  minds  readily  allow  themselves  to 
be  attracted  by  the  facilities  that  some  places  offer  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a  great  naval  arsenal,  and  they  are  inclined  to  believe  that 
this  fact  alone  gives  to  such  ports  strategical  importance.   Then  it 

**  Still  there  must  be  some.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  the  ships  on  our 
foreign  stations  can  carry  on  war  so  long  as  they  do  not  have,  on  each 
station,  at  least  one  port  where  they  can  find  safety. 

68 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

is  desired  to  transform  the  lake  of  Berre  into  a  second  Bizerta ;  and 
radicals  even  go  so  far  as  to  wish  to  utilize  the  sea  of  Bou-Grara. 
The  sole  advantage  of  these  two  lakes  resides  in  the  enclosed 
sheet  of  water,  "  which  would  suffice  to  give  shelter  to  all  the 
fleets  of  the  world."  This  phrase,  which  we  have  all  heard  applied 
to  Brest,  Rio  de  Janeiro,  Bizerta  and  Diego-Suarez,  has  the  gift  of 
producing  a  profound  impression  on  the  public. 

The  excessive  dimensions  of  a  roadstead  are,  nevertheless,  an 
inconvenience  rather  than  an  advantage,  and  it  is  absolutely  useless 
to  be  able  to  shelter  a  thousand  ships  in  a  place  where  the  necessi- 
ties of  war  will  never  bring  more  than  fifty.  If  the  roadstead  of 
Brest  were  less  vast,  the  inner  defense  would  have  been  easier  to 
organize,  and  the  need  of  a  breakwater  would  not  have  been  felt 
at  all;  it  is  the  extent  of  the  lake  of  Bizerta  similarly  that  has 
necessitated  the  construction  of  a  small  harbor  inside  the  big  one. 
The  importance  of  these  roadsteads,  therefore,  consists  much  less  in 
the  extent  of  their  liquid  surface  than  in  the  distance  that  separates 
them  from  the  sea,  a  distance  which  places  their  establishments 
out  of  reach  of  shot. 

The  strategical  value  of  advanced  bases  really  depends  only 
upon  their  geographic  position. 

The  utilization  of  bases  of  operations  is  a  complex  problem  that 
presents  itself  in  a  different  light  in  each  region,  according  to  the 
conditions  peculiar  to  each  of  them.  It  will  be  sufficient  for  us  to 
seek  out  the  part  that  some  of  them  have  played  in  the  past,  and 
that  which  they  can  have  in  the  future,  to  show  that  the  services 
they  render  are  not  all  of  the  same  order. 

Brest  and  Cherbourg  threaten  directly  the  shores  of  England, 
and  Toulon  was  built  to  command  the  Mediterranean.  It  seems, 
therefore,  that  the  first  two  ports  would  serve  as  points  of  concen- 
tration for  forces  intended  to  operate  in  the  Channel,  and  that 
the  squadrons  that  are  to  act  in  the  Mediterranean  would  be  drawn 
from  Toulon.  Yet  we  have  seen  that  the  immense  fleet  which, 
under  Villeneuve's  orders,  imperiled  English  supremacy  in  the 
Channel,  was  drawn  entirely  from  Toulon,  Cadiz  and  Ferrol,  while 
the  Brest  squadron  played  no  part  in  it.  On  the  other  hand,  when 
Bruix  found  himself  in  the  Mediterranean  at  the  head  of  forces 
double  those  of  the  English,  it  was  Brest  that  had  furnished  the 
greater  part  of  his  force.  Later,  the  First  Consul,  wishing  to  send 
help  to  Egypt,  had  the  forces  destined  for  this  expedition  set  out 
from  Brest  (Ganteaume's  cruise). 

69 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

These  anomalies  are  easily  explained.  The  menace  constituted 
by  the  presence  of  naval  forces  in  Brest  was  too  evident  for  the 
English  not  to  take  acount  of  it  by  stationing-  in  their  neighborhood 
equal  or  superior  forces ;  and  the  proximity  of  her  coast  gave  her 
every  facility  in  this  respect,  for,  if  Brest  commands  the  English 
coast,  Portsmouth  commands  the  French  coast.  To  secure  supe- 
riority, therefore,  it  was  necessary  to  draw  from  out-of-the-way 
regions  supplementary  forces,  which,  from  their  remoteness,  might 
have  other  objectives  and  consequently  not  inspire  the  same  appre- 
hensions in  the  enemy. 

Toulon  was  not,  like  Brest,  paralyzed  by  a  hostile  port,  and 
would  perhaps  have  sufficed  to  the  Mediterranean  forces  with  its 
own  resources  if  our  rivals  had  not  had  the  foresight  to  secure 
provisional  advanced  bases  that  compensated,  in  a  certain  measure, 
for  the  distance  of  their  great  military  ports. 

So  long  as  a  battle  does  not  intervene,  the  absolute  benefit  of 
bases  that  command  a  coast  or  a  region  is  acquired  only  by  the 
stronger  side  which  in  advance  concentrates  there  the  forces  that 
it  judges  necessary.  But  it  is  only  after  a  victory  that,  on  one  side 
as  well  as  on  the  other,  the  strategical  importance  of  such  bases 
makes  itself  specially  felt.  The  victor,  master  of  the  sea,  establishes 
himself  there  permanently  and  finds,  in  the  resources  that  they  af- 
ford, means  of  resupplying  his  squadrons  without  separating  him- 
self from  his  field  of  action.  The  importance  of  a  point  must,  there- 
fore, not  be  deduced  from  the  number  of  ships  that  are  there  at  the 
beginning  of  hostilities,  but  from  the  forces  that  the  progress  of 
operations  may  bring  there  ;  for,  soon  or  late,  the  interest  of  the 
war  will  concentrate  itself  in  regions  that  may  be  called  centers  of 
attraction. 

Rochefort  and  Lorient. — The  advantages  of  these  ports  during 
our  naval  wars  arose  from  a  double  cause :  the  importance  of  Brest, 
where  the  principal  armaments  took  place,  drew  from  them  the 
attention  of  the  English ;  at  the  same  time  their  distance  from  the 
enemy's  coasts  made  their  surveillance  more  difficult.  That  is  why 
it  was  always  endeavored  to  make  the  reliefs  destined  for  the 
colonies  and,  in  general,  small  expeditions  intended  to  operate  in 
the  Atlantic  start  from  these  ports.  It  is  to  be  observed  that  the 
divisions  of  Missiessy,  of  Allemand  and  of  Savary,  which  were 
almost  the  only  ones  able  to  go  and  come  without  hindrance,  had 
Rochefort  for  base.  And  their  success  must  be  attributed  to  the 
difficulty  the  enemy  had  in  watching  that  port. 

70 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Secondary  bases,  therefore,  advantageously  supplement  the  prin- 
cipal bases,  without  taking  away  from  the  latter  their  importance, 
and  without  making  them  lose  anything  of  their  own  proper  value. 

The  suppression  of  secondary  bases  simplifies  the  task  of  the 
enemy  by  permitting  him  to  watch  with  a  single  force  the  different 
fractions  that  are  not  called  upon  to  act  together. 

However,  it  is  evident  that  from  the  moment  that  our  military 
ports  of  the  second  class  have  become  unequal  to  receiving  existing 
squadrons,  whose  units  are  of  not  less  than  12,500  tons  displace- 
ment, they  cease  to  constitute  bases  and  no  longer  render  any 
service.    This,  unhappily,  is  the  case  with  Rochefort  and  Lorient. 

Gibraltar  has  not  always  had  the  importance  that  is  now  given 
to  it.  Its  true  efficaciousness  only  dates  from  the  wars  of  the  Revo- 
lution, that  is  from  the  period  when  the  English  maintained  per- 
manent squadrons  in  the  Mediterranean.  Even  then  the  rock  was 
only  a  post  for  news,  coupled  with  a  rather  poor  anchorage ;  ships 
did  not  even  find  water  there,  but  had  to  go  to  Tetuan  or  Lagos  for 
it.  The  immense  works  undertaken  in  later  years  have  been  neces- 
sary to  make  Gibraltar  a  real  base  of  operations. 

Before  1793  the  Mediterranean  only  formed  part  of  the  theater 
of  war  intermittently,  and,  in  the  interludes,  the  fortress  was  some- 
times a  heavy  burden ;  it  no  longer  rendered  any  service,  and  it 
was  none  the  less  necessary  to  revictual  it  by  passing  through  the 
Spanish  forces  stationed  at  Cadiz. 

Malta  is,  for  the  English,  the  key  of  the  Mediterranean.  The 
entrance  to  this  sea  is  closed  by  Gibraltar,  but  we  are  already  inside. 
Without  Malta,  Egypt  and  Cyprus  are  in  danger,  the  mouth  of 
the  Suez  Canal  is  at  our  mercy;  and,  if  an  action  were  to  take 
place  east  of  Bizerta,  we  would  be  able  to  bring  to  it  all  our  forces, 
while  the  English,  if  they  had  only  Gibraltar,  would  be  deprived 
of  their  torpedo-boats. 

Bizerta. — The  creation  of  Bizerta  was  necessary  for  France  on 
several  accounts. 

First  of  all,  a  look  at  the  chart  will  make  it  unnecessary  to  dwell 
upon  the  advantage  that  could  be  derived  from  this  arsenal  after 
a  victory  in  the  Mediterranean. 

In  the  second  place,  the  need  of  Bizerta  arises  from  the  great 
extent  of  coast  that  we  possess  in  Africa.  From  Cape  Bon  to 
Nemours  our  shores  border  upon  the  route  between  Gibraltar  and 
Malta;  war  must,  therefore,  inevitably  lead  us  into  these  regions. 

71 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

We  had  no  means  of  revictualing  there  because  all  the  ports  of 
Algeria  are  directly  on  the  coast;  Bizerta  fills  this  want. 

Finally,  the  possession  of  but  one  arsenal  in  so  vast  a  sea  as  the 
Mediterranean  placed  our  forces  in  a  difficult  position ;  since,  as 
one  of  our  admirals  said,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  imagine  strate- 
gical operations  when  there  is  only  a  single  base  at  one's  dis- 
position. ^ 

*     * 

There  are  three  kinds  of  bases  of  operations : 

1st.  Arsenals,  which  are  ports  of  construction,  arming  and 
repair. 

2d.  Advanced  bases,  where  ships  find  fuel  and  supplies  and 
where  they  can  make  slight  repairs. 

3d.  Stations  for  torpedo-boats. 

Whichever  they  may  be,  these  different  bases  are  too  intimately 
connected  with  the  utilization  of  our  active  forces  not  to  be  ren- 
dered inviolable,  and  this  condition  will  be  the  easier  to  fulfill  if 
they  are  at  the  end  of  long  narrow  passages. 

Nevertheless,  it  is  not  needful  to  consider  the  situation  of  Cher- 
bourg desperate.  That  port  is  directly  on  the  coast,  it  is  true ;  but 
in  consequence  of  this  it  has  been  defended.  It  is  customary  to 
consider  that  the  enemy  can  easily  bombard  it.  But  will  the  three 
hundred  heavy  guns  of  the  water  batteries  remain  silent?  Will 
not  the  torpedo-boats  and  submarines  issue  forth  ? 

The  protection  of  torpedo-boat  stations  cannot  be  developed  to 
the  same  extent  as  that  of  the  fleet's  grand  bases.  Their  best 
defense  will  consist  of  placing  them  in  ports  extending  well  into 
the  land,  difficult  of  access  and  inaccessible  to  vessels  of  greater 
draft  than  torpedo-boats.  Boom  defenses,  defended  by  light 
artillery,  will  suffice  to  preserve  them  from  the  enemy's  enterprises. 

It  has  rarely  happened  that  ships  have  dared  to  attack  directly 
the  defenses  of  a  naval  arsenal.  Still,  in  the  sixteenth  century, 
the  English  succeeded  in  reaching  a  Spanish  fleet  inside  the  road- 
stead of  Cadiz,  and  the  Dutch,  in  the  following  century,  burned 
some  disarmed  English  ships  at  Chatham.  The  only  conclusion 
that  can  be  drawn  from  these  isolated  facts  is  that  the  defense  of 
the  places  named  was  insufficient ;  for  no  attempt  has  ever  been 
made  to  pass  through  the  narrow  entrance  of  Brest.  If  the  im- 
prudence is  committed  of  stationing  ships  in  bases  before  they  are 
supplied  with  sufficient  means  of  defense,  the  bases  become  points 
of  weakness. 

72 


VI. 
The  Radius  of  Action. 

If  circles  are  drawn  with  the  bases  of  operations  as  centers  and 
half  the  steaming  distance  of  the  ships  as  radius,  the  sectors  of 
sea  contained  in  the  circles  will  represent  the  maximum  field  of 
action  of  the  mobile  forces  starting  from  each  port. 

When  the  radius  of  action  is  very  small,  these  various  sectors 
will  cover  but  an  insignificant  part  of  the  surface  of  the  sea ;  they 
are  isolated  from  each  other  and  even  may  not  touch  the  territorial 
waters  of  the  enemy.  There  is  no  strategy  then  ;  the  ships  are 
riveted  to  their  base  by  a  chain  which  fetters  their  movements, 
and,  outside  of  their  zone,  the  sea  is  free ;  the  war  does  not  reach 
it.  If  the  enemy,  better  equipped,  has  given  his  ships  a  sufficient 
radius  of  action,  he  has  full  leisure  to  assemble  his  forces  and  to 
attack  a  single  sector,  sure  of  having  nothing  to  fear  from  the 
others.  Thus  the  side  which  has  the  least  mobility  is  inevitably 
condemned  to  inferiority  on  the  field  of  battle,  even  if  it  has  abso- 
lute superiority. 

Now  let  the  radius  of  action  be  increased.  The  sectors  will 
extend  to  the  neighboring  bases,  and  immediately  the  situation  is 
bettered.  A  squadron,  starting  from  one  base,  can  end  at  another, 
or  separated  squadrons  can  unite.  The  number  of  combinations 
increases  and  also  the  possibility  of  surprises.  The  enemy  is  no 
longer  so  free  from  anxiety;  if  he  makes  a  given  force  his  objec- 
tive, he  is  in  danger  of  being  taken  in  the  rear  and,  to  protect  him- 
self, he  divides  his  forces. 

Finally,  if  we  assume  a  very  great  radius  of  action,  strategy 
attains  its  full  development ;  the  enemy  is  everywhere  accessible 
and  all  the  movements  of  forces  that  the  circumstances  demand 
can  be  put  into  efifect. 

The  first  supposition  that  we  have  made  is  not  an  imaginary 
one.  It  corresponds  still  to-day  to  a  reality  as  far  as  a  part  of  our 
naval  forces  are  concerned. 

We  have  coast-defense  vessels  which  cannot  go  from  Toulon  to 
Brest,  even  at  moderate  speed,  without  renewing  their  coal  supply. 
If  the  interest  of  the  war  is  transferred  far  from  their  base,  we 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

shall  have  to  do  without  their  aid.  But,  it  will  be  said,  they  have 
been  put  there  to  remain  there.  There  are  necessities  from  which 
there  is  no  escape ;  did  not  Admiral  Nebogatof 's  coast-defense 
ships,  whicli  were  built  for  the  Baltic,  go  to  the  shores  of  Japan 
to  be  sunk? 

Let  us  now  inquire  what  the  situation  of  our  foreign  posses- 
sions is.  Actually,  the  ships  stationed  in  them  can  find  support 
only  in  their  single  base.  Unless  they  shut  themselves  up  in  it 
(in  which  case  they  are  of  no  use)  they  will  be  destroyed  sooner  or 
later.  The  enemy,  knowing  their  number  and  isolation,  will  op- 
pose to  them  superior  forces  and  will  always  succeed  in  meeting 
them,  because  they  will  only  be  able  to  move  in  a  restricted  zone 
and  because,  for  this  reason,  their  objectives  will  be  limited;  the 
enemy  will  know,  besides,  that  through  unavoidable  necessity  these 
ships  must  return  to  their  point  of  departure,  and  he  will  await 
them  in  its  vicinity. 

If  these  same  ships  had  a  sufficient  radius  of  action  to  be  able, 
from  their  central  station,  easily  to  reach  the  neighboring  stations 
and  to  go,  for  example,  from  Dakar  to  Martinique  and  to  Diego- 
Suarez,  or  from  Diego-Suarez  to  Saigon  and  to  Dakar,  the  mili- 
tary value  of  our  foreign  stations  would  cease  to  be  a  negligible 
quantity.  The  forces  of  two  or  three  stations  could  unite  at  a 
single  one,  find  themselves  thus  momentarily  superior  to  the  hos- 
tile forces  and  crush  them.  Instead  of  shutting  themselves  up  in 
a  trap,  which  amounts  to  moral  defeat,  they  could  assume  the 
offensive  and  play  the  only  part  that  becomes  fighting  ships :  wage 
w^ar.  It  will  doubtless  be  pointed  out  that  hundreds  and  thousands 
of  miles  will  have  to  be  covered  in  pursuit  of  an  uncertain  result ; 
but  war  is  not  a  child's  game  and  nothing  is  won  without  cost. 
It  is  possible  that  fruitless  raids  will  be  made ;  yet  perseverance 
has  always  been  compensated,  and  a  good  victory  quickly  effaces 
the  memory  of  past  trials.  Calculate  from  the  chart  the  number 
of  leagues  traversed  by  Nelson  before  coming  up  to  Brueys  at 
Aboukir  and  Villeneuve  at  Trafalgar,  and  take  account  of  the 
effort  he  must  have  made  to  reach  the  enemy ;  and  if  Nelson  had 
survived  his  last  victory,  perhaps  he  would  have  felt  that  he  had 
not  bought  it  too  dearly  by  paying  for  it  seven  months  of  pursuit. 

The  small  importance  that  for  a  long  time  has  been  attached  to 
the  radius  of  action  was  the  consequence  of  the  transformation  of 
naval  material.    The  appearance  of  steam  completely  changed  the 

74 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

strategical  conditions  of  naval  warfare;  and,  while  giving  the  ship 
freedom  of  movement,  imprisoned  it  in  a  narrow  circle.  Military 
operations  were  then  seen  under  a  new  aspect,  and  in  the  presence 
of  the  facts,  the  value  of  the  distance  that  could  be  traversed  was 
lost  sight  of  little  by  little.  Thus  for  a  long  time  no  advantage 
was  taken  of  improvements  in  the  economy  of  engines ;  the  old 
ways  were  followed,  because  mental  conceptions  are  always  be- 
hind material  progress.  It  is  only  in  these  latter  years  that  more 
correct  ideas  have  led  to  increasing  the  radius  of  action  of  our 
ships,  but  the  error  committed  brought  us  a  fleet  of  coast-defense 
vessels  that  are  unsuitable  for  carrying  on  war.  Yet  there  were 
numerous  examples  of  enterprises  that  had  to  be  interrupted  or 
failed  on  account  of  the  necessity  of  returning  to  port.°" 

As  to  the  advantages  secured  by  a  greater  radius  of  action  than 
the  enemy's,  they  were  particularly  evident  during  the  wars  of 
the  Revolution  and  Empire.  At  this  period,  the  English  had  to  a 
considerable  degree  increased  the  independence  of  their  squadrons 
by  introducing  the  use  of  iron  water  tanks  on  board  ship  and  bet- 
tering the  health  of  the  crews  by  measures  of  cleanliness  unknown 
till  then.  At  the  same  time,  the  constant  training  given  to  the  sail- 
ors had.  diminished  the  damages  that  so  often  obliged  ships  to  re- 
turn to  port ;  so  that  Nelson  could  say  that  his  ships  were  less  tried 
by  bad  weather  in  a  year  than  ours  were  in  a  day.  It  was  due  to 
these  improvements  and  this  training  that  the  English  were  able 
to- keep  up  a  continuous  blockade  of  our  coasts,  which  had  never 
before  been  attempted,  and  to  make  those  gigantic  raids  which 
would  have  been  impossible  in  the  previous  wars."^  They  thus 
secured  an  absolute  advantage.  But  to-day  the  elements  of  the 
radius  of  action  are  altered :  they  no  longer  depend  on  the  sanitary 

^  One  of  those  which  best  bring  clearly  out  the  consequences  that  dis- 
regard of  this  strategic  factor  may  entail  is  the  campaign  that  the  combined 
fleets  of  France  and  Spain  made  on  the  coast  of  England,  during  the  sum- 
mer of  1779,  under  d'Orvillier's  command,  and  which  failed  miserably 
because  the  ships  could  remain  at  sea  no  longer. 

"  The  radius  of  action  of  sailing  ships  was  not  as  great  as  is  thought, 
even  though  it  was  independent  of  a  motor.  In  going  to  the  East  Indies, 
the  English  put  in  at  Brazil,  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  (or  at  St.  Helena 
before  the  seizure  of  the  Cape)  and  in  the  Portuguese  possessions  in  the 
Indian  Ocean.  To-day  the  Powerful  can  go  from  England  to  Mauritius 
without  coaling.  Squadrons  of  steamers,  therefore,  can  cover  a  greater 
distance  than  could  the  old  fleets  of  sailing  ships  to  which  an  "  infinite  " 
radius  of  action  is  often  ascribed. 

75 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

condition  on  board  ship,  but  on  the  quantity  of  coal  that  can  be 
burned ;  they  thus  have  a  direct  effect  upon  displacements,  which 
constantly  increase,  and  an  indirect  effect  upon  the  number  of  units, 
which  diminishes  proportionally  as  displacement  increases.  Still, 
it  can  be  said  that  the  radius  of  action,  facilitating  the  utilization 
of  all  available  forces,  compensates  to  a  certain  degree  for  the 
reduction  of  numbers  that  its  development  entails. 

The  limit  that  the  development  of  the  radius  of  action  ought  to 
attain  is  quite  dilificult  to  determine  precisely.  Some  officers  think 
that  it  is  fixed  by  the  distance  that  separates  the  different  bases  of 
operations.  War,  however,  does  not  consist  of  going  from  one 
point  to  another  by  the  shortest  road.  It  is  necessary  to  go  wher- 
ever the  enemy  is,  to  expend  coal  in  goings  and  comings,  in  a  word 
to  use  that  continuity  of  action  that  characterizes  successful  enter- 
prises. It  must  not  be  necessary  to  stop  to  take  coal  at  the  moment 
when  the  objective  is  reached.  The  radius  of  action  ought  not  to 
be  calculated  too  nicely;  it  can  only  be  deduced  from  the  general 
lines  of  the  plan  of  campaign  that  it  is  proposed  to  adopt. 

The  influence  of  the  radius  of  action  on  the  progression  of  dis- 
placements has  developed  in  the  French  Navy  a  current  opinion 
opposed  to  expansion  of  the  steaming  distance.  Fuel  being  a 
renewable  element,  it  has  been  thought  that  it  could  be  taken  on 
board  in  smaller  quantity  on  condition  of  more  often  filling  the 
empty  bunkers.  It  is  not  the  same  thing,  however,  to  traverse  a 
given  distance  at  one  stretch  and  in  several  successive  ones.  In 
the  latter  case,  there  results  a  great  loss  of  time,  and  perhaps  also 
the  necessity  of  going  out  of  one's  way. 

In  naval  operations,  the  steammg  distance  represents  the  factor 
"  movement."  Movement  is  the  soul  of  strategy,  that  which  gives 
it  life.  Without  the  faculty  of  moving  about,  all  is  arranged  in  ad- 
vance, events  follow  their  natural  course,  the  stronger  is  the  vic- 
tor, the  weaker  is  vanquished.  With  the  aid  of  movements  of 
forces,  on  the  contrary,  the  parts  may  be  reversed ;  the  material 
afloat  is  made  to  give  the  maximum  return,  it  is  multiplied. 
Whether  the  field  of  battle  be  accepted  or  imposed,  it  is  first  of  all 
important  to  bring  the  greatest  possible  number  of  ships  there: 
movement.  Finally,  the  most  direct  benefit  that  victory  procures 
is  to  permit  abandoning  an  adversary  reduced  to  impotency  in 
order  to  go  to  another  field :  movement. 

A  tactical  unit,  however  powerful,  will  never  render  any  but 
feeble  services  if  it  is  not  capable  of  moving  about  freely.     The 

76 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

enemy  will  be  satisfied  to  keep  out  of  its  way.  Without  going  back 
to  coast-defense  vessels,  regard  mobile  defenses :  if  our  squadrons 
were  sure  of  having  always  with  them  a  swarm  of  torpedo-boats, 
their  force  would  be  sensibly  increased ;  but  this  certitude  is  lack- 
ing because  those  boats  have  very  little  endurance,  are  frequently 
incapacitated  by  bad  weather,  and  finally  because  it  cannot  be  fore- 
seen where  and  when  the  enemy  will  be  encountered."^  If  some 
day  we  are  astonished  at  the  small  results  obtained  from  torpedo- 
boats,  w^e  shall  have  to  attribute  it  in  great  part  to  their  want  of 
mobility.  This  shows  that  tactics  and  strategy  are  indissolubly 
connected :  one  is  good  for  nothing  without  the  other. 

A  naval  force,  devoid  of  radius  of  action,  is  exclusively  defen- 
sive. It  may  thwart  the  enemy's  plans,  but  it  will  never  en- 
danger him.  It  contributes  nothing,  therefore,  towards  the  ends 
of  the  war ;  it  has  a  negative  efficiency.  It  may  be  redoubtable, 
but  its  power  is  fettered :  it  is  a  lion  enclosed  in  a  cage.  Interdict- 
ing access  to  such  or  such  a  point  does  not  better  one's  situation ; 
what  is  needed  is  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  being  safe  wherever 
he  may  be.  The  defensive  is  passive ;  the  oflfensive  is  active.  But 
the  latter  is  inconceivable  without  movement. 

Evidently  nations  that  build  ships  without  steaming  endurance 
have  good  hopes  of  being  able  to  make  use  of  them  ;  they  suppose 
that  war  will  take  a  form  appropriate  to  their  employment.  They 
thus  prepare  for  themselves  many  disappointments,  for,  with  this 
plan,  it  is  necessary  to  reckon  with  the  enemy,  who  will  always 
find  means  of  being  superior  in  force  and  in  number  if  he  has  only 
passive  forces  to  fear.  War  does  not  divide  itself  up  into  a  series 
of  particular  cases ;  it  comprises  onlv  one  general  case  which  is  to 
go  wherever  there  is  need  of  being. 

After  the  example  that  Spain,  the  United  States  and  Russia 
have  just  given  us,  mobility  cannot  be  thought  lightly  of.  Neither 
of  these  three  nations  was  capable  of  making  the  whole  of  its 
forces  take  part  in  operations,  because  part  of  them  was  incapable 
of  changing  its  place. 

*  '  * 

Fuel  is  not  the  only  constituent  of  the  radius  of  action.  That  is 
what  is  generally  referred  to;  but  there  is  another  factor  which 
cannot  be  neglected :  that  is  the  supply  of  munitions. 

"  Sea-going  qualities  have  a  place  among  the  factors  of  the  radius  of 
action  of  torpedo-boats. 

71 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

A  naval  force  whose  coal  bunkers  are  full  while  its  ammunition 
rooms  are  empty  is  none  the  less  powerless." 

In  estimates  of  a  ship's  radius  of  action,  the  supply  of  ammuni- 
tion is  the  necessary  condition,  and  the  quantity  of  coal  is  the 
sufficient  condition,  because  the  object  of  the  second  factor  is  to 
enhance  the  first. 

"When  the  Japanese  squadron  abandoned  the  battlefield  of  the  Yalu,  in 
want  of  ammunition,  it  lacked  radius  of  action.  It  was  the  same  with  the 
American  division  that  fought  the  battle  of  Cavite:  the  destruction  of  the 
Spanish  fleet  was  succeeded  by  a  long  period  of  inaction  occasioned  by  lack 
of  shell.  If  the  Spaniards  had  had  other  forces  in  the  Philippines,  the 
Americans  would  have  been  obliged  to  leave  the  islands. 


78 


Speed. 

The  advantages  secured  by  speed,  in  the  old  navy,  stand  out 
clearly  in  the  following  report  of  Suffren,  in  which  he  asks  that 
our  ships  be  copper-bottomed  so  as  to  be  able  to  cope  with  those 
of  the  English : 

"  Since  the  English  have  coppered  a  number  of  their  ships  and 
continue  to  do  so  with  such  activity  that  they  will  all  be  copper- 
sheathed  in  a  short  time,  the  operation  of  sheathing  ours  ought  not 
to  be  regarded  merely  as  advantageous ;  it  is  an  absolute  necessity. 
Otherwise,  when  they  are  the  stronger,  they  will  be  sure  of  coming 
up  with  us,  and  when  they  are  the  weaker,  avoiding  us 

"  In  Admiral  Rodney's  reports  may  be  seen  with  what  confi- 
dence he  sends  three  ships  into  the  Mediterranean,  with  what 
temerity  he  has  them  cruise  off  Port  Royal,  where  we  had  twenty- 
five.  But  for  the  sheathed  ships,  in  view  of  the  approach  of  night 
and  bad  weather,  Langara  might  have  escaped;  if  the  Prothcc 
had  been  sheathed,  she  would  not  have  been  taken.  These  re- 
flections, which  a  seaman  cannot  avoid  making,  have  deeply  af- 
fected me,  seeing  escape  the  escort  of  the  convoy  just  taken  by  the 
combined  fleet.  If  the  Zclc  had  been  sheathed,  she  would  have 
come  up  with  the  Ramillies  and  attacked  her.  In  a  previous 
cruise,  I  would  have  taken  five  privateers  that  I  had  chased,  and  a 
very  rich  convoy  going  from  London  to  Lisbon,  which  I  missed 
because  of  having  chased  for  sixteen  hours  a  privateer,  which 
separated  me  twenty-five  leagues  from  the  cruising  ground  that  I 
had  established  from  Cape  La  Roque  to  the  Scilly  Islands.  Finally, 
the  boldness  with  which  Commodore  Johnstone  cruises  with  a 
fifty-gun  ship  and  some  frigates,  encompassed  by  fifty  ships  of 
war,  is  a  very  strong  proof  of  what  I  have  just  stated." 

All  these  considerations  are  still  true.  The  advantages  of  speed 
can  be  summed  up  as  follows : 

Inferiority  of  speed  in  relation  to  the  enemy  compromises  all 
operations ;  it  renders  the  offensive  almost  impossible,  without 
profiting  the  defensive. 

79 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Superiority  of  speed  diminishes  the  dead  time  that  separates 
conception  from  execution ;  it  favors  surprises. 

The  influence  of  speed  manifests  itself  Hkewise  in  that  it  gives 
to  the  commander  greater  freedom  of  mind  and  of  movement, 
on  account  of  diminution  of  the  danger  that  results  from  the 
neighborhood  of  a  superior  force. 

Every'  effort  will,  therefore,  be  made  to  be  faster  than  the 
enemy,  but  just  here  comes  in  the  difficulty.  No  one  power  pos- 
sesses the  secret  of  building  ships  faster  than  those  of  its  neighbor ; 
and,  for  this  reason,  among  the  great  maritime  nations,  the  speeds 
of  each  class  of  ships  are  sensibly  equal.  If  a  navy  aims  at  supe- 
riority, its  lead  lasts  but  a  short  time  and  affects  only  so  limited  a 
number  of  ships  that  it  is  not  worth  being  concerned  about." 

Moreover,  supernatural  virtues  must  not  be  ascribed  to  speed. 
Its  admirers  draw  up  for  us  an  attractive  list  of  its  qualities: 
"  If  we  are  faster  than  the  enemy,  we  can  force  him  to  fight  when 
and  where  we  wish."  Things  do  not  come  to  pass  so  simply. 
Doubtless  it  is  possible  to  draw  the  enemy  to  oneself  by  occupying 
a  region  where  he  has  interests  to  safeguard ;  but  when  he  is  there 
the  encounter  will  take  place  when  and  where  it  can,  and  not  when 
and  where  one  would  like  it  to  be.  Speed  will  certainly  be  useful ; 
but  what  good  purpose  will  it  have  served  if,  in  order  to  arrive 
first  upon  the  battlefield,  we  have  had  to  throw  overboard  part  of 
the  artillery  to  increase  our  headway.  Yet  this  is  the  result  ar- 
rived at  by  seeking  superiority  of  speed  at  any  cost.  To  be  con- 
vinced of  it,  it  is  sufficient  to  compare  the  armaments  of  two  ships 
of  the  same  displacement  and  of  different  speeds. 

There  is  nothing  left  to  do  then  but  to  escape,  and  the  natural 
conclusion  is  that  it  would  have  been  better  not  to  come.  Flight  is 
not  a  solution ;  it  is  an  avoidance. 

When  speed  is  at  the  service  of  weakness,  it  merely  facilitates 
desertion.  During  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  the  Russian  cruis- 
ers furnished  us,  on  three  different  occasions,  with  valuable  indica- 
tions :  let  us  take  care  not  to  forget  them. 

It  will  not  be  easy  even  to  play  the  part  of  the  Wandering  Jew 
on  the  sea.    We  are  preparing  lor  ourselves  a  terrible  awakening 

"According  to  official  figures,  the  English  destroyers  are  faster  than 
ours;  but  accidents  have  shown  that  their  excess  of  speed  was  only  ob- 
tained by  the  sacrifice  of  qualities  essential  in  vessels ;  it  would,  therefore, 
be  an  embarrassment  rather  than  an  advantage. 

80       < 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

when  we  figure  that  a  superiority  of  two  or  three  knots  will  permit 
escaping.  It  may  be  supposed  that  a  ship  which  constantly  keeps 
all  fires  lighted  and  all  boilers  under  pressure  will  be  able  to 
escape  every  attack,  thanks  to  her  speed,  if  she  has  nothing  else  to 
do  but  take  to  her  heels  as  soon  as  smoke  is  seen  on  the  horizon. 
But  all  this  is  pure  theory.  In  practice  no  warship  is  capable  of 
keeping,  through  the  whole  duration  of  a  cruise,  her  boilers  at  17 
atmospheres'  pressure ;  and  before  taking  flight  it  is  needful  first 
to  recognize  with  whom  one  has  to  deal.  Thus  it  will  be  necessary 
to  let  oneself  be  approached,  and  when  it  is  decided  to  run  away, 
the  situation  will  already  be  critical.  To  escape  from  it,  the  ship 
will  have  to  undergo  one  of  those  tests  that  are  so  often  inter- 
rupted by  breakdowns  during  official  trials.  Mere  statistics  will 
show  the  danger  of  trusting  to  speed  under  these  excessive 
conditions. 

Doubtless  the  chaser  may  also  suffer  the  same  injuries,  but  for 
him  they  will  not  have  the  same  consequences ;  they  will  not 
entail  his  loss.    The  situation  is  not  the  same,  therefore. 

If,  instead  of  considering  the  case  of  a  single  ship,  we  take  that 
of  a  group  of  vessels,  we  arrive  at  still  more  pessimistic  conclu- 
sions. Homogeneity  of  speed  is  most  difficult  to  obtain ;  ships 
have  a  speed  depending  upon  their  age,  the  cleanness  of  their 
hulls,  the  amount  of  scale  in  their  boilers,  etc.  At  the  present 
time,  when  the  speed  of  battle-ships  closely  presses  that  of  cruisers, 
a  squadron  of  battle-ships  has  units  faster  than  the  poor  sailers  of 
a  division  of  cruisers.  Thenceforth,  the  latter  can  no  longer  es- 
cape without  abandoning  to  the  enemy  some  of  its  ships ;  the  lag- 
gards will  be  quickly  caught  by  the  fast  battle-ships ;  and  to  succor 
them  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  a  stand. 

All  this  proves  that  the  advantages  of  speed  are  much  more 
sensible  for  the  stronger  side,  which  derives  an  absolute  benefit 
from  it,  than  for  the  weaker  side,  which  will  make  use  of  it,  but 
which  only  has  an  interest  in  seeking  after  it  if  not  thereby 
weakened.  But,  until  a  new  invention  permits  getting  greater 
power  on  a  less  weight,  speed  will  only  be  increased  by  increasing 
the  power  of  the  engines  and  the  number  of  boilers  to  the  detri- 
ment of  armament.  In  this  way  we  fall  again  into  the  error  com- 
mitted at  the  time  when  battery  power  was  increased  by  making 
monster  guns,  and  the  protection  of  ships  by  giving  them  armor 
of  greater  thickness.    In  the  first  case,  the  armament  was  reduced 

81 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

to  one  or  two  big  guns;  in  the  second,  the  armor  sheltered  but  a 
slender  battery. 

The  result,  therefore,  is  that  the  weakest  navy  is  reduced  to  not 
letting  itself  be  left  behind,  and  to  seeking  preferably  endurance, 
which,  with  theoretically  equal  speeds,  gives  in  fact  superiority. 
This  necessity  is  all  the  more  imperative  because  speed  is  so  ex- 
cessively costly;  not  only  will  a  fast  ship  be  less  armed  on  an 
equal  displacement,  but  she  will  likewise  cost  more,  since  battle- 
ships cost  about  2200  francs  a  ton,  while  light  vessels  without  any 
protection  come  to  about  3000  francs  a  ton.  Speed,  therefore, 
weakens  in  two  ways :  it  diminishes  the  armament  of  ships  as  well 
as  their  number.  Nevertheless,  to-day,  one  can  no  longer  discuss 
speed  under  its  different  aspects  without  being  accused  of  the 
crime  of  lack  of  patriotism.  By  dint  of  exalting  it,  we  have  come 
to  deify  it.  It  is  no  longer  considered  in  its  relationship  to  other 
elements ;  it  is  made  a  thing  apart,  intangible,  which  has  value  in 
itself.  Let  us  not  fear,  on  the  contrary,  to  cry  aloud  (at  the  risk 
of  being  regarded  as  retrogressives)  that  speed  is  not  a  force,  but 
a  means  of  giving  value  to  force,  and  that  one  has  no  right  to 
sacrifice  a  single  sfun  to  it.    That  is  the  truth. 


The  speed  corresponding  to  the  most  rapid  pace  that  can  be  kept 
up  indefinitely  is  called  the  "  strategical  speed."  We  seamen  have 
no  concern  with  those  trial  speeds  that  are  reached  by  forcing  a 
ship  over  the  measured  base  like  a  race  horse  in  the  home  stretch. 
Such  feats  require  an  expenditure  of  energy  and  a  supplementary 
personnel  that  cannot  be  furnished  in  regular  service.  What  we 
need  is  to  keep  up  without  failure  a  sustained  rate  oi  speed,  that 
is  to  have  engines  that  are  not  liable  to  break  down. 

High  speed  demands  the  presence  in  engine  and  fire  rooms  of 
the  whole  force  of  mechanicians.     It  is,  therefore,  only  a  tactical  jl 
element  that  permits,  at  a  given  moment,  giving  a  leap  forward 
when  in  contact  with  the  enemy.'" 

°°  On  war-ships,  where  the  weight  and  space  allotted  to  the  machinery  are 
limited',  high  speeds  have  been  attained  by  means  of  an  expedient;  thanks 
to  very  elastic  boilers  that  can  burn  up  to  200  kilograms  of  coal  per  square 
meter  of  grate  surface,  there  is  obtained  by  forced  draft  an  overproduction 
of  steam  that  is  used  in  giving  an  excessive  number  of  revolutions  to  the 
engines.  For  cruising  speed  it  is  necessary  to  reduce  the  power  of  the 
engines  to  the  normal.  When  this  result  is  attained,  the  weight  per  horse- 
power is  almost  as  great  as  on  merchant  steamers. 

82 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Radius  of  action,  together  with  speed,  gives  the  ship  mobility. 
But  the  relative  importance  of  these  two  factors  is  not  the  same. 
Speed  is  a  prodigal  that  spends  without  counting  and  quickly  uses 
up  its  resources.  Radius  of  action  is  distinguished  by  perse- 
verance and  tenacity.  One  is  a  brilliant  quality ;  the  other  a  solid 
quality. 

However  weak  a  naval  force  may  be,  there  will  never  be  any 
difficulty  about  utilizing  it,  if  it  has  mobility  ;  it  will  always  be  pos- 
sible to  find  for  it  a  field  of  action  where  it  will  not  be  confronted 
with  the  cruel  necessity  of  yielding  with  honor. 


83 


VIII. 
Homogeneity. 

The  object  of  homogeneity  is  to  secure  the  maximum  return 
from  speed  and  radius  of  action.^"  It  is  the  factor  that  above  all 
others  gives  economy  of  forces.  Lack  of  homogeneousness  in  a 
fleet  constitutes  a  useless  squandering  of  force  and  money.  It  is 
evident,  in  fact,  that  the  speed  of  a  squadron  is  regulated  by  that 
of  the  slowest  ship  and  that  the  extent  of  operations  is  limited  by 
the  resources  of  the  ship  which  has  the  least  of  them."  It  may  be 
necessary,  therefore,  on  account  of  a  single  ship,  not  to  utilize  the 
qualities  of  a  whole  body  of  ships. 

Since  heterogeneousness  is  a  source  of  weakness,  the  weakest 
navy  ought  logically  to  strive  with  the  most  tenacity  for  similarity 
of  types. 

Unhappily,  France  has  never  done  so.  Never  has  she  taken 
pains  to  give  her  squadrons  a  reasonable  composition.  Matters 
have  even  gone  so  far  that  it  seems  as  if  there  had  sometimes  been 
an  endeavor  to  compose  a  mixture  of  unlike  ships  so  that  there 
might  be  some  for  every  taste.  It  was  doubtless  thought  that  the 
superior  qualities  of  some  would  compensate  the  deficiencies  of 
others,  and  that  all  lumped  together  would  have  an  average  value. 

Some  attempts  have  been  made  to  follow  a  more  reasonable 
course ;  they  were  partly  abandoned  and  moreover  were  but  im- 

°'  We  are  here  speaking  only  of  strategical  homegeneity ;  further  on  we 
shall  consider  the  character  of  tactical  homogeneity. 

"  Extract  from  one  of  d'Estaing's  cruising  reports :  "  The  Langnedoc 
and  the  Cesar  are  the  fastest.  The  Tonnanl  is  the  third  sailer  of  the  squad- 
ron ;  after  that  vessel  come  the  Hector  and  the  Zele.  The  Protecteur, 
Faniasque  and  Sagittaire  are  what  is  called  three  companion  ships.  The 
Marscillais  and  the  Provenge  sail  fairly;  as  for  the  Guerrier  and  the  Vail- 

lant,  they  are  the  two  worst  sailers  of  the  squadron You  may  get 

an  idea  of  the  slowness  to  which  we  are  condemned  by  the  Guerrier  and  the 
Vaillant  from  the  fact  that  of  all  the  merchant  ships  that  have  joined  us 
none  have  separated  from  the  squadron  except  when  they  wished.  These 
two  ships  labor  and  risk  theirs  spars,  keeping  always  under  full  sail,  while 
we  roll  and  the  sea  devours  us,  because  it  is  constantly  necessary  to  shorten 
sail  to  wait  for  them." 

84 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy, 

perfectly  carried  out.  How  reach  a  logical  solution  when,  in  our 
navy,  each  unit  has  its  special  character?  It  is  enough  to  cite  the 
Redoiitahlc,  Devastation  and  Coiirbet  to  show  that  ships  can  have 
very  different  capabilities  in  spite  of  a  certain  similarity  of  lines. 
Our  latest  squadron  itself  is  not  homogeneous  as  regards 
armaments. 

One  would  like  to  know  the  role  intended  to  be  assigned  to  a 
division  such  as  our  Far-Eastern  squadron  was  quite  recently 
(Bayard,  Vaiiban,  Isly,  Pascal,  Eclaireur).  These  ships  embar- 
rassed each  other,  without  being  able  to  mutually  support  one 
another.  It  would  have  been  at  least  logical  to  give  to  the  less 
armed  ships  the  greatest  speed ;  yet  the  Kersaint,  which  replaced 
the  Eclaireur,  was  built  for  i6  knots,  while  the  Pascal  steams  19, 

At  all  periods  the  English  have  cared  more  than  we  for  homo- 
geneity. It  is  known  witn  what  care  the  squadrons  that  had  the 
mission,  always  delicate,  of  revictualing  Gibraltar  in  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  were  composed.  The  cohesion  that  was  the  advan- 
tage of  homogeneity  was  not  unconnected  with  the  success  of  this 
operation.  In  our  times,  the  English  fleet  has  this  same  char- 
acteristic that  is  so  wholly  wanting  to  ours,  because  in  England 
ships  are  built  in  groups  and  improvements  are  introduced  in  a 
whole  group. 

It  would  be  vain  to  seek  in  the  past  for  instances  of  lack  of 
homogeneousness  procuring  advantage,  while  its  disadvantages 
are  revealed  to  us  on  every  page  of  history.  What  fatality  then 
weighs  upon  the  French  Navy  that  it  persists  in  not  seeing  this? 

Beyond  doubt,  a  great  effort  was  made  to  try — without,  how- 
ever, succeeding — to  have  at  least  one  homogeneous  squadron  of 
battle-ships ;  but  this  laudable  intention  did  not  extend  to  armored 
cruisers,  which  continue  to  be  samples.  The  Lcon-Gamhetta, 
Ernest-Renan  and  Waldeck-Rousseaii  have  different  batteries. 

There  is  no  situation,  in  naval  warfare,  where  lack  of  homo- 
geneity is  a  greater  handicap  than  in  the  case  of  a  naval  force 
obliged  to  take  to  flight.  At  the  end  of  a  short  time  the  ships  are 
trailed  out  in  the  order  of  their  speed  and  fall  successively  into  the 
enemy's  ranks."*  A  uniform  speed,  however  small,  would  compel 
making  a  stand  and  the  battle  would  have  a  less  unfavorable 
aspect. 

■^  This  was  the  cause  of  the  Quiberon  disaster  and  the  origin  of  the  loss 
of  de  la  Clue's  ships. 

8S 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Homogeneousness  of  squadrons  has  not  the  same  value  as 
that  of  the  ships  of  each  squadron  by  itself. 

There  is  no  advantage  in  having  several  squadrons  of  the  same 
characteristics.  Naval  material  is  always  being  improved  upon, 
and,  if  it  were  wished  to  have  all  our  squadrons  similar,  we  would 
be  distanced  by  rival  navies,  or  would  be  deprived  of  the  assistance 
of  ships  already  old,  but  not  destitute  ot  military  value.  The 
different  fractions  of  our  forces  will  have  to  fulfil  different  duties 
that  do  not  require  them  all  to  have  the  same  qualities  to  the  same 
degree ;  if  they  have  to  unite,  they  will  not  all  have  the  same  road 
to  follow.  It  will  be  sufficient,  therefore,  to  give  the  hardest  task 
to  the  squadron  that  has  the  most  means. 

In  any  one  squadron,  it  is  the  homogeneity  of  the  fighting  line 
alone  that  is  important.  The  light  vessels  that  spread  in  all  direc- 
tions will  frequently  be  employed  singly.  On  the  different  services 
that  are  given  them,  they  will  have  to  display  all  their  qualities, 
and  the  more  these  qualities  are  developed  the  better ;  but  the  older 
vessels,  and  consequently  less  well  equipped,  will  not  be  the  less 
useful  in  default  of  others ;  they  will  render  services  of  less  value, 
but  still  valuable.  Moreover,  the  employment  of  light  vessels  is  of  so 
various  a  nature  that  it  even  requires  sometimes  different  types."" 
The  relative  homogeneity  given  them  will,  therefore,  result  from 
considerations  of  economy  rather  than  of  strategy,  because  variety 
is  a  source  of  expense. 

"  Scouts  of  small  draft  may  be  needed,  and  others  of  great  radius  of 
action. 


86 


THIRD   PART 


OPERATIONS 


I. 

The  Attack  and  Defense  of  Coasts. 

In  our  time  coast  defense  has  assumed  such  a  preponderance  in 
the  thoughts  of  the  naval  world  that  it  seems,  by  itself  alone,  to 
embody  naval  war.  According  to  some,  we  have  built  a  navy  at 
great  expense  only  to  secure  "  the  inviolability  of  our  shores  " — 
such  is  the  consecrated  expression.  Others,  seeking  to  discover 
the  unknown  of  future  struggles  in  the  naval  operations  of  the 
last  century,  have  observed  that  they  almost  all  took  place  along 
the  coast  and  were  summed  up  in  attacks  upon  fortified  works, 
combined  with  landings ;  thence  they  have  concluded  that  naval 
warfare  in  the  course  of  its  evolution  has  taken  a  new  form,  of 
which  the  type  is  furnished  by  the  American  Civil  War,  and  the 
Crimean  expedition. 

Before  imposing  this  system  of  warfare  upon  France,  with  all 
the  consequences  that  it  entails  in  respect  to  material,  the  causes 
which  gave  birth  to  it  should  first  have  been  determined  ;  it  would 
then  have  been  found  that,  during  the  American  Civil  War,  the 
Confederates  had  an  improvised  navy,  absolutely  unfit  for  carry- 
ing on  a  war,  and  that,  during  the  Crimean  expedition,  the  Rus- 
sians sunk  their  ships.  In  both  cases,  therefore,  the  aggressor 
found  himself,  at  the  very  outset,  in  a  position  as  advantageous  as 
if  he  had  previously  destroyed  the  offensive  forces  of  the  adver- 
sary, and  these  examples  do  not  furnish  us  with  any  indication  as 
to  the  influence  that  naval  forces  will  exercise  upon  the  protection 
of  the  coast. 

The  public  always  looks  with  favor  upon  coast  defense  ;  without 
responsibility  for  the  conduct  of  war,  it  sees  above  all  the  evils  that 
war  engenders,  and  is  frightened  at  the  idea  of  suffering  its  con- 
sequences. The  ready-made  opinions  of  those  facile  writers  who 
flatter  the  instinct  of  self-preservation  innate  in  man  are,  there- 
fore, freely  accepted.  Under  this  influence,  each  village,  each  city, 
each  region  craves  its  share  of  protection ;  the  spectre  of  the 
Augusta  ravaging  our  shores  in  1870  is  evoked,  and  batteries, 
torpedo-boats,  coast-defense  ships  and  even  squadrons  are 
demanded. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Whither  do  such  exaggerations  lead?  For.  after  all,  the 
always-cited  Augusta  captured  but  two  steamers  and  a  navy-yard 
auxiliary ;  and  we  have  not  built  two  hundred  torpedo-boats  and 
spent  hundreds  of  millions  on  battleships  in  order  to  arm  ourselves 
against  such  a  danger  as  that.  It  will  be  impossible  to  carry  on 
war  if  all  our  resources  are  devoted  to  repelling  imaginary 
dangers. 

War,  we  cannot  too  often  repeat,  can  have  no  other  object  than 
imposing  upon  the  enemy  the  law  of  the  stronger.  We  have  no 
right,  therefore,  to  regard  the  defense  of  the  coast  as  an  inde- 
pendent question,  which  leads  to  becoming  absorbed  in  the  acces- 
sory to  the  detriment  of  the  principal.  It  can  only  be  taken  into 
account,  in  the  employment  of  our  resources,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  its  relations  with  the  public  wealth  that  nourishes  the 
war.  The  share  that  goes  to  it  ought  to  represent  only  an  insur- 
ance premium  proportional  to  the  capital  guaranteed.  If  the  pre- 
mium is  greater  than  the  insured  capital,  it  is  an  absurdity. 

The  first  thing  to  do,  therefore,  is  to  take  account  of  the  danger 
incurred  from  expeditions  against  the  coast  and  the  chances  of 
their  taking  place.  We  shall  then  try  to  determine  if  it  be  not 
possible  to  secure  an  efficient  protection  of  the  coast  without  im- 
peding the  offensive  action  that  alone  can  bring  the  enemy  to 
terms. 

It  is  curious  that  those  who  profess  to  see  in  attack  upon  our 
shores  the  supreme  calamity  have  confined  themselves  to  recording 
facts  without  weighing  their  import.  Yet  the  study  of  causes  and 
efifects  is  the  best  basis  of  estimation  that  we  have :  we  will  begin 
with  it. 

attacks  against  the  coast  in  the  reign  of  LOUIS  XIII.™ 

In  1627,  France  has  no  navy.  The  enemy  can  insult  our  shores 
without  fear  of  being  taken  in  the  rear ;  if  he  attempts  a  landing, 
the  sea  gives  him  a  line  of  retreat  and  secure  communications, 

England  takes  advantage  of  this  to  endeavor  to  get  a  foothold 

""  For  the  attacks  that  took  place  upon  the  Atlantic  coast  during  the 
period  comprising  the  reigns  of  Louis  XIII  and  Louis  XIV,  we  have  fol- 
lowed fhe  account  of  Mr.  Georges  Toudouze,  who  has  published  an  excel- 
lent work,  with  full  references,  upon  the  organization  of  the  defense  of  the 
coasts  in  the  seventeenth  century.  We  quote  verbatim  such  passages  as  are 
of  special  interest. 

90 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

in  the  midst  of  the  rebellious  Protestant  communities,  and  to 
acquire  a  base  of  operations  with  a  view  to  reconquering  the  an- 
cient kingdom  of  Aquitaine. 

On  July  20,  Buckingham  appears  before  the  island  of  Re  with 
120  ships  carrying  8000  soldiers. 

On  the  26th,  the  landing  is  completed  ;  the  27th,  the  little  French 
garrison,  forced  to  retreat,  shuts  itself  up  in  the  citadel  of  Saint 
Martin,  where  it  is  immediately  besieged.  The  siege  lasted  five 
months. 

In  spite  of  a  reinforcement  of  4000  men,  Buckingham  could  not 
overcome  the  heroic  resistance  of  Toiras ;  and,  on  November  27, 
he  re-embarked,  taking  back  to  England  only  2000  men. 

The  failure  was  complete. 

ATTACKS  AGAINST  THE  COAST  IN   THE  REIGN   OF  LOUIS  XIV. 

War  breaks  out,  in  1672,  between  Holland  on  one  side  and 
France  and  England  on  the  other. 

The  first  two  years  pass  in  conflicts  of  squadrons  against  squad- 
rons ;  they  are  signalized  by  the  battles  of  Southwood,  Walcheren 
and  the  Texel ;  but  in  1674,  Holland,  having  made  peace  with 
England,  takes  advantage  of  the  transfer  of  all  our  forces  from 
the  Atlantic  to  the  Mediterranean  to  attempt  systematically  to 
ravage  our  sea  coast. 

Tromp,  with  a  fleet  of  36  ships  and  34  transports,  carrying  8000 
men,  first  cruises  off  the  Normandy  coast,  seeking  a  landing  place  ; 
but  he  found  the  shore  so  well  guarded  everywhere  that  he  dared 
not  risk  his  troops. 

At  the  end  of  June,  the  Dutch  fleet  appears  at  the  entrance  of 
the  Iroise ;  a  storm  drives  it  out  to  sea.  It  then  proceeded  to 
Belle-Isle  where  it  anchored  on  June  27. 

Count  Horn,  who  commanded  the  troops,  summoned  the  place 
to  surrender.  The  governor  of  the  island  having  refused  to  yield, 
the  Dutch  general  did  not  dare  to  force  a  landing  and  employed  a 
classic  method. 

During  the  night  fifty  men  were  put  on  shore  at  the  little  village 
of  Locmaria,  and  set  fire  to  the  houses.  Thanks  to  this  diversion, 
which  attracted  the  defenders  of  the  island,  the  troops  were  able 
to  land  in  the  harbor  of  Grand-Sable  without  opposition. 

The  garrison  of  the  island  took  refuge  in  the  citadel,  expecting 

91 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

to  support  a  siege ;  after  a  fruitless  assault,  the  Dutch  were  con- 
tent to  ravage  the  island,  and  on  July  4  they  got  under  way  and 
steered  for  Noirmoutiers. 

The  hostile  fleet  remained  off  this  island  three  weeks,  while  the 
disembarked  forces  levied  contributions  upon  the  inhabitants,  de- 
stroyed the  fortifications  and  laid  hands  on  private  properties. 
After  having  loaded  his  ships  wath  the  spoils,  Tromp  got  under 
way  and  proceeded  to  make  a  peaceful  demonstration  in  the 
Straits  of  Oleron  ;  then  he  finally  left  the  Atlantic  and  went  to 
join  the  Spaniards  in  the  Mediterranean. 

"  Nobody  in  France  at  all  understood  this  strange  expedition 
which  journeyed  along  the  coast  and  whose  greatest  exploit  was 
the  pillage  of  Noirmoutiers."  " 

Our  shores  were  troubled  no  further  until  the  Peace  of  Nime- 
guen :  the  fleets  of  both  sides  operate  in  the  Mediterranean,  where 
they  have  neither  the  time  nor  the  means  of  doing  harm  of  a 
purely  material  nature. 

We  come  now  to  the  war  of  the  League  of  Augsburg. 

The  first  four  years  pass  without  attacks  upon  the  coast :  it  is 
the  period  when  our  naval  power  is  at  its  apogee  and  enables  us 
to  hold  in  check  the  united  forces  of  England  and  Holland.  Three 
years  in  succession,  Tourville  paralyzes  the  efforts  of  the  allied 
fleets,  and  even  inflicts  defeat  upon  them  at  Beachy  Head.  But, 
in  1692,  he  is  beaten  at  La  Hogue,  and  with  the  following  year  the 
enemy  reappears  off  our  coasts."^ 

Louis  XI\^,  in  fact,  yielding  to  Pontchartrain's  solicitations, 
renounces  the  struggle  of  fleets  in  the  Atlantic  and  sends  Tour- 
ville into  the  Mediterranean."^  The  following  year  this  admiral 
goes  again  to  the  Levant,  where  his  squadron  remains  until  the 

"  Georges  Toudouze,  La  Defence  des  cotes  de  Dunkerque  a  Bayonnc  au 
dix-septicme  siecle. 

"  The  battle  of  La  Hogue  was  fought  at  the  end  of  May.  The  allies, 
therefore,  had  time  to  profit  by  their  victory,  campaigns  not  ending  until 
the  autumn;  in  fact  they  had  planned  a  combined  attack  upon  Saint  Malo, 
but  the  season  slipped  uway  before  the  naval  and  military  authorities  were 
able  to  agree  upon  the  plan  of  operations  (see  Colomb,  Naval  Warfare). 

*^  He  set  sail  from  Brest,  on  May  26,  with  seventy-one  ships,  almost  the 
entire  naval  force  of  France.  It  was  during  this  voyage  that  he  met,  off 
Lagos,  a  convoy  of  four  hundred  sail  escorted  by  twenty-six  ships,  part  of 
which  he  captured. 

92 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

end  of  the  war  very  nearly  without  occupation."  The  Atlantic, 
therefore,  remains  undefended. 

It  was  Saint  Malo  that  sustained  the  first  onset. 

On  November  27,  a  fleet  composed  of  ''  twelve  ships,  twelve 
bomb-ketches,  twelve  brigantines  and  several  gunboats,"  under 
the  orders  of  Captain  Benbow,  arrayed  itself  in  the  roadstead. 

For  five  days  the  town  was  bombarded.  Although  the  defenses 
were  far  from  complete,  the  inhabitants,  seconded  by  the  troops, 
put  a  good  face  on  the  matter  and  replied  energetically. 

It  was  on  this  occasion  that  the  English  made  trial  of  those 
infernal  machines  *  that  they  were  to  make  frequent  use  of  in  this 
war  and  that  never  yielded  anything  but  disappointments.  The 
Vesuve  was  blown  up,  but  destroyed  only  her  own  crew. 

The  enemy  reckoned  upon  destroying  a  nest  of  privateers  when 
he  appeared  of?  Saint  Malo;  he  only  succeeded  in  breaking  win- 
dows and  slates.  "  It  is  no  joke,  says  a  contemporary  account, 
to  say  that  with  the  exception  of  a  soldier  who  disappeared 
from  the  Bidouane  tower  where  he  was  on  sentry  duty,  and  of  the 
poor  devil  of  a  gunner  before  mentioned,  our  only  loss  was  an 
unfortunate  cat  killed  in  a  gutter."  °* 

After  this  exploit,  the  fleet  went  to  its  home  ports  to  winter. 

In  order  to  restore  their  prestige,  the  allies  prepared,  for  the 
next  campaign,  an  attack  upon  Brest.  The  plan  consisted  of 
landing  a  small  army  on  the  peninsulas  of  Kelern  in  order  to 
destroy  all  the  defenses  on  the  south  side  of  the  narrow  entrance 
and  so  to  permit  the  ships  to  go  through  the  passes  and  reach  the 
arsenal. 

On  June  17,  1694,  the  Dutch-English  fleet,  commanded  by  Lord 
Berkeley,  entered  the  Iroise  and  moored  at  the  entrance  of  the 
passage,  between  Bertheaume  and  Camaret.  It  was  composed  of 
22  English  ships,  19  Dutch,  12  bomb-ketches  and  a  great  number 
of  transports.*'  General  Tollemache  was  in  command  of  the  land- 
ing force  of  troops,  6000  in  number. 

"  He  left  Brest  on  April  24. 

*  "  Machines  "  or  "  infernals  "  were  fire  ships  arranged  to  explode. — 
P.  R.  A. 

^  Quoted  by  Georges  Toudouze. 

°*  Colomb,  Naval  Warfare.  We  have  given  preference  to  the  figures  of 
English  historians  as  regards  the  composition  of  squadrons  and  the  number 
of  troops ;  on  the  contrary,  we  have  adopted  the  French  version  of  the 

93 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

That  very  evening-  a  frigate  went  to  reconnoiter  the  beach  at 
Trez-Roiiz,  on  the  Camaret  side,  where  the  landing  was  to  take 
place ;  but  scarcely  had  she  approached  the  shore  when  the  fire  of 
the  batteries  forced  her  to  withdraw.  It  was  a  disappointment : 
Lord  Berkeley  was  not  expecting  any  resistance  and,  since  the 
French  were  on  their  guard,  the  situation  took  on  quite  another 
aspect. 

In  a  council  of  war,  the  admiral  was  in  favor  of  giving  up  the 
expedition  ;  but  General  Tollemache's  opinion  prevailed,  and  the 
landing  was  agreed  upon  for  the  following  day. 

In  the  night,  Vauban,  who  commanded  the  defense,  sent  rein- 
forcements onto  the  peninsulas  of  Kelern ;  everyone  got  ready  to 
receive  the  enemy. 

On  the  1 8th,  as  soon  as  the  fog  lifted,  seven  frigates  got  under 
way,  with  Rear-Admiral  Carmarthen  in  command,  to  protect  the 
landing. 

"  Carmarthen  made  preparations  to  direct  his  whole  fire  against 
the  fort  (of  Camaret)  ;  but  scarcely  had  the  seven  frigates  cleared 
the  reef  that  terminates  Convent  Point  when  the  entire  circuit  of 
the  shore  burst  into  flame,  and  a  terrific  fire,  from  batteries  whose 
existence  was  unknown  to  the  allies,  was  poured  upon  the  seven 
ships.  For  a  moment  they  were  thrown  into  a  disorder  and  con- 
fusion that  only  the  impetuous  valor  of  Carmarthen  saved  from 
being  fatal  to  them.  While  he  established  order  in  the  action  so 
brusquely  begun,  and  recovered  his  men  from  their  surprise, 
Berkele}-  made  a  last  effort  to  induce  Tollemache  to  withdraw 
from  his  enterprise  in  view  of  such  a  superiority  of  the  defense. 
But  the  lieutenant-general  would  pay  no  heed  and  took  the  leader- 
ship of  a  hundred  boats  containing  the  first  troops  of  the  landing 
force. 

"  Very  gallantly,  meanwhile,  three  frigates  brought  their  broad- 
sides to  bear  at  half-range  from  the  batteries  of  Convent  Point ; 
three  others  attacked  the  little  fort  of  Camaret,  and  the  seventh 
stood  for  the  beach  of  Trez-Rouz  to  be  ready  for  the  arrival  of 
the  boats.  The  latter,  in  their  turn,  entered  the  circle  of  fire 
formed  by  the  French  batteries,  which  sunk  a  number  of  them ; 
the  rest,  nevertheless,  put  ashore  under  the  most  frightful  fire 


results  of  each  operation,  because  the  enemy  never  made  an  exact  return 
of  the  damages  he  did. 

94 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

from  artillery  and  small  arms  that  can  be  imagined,  and  the  troops, 
already  harassed,  began  to  land  among  the  breakers.  But,  taken 
from  one  side  by  a  battery,  shot  at  from  the  front  by  marines  and 
coast-defense  militia  sheltered  behind  breastworks  overlooking  the 
beach,  the  Dutch-English  deployed  in  a  disorderly  manner  on  the 
wet  sands  and  their  decimated  lines  wavered.  Too  numerous  to  be 
all  sheltered  behind  an  enormous  rock  that  occupies  the  center  of 
the  beach,  they  were  not  sufficiently  numerous  to  attempt  to  as- 
sault intrenchments  ;  the  murderous  fire  that  they  endured  delayed 
the  arrival  of  other  boats,  already  hindered  by  the  ebb  tide,  while 
the  supporting  frigates  with  great  difficulty  made  head  against 
the  French  batteries 

"  In  this  critical  situation,  a  very  visible  hesitation  showed  itself 
in  the  ranks  of  the  disembarked  soldiers :  seizing  with  the  greatest 
good  fortune  upon  this  instant  of  indecision,  MM.  de  •  Benoise 
and  de  la  Cousse  rushed  sword  in  hand  onto  the  beach  and,  at  the 
head  of  a  hundred  men  from  the  volunteer  companies,  ran  straight 
at  the  1 200  or  1300  Dutch-English  drawn  up  along  the  sands. 
Following  at  once  this  bold  example,  1600  to  1800  coast-defense 
militia,  who  were  occupying  the  ridges  bordering  the  beach  and 
many  of  whom  were  armed  only  with  sticks  and  scythes  with 
handles  reversed,  rushed  in  a  body  upon  the  enemy  with  savage 
cries.  A  furious  but  brief  hand-to-hand  conflict  ensued.  At  the 
very  beginning  Tollemache  fell,  mortally  wounded ;  he  was  im- 
mediately borne  to  his  boat,  which  escaped  under  oars  and  sail, 
as  did  also  all  the  boats  that  had  not  yet  been  beached.  It  was  the 
beginning  of  a  complete  rout ;  the  disembarked  troops  wished  to 
flee,  but  the  falling  tide  had  left  their  boats  aground  and  the  over- 
loaded craft  remained  stranded.  The  supporting  frigate  gave  way 
in  her  turn  and  stood  ofif,  three-quarters  dismantled  and  powerless 
to  help.  On  the  beach,  in  spite  of  a  very  fine  resistance,  800  sol- 
diers lay  dead,  and  the  400  to  500  survivors  laid  down  their  arms 
to  a  squadron  of  Du  Plessis-Praslin's  regiment,  arrived  post-haste 
to  save  these  unfortunates  to  whom  the  coast-guards,  drunk  with 
fury,  refused  any  quarter. 

"  In  a  few  moments  all  was  over  and  shouts  of  victory  rang 
about  the  circuit  of  the  bay,  while  the  batteries,  still  keeping  up  a 
rapid  fire,  hailed  projectiles  upon  the  retreating  boats  and  the 
frigates  already  so  harassed.  The  Monck,  Carmarthen's  ship, 
after  having  in  vain  sought  to  force  the  Camaret  entrance,  her 

95 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

yards  carried  away,  her  sails  in  tatters,  her  hull  pierced  with  shot 
holes,  had  to  call  for  a  tow.  The  two  frigates  that  had  attacked 
the  little  fort  of  Camaret  retreated  in  their  turn,  after  having 
knocked  down  the  bell  of  the  chapel  of  Notre  Dame  of  Roc- 
Amadour,  situated  on  the  jetty,  beside  the  fort,  and  on  the  walls 
of  which  the  marks  of  their  shot  are  still  to  be  seen.  But  of  the 
three  ships  that  struggled  painfully  with  the  batteries  of  Convent 
Point,  only  two  could  regain  the  fleet.  The  third,  a  Dutch  34-gun 
ship  named  the  Wesep,  was  too  near  the  shore ;  she  touched  bot- 
tom on  the  shoal  known  under  the  name  of  Corejou,  could  not 
lighten  herself  and  remained  stranded  wath  12  feet  of  water  in 
her  hold,  under  a  terrible  fire:  she  finally  surrendered  to  M.  de 
La  Gondiniere,  whose  musketeers  were  shooting  the  crew  from  the 
top  of  the  neighboring  cliff;  forty  dead  were  found  on  her  and  60 
prisoners.  Just  prior  to  this,  a  boat  loaded  with  infantry  had  been 
sunk  outright  in  the  middle  of  the  bay  by  a  shell  from  the  battery 
of  two  mortars  established  on  Convent  Point. 

"  Little  by  little,  the  remnants  of  the  expedition  rejoined  the 
main  body  of  the  squadron,,  over  which  reigned  profound  dis- 
couragement; the  losses,  in  fact,  were  out  of  all  proportion  with 
the  duration  of  the  fight.  On  the  beach  of  Trez-Rouz,  800  men 
had  perished ;  500  were  prisoners ;  400  to  500  soldiers  and  sailors 
had  been  killed  on  the  ships  and  in  the  boats ;  2  vessels  and  48 
boats  were  lost.  It  was  a  veritable  disaster,  and  English  his- 
torians have  vainly  sought  to  conceal  its  full  extent.  Tollemache, 
enraged  at  having  been  beaten  by  peasants,  wished  to  attempt 
savage  reprisals ;  he  demanded  that  Berkeley  force  the  entrance  of 
the  harbor  at  any  cost  and  destroy  the  town  of  Camaret  with  hot 
shot  from  the  entire  squadron,  to  avenge  upon  the  inhabitants  his 
bloody  repulse.  This  proposal  on  the  part  of  the  lieutenant-general 
was  rejected  by  the  members  of  the  council  of  war,  who  were 
little  anxious  to  engage  in  a  new  action ;  and  Berkeley,  whose  too 
well-founded  apprehensions  had  been  justified  by  the  event,  or- 
dered sail  made.  The  allied  squadron,  lifting  anchor,  started  back 
for  England,  but  its  misfortunes  were  not  over ;  in  doubling  Oues- 
sant,  it  had  to  abandon  to  sink  in  those  waters  two  ships  that  had 
suffered  much  in  the  battle  of  the  i8th,  and  it  was  then  assailed 
for  five  days  by  a  violent  storm  from  the  southeast.  It  only 
reached  Portsmouth  at  the  end  of  the  month,  much  crippled."  " 

"  Georges  Toudouze. 

96 


A  Studv  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Made  ridiculous  at  Saint  Malo,  beaten  at  Camaret,  the  allies 
sought  a  revenge  that  could  repay  them  without  making  them  run 
any  risk. 

They  fixed  their  choice  upon  Dieppe,  a  town  almost  without 
defense. 

In  the  middle  of  July,  the  town  was  bombarded.  The  houses, 
built  of  wood,  were  soon  set  on  fire  by  the  action  of  shells ;  two- 
thirds  of  the  town  was  consumed  by  the  flames.  The  inhabitants, 
moreover,  did  nothing  to  arrest  the  conflagration. 

After  this  easy  success,  the  Dutch-English  went  to  Havre  to 
recommence  the  same  operation.  But  there  arrangements  had 
been  made  to  combat  the  fire,  which  was  the  only  serious  danger 
from  such  bombardments.  The  damage  done  was  unimportant ; 
moreover,  the  place  made  a  good  defense :  twice  the  batteries 
forced  the  hostile  fleet  to  change  its  anchorage  and  blew  up  a 
bomb-ketch. 

After  having  remained  five  days  before  Havre,  the  allies  pro- 
ceeded to  Dunkirk :  "  but  there  they  had  to  deal  with  a  veritable 
stronghold  and  they  were  awaited  resolutely ;  the  forts  were  well 
armed  and  supplied,  and  Jean  Bart  in  person  had  accepted  the 
command  of  six  long-boats  and  eleven  chaloupes  intended  to  give  a 
warm  reception  to  bomb-ketches  that  came  near  the  harbor. 

"  The  enemy  appeared  on  September  20,  and  the  advance  guard 
of  frigates  that  came  to  sound  the  roadstead  gave  way  under  the 
fire  from  the  Risban  and  the  citadel.  The  22d,  thirty-six  ships, 
frigates  and  fire-ships  came  to  attack  the  forts  at  the  head  of  the 
jetties,  but  the  guns  of  these  forts  blew  up  the  two  infernal 
machines  brought  by  the  fleet,  before  they  were  able  to  secure 
them  to  the  framework  of  the  jetty ;  and  after  this  check  the 
enemy  withdrew  out  of  range  of  the  artillery. 

"  They  only  got  up  anchor  on  the  26th,  to  throw  some  bombs, 
without  result,  into  Calais ;  from  Calais  they  went  to  cruise  oflf 
Cherbourg  and  finally  returned  to  England."  ^ 

The  campaign  of  1694  was  over,  According  to  custom,  the 
fleets  took  up  their  winter  quarters  and  only  rearmed  in  the  spring. 

In  1695,  the  objective  of  the  allies  has  not  changed:  they  wish 
at  any  cost  to  utterly  destroy  the  haunts  where  our  privateers  took 
refuge.  The  towns  of  Saint  Malo  and  Dunkirk,  therefore,  will 
sustain  their  principal  attack.     But,   doubtless   attributing  their 

**  Georges  Toudouze. 

97 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

repulses  in  the  preceding  year  to  the  insufficiency  of  their  means, 
they  increase  their  forces.  It  is  a  fleet  of  seventy  ships  that  comes 
to  anchor  off  Saint  Malo  on  July  14. 

The  15th,  the  enemy  endeavored,  without  any  success,  to  de- 
stroy the  Conche  fort;  they  fired  1500  to  1600  shells,  only  900  of 
which  fell  in  the  town,  and  the  appraisement  that  was  made  on  the 
following  30th  of  July  gives  as  the  sum  total  of  damages  103,532 
francs,  and  as  the  number  of  victims  20  to  25  persons,  besides  four 
soldiers  of  the  Oleron  regiment.  As  for  the  allies,  their  losses, 
which  can  scarcely  be  estimated  accurately,  must  have  been  great, 
for  the  English  historian  Smollet  says  that  the  English  bomb  ves- 
sels suffered  more  harm  than  they  caused.  What  is  certain  is  that 
one  of  them  ran  aground  at  Cesambre  and  another  was  burned 
and  then  abandoned  by  her  crew ;  besides  which  three  double 
chaloupes  were  sunk.°° 

The  enemy  perceived  that  they  were  uselessly  expending  their 
time  and  money,  and  on  the  17th  they  withdrew.  But  while  the 
main  body  of  the  fleet  proceeded  to  England,  a  newly  arrived 
detachment  delayed  to  throw  500  shells  into  Granville,  "  without 
doing  much  damage,  although  the  English  boasted  of  having  left 
that  town  in  flames."  ™ 

After  having  revictualed,  the  allies  appear  before  Dunkirk  in 
August. 

It  is  probable  that  the  commanders  of  the  f^eet  understood  very 
well  that  they  would  be  no  more  successful  than  at  Saint  Malo,  but 
their  governments  still  had  a  right  to  preserve  their  illusions  ; 
since,  judging  by  the  English  accounts,  the  admirals,  not  daring 
to  avow  their  repulses  themselves,  aided  to  deceive  them  by  exag- 
gerating the  results.  If  what  they  said  had  been  true,  it  would  not 
have  been  necessary  to  attack  the  same  places  after  such  short 
intervals. 

This  time,  the  number  of  bomb-ketches  had  been  increased  to 
twenty."  It  was  all  to  no  efifect,  or  rather  it  had  this  effect — 
never  again  did  the  English  attack  Dunkirk. 

"^  Georges  Toudouze.  ""  Georges  Toudouze. 

"  At  this  epoch,  bomb-ketches,  invented  by  the  French  engineer  Petit- 
Renau,  played  the  principal  part  in  bombardments.  The  movable  sight  not 
existing  (it  did  not  appear  till  the  middle  of  the  19th  century),  gun  fire 
was  very  uncertain,  and  the  ketches,  owing  to  their  small  size,  offered  a  tar- 
get very  difficult  to  hit.    Advantage  was  taken  of  this  to  bring  them  as  near 

9<S 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

"  Finding  themselves  in  this  sorry  plight,  being  obliged  either 
to  endure  the  fire  of  the  batteries  or  to  risk  being  lost  on  the 
Brack  shoal,  the  enemy  preferred,  according  to  Clement's  phrase, 
'  to  wipe  avv^ay  their  grief  upon  Calais,'  which  they  did,  however, 
to  a  very  moderate  degree,  since,  although  they  did  some  damage, 
they  could  not,  in  spite  of  all  their  efforts,  burn  or  destroy  the 
wooden  pier  that  sheltered  Calais  on  the  side  of  the  sea."  " 

In  1696  the  allies  become  more  cautious ;  in  May  they  bombard 
Calais  in  a  spiritless  way,  make  a  demonstration  before  Brest,  and 
come  to  anchor  in  Quiberon  bay. 

Landings  were  made  on  the  two  small  islands  of  Houat  and 
Hoedic,  as  well  as  at  Groix ;  these  islands,  in  view  of  their  unim- 
portance, were  absolutely  without  defenses. 

"  The  English  historians  have  represented  these  islands  as  of 
great  extent,  populous,  with  large  towns  and  innumerable  villages  ; 
they  say  that  twenty  villages  were  burned  on  Hoedic,  where  there 
were  scarcely  that  many  cottages,  and  declare  that  six  hundred 
cattle  were  taken  away  or  killed  on  that  island,  which  could  not 
have  fed  half  as  many ;  as  for  the  town  of  Houat,  it  has  never 
existed  except  in  the  imagination  of  historians  eager  to  conceal 
the  insignificance  of  these  expeditions :  thus  Father  Frangois- 
Marie  Galen,  who  was  an  eye-witness,  continually  heaps  sarcasms 
upon  them  in  this  connection."  " 

After  these  exploits,  Admiral  Rooke,  who  commanded  the  allied 
fleet,  attempted  a  landing  at  Belle-Isle  with  8000  men. 

But  there  there  was  an  energetic  governor  and  a  garrison,  small 
it  is  true,  but  which  sufficed  for  the  population  to  gather  around  ; 
in  a  word  there  was  an  organized  defense.  Thus,  when  the  troops 
wished  to  land,  they  were  so  badly  received  that  they  did  not 
insist.  The  memory  of  Camaret  seems  to  be  still  present  in  the 
minds  of  the  allies,  for  the  fleet  remains  eleven  days  before  Belle- 
Isle  without  daring  to  do  anything.  During  this  time,  a  detach- 
ment goes  to  throw  a  few  shells  at  Sables-d'Olonne  and  into  Saint 
Martin-de-Re,  in  order  not  to  return  to  England  without  anything 
to  tell  of. 

Peace  was  signed  in  the  following  year. 

as  possible  to  the  shore,  whence  they  launched  shells  against  the  town, 
while  the  ships  kept  at  the  extreme  range  of  the  batteries.    This  explains 
why  the  latter  suffered  so  little  in  this  class  of  operations. 
''  Georges  Toudouze.  "  Georges  Toudouze. 

99 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Thus  for  three  successive  years  the  English  immobiHzed  enor- 
mous forces  to  bombard  our  whole  coast,  and  all  these  armaments 
served  only  to  reduce  to  ashes  one  small  town.  The  English 
historian  Burchett  recognized  that  when  everything  was  taken 
into  account  the  result  was  disproportionate  to  the  expense. 

The  enemies  recognized  the  fruitlessness  of  bombardments, 
and,  during  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  we  shall  see  them 
give  up  ploughing  our  fields  with  shot  and  devote  themselves 
exclusively  to  landings.  Eut  they  will  act  with  such  circumspec- 
tion that  their  troops  will  only  once  succeed  in  setting  foot  upon 
French  soil. 

As  in  the  latter  years  of  the  preceding  war,  France  abandoned 
the  Atlantic.  She  made  over  part  of  her  western  forces  to  priva- 
teers to  prey  upon  commerce ;  the  rest  were  sent  to  Toulon  or 
employed  in  protecting  convoys. 

The  English  took  advantage  of  this  to  attempt  to  surprise 
Cadiz  with  14,000  men,  which  was  unsuccessful,  and  to  destroy 
at  Vigo  the  Spanish  galleons  and  Chateau-Renault's  ships  which 
were  convoying  them. 

In  1703,  the  same  fleet  made  a  useless  cruise  along  our  coasts. 
Yet  it  had  put  to  sea  with  magnificent  projects :  nothing  less  was 
proposed  than  to  destroy  all  the  defenses  that  protected  the  straits, 
then  to  ruin  Rochefort  and  to  end  by  a  landing  at  Brest. 

Admiral  Rooke,  who  commanded  the  fleet,  brought  with  him  a 
landing  force  of  7000  men ;  he  had  even  had  the  foresight  to  have 
vessels  laden  with  stones  made  ready  to  obstruct  the  passes. 

But  it  is  far  from  conception  to  execution:  the  start  is  made 
with  fine  resolutions ;  then,  on  arriving  at  the  spot,  it  is  perceived 
■ — though  rather  late — that  to  land  a  handful  of  men  in  a  country 
like  France  is  very  dangerous ;  then  prudence  is  seen  to  be  the 
better  part  of  valor. 

As  a  matter  of  fact.  Sir  George  Rooke  first  steered  towards  the 
shores  of  Saintonge,  and  then  all  at  once  went  to  the  north.  It 
has  been  said  that  he  received  notice  of  the  presence  of  a  French 
squadron  of  twenty-six  ships,  and  that  he  wished  first  to  get  rid  of 
them ;  but  this  squadron  did  not  exist.'*  At  the  beginning  of  June 
the  hostile  fleet  anchored  off  Belle-Isle. 

'*  It  is  probable  that  it  was  a  convoy  of  merchant  ships  escorted  by  a  few 
war  vessels. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

PTad  the  English  admiral  come  there  bacause  there  was  nothing 
else  to  do,  or  did  he  really  intend  to  make  a  landing?  The  fact  is 
that  he  remained  a  fortnight  off  Le  Palais  without  doing  any- 
thing. On  the  other  hand,  the  active  preparations  going  on  on 
shore  showed  clearly  that,  if  the  enemy  landed,  they  would  find  a 
warm  reception.  In  1696,  Rooke  had  had  a  taste  of  what  the 
governor  could  do,  and  perhaps  this  memory  had  something  to  do 
with  the  resolution  to  withdraw  that  he  arrived  at.'° 

Dissatisfaction  with  oneself  often  leads  to  the  venting  of  one's 
rage  upon  inoffensive  people.  The  English,  before  returning  to 
England,  sought  an  expiatory  victim  and  fixed  upon  the  island  of 
Groix,  which  this  same  Admiral  Rooke  had  twice  devastated  in 
1696. 

"  This  island,  which  vv^as  without  troops  and  without  fortifica- 
tions, would  certainly  have  seen  repeated  the  disaster  from  which 
it  suffered  in  1696  but  for  the  parish  priest,  who  saved  it.  '  Thanks 
to  a  strategem  conceived  by  the  priest,  the  English  believed  that 
they  were  confronted  by  a  considerable  number  of  regular  troops, 
and  so  did  not  land.  The  priest  made  the  women  and  girls  put  on 
red  caps  and  ordered  them  to  stand  in  line  with  all  the  men  on 
the  highest  part  of  the  island,  which  slopes  down  towards  the  sea. 
The  population,  mounted  upon  horses,  asses,  cows  and  oxen,  so 
deluded  the  English  admiral  that  he  did  not  dare  to  go  any 
further  .  .  .  .  '  The  priest  received  from  minister  Pontchartrain 
some  most  curious  letters,  in  which  the  latter  presented  him  with 
a  draft  for  500  livres  on  the  bishop  of  Agen,  for  the  services  he 
had  rendered,  and  named  him  commandant  of  the  militia  and 
coast-guards,  in  case  of  the  absence  of  officers."  " 

After  1704,  the  English  government's  attention  is  drawn  to- 
wards the  south.  The  same  fleet  that  operated  in  Spain  in  1702, 
and  in  France  in  1703,  escorts  as  far  as  Lisbon  an  army  corps 
intended  to  support  the  claims  of  the  Archduke  Charles ;  then  it 
takes  Gibraltar  by  surprise  and  is  kept  in  the  Mediterranean  by  the 
squadron  of  the  Count  of  Toulouse,  with  which  it  has  an  encounter 
at  Malaga.     After  the  disarming  of  our  ships,  it  takes  part  in  the 

" "  When  the  hostile  fleet  appeared  before  Belle-Isle,  the  governor, 
Herve  de  la  Ferriere  (the  same  as  in  1696)  was  hunting  on  the  mainland. 
A  vessel  was  sent  to  look  for  him  and  brought  him  back  through  the 
fleet." — Georges  Toudouze. 

™  Cabart-Danneville  (report  to  the  Senate)   and  Georges  Toudouze. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

military  operations  before  Barcelona  ;  then  it  winters  at  Lisbon 
and  in  English  ports. 

The  following-  year  (1706)  the  appearance  of  the  Count  of 
Toulouse  before  Barcelona  draws  the  allies  into  the  Mediter- 
ranean ;  they  force  our  squadron  to  retire  to  Toulon. 

Thus,  for  three  years,  our  shores  enjoy  complete  tranquillity. 
But  in  1707  the  Duke  of  Savoy  and  Prince  Eugene  besiege 
Toulon  by  land,  and  Shovel,  who  commanded  the  hostile  naval 
forces,  thinks  the  moment  favorable  to  disembarrass  himself  of  our 
ships,  which,  in  spite  of  their  disarmament,  are  a  permanent 
menace. 

It  was  only  an  alarm.  The  hostile  army  having  raised  the  siege 
at  the  end  of  ten  days,  the  fleet  lost  all  hope  of  penetrating  into  the 
harbor,  and  it  withdrew  after  having  emptied  its  magazines  to  no 
effect. 

The  following  year  a  hostile  fleet  reappeared  in  the  north. 

Admiral  Byng  anchors,  on  August  20,  1708,  off  Vaast-la- 
Hougue,  with  sixty  ships. 

As  soon  as  the  presence  of  the  hostile  fleet  was  signaled,  the 
Marshal  of  Matignon  hastened  with  three  regiments  to  the  assist- 
ance of  the  little  garrison  of  the  place. 

On  the  23d  an  attempt  at  landing  fails ;  the  boats  do  not  even 
reach  the  beach. 

The  fleet  then  gets  under  way  and  goes  to  show  itself  before 
Cherbourg ;  then,  suddenly,  it  comes  back  to  its  former  anchorage. 
But  the  defense  has  not  fallen  into  the  snare,  and  from  all  direc- 
tions troops  flow  in. 

On  the  28th  the  boats  once  more  approach  the  shore,  and,  as 
on  the  first  occasion,  they  have  to  regain  their  ships  without  hav- 
ing been  able  to  disembark  the  troops. 

The  enemy  doubtless  hesitated  to  go  away  baffled,  since,  for  a 
month,  they  remained  on  the  Cotentin  coast,  and  it  was  not  until 
the  end  of  September  that  they  definitely  withdrew. 

This  repulse  took  from  the  English  for  the  remainder  of  the 
war  the  desire  of  attacking  anew  our  western  shores  ;  they  thought 
they  would  be  more  fortunate  on  our  Mediterranean  coast,  which, 
not  having  as  yet  felt  such  invasions,  might  be  less  prepared  to 
repel  them. 

Actually,  700  men  were  easily  able  to  land  in  the  neighborhood 


Jl 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

of  Cettc,  on  July  19,  1710;  the  following  day  they  took  possession 
of  the  town,  while  the  ships  exchanged  broadsides  with  the  forts. 

The  object  of  the  English  was  to  offer  help  to  the  Protestant 
peasants  of  the  Cevennes,  who  were  then  in  full  revolt,  and  to 
carry  aid  to  them  in  the  shape  of  men  and  money  by  taking  the 
town  of  Cette  as  a  base  of  operations  ;  but  the  English  government 
must  have  been  very  ill-informed  as  to  the  importance  of  these 
risings  to  expect  to  maintain  itself  in  French  territory  with  such  a 
ridiculous  force. 

On  the  2 1st,  the  town  and  bridge  of  Agde  were  taken ;  then  the 
enemy  stopped,  not  daring  to  adventure  further.  On  the  27th, 
the  heads  of  column  of  the  French  troops  were  signaled  at  Meze. 
Threatened  with  being  cut  off,  General  Seissan  requested  the 
English  admiral  to  send  armed  boats  into  the  lagoon  of  Thau  to 
prevent  the  French  from  fording  it ;  "  but,  at  the  same  time,  infor- 
mation was  received  that  considerable  forces  were  marching  on 
Agde.  Retreat  was  necessary.  The  English  withdrew  upon 
Cette ;  hard-pressed,  they  could  only  pass  through  the  town  to 
gain  their  boats,  and  they  only  embarked  at  the  sacrifice  of  their 
rear-guard. 

This  attack  was  the  last  of  the  war,  which  v>'as  ended  on  April 
II,  1713,  by  the  treaty  of  Utrecht. 

ATTACKS  AGAINST  THE  COAST  IN  THE  REIGN  OF  LOUIS  XV. 

During  the  naval  wars  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XV,  attacks  upon 
the  coast  continue,  but  they  take  on  a  new  character. 

Objectives  remain  the  same ;  methods  are  different.  The  Eng- 
lish systematically  refrain  from  bombardments ;  they  endeavor  to 
take  our  maritime  towns  from  the  rear  by  landing  bodies  of  troops 
numbering  as  much  as  14,000  men ;  but,  taught  by  experience,  they 
avoid,  as  far  as  possible,  forcible  landings,  and,  in  order  to  find 
undefended  beaches,  they  are  obliged  to  disembark  far  from  their 
objectives ;  whenever  the  defense  does  not  lose  its  head,  this  sepa- 
ration is  fatal  to  them. 

The  war  of  the  Austrian  Succession  was  marked  by  but  a  single 
attack  upon  the  coasts.     After  the  battle  of  Toulon,  which  deter- 

''  The  towns  of  Cette  and  Agde  are  separated  by  a  long  dyke  which  is 
washed  on  one  side  by  the  sea  and  on  the  other  by  the  lagoon  of  Thau. 
Meze  is  on  the  edge  of  the  lagoon  near  its  middle. 

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A  Studv  of  Naval  Strategy. 

mined  the  official  declaration  of  war,"  France  prepared  an  expedi- 
tion to  attempt  once  a.qain  the  restoration  of  the  Stuarts.  The 
active  surveillance  of  the  English  squadrons  ruined  these  projects, 
and  the  French  squadron  that  had  been  armed  was  broken  up :  a 
part  went  into  the  Mediterranean,  other  ships  went  to  Lorient  and 
Rochefort. 

But  the  English  government  still  had  causes  for  anxiety ; 
Charles-Edward,  son  of  the  Pretender,  had  landed  in  the  north 
of  Scotland  and  had  raised  the  country.  For  nearly  two  years  he 
held  in  check  the  troops  launched  in  his  pursuit. 

So  long  as  this  heroic  frolic  lasted,  the  enemy's  squadrons 
cruised  off  our  coast,  from  Dunkirk  to  Rochefort,  to  intercept  any 
aid  sent  to  the  prince.  When  Charles-Edward,  having  no  more 
soldiers,  was  reduced  to  wandering  as  a  fugitive  in  the  Scottish 
mountains,  the  British  government  breathed  again ;  and  then  only 
did  it  think  of  attempting  to  surprise  Lorient  in  order  to  ruin  the 
establishments  of  the  East  Indian  Company. 

Admiral  Lestock  anchored  on  October  i,  1746,  in  the  bay  of 
Pouldu  with  16  ships,  8  frigates  and  2  bomb-vessels ;  he  escorted 
a  convoy  carrying  5800  troops  commanded  by  General  Sinclair. 

A  landing  was  effected  the  same  day ;  on  the  2d,  the  English 
seized  Guidel  and  Plimur,  and  established  their  camp  between  the 
two  places.  Thence  General  Sinclair  sent  to  summon  the  town  to 
surrender. 

The  inhabitants  were  not  high-spirited :  although  Lorient  had 
walls  armed  with  cannon,  it  could  not  be  considered  a  stronghold. 
The  authorities  signed  a  truce  and  entered  upon  deliberations  as 
to  the  course  that  should  be  taken. 

While  the  people  of  Lorient  discussed  the  matter,  the  English 
general  conferred  with  his  admiral ;  for,  if  the  French  did  not 
think  their  situation  a  good  one,  the  English  found  theirs  worse : 
at  any  moment  they  might  be  cut  off  from  their  ships. 

At  the  end  of  several  days  the  inhabitants,  intimidated  by  a  few 
cannon  shot,  decided  to  surrender ;  a  flag  of  truce  left  the  town  to 
agree  upon  the  terms  of  capitulation.  But  precisely  at  this  mo- 
ment, the  English  had  reached  the  conclusion  to  retire;  and  they 
had  struck  their  camp  so  hastily  that  they  left  behind  four  cannon, 
a  mortar  and  a  quantity  of  stores.     Sinclair  had  received  notice  of 

'*  Hostilities  had  already  begun,  according  to  the  English. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

the  assembling  of  troops,  and,  not  knowing  whether  he  would 
have  to  deal  with  a  company  of  loo  men  or  an  army  of  20,cxx) 
soldiers,  he  had  preferred  to  retreat.  Actually,  thirteen  battalions 
and  fourteen  squadrons  were  advancing  under  the  orders  of  MM. 
de  Saint-Pern  and  de  Coetlogon,  but  they  were  still  several  days' 
march  away." 

On  Oct.  9,  the  fleet  got  under  way.  Lestock,  not  daring  to  re- 
turn immediately  to  England,  cruised  for  a  fortnight  off  the  coast, 
made  a  landing  at  Houat  and  at  Hoedic,  and  finally  went  away  on 
October  23. 

Was  it  the  failure  of  this  expedition  that  kept  the  English  away 
from  our  coasts  during  the  rest  of  the  war  ?  It  would  seem  so,  for 
the  few  ships  that  we  had  kept  armed  could  not  have  interfered 
with  them. 

The  Seven  Years  War  began  with  a  setback  for  the  enemy : 
France  seized  Minorca  before  the  English  had  had  time  to  send 
forces  into  the  Mediterranean. 

The  loss  of  Minorca  was  deeply  felt  in  England  and  public 
opinion  loudly  demanded  reprisals.  The  occasion  was  favorable : 
after  a  first  effort  crowned  with  success,  the  French  navy  seemed 
for  three  years  to  be  non-existent ;  it  was  then  directed  by  Berryer, 
who  had  set  his  heart  on  ruining  it. 

England  had  a  fine  chance  and  took  advantage  of  it. 

A  fleet  composed  of  seventeen  ships  of  the  line,  under  the 
orders  of  Admiral  Hawke,  set  sail  from  Portsmouth  on  September 
7,  1757  ;  it  escorted  a  convoy  carrying  10,000  men.  On  the  20th  it 
was  made  out  by  the  lookouts  on  the  island  of  Re  beating  to  wind- 
ward to  approach  the  land ;  on  the  22d  it  anchored  in  the  Basque 
Roads.  There  was  no  doubt  but  that  it  had  designs  against 
our  Rochefort  arsenal. 

On  the  day  following,  the  island  of  Aix,  which  was  defended  by 
only  16  cannon  and  had  a  garrison  of  only  250  men,  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  enemy.  The  English  made  as  if  to  land  at  Chatelail- 
lon,  where  there  were  a  few  hundred  coast-guards ;  they  were 
prevented,  it  is  said,  by  the  state  of  the  sea.  They  likewise  made  a 
demonstration  before  Fouras,  where  Lieutenant-General  de  Lan- 
geron  had  gone ;  on  September  30  they  retired,  abandoning  the 
island  of  Aix. 

'°  These  troops  had  been  detached  from  the  army  of  Marshal  Saxe. 

105 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

During  all  this  time  the  most  extreme  confusion  continued  to 
reign  at  Rochefort,  where  there  was  much  more  thought  of  seek- 
ing safety  than  of  putting  up  a  defense.  Here  again  there  was  as 
much  fear  on  one  side  as  on  the  other  ;  M.  de  Langeron,  with  a  few 
companies  of  regulars  and  coast-guards,  saved  the  situation  by  his 
energetic  attitude. 

The  following  year  Admiral  Hawke  reappeared  off  the  island 
of  Aix ;  but  this  time  the  land  was  not  his  objective.  He  brought 
with  him  only  seven  ships  and  three  frigates,  and  had  in  view 
only  the  destruction  of  an  important  convoy  bound  for  the  colonies. 
We  shall,  therefore,  merely  mention  this  operation,  which  does 
not  belong  to  the  class  of  attacks  on  the  coast  f°  but,  some  time 
after,  the  invasions  recommence,  and  it  is  again  Saint  Malo  that 
attracts  the  English. 

An  immense  effort  was  made :  a  hundred  transports  carried 
16,000  men  under  the  orders  of  the  Duke  of  Marlborough. 

On  June  5,  1758,  the  fleet,  commanded  by  Lord  Howe,  anchored 
in  Cancale  bay.  A  landing  was  effected  without  difficulty,  and 
Marlborough,  after  establishing  an  intrenched  camp  to  protect 
his  embarkation  in  case  of  a  reverse,  began  to  march  towards 
Saint  Malo.  On  the  way  he  delayed  to  ravage  the  country,  and 
when  he  arrived  under  the  walls  of  the  place  the  Marquis  de  la 
Chatre  had  had  time  to  shut  himself  up  in  it  with  2000  men  and  to 
put  it  in  a  state  of  defense. 

Unable  to  penetrate  into  the  town,  and  not  anxious  to  make  an 
assault,  the  English  burned  all  the  vessels  that  were  in  the  harbor 
of  Saint-Servan.  Meanwhile  the  Duke  d'Aiguillon,  governor  of 
the  province,  directed  a  movement  of  all  the  troops  of  Brittany 
towards  the  coast,  and  he  had  already  collected  several  thousand 
men  at  Dinan,  where  he  had  gone  in  person. 

Fearing  to  be  cut  off  from  his  line  of  retreat,  Marlborough 
decided  to  raise  the  siege ;  the  forces  at  the  disposition  of  the 
Duke  d'Aiguillon  were  not  yet  sufficient  to  disturb  him,  and  he 
was  able  to  re-embark  without  loss  on  June  11.  The  fleet  got 
under  way  on  the  17th  and  returned  to  England. 

*"  The  enterprise  did  not  fail  completely :  the  vessels,  which  had  been 
obliged  to  lighten  themselves  in  order  to  ascend  the  river,  lost  a  great  part 
of  their  stores,  and  the  departure  of  the  convoy  was  delayed.  It  consisted 
of  five  ships,  some  frigates  and  forty  transports. 

106 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

What  was  the  purpose  of  the  English  in  going  to  Saint  Malo  ? 

A  thousand  horses  and  twenty-five  pieces  of  artillery  were  not 
joined  with  the  infantry  in  order  to  burn  eight  vessels,  most  of 
which  were  only  boats. 

A  week's  expedition  does  not  require  the  mobilizing  of  16,000 
men  and  the  chartering  of  a  hundred  merchant  ships. 

They  intended,  therefore,  to  take  the  place,  and  it  is  not  easy 
to  see  why  they  neither  tried  to  open  a  breach  nor  to  make  an 
assault ;  or  rather  it  must  be  supposed  that  they  perceived  then 
that  they  had  put  themselves  in  a  false  position. 

Marlborough's  conduct  was  no  doubt  severely  judged  in  Eng- 
land, for  he  was  replaced  by  General  Bligh  ;  and,  at  the  end  of 
July,  the  fleet  proceeded  to  Cherbourg,  carrying  with  it  only  6000 
men  for  landing. 

In  this  sad  affair  of  Cherbourg,  there  are  occurrences  so  extra- 
ordinary that  it  is  interesting  to  give  a  detailed  account  of  it. 

"  At  the  end  of  July,  1758,  it  is  learned  that  several  divisions 
of  the  English  fleet  are  18  leagues  ofif  and  that  there  are  some 
ships  beating  to  windward  along  the  coast  off  Cherbourg. 

"  On  August  5,  the  English  fleet  makes  all  sail  to  double  Cape 
la  Hague.  The  commandant  of  Cherbourg,  Baron  de  Coppley, 
is  informed  of  this  at  9  o'clock  in  the  evening  of  the  same  day. 

"  On  August  6,  the  English  fleet  directs  its  course  for  the  road- 
stead. M.  de  Coppley  informs  Count  Raymond,  major-general, 
commanding  the  troops  of  Cotintin  under  the  orders  of  Lieuten- 
ant-General  d'Harcourt,  who  is  living  at  Caen. 

"  The  same  day  there  are  assembled  at  Caen,  the  Orion  regi- 
ment, the  Clark  regiment,  1200  armed  citizens,  20  bombardiers, 
^2  citizen  cannoniers,  6  battalions  of  coast-guards  and  the  Langue- 
doc  regiment  of  dragoons. 

"  This  made  up  an  effective  force  of  more  than  6500  men.  And, 
let  us  add,  the  Guyenne  regiment  and  two  battalions  of  militia 
who  are  at  La  Hogue  receive  orders  to  remain  there,  for  some 
unknown  reason. 

"  On  August  7,  the  English  fire  some  shell  which,  however,  do 
no  harm. 

"  Some  of  the  coast  batteries  begin  to  fire  :  the  Tourlaville  battery 
shatters  the  quarter  of  a  frigate  and  kills  or  wounds  forty-five 
men,  among  others  almost  all  the  officers  of  the  ship. 

"  Ten  shots  were  all  that  were  fired. 

107 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

"  The  commandant  of  Cherbourg  orders  the  firing  to  cease.  It 
is  impossible  to  find  a  plausible  explanation  of  this  strange  fact ; 
moreover,  this  is  only  the  first  of  many  errors  committed  by  the 
commandant.  General  Baron  Raymond  perhaps  wished  to  await 
the  English  in  Sainte  Anne's  Bay,  where  formidable  preparations 
had  been  made  to  drive  them  back  into  the  sea.  There  happened 
what  always  will  happen,  namely  that  the  English  carefully  re- 
frained from  landing  where  their  reception  had  been  so  well  pre- 
pared for,  and  went  to  Urville  Bay,  which  had  been  judged  im- 
practicable. The  landing  was  effected  with  much  good  fortune  and 
skill  under  the  eyes  of  our  troops,  who,  restrained  by  the  ships' 
artillery,  offered  no  resistance.  The  landing  force  had  a  strength 
of  about  5000  men.  General  Raymond  then  gives  orders  to  re- 
treat ;  the  English  form  and  occupy  the  dominant  positions. 

"  '  Thus,'  says  the  eye-witness  from  whom  we  take  this  account, 
'  thus  astonishingly  was  carried  out  an  invasion  for  which  we  had 
been  preparing  two  months  with  all  sorts  of  fortifications  in  the 
places  most  susceptible  of  attack.' 

"  It  certainly  is  not  the  first  time  (nor  will  it  be  the  last)  that 
fortifications  have  caused  the  loss  of  wits  of  a  leader  ill  prepared 
to  make  use  of  them. 

"  And  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  available  troops  were 
not  well-disposed  to  fight. 

"  '  The  troops,  the  citizens,  even  the  residents  of  the  country,' 
says  our  author,  'had  no  fear  of  an  attack  on  the  part  of  the  Eng- 
lish. On  the  contrary,  they  wished  that  there  might  be  some 
attempts  against  our  coast,  satisfied  that  they  would  be  repented 
of.' 

"  Not  till  half  an  hour  after  noon  on  August  8  does  General 
Raymond  leave  Cherbourg  and  go  on  horseback  to  reconnoiter  the 
enemy ;  but  he  does  not  go  even  as  far  as  the  advance  guards  of 
the  French  troops,  and  he  re-enters  the  city,  leaving  for  all  the 
troops  the  strange  order  to  go  to  rejoin  him  at  Mount  Epinguet, 
10  kilometers  from  Cherbourg.  In  the  evening  the  English  en- 
tered the  city,  which  no  longer  had  any  soldiers.  August  9,  the 
fleet  lands  1800  more  men,  and  the  English  occupy  Mount  Roule, 
which  we  have  abandoned.  August  10,  they  send  a  patrol  of 
cavalry  to  reconnoiter  upon  the  road  to  Valognes.  It  gets  a  hot 
reception  from  a  small  French  troop  and  beats  a  retreat. 

"  That  day  there  arrive  in  the  French  camp  Lieutenant-Generals 

108 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Harcourt,  Count  Coetlogon  and  Roth,  as  well  as  a  battalion  from 
Avranches.  August  12,  there  come  likewise  to  the  French  camp 
the  Escav  cavalry  regiment,  two  battalions  from  Poitou  and 
four  battalions  of  coast-guards  from  Caen.  August  13,  come  two 
battalions  of  the  Saint-Kamans  regiment  and  the  Bourbon- Prince 
cavalry  regiment.  August  14,  the  Marshal  of  Luxemburg 
arrives. 

"  The  English  occupy  their  time  in  pillaging  the  inhabitants, 
ransoming  the  city,  destroying  the  jetties,  smashing  or  carrying 
off  the  abandoned  cannon,  sinking  or  burning  the  vessels  in  the 
harbor,  etc.  They  are  not  disturbed  by  any  incident  during  the 
whole  time  that  they  are  carrying  on  the  execution  of  the  countr}\ 
On  August  16  they  re-embark.  On  the  17th,  at  3  in  the  after- 
noon, the  generals  and  French  troops  re-enter  Cherbourg."  " 

Emboldened  by  this  success,  the  causes  of  which  they  do  not 
seem  to  have  discerned,  the  English  wish  to  redeem  their  failure 
before  Saint  Malo  in  June ;  but  this  time  they  are  to  learn  that 
nothing  but  lack  of  energy  on  the  part  of  the  defenders  can  permit 
such  incursions. 

Their  fleet  appeared  abreast  Cape  Frehel  on  September  3 ;  on 
the  4th  it  anchored  off  the  island  of  Agot ;  the  5th  the  troops  dis- 
embark in  the  harbor  of  Saint-Briac,  without  meeting  any 
resistance. 

If  General  Bligh's  choice  of  a  landing  place  on  the  side  of  the 
left  bank  of  the  Ranee  was  to  enable  him  to  disembark  unhindered, 
his  calculation  was  correct ;  but  this  advantage  was  largely  bal- 
anced by  the  difficulty  of  having  to  cross  the  Ranee  to  reach  Saint 
Malo.  Moreover,  the  entrance  to  the  river  was  defended  by  a 
line  of  frigates  and  privateers ;  it  would  have  been  necessary  to 
penetrate  into  the  interior  of  the  country  to  turn  it.  Bligh  did  not 
dare  to  venture  so  far,  and  to  justify  his  enterprise  he  began  to 
ravage  the  country. 

As  soon  as  he  had  learned  of  the  presence  of  the  English,  the 
Duke  d'Aiguillon  had  gone  to  establish  himself  at  Lamballe,  direct- 
ing the  convergence  of  all  the  troops  of  the  region  on  that  point. 

Bligh  then  decided  to  beat  a  retreat,  and  proceeded  towards 
Saint-Cast,  where  his  ships  had  gone  to  await  him ;  but  he  was 

"  Des  Operations  mariti}nes  conire  Ics  cotes  et  des  dcbarquements,  by 
M.  D.  B.  G. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

still  far  ofif  and  he  had  to  traverse  Arguenon.  For  two  days  the 
EngHsh  were  harried  by  our  troops  ;  finally  they  stopped  on  the 
plateau  of  Matignon  to  concentrate. 

"  In  this  position,  they  were  impregnable ;  but  they  would  have 
to  descend  from  it,  whether  to  procure  food  or  to  re-embark.  It 
was  this  moment  that  the  Duke  d'Aiguillon  waited  for.  He  had 
divided  his  little  army  into  three  bodies ;  himself,  with  the  central 
one,  was  to  follow  the  English  step  by  step,  and  the  two  others 
were  to  skirt  the  edge  of  the  sea  and  attack  them  in  flank  when- 
ever they  should  re-embark.  A  re-embarkation  is  always  a  diffi- 
cult operation,  because  there  is  a  moment  when  one-half  the  troops 
is  aboard  and  the  other  on  shore,  and  the  latter  need  a  great  deal 
of  coolness  and  courage  to  stand  their  ground.  On  this  occasion 
there  was  still  another  difficulty :  the  road  descending  from  Matig- 
non to  the  sea  was  a  steep  and  sandy  slope ;  it  had  to  be  traversed 
under  pressure  from  all  the  French  forces.  On  the  morning  of  the 
loth,  General  Bligh  began  his  movement ;  Admiral  Howe's  boats 
were  on  the  shore  and  the  frigates  with  broadsides  bearing.  When 
nearly  half  the  English  troops  had  embarked,  the  French  attacked 
as  arranged,  on  three  sides  at  once.  At  first  the  English  stood 
firm  :  but  quite  a  large  number  of  them,  frightened,  having  thrown 
themselves  into  the  w^ater  to  reach  the  boats,  two  of  the  latter 
overloaded,  went  to  the  bottom ;  those  in  others,  to  avoid  a  similar 
mishap,  then  slashed  with  their  sabers  the  hands  of  the  unfortu- 
nates who  were  clinging  to  the  sides.  At  this  spectacle,  the  troops 
still  on  the  shore,  thinking  themselves  deserted,  uttered  cries  of 
distress  and  broke  ranks.  The  disorder  was  at  its  height.  The 
frigates,  which  had  not  yet  opened  for  fear  of  hitting  their  own 
army  corps,  began  to  fire  wildly  into  the  confused  melee  of  friends 
and  enemies.  The  Duke  d'Aiguillon  then  had  the  presence  of 
mind  to  withdraw  his  soldiers  and  force  the  English  alone,  in  a 
mass,  onto  the  beach.  The  frigates  perceived  this  and  ceased 
firing,  and  the  unhappy  English  soldiers,  victims  of  their  grape 
and  cannister,  had  no  other  recourse  than  to  surrender,  to  the 
number  of  3500.*"    The  same  evening  the  fleet  got  under  way."  ^^ 

**  This  number  is  exaggerated.  The  Chevalier  de  Mirabeau,  who  was  on 
the  spot,  wrote  to  his  brother :  "  A  thousand  to  twelve  hundred  killed, 
seven  to  eight  hundred  prisoners."  See  Lacour-Gayet,  La  Marine  miii- 
taire  de  la  France  sous  le  regne  de  Louis  XV. 

*^  Henri  Riviere.    La  Marine  frangaise  sous  Ic  rcgne  de  Louis  XV. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Meanwhile  the  Duke  de  Choiseul  had  come  into  power.  An 
ardent  patriot,  he  asked  himself  if  the  policy  of  abstention  was 
suitable  for  France  and  if  the  navy  ought  to  attend  impotently 
upon  the  ruin  of  our  colonies  and  the  outrage  of  our  shores.  Then 
it  was  that  he  conceived  the  project  of  an  invasion  of  England 
which,  striking  to  the  enemy's  heart,  should  lay  him  low  with  a 
single  blow.  Unfortunately  the  navy  no  longer  had  enough  ships 
to  successfully  conduct  such  an  enterprise,  and  this  attempt  led  to 
the  loss  of  our  squadrons  at  Lagos  and  Quiberon.  But  the  threat 
of  an  invasion  has  always  had  the  quality  of  disquieting  Eng- 
land;  and  jthis  time,  as  in  1745,  she  suspended  her  operations  in 
order  to  watch  over  the  preparation  that  were  being  made  in 
France. 

When  all  danger  was  averted,  she  thought  once  more  of  appear- 
ing off  our  shores.  But  experience  had  shown  her  the  danger  of 
invasions  of  the  mainland,  and  she  turns  her  attention  to  Belle- 
Isle,  which  for  the  fourth  time  in  less  than  a  century  saw  the 
enemy. 

On  April  7,  1761,  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Keppel,  of  twenty-five 
ships,  appeared ;  it  escorted  a  convoy  of  100  transports  carrying 
10,000  men. 

We  have  seen  that  Tromp  succeeded  in  landing  at  Belle-Isle  by 
means  of  a  diversion ;  Rooke  failed  to  make  a  landing  by  force  in 
1696,  and  in  1703  did  not  dare  even  to  attempt  it.  So  Keppel  will 
first  be  repulsed  in  a  direct  attack,  and  then  by  using  the  scheme 
of  a  false  attack  will  succeed  thus  in  getting  a  foothold  on  the 
island. 

On  the  8th  the  boats  of  the  squadron  disembark  troops  at  Point 
Andro.  The  governor,  M.  de  Sainte-Croix,  receives  them  in  such 
fashion  that  they  hastily  regain  their  ships,  leaving  400  men 
behind. 

This  repulse  seems  to  discourage  Keppel ;  for  a  fortnight  he 
does  nothing.  Perhaps  he  was  waiting  for  the  six  ships  that 
brought  him  a  reinforcement  of  2400  men.  As  soon  as  he  had 
received  them,  the  22d,  he  bombards  Le  Palais  with  his  ships, 
while  the  boats  go  to  land  4000  men  in  the  harbor  of  Locmaria." 
M.  de  Sainte-Croix  arrived  too  late  to  oppose  the  landing;  he  had 

"  Probably  at  daylight. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

to  shut  himself  up  in  the  town.     After  an  energetic  resistance,  he 
capitulated  on  June  7." 

Soon  after  the  preliminaries  of  peace  were  opened,  and  Mahon 
was  exchanged  for  Belle-Isle.  It  even  seems  that  the  taking  of 
this  island  was  for  no  other  object  than  to  use  it  as  an  exchange ; 
for  the  English  could  only  keep  it  by  immobilizing  a  squadron  to 
guard  the  channel  that  separates  it  from  the  mainland,  and  if 
hostilities  had  continued,  it  would  have  been  a  burden  upon  them. 

attacks   upon    the   coast   in   the   reign   of  LOUIS   XVI. 

During  the  five  years  that  the  war  of  American  Independence 
lasted,  our  shores  were  absolutely  unmolested.  That  is  because 
we  had  a  navy  that  kept  the  sea  and  did  not  allow  the  English  to 
devote  themselves  to  games  whose  fruits  were  often  bitter. 

It  is  fair  to  say  that  operations  in  America  did  not  leave  Eng- 
land sufficient  resources  to  undertake  expeditions  that  sometimes 
required  16,000  men ;  but  she  could  have  recommenced,  if  she  had 
thought  it  profitable,  such  a  series  of  bombardments  as  distin- 
guished the  war  of  the  League  of  Augsburg.  For  it  is  worthy  of 
note  that  our  squadrons  never,  from  1778  to  1783,  sought  to  pro- 
tect directly  our  coasts;  they  passed,  on  several  occasions,  whole 
months  on  the  coasts  of  Spain  and  in  the  Mediterranean,  abandon- 
ing thus  the  entire  Atlantic  coast  and  Channel  to  the  enemy's 
enterprises ;  but  the  mere  existence  of  these  fleets  was  a  sufficient 
menace  to  England  to  make  her  more  anxious  to  watch  them  than 
to  attack  the  coast. 

attacks  upon  the  coast  DURING  THE  REVOLUTION   AND  EMPIRE. 

With  the  wars  of  the  Revolution  and  Empire  we  enter  upon  the 
darkest  period  of  our  naval  history.  The  bad  state  of  material, 
the  incapacity  of  commanders  and  the  lack  of  discipline  of  crews 
made  our  forces  so  distinctly  inferior  that  we  seem  to  have  sent 
our  squadrons  out  only  to  deliver  them  over  to  the  enemy.  Yet 
during  twenty  years  of  war  we  count  only  five  expeditions 
against  our  coasts.**  First  comes  the  capture  of  Toulon ;  but  an 
affair  of  this  sort  should  not  be  counted,  since  the  city  was  handed 

"'For  the  capture  of  Belle-Isle  see:  Lacour-Gayet,  La  Marine  militaire 
de  la  France  sous  le  regne  de  Louis  XV. 
^  We  do  not  refer  to  unimportant  surprises. 

112 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

over  by  its  own  inhabitants,  whose  treason  is  a  unique  occurrence 
in  history.  The  place,  moreover,  was  soon  retaken ;  though  the 
Enghsh  occupation  had  a  direct  influence  on  naval  operations  by 
causing  us  to  lose  an  entire  squadron. 

In  1794  Corsica  was  occupied  by  the  English,  thanks  to  Paoli's 
assistance,  and  evacuated  in  1796. 

In  1795  and  1800  two  fruitless  landings  took  place  in  Quiberon 
Bay. 

The  first  has  an  aspect  peculiar  to  itself :  its  object  was  to 
establish  a  body  of  emigrants  on  the  shores  of  Brittany,  and  it  is 
doubtful  if  England  would  have  attempted  this  venture  with  her 
own  troops,  since  the  only  justification  for  it  was  the  hope  of 
raising  the  whole  of  Brittany. 

A  French  squadron  of  twelve  ships,  commanded  by  Villaret- 
Joyeuse,  was  then  in  the  neighborhood  of  Belle-Isle. 

The  English  squadron  under  Lord  Bridport  met  it  on  June  22 
off  Groix  and  forced  it  to  take  refuge  in  Lorient,  after  having 
taken  from  it  three  ships.  The  convoy,  composed  of  fifty  trans- 
ports and  escorted  by  three  ships  under  Commodore  Warren,  then 
proceeded  to  anchor  in  the  bay  of  Quiberon,  and  the  landing  was 
effected  without  difficulty  on  the  beach  of  Carnac  on  June  25. 

The  land  defense  was  in  the  hands  of  an  energetic  leader ;  so 
events  follow  their  natural  course. 

The  emigrants,  reinforced  by  several  thousand  Chouans,  ad- 
vance a  few  leagues  into  the  interior ;  Hoche  assembles  his 
troops. 

On  July  16  there  is  a  battle :  the  emigrants,  beaten,  take  refuge 
on  the  peninsula  of  Quiberon. 

On  July  21  Hoche  takes  possession  of  Fort  Penthievre  and 
penetrates  into  the  peninsula;  the  emigrants  flee  towards  the 
beach  and  are  obliged  to  yield.  Bad  weather  then  comes  on  to 
further  complicate  the  situation :  the  boats  cannot  come  close  in 
and  so  pick  up  very  few  people. 

On  September  1 1  a  convoy  of  eighty  sail  entered  Quiberon  Bay 
and  anchored  between  Houat  and  Hoedic:  it  brought  the  Count 
d'Artois. 

The  situation  in  Brittany  appearing  desperate,  the  Prince  is 
conducted  to  the  island  of  Yeu,  where  he  remains  till  November 
7,  without  daring  to  set  foot  in  France ;  on  this  date  the  English 
fleet  departs  and  returns  to  its  own  ports. 

113 


A  Study  of  N.wal  Strategy. 

The  attempt  of  1800  scarcely  took  definite  shape. 

Sir  Edward  Pellew  anchors  on  June  2  in  Quiberon  Bay  with 
7  ships,  5  frigates,  i  corvette  and  5  large  transports ;  5000  sol- 
diers, commanded  by  General  Maitland,  were  on  board. 

The  English  occupy  the  islands  of  Houat  and  Hoedic  and  make 
them  their  base  of  operations.  From  June  to  September  they  turn 
aside  upon  Quiberon  and  Port-Navallo ;  but  they  do  not  dare  to 
advance  into  the  interior.  In  September  the  convoy  sets  sail  for 
the  Mediterranean  ;  the  expeditionary  corps  has  to  take  part  in  the 
expedition  to  Egypt. 

For  nine  years  England  refrains  from  attacking  pur  shores  ;  but 
in  1809  she  hopes  to  be  able  to  seize  Antwerp  while  the  whole 
French  Army  is  still  in  Austria.  In  the  hands  of  the  French,  this 
port  took  on  a  considerable  development;  the  shipyards  there 
were  busily  occupied,  and  the  English  feared  lest  this  arsenal 
should  become  a  dangerous  base  of  operations  against  Great 
Britain. 

The  Antwerp  expedition  was  perhaps  the  most  important  at- 
tempt every  made  to  land  by  force  in  a  hostile  country.  "  The 
expeditionary  fleet  comprised  39  ships,  25  frigates,  31  corvettes,  5 
bomb  vessels,  23  gunboats,  59  small  vessels  and  82  armed  launches. 
The  number  of  transports  was  from  400  to  500,  carrying  50,000 
men,  several  thousand  horses,  artillery,  ammunition,  material  and 
supplies.  The  fleet  was  placed  under  the  orders  of  Sir  John 
Strachan ;  Lord  Chatham,  the  elder  brother  of  the  celebrated 
minister,  was  commander-in-chief  of  the  land  and  sea  forces. 

The  fleet  appeared  off  the  mouths  of  the  Scheldt  on  July  29, 
1809 ;  on  the  31st  15,000  men  were  put  on  shore  on  the  island  of 
Walcheren :  it  was  important  to  secure  possession  of  Flushing 
before  marching  on  Antwerp.  Middleburg,  the  capital  of  the 
island,  was  easily  occupied ;  then  Flushing  was  invested  by  land 
and  sea.  After  a  three-day  bombardment,  the  place  capitulated  on 
August  16. 

A  fortnight  had  already  elapsed. 

There  remained  nothing  more  to  do  but  to  transfer  the  40,000 
men  to  the  mainland  and  march  upon  Antwerp,  but  Lord  Chatham 
could  not  make  up  his  mind  to  do  it :  it  seems  that  the  hazards  of 
all  such  enterprises  only  become  apparent  on  the  spot. 

The  troops  re-embarked;  the  expedition  returned  to  England, 
leaving  a  garrison  of  12,000  men  in  Flushing. 

114 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

In  the  month  of  December  the  island  of  Walchercn  itself  was 
abandoned. 

This  venture  cost  England  the  small  sum  of  625,000,000  francs ; 
she  lost  in  it  4000  men,  and  10,000  others  returned  sick. 

The  coast  of  France  was  decidedly  too  well  guarded :  there- 
after, to  give  her  army  a  part  in  operations  against  France,  Eng- 
land will  land  them  in  a  friendly  country. 

To  sum  up,  during  the  wars  of  the  Revolution  and  Empire, 
attacks  against  the  coasts  were  never  systematic ;  the  enemy  only 
took  advantage  of  opportunities  that  seemed  to  him  favorable, 
such  as  the  treason  of  the  Toulonese,  Paoli's  insurrection  in 
Corsica,  the  royalist  disturbances  in  Brittany,  or,  finally,  the 
Austrian  campaign ;  he  preferred  to  devote  himself  more  par- 
ticularly, when  he  had  secured  command  of  the  sea,  to  the  con- 
quest of  our  colonies,  which  did  not  present  the  same  elements  of 
resistance. 

*     * 

All  these  details  are  not  without  use ;  what  actually  happened 
alone  can  give  us  knowledge  of  the  enemy's  aspirations,  furnish 
us  with  an  exact  idea  of  the  dangers  that  France  has  incurred, 
and  reveal  to  us  the  best  methods  of  attack  and  defense. 

For  two  centuries  England  has  essayed  against  our  coasts  every- 
thing that  the  passions  of  war  can  suggest  to  an  unscrupulous 
people.  We  have  a  right,  therefore,  to  assume  that  a  nation  which 
wished  to  recommence  the  same  system  of  war  would  be  naturally 
led  to  employ  the  same  methods. 

From  another  point  of  view,  it  is  striking  to  see  the  same  names 
always  reappearing ;  it  is  observed  that  the  enemy,  after  having 
failed  on  the  mainland,  is  irresistibly  drawn  to  islands,  or  rather 
to  a  particular  one :  Belle-Isle ; "  and  from  this  aggregate  of  facts 
we  can  draw  very  precise  conclusions. 

It  would  have  been  possible  to  find  other  examples  elsewhere 
than  in  our  history ;  but  they  would  not  have  offered  the  same 
interest,  because  the  situation  appears  in  a  different  light  in  each 
country,  according  to  its  military  organization,  the  development 
of  its  means  of  communication  and  the  geographic  conditions. 

We  shall  now  examine  the  question  of  the  attack  and  defense  of 
coasts  under  three  successive  aspects. 

*^  Let  us  hope  that  this  indication  will  not  be  lost  sight  of. 

115 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

We  shall  first  seek  to  ascertain  the  degree  of  resistance  offered 
by  coasts  left  to  themselves ;  then  we  shall  study  the  effect  exer- 
cised by  naval  forces  upon  their  protection,  setting  aside  their 
own  means  of  defense ;  and  last  we  shall  deduce  the  method  by 
which  the  action  of  shore  defenses  ought  to  be  combined  with 
that  of  mobile  defenses  in  order  to  secure  the  best  system  of 
protection. 

We  have  been  able  to  note  that  the  enterprises  directed  against 
our  shores  consisted  at  first  almost  exclusively  of  landings  (1627- 
1694)  ;  then  came  the  era  of  bombardments,  which  lasted  scarcely 
three  years  (1694-1696)  and  was  followed  by  a  renewal  of  land- 
ings.   They  retain  this  last  form. 

Landings."* — In  two  centuries  our  shores  had  to  endure  more 
than  twenty  invasions.  Each  of  these  expeditions  required  a 
considerable  display  of  military  forces ;  the  number  of  troops 
varied  from  5000  to  11,000  men  (it  was  even  greater  on  some 
occasions),  necessitating  a  great  many  transports. 

What  was  the  result  of  these  immense  armaments  ?  Whenever 
the  enemies  find  a  resolute  man  facing  them,  they  suffer  a  repulse 
or  even  a  veritable  disaster.  Usually  they  re-embark  without 
even  attempting  to  contend  with  our  troops ;  an  inconceivable  in- 
capacity on  the  part  of  the  authorities  is  necessary  in  order  that 
they  may  accomplish  some  depredations  without  being  molested. 

The  English  (aside  from  the  Antwerp  expedition)  seem  never 
to  have  thought  of  seizing  a  foothold  on  the  mainland:  in  all 
cases,  save  one  (Cherbourg,  1758),  they  fail  to  accomplish  the 
object  of  the  expedition  and  content  themselves  with  pillaging 
villages,  trampling  crops  under  foot  and  carrying  off  a  slender 
booty.  What  is  such  a  gain  in  comparison  with  the  risks  run  and 
the  expenses  incurred  by  each  expedition?  Yet  France,  engaged 
in  continental  wars,  could  only  oppose  raw  levies  to  England's 
regulars ! 

The  sterility  of  all  these  attempts  arises  less  from  faulty  organi- 
zation or  poor  leadership  than  from  the  very  nature  of  the  opera- 
tion. 

An  enemy  who  disembarks  in  a  territory  having  such  vast  re- 

**  In  this  chapter  we  treat  only  of  such  landings  on  the  coast  as  imply 
the  possession  by  the  enemy  of  limited  forces.  In  another  chapter  we 
shall  speak  of  expeditions  whose  object  is  the  conquest  of  territories. 

116 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

sources  as  those  of  France  finds  himself  from  the  beginning  in  a 
difficult  situation.  The  aim  of  the  expedition  is  usually  one  of  the 
centers  of  activity  of  our  navy :  Brest,  Saint  Malo,  Lorient,  Roche- 
fort.  These  towns  are  more  or  less  fortified,  and  landing  under 
the  guns  of  the  place  is  an  almost  impossible  operation:  it  has 
never  been  attempted.  To  put  on  shore  and  assemble  in  safety 
small  army  corps  comprising  infantry,  artillery  and  sometimes 
even  cavalry,  there  is  needed  a  landing  place  devoid  of  all  means 
of  defense.  The  further  the  disembarkation  from  the  objective 
point,  the  easier  will  such  a  place  be  found. 

When  the  troops  are  on  shore,  an  intrenched  camp  is  established 
to  protect  the  reembarkation  in  case  of  repulse. 

All  this  takes  valuable  time  which  the  defense  takes  advantage 
of  to  throw  forces  into  the  place  and  organize  resistance.  Thence- 
forth the  object  of  the  expedition  is  spoiled:  from  the  moment 
that  the  assailant  has  failed  to  eflfect  a  surprise,  he  must  renounce 
the  hope  of  entering  the  town  without  striking  a  blow ;  he  cannot 
undertake  a  siege,  for  he  will  be  obliged  to  raise  it  after  a  few 
days  to  make  head  against  troops  coming  from  the  interior. 

As  soon  as  the  small  army  penetrates  into  the  country,  it  is 
exposed  to  an  encounter  during  its  march  with  hostile  forces 
whose  numbers  it  is  ignorant  of :  it  marches  towards  the  unknown. 
Each  day  that  elapses,  each  stage  of  the  journey  that  separates  it 
from  its  landing  place,  renders  its  situation  more  critical ;  it  does 
not  know  that  its  line  of  retreat  may  not  suddenly  find  itself 
threatened. 

These  ideas  weigh  upon  the  mind  of  the  commander  and  in- 
fluence his  decisions ;  evidence  of  the  anxieties  to  which  they 
give  rise  are  found  in  all  such  enterprises,  and  some  have  had  no 
other  cause  of  failure. 

Fearful  of  being  cut  oflf  from  the  sea,  growing  weaker  in  pro- 
portion as  he  advances  on  account  of  the  necessity  of  guarding  his 
lines  of  communication,  the  enemy  only  marches  with  extreme 
caution.  As  soon  as  he  learns  of  the  gathering  of  troops,  he 
regains  his  boats  as  quickly  as  possible,  fortunate  if  he  is  not 
obliged  to  sacrifice  his  rear  guard.  On  his  return  home,  the  poor 
villages  that  have  been  pillaged  are  transformed  into  great  towns, 
and  honor  is  safe.  But  if  the  result  obtained  is  compared  with 
the  expeditionary  expenses,  the  balance  is  uneven. 

When  the  enemy,  thanks  to  the  foolishness  of  incapable  leaders, 

"7 


A  Study  or  Naval  Strategy. 

enters  a  town,  as  in  the  case  of  Cherbourg,  he  does  not  even 
think  of  maintaining  himself  there.  He  knows  that  at  the  end  of 
a  short  time  he  will  be  attacked  and  he  has  not  the  necessary 
means  at  his  disposal  to  put  himself  in  a  state  of  defense. 

Looking  at  past  events  from  a  present  standpoint,  with  exact 
knowledge  of  local  resources,  taking  into  account  the  improvised 
defense,  we  are  tempted  to  judge  severely  the  precipitate  reso- 
lutions adopted  by  certain  English  generals :  but  let  us  not  forget 
that  if  the  latter  sometimes  beat  a  retreat  before  imaginary  perils, 
those  perils  would  have  become  real  at  the  end  of  a  few  days ;  and 
by  persisting  they  would  have  had  the  same  fortune  as  Tolle- 
mache  and  Bligh.  Even  then  France  offered  too  much  resistance 
for  a  handful  of  men  to  be  able  to  put  her  in  danger. 

To-day  an  attempt  at  landing  would  have  still  fewer  chances  of 
success  than  in  former  times :  the  maritime  towns  are  better  de- 
fended ;  our  military  organization  is  out  of  all  comparison  with 
what  it  used  to  be ;  the  tailroads  enable  great  bodies  of  troops  to 
be  poured  into  a  single  place  in  a  few  hours ;  the  commanders  of 
sections  are  no  longer  merely  gentlemen,  usually  very  brave,  but 
little  versed  in  the  art  of  war ;  finally,  our  soldiers  are  greatly 
superior,  in  number  and  in  value,  to  peasants  armed  with  scythes, 
to  militia  and  coast-guards. 

The  enemy  who  should  attempt  a  landing,  even  with  great 
forces,  would  be  rushing  upon  certain  failure,*'  especially  if 
France  were  not  engaged  in  a  continental  war  and  had  the  free 
disposal  of  her  army. 

In  this  latter  case,  far  from  fearing  such  operations,  we  ought 
earnestly  to  wish  for  them :  the  undiscerning  terror  inspired  in 
many  people  by  the  contemplation  of  40,000  English  landing  on 
Cotentin  is  hard  to  explain.  After  all,  the  principal,  almost  the 
sole  solicitude,  in  wartime,  is  to  find  a  favorable  field  of  battle 
where  the  enemy  can  be  crushed  by  numbers.  The  English,  by 
landing  on  our  territory,  offer  us  on  land  lists  that  we  vainly  seek 
at  sea,  and  yet  we  tremble  at  the  idea !  And  some  talk  of  con- 
quering the  whole  United  Kingdom  with  150,000  men.  Tf  we 
hope  to  be  able  to  be  victors  on  English  soil  with  limited  forces. 

"  Naturally  we  assume  that  we  shall  oppose  the  enemy  and  not  be  con- 
tent to  escape  from  him.  We  are  here  studying  operations  of  war ;  it  is 
evident  we  cannot  prevent  the  enemy  from  attaining  his  object  if  we  per- 
mit him  to  do  so. 

118 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

we  shall  be  very  much  more  so  on  our  own  soil  with  unlimited 
forces. 

There  is  no  occasion,  therefore,  to  be  afraid  of  a  landing  on  the 
mainland ;  but  we  shall  make  some  qualifications  respecting  the 
islands  that  border  upon  our  shores. 

The  situation  then  is  no  longer  the  same :  resistance  is  limited 
to  the  local  resources,  and  the  enemy  may  have  quite  an  exact 
knowledge  concerning  them ;  the  assailant  is  no  longer  pursued  by 
the  nightmare  of  an  attack  from  the  rear ;  finally,  the  fleet  is 
always  near  at  hand  and  furnishes  a  more  efficient  protection  to 
troops  which  operate  near  the  shore.^ 

Nevertheless,  save  for  one  exception,  none  of  our  islands  have 
remained  in  the  enemy's  hands. 

The  reason  of  this  is  as  follows : 

It  is  always  difficult  to  cflfect  a  landing  by  force.  The  ships  have 
not  boats  enough  to  throw  on  shore  the  whole  expeditionary  force 
with  a  single  movement.  The  portion  which  sets  out  first  is 
reached  by  the  enemy's  fire  even  before  it  has  put  foot  ashore ; 
when  it  lands  it  has  to  assemble  and  form  for  battle :  there  is  a 
critical  time  during  which  the  defense  has  all  the  advantages  on 
its  side  in  spite  of  the  weakness  of  it?  available  forces.  The 
operation  is  not  impossible,  but  it  is  always  dangerous.  It  is 
evident,  too,  that  on  an  island  of  small  extent,  where  the  landing 
places  are  few  in  number,  an  active  watch  can  usually  prevent  a 
surprise.  This  circumstance  has  several  times  saved  our  islands. 
Yet  landings  have  been  made  on  them,  and  they  will  be  made  still 
more  easily  with  fast  vessels  that  can  facilitate  diversions ;  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  either  that,  with  calm  weather,  infantry  can 
land  anywhere  and  so  take  in  reverse  the  fortifications  con- 
structed by  the  defense  in  the  vicinity  of  beaches  to  locate  its  artil- 
lery and  shelter  its  sharpshooters. 

If  a  landing  has  been  effected  in  this  manner,  there  remains  for 
the  garrison  nothing  to  do  but  to  shut  itself  up  in  a  fort  and  stand 
a  siege. 

The  island  will  not  yet  be  taken :  if  resistance  is  prolonged,  the 

^  In  operations  against  coasts,  the  fleet  never  goes  away  until  the  affair 
is  over.  It  is  only  in  the  conquest  of  territory  over  seas,  which  is  ac- 
complished with  force  sufficient  to  subjugate  a  whole  country,  that  ships 
can  abandon  troops  to  their  fate,  and  they  only  do  so  when  the  army 
advances  into  the  interior. 

119 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

enemy  will  tire  of  immobilizing  troops  and  ships,  the  need  of  which 
elsewhere  will  make  itself  felt,  and  will  withdraw. 

Sometimes,  moreover,  the  only  object  of  the  attack  is  to  produce 
a  moral  effect  by  the  ravages  accomplished,  without  any  idea  of 
conquest.  Groix,  Houat,  Hoedic,  Noirmoutiers,  have  thus  seen 
their  soil  violated  by  hordes  that  passed  over  them  without 
stopping. 

It  is  not  enough  to  take  islands :  it  is  necessary  to  retain  them. 
But  ours  are  so  near  the  mainland  that  they  cannot  be  left  in 
charge  of  a  mere  garrison  without  risking  their  loss ;  therefore 
they  have  to  be  guarded  by  naval  forces.  And  then  it  is  seen  that 
the  consequences  of  such  an  obligation  are  that  the  land  depends 
upon  the  fleet  for  support,  whereas  the  possession  of  the  islands 
is  only  really  advantageous  if  the  ships  can  be  supported  by  them. 
Of  course  squadrons  will  be  enabled  to  anchor  there,  just  as  they 
might  in  a  great  many  other  places  on  our  coast  which  are  not 
defended ;  but  they  will  never  find  there  anything  but  alien  and 
unsafe  roadsteads."^ 

These  considerations  are  not  sufficient  to  justify  leaving  our 
sea-coast  islands  without  defense;  quite  to  the  contrary,  they 
should  be  given  sufficient  power  of  resistance  for  the  enemy  to  say 
to  himself  that  the  effort  required  to  seize  them  would  be  out  of 
proportion  to  the  advantages  that  he  would  derive  from  them. 

But  when  one  of  our  islands  is  invaded  and  its  garrison  be- 
sieged, all  that  will  not  prevent  its  finally  succumbing  if  the  navy 
does  not  intervene  in  time  to  put  a  stop  to  it. 

Colonies  may  be  likened  to  our  coast  islands  in  the  sense  that 
they  also  have  but  limited  resources,  but  their  distance  from  the 
mother  country  places  them  in  a  still  more  unfavorable  situation. 
If  the  enemy  commands  the  sea,  they  will  fall  into  his  hands  when- 
ever he  is  able  to  assemble  forces  sufficient  to  overcome  all  re- 
sistance: it  is  only  a  question  of  time  and  means.  Once  taken, 
they  will  never  more  be  recaptured,  smce  the  communications  will 
be  cut. 

Evidently,  they  can  be  safeguarded  by  making  sufficient  sacri- 
fices to  put  them  out  of  reach  of  any  attack,  but  such  sacrifices 
have  a  limit. 

"  It  will  be  observed  that  Corsica  was  evacuated  the  moment  the  English 
fleet  was  recalled  into  the  Atlantic;  the  English  frequently  sojourn  at 
Houat  and  Hoedic,  but  they  abandon  them  whenever  their  ships  go  away. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Here  again  the  intervention  of  the  navy  is  necessary ;  we  shall 
see  further  on  what  its  nature  must  be. 

Bombardments. — There  can  be  no  question  here  of  bombard- 
ing undefended  towns.  It  is  evident  that  the  material  damages 
will  depend  solely  upon  the  number  of  shell  that  the  enemy  ex- 
pends in  useless  slaughter."^  It  may  be  observed,  nevertheless, 
that  it  is  not  customary  to  throw  the  burden  of  war  on  defenseless 
centers  for  the  reason  that,  such  centers  being  unimportant, 
their  destruction  is  of  no  interest  as  regards  the  settlement  of 
the  conflict.  War  is  not  made,  especially  naval  war,  to  trouble 
the  repose  of  peaceable  citizens  ;  a  more  lucrative  result  is  sought, 
and,  even  were  this  result  only  moral  effect,  it  can  only  be  at- 
tained by  attacking  an  important  center,  which  is  always  pro- 
vided with  defenses.  It  was  unpardonable  negligence  to  have 
left  Dieppe,  where  in  the  17th  century  privateers  fitted  out,  ex- 
posed to  bombardment,  without  furnishing  it  with  means  of 
defending  itself. 

Bombardments  have  generally  been  occasioned  by  the  fits  of 
rage  of  a  nation  that  wished  to  avenge  the  losses  inflicted  upon 
its  commerce  by  privateers.  Thus  we  have  seen  the  English  fall 
furiously  upon  Dunkirk,  Dieppe  and  Saint  Malo ;  thus  France 
vainly  tried,  for  two  centuries,  to  burn  the  nest  of  Barbary  cor- 
sairs at  Algiers. 

Sometimes  the  result  has  been  insignificant ;  most  often  it  has 
been  nil. 

Will  it  be  otherwise  nowadays? 

Certain  writers  seems  to  take  a  malign  pleasure  in  terrifying 
the  sea-coast  population  by  exalting  the  destructive  power  of 
modern  explosives.  Let  us  come  to  an  understanding  about  this. 
When  ships  appear  before  a  port,  before  sending  into  the  town 
those  great-capacity  shell  that  are  to  reduce  it  to  ashes,  they  must 
first  engage  in  a  regular  contest  with  the  shore  batteries ;  they  will 
turn  all  their  fire  upon  the  latter,  for  there  is  no  example  of  ships 
receiving  cannon  shot  and  not  turning  against  those  who  send 
them.    Not  until  after  the  defensive  works  have  been  silenced  can 

°^Yet  the  entire  contents  of  the  magazines  of  a  squadron  of  ordinary 
composition  would  not  suffice  to  destroy  a  city.  See  on  this  subject  an 
extract  from  the  Memorial  de  I'Artillerie  de  Marine  appearing  under  the 
title :  Des  Operations  maritime  contre  les  cotes  et  des  debarquements,  by 
M.  D.  B.  G. 

121 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategv. 

the  task  of  destruction  be  undertaken — provided  there  remain 
shell  in  the  magazines. 

We  will  seek,  therefore,  in  the  most  recent  wars  for  indications 
as  to  the  efficacy  of  a  contest  of  ships  against  coast  batteries. 

During  the  war  between  China  and  Japan,  the  Japanese  ships 
contended  in  a  spiritless  manner  and  at  long  range  with  the  works 
at  Port  Arthur  and  Wei-hai-wei.  The  Japanese  had,  nevertheless, 
in  both  cases,  a  deep  interest  in  destroying  the  sea-front  defenses, 
because  they  were  seeking  to  get  into  the  interior  of  the  harbors 
to  second  the  operations  of  their  army. 

They  secured  no  result. 

The  Americans  were  no  more  fortunate :  at  Matanzas,  Cabanas, 
San  Juan  and  Santiago,  the  coast  batteries  endured,  almost  with- 
out replying,  the  fire  of  the  ships  and  were  none  the  worse  for  it. 

It  is  probable  that  if  the  Japanese  and  Americans  had  really 
wished  to  destroy  the  works,  they  would  have  succeeded,  because 
the  armament  of  the  shore  batteries  was  composed  only  of  old- 
fashioned  guns  and  their  gunners  fired  as  badly  as  the  enemy 
could  desire ;  but  in  that  case  it  would  have  been  necessary  to 
engage  seriously  and  to  enter  upon  a  combat  at  point-blank  dis- 
tance ;  ■"  but,  if  the  expression  may  be  pardoned,  the  game  was  not 
worth  the  candle.  The  Japanese,  as  well  as  the  Americans,  had 
need  of  their  ships  and  their  ammunition ;  they  did  not  at  all  favor 
exposing  the  former  and  using  up  the  latter  for  a  problematic 
result.  Their  prudence  would  have  been  still  greater  if  the  bat- 
teries had  been  armed  with  modern  guns  and  served  by  real 
artillerymen. 

The  Americans  certainly  cannot  be  accused  of  having  shown 
excessive  sensitiveness  during  their  last  war.  Yet  it  has  not  been 
sufficiently  remarked  that  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Long  enjoined 
upon  Admiral   Sampson,   who   had   charge   of  the  blockade   of 

^  Shore  batteries  offer  only  a  very  small  target ;  and  to  dismantle  them 
it  is  necessary  to  hit  each  separate  piece.  In  order  to  avoid  receiving  hard 
knocks,  the  ships  are  led  to  oppose  to  each  battery  a  crushing  superiority 
of  fire  in  order  to  prevent  it  from  firing,  and  to  fight  at  short  range.  But 
when  they  have  affair  with  the  works  of  an  important  place,  whose  lines 
of  fire  cross,  the  contest  becomes  dangerous,  and  the  attack  prefers  to  get 
around  the  difficulty  by  taking  the  batteries  from  the  rear  by  means  of  a 
landing.  That  is  how  the  Federals  usually  acted  in  the  American  Civil 
War,  the  Japanese  at  Wei-hai-wei  and  Port  x\rthur,  and  the  Americans 
at  Santiago. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Cuba,  never  to  engage  coast  batteries  armed  with  heavy  guns, 
and  only  to  attack  others  for  the  purpose  of  getting  at  vessels 
that  they  were  protecting."  If  we  may  judge  from  one  of  the 
American  admiral's  letters,  he  would  not  have  been  sorry  to 
give  voice  to  his  guns  to  break  the  monotony  of  the  blockade ; 
but  his  government  thought,  with  good  reason,  that  there  were 
only  hard  knocks  to  receive,  and  no  benefits  to  gain,  from  a  contest 
with  even  badly  served  and  poorly  armed  batteries ;  and  that  it  is 
useless  to  squander  valuable  ammunition  so  long  as  there  remains 
hope  of  using  it  against  the  enemy  afloat.  This  calculation  was 
rigorously  exact :  after  the  destruction  of  Cervera's  squadron, 
peace  had  to  be  made. 

By  a  singular  contradiction,  while  the  American  authorities 
adopted  so  wise  a  measure,  the  sea-coast  population  of  the  United 
States  was  obsessed  with  the  idea  that  the  Spanish  squadron  might 
appear  off  their  shores.  Yet  what  harm  could  the  entire  contents 
of  the  magazines  of  four  cruisers  do  to  the  fortunes  of  the  United 
States  ? 

Finally,  the  part  played  by  bombardments  in  the  Russo-Japanese 
war  is  still  more  insignificant  than  in  previous  v/ars.  Admiral 
Togo  had  better  to  do  than  to  expend  his  ammunition  against  the 
batteries  of  Port  Arthur,  and  he  contented  himself  with  an  ex- 
change of  a  few  shots  at  long  range. 

It  seems  that  the  point  of  view  adopted  by  the  American  and 
Japanese  governments  will  likewise  force  itself  upon  every  naval 
power  solicitous  of  obtaining  the  best  return  from  its  forces. 
Ships  will  not  be  risked  against  batteries  before  the  hostile  fleet 
has  been  completely  destroyed ;  and  when  this  result  has  been 
attained  it  will  be  preferred  to  take  the  forts  from  the  rear,  by 
landing  troops,  rather  than  to  attack  them  with  ships  from  the 
front.  This  consideration  affords  us  a  just  measure  of  the  dan- 
gers run  by  sea-coast  towns ;  and  we  are  seized  with  pity  when  we 
learn  from  Cervera's  correspondence  that  this  admiral,  placed  at 
the  head  of  his  country's  principal  naval  force,  saw  no  better  use 
to  make  of  it  than  devoting  it  to  the  defense  of  the  Canaries, 
while  his  minister  leaned  rather  to  Porto  Rico. 

At  the  present  time  bombardments  are  good  only  to  intimidate 
half-civilized  peoples.  A  great  moral  effect  can  then  be  discounted 

"'Why  then  was  the  useless  bombardment  of  Porto  Rico  ordered?  Do 
we  not  see  there  again  a  yielding  to  public  opinion? 

123 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

with  a  small  material  result ;  but  this  method  will  only  be  employed 
against  nations  that  have  no  navy,  because  it  will  often  be  the 
only  way  of  reaching  them.  Moreover,  every  one  knows  that  the 
ammunition  supply  of  modern  artillery  is  excessively  costly,  and 
yet  scanty :  squandering  ammunition  in  operations  that  do  not 
advance  at  all  the  settlement  of  the  conflict  will,  therefore,  be 
avoided. 

We  would  certainly  have  less  apprehension  of  bombardments 
if,  instead  of  always  reckoning  up  the  harm  that  an  enemy  could 
do  us  by  attacking  our  coasts,  we  turned  the  problem  around. 
We  would  then  ask  ourselves  what  one  of  our  naval  forces  could 
do  if  it  were  given  the  mission  of  "  insulting  "  the  enemy's  shores. 
Whoever  was  charged  with  this  thankless  task  would  not  fail  to 
represent  the  danger  of  such  an  operation  and  the  small  benefit 
that  it  ^ould  procure.  These  considerations  would  bring  the  im- 
portance of  bombardments  down  to  its  true  value. 

Let  us,  therefore,  provide  our  great  naval  centers  with  coast 
batteries ;  let  us  keep  light  vessels  out  of  the  docks  by  booms 
protected  by  rapid-fire  guns ;  let  us  even  plant  lines  of  torpedoes 
at  the  harbor  entrances :  then  if  the  enemy  appears  he  will  know 
what  the  cost  will  be. 

The  Influence  of  Naval  Forces  on  Coast  Defense. — In  all 
that  precedes  we  have  supposed  the  coast  to  be  left  to  take  care  of 
itself.  We  will  now  inquire  how  naval  forces  can  contribute  to 
the  protection  of  a  coast  without  land  defenses. 

The  influence  of  naval  forces  is  very  clearly  shown  by  the  his- 
tory already  set  forth :  it  can  be  summed  up  in  two  words : 

So  long  as  the  squadrons  keep  the  sea,  so  long  as  they  show 
themselves,  the  coast  enjoys  absolute  tranquillity. 

As  soon  as  the  squadrons  disappear,  whether  because  they  have 
been  destroyed,  or  because  they  operate  in  another,  far-distant 
region,  the  coast  is  attacked. 

In  the  colonies  this  characteristic  has  been  less  clearly  defined, 
because  the  intermingling  of  English  and  French  possessions 
permitted  landing  troops  on  the  islands  unexpectedly ;  but  it  sub- 
sists in  a  general  way.** 

The  mere  fact  that  "  war  is  being  carried  on  "  is,  therefore, 

^  See  in  the  Second  Part,  in  the  paragraph  on  "  The  Offensive  and  the 
Defensive,"  the  character  of  our  naval  wars. 

124 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

sufficient  to  create  a  powerful  enough  diversion  to  turn  aside  the 
enemy's  attention  from  the  coast,  because  he  is  urged  seaward  by 
more  powerful  interests ;  but  since  the  introduction  of  steam  this 
guarantee  has  seemed  insufficient,  and  it  has  been  demanded  of 
the  navy  to  devote  itself  more  directly  to  securing  the  safety  of 
the  coasts.  From  this  period  date  the  creation  of  a  special  mate- 
rial and  the  birth  of  new  conceptions  as  to  the  employment  of 
naval  forces. 

If  we  may  judge  from  the  nature  and  distribution  of  part  of 
our  ships,  from  the  majority  of  naval  writings  and  from  the 
themes  of  our  grand  maneuvers,  protection  of  the  coast  can  be 
assured  at  the  present  time  : 

1st.  By  torpedo-boats. 

2d.  By  coast-defense  vessels,  either  distributed  singly  in  the 
ports,  or  grouped  in  divisions. 

3d.  By  squadrons  assigned  to  the  protection  of  a  fixed  stretch 
of  coast. 

We  will  examine  successively  each  of  these  systems,  which  may 
be  employed  together  or  separately,  and  deduce  from  this  ex- 
amination their  efficiency. 

Protection  of  the  Coast  by  Torpedo-Boats. — It  is  easy  to 
prove  that,  with  the  speed  of  modern  vessels  and  the  rapidity  of 
fire  of  their  guns,  a  squadron  can  appear  by  day  oflf  a  port,  empty 
its  magazines  and  put  to  sea  again  without  havmg  anything  to 
fear  from  the  torpedo-boats  of  the  local  defense.** 

Protection  of  a  port  by  torpedo-boats  is  more  difficult  to  realize 
than  is  supposed.  Durin.<^  the  grand  maneuvers  cruising  grounds 
are  established  in  the  approaches  to  the  central  station  of  the 
mobile  defenses :  but  this  is  a  solution  that  can  only  be  used  for  a 
few  days :  it  will  become  impracticable  as  soon  as  hostilities  have 
a  duration  of  several  months ;  in  our  opinion,  it  is  a  bad  utilization 
of  the  torpedo-boats.  ^  Little  by  little  this  continued  effort  will  use 
up  the  boats,  and  when  there  is  need  of  them  they  will  not  be 
available.  Even  disregarding  the  unfitness  of  coast-defense  tor- 
pedo-boats to  keep  the  sea  continuously,  it  is  not  reasonable  to  put 
mobile  forces  on  permanent  guard  duty  in  anticipation  of  an  event 
that  may  never  happen ;  on  the  one  hand,  attention  ends  by  tir- 
ing and  they  let  themselves  be  surprised ;  on  the  other,  the  return 

"  The  Japanese  squadron  furnished  proof  of  this  for  ten  successive 
months. 

125 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

is  too  insignificant.  When  the  presence  of  the  enemy  is  signaled, 
all  the  torpedo-boats  should  be  sent  out  and  go  to  seek  the  enemy. 
While  waiting,  the  boats  should  be  kept  in  practice  and  exercised 
without  undue  strain  in  order  to  have  them  all  in  readiness. 

But  it  is  probable  that  the  enemy  will  surround  his  intentions 
with  a  cloud  of  doubt,  and  that  his  appearance  will  be  unexpected ; 
he  will  thus  have  a  very  good  chance  of  not  meeting  torpedo- 
boats  on  his  route. 

However,  to  conform  to  the  established  rules,  we  will  suppose 
that  there  are  always  torpedo-boats  at  sea,  and  even  that,  by  a 
happy  chance,  they  are  all  outside  on  the  night  that  precedes  the 
attack. 

Their  scouting  zone  will  necessarily  be  quite  close  to  the  point 
to  be  defended ;  for,  as  they  increase  their  distance  from  it,  the 
space  to  be  covered  increases  rapidly  and  quickly  becomes  so 
extended  that  the  guard  is  ineflficient.  In  all  probability  the 
torpedo-boats  will  not  be  more  than  lo  miles  off  shore :  to  make 
every  allowance,  let  us  put  it  at  20  miles. 

It  will  be  sufficient,  therefore,  for  the  enemy  to  appear  before 
the  port  less  than  two  hours  after  sunrise  in  order  to  preserve 
himself  from  a  night  attack." 

Two  hours  later  he  will  have  emptied  his  magazines  and  will 
put  to  sea  again. 

His  speed  will  perhaps  then  be  reduced  on  account  of  injuries 
to  his  ships ;  but  he  will  be  careful  not  to  depart  before  stationing 
his  destroyers  on  guard  so  as  to  prevent  the  torpedo-boats  from 
coming  out  at  least  until  night-fall.  If  the  latter  succeed  in  then 
escaping,  the  enemy  will  have  had  such  a  start  that  he  will  long 
have  been  out  of  reach. 

This  is  not  all. 

Operations  against  the  coast,  of  the  kind  that  we  are  consider- 
ing, are  never  of  an  urgent  nature,  since  it  is  sure  that  the  land 
will  not  move  away.  Therefore,  favorable  conditions  will  be 
waited  for:  if  it  is  known  that  the  torpedo-boats  come  out  regu- 
larly at  night,  an  attempt  will  first  be  made  to  cut  them  off  from 
their  refuge  by  means  of  light  vesseb :  the  destruction  of  all  of 
them  doubtless  will  not  be  attained  to,  but  those  that  escape  will 
become  more  cautious  and  will  no  longer  dare  to  separate  them- 

■"  This  will  even  be  an  excess  of  precaution,  since  the  torpedo-boats  al- 
ways return  to  their  port  at  daylight  so  as  not  to  be  caught  at  sea. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

selves  from  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  entrances ;  this  accom- 
plished, there  will  be  chosen  for  the  attack  preferably  short  nights, 
of  full  moon,  and  finally  weather  ill  suited  to  small  boats. 

It  will  only  be  necessary  for  part  of  these  conditions  to  exist  in 
order  to  remove  all  apprehensions  on  the  part  of  the  battleships. 

There  would  be  danger  for  them  from  torpedo-boats  that,  set- 
ting out  from  ports  very  far  off,  and  therefore  not  under  watch, 
might  come  to  wait  for  them  on  their  return  passage ;  but  our 
mobile-defense  torpedo-boats  have  neither  endurance  nor  radius 
of  action  enough  to  undertake  raids  of  this  sort. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  in  the  numerous  exercises  of  coast  attack 
that  have  been  carried  on  in  recent  years,  torpedo-boats  have 
played  but  a  small  part. 

I  am  not  at  all  seeking  here  to  depreciate  the  value  of  torpedo- 
boats  ;  I  believe,  on  the  contrary,  that,  if  employed  judiciously, 
they  can  to  a  certain  extent  make  up  for  the  inferiority  of  our 
squadrons:  I  am  merely  finding  fault  with  the  defensive  part  to 
which  they  have  been  condemned.  In  order  that  they  may  do 
justice  to  the  torpedo,  the  enemy  ought  not  know  their  number, 
their  customs,  or  where  they  are  to  be  found :  on  the  contrary, 
they  should  attack  without  premeditated  plan,  which  amounts  to 
having  offensive  torpedo-boats  capable  of  going  to  look  for  the 
enemy  wherever  he  may  be."* 

Under  the  pressure  of  public  opinion  we  have  built  two  hundred 
coast-defense  torpedo-boats,  and  we  have  distributed  them  from 
Dunkirk  to  Villefranche,  from  Oran  to  Bizerta,  seeking  thus  to 
assign  to  each  place  a  part  proportional  to  its  importance,  so  as  to 
content  everybody.  Even  this  does  not  suffice ;  for,  once  entered 
upon  this  way,  there  is  no  reason  to  stop  ;  thus  we  have  read  news- 
paper articles  demanding  torpedo-boats  as  far  as  in  Bou-Grara 
sea. 

The  consequences  of  this  singular  strategy  will  not  be  long  in 
making  themselves  felt. 

The  war  will  not  have  the  same  intensity  everywhere :  it  will  be 
localized  in  certain  regions,  because  the  number  of  squadrons  is 

"*  The  movements  of  sea-going  torpedo-boats  ought  to  be  combined  with 
those  of  squadrons,  because,  as  soon  as  a  torpedo-boat  puts  to  sea,  it  needs 
to  be  supported  in  day  time  by  a  force  that  prevents  its  being  captured 
by  the  hostile  cavalry,  that  is  by  cruisers. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

limited  and  the  enemy  is  not  interested  in  attacking  the  coast  at 
all  points  at  once — if  he  even  attacks  it  at  all. 

Admitting  that  torpedo-boats  have  in  the  direct  protection  of 
the  coast  an  efficiency  which  we  do  not  deny  to  them,  it  will  only 
be  those  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  point  attacked  that  can 
be  utilized.  All  the  rest  will  remain  inactive  and  will  be  mere 
spectators  of  the  events  that  occur  far  from  them:  when  the  war 
is  over,  the  greater  number  of  them  will  not  have  fired  a  single 
torpedo. 

And  then  the  same  men  who,  during  peace,  were  the  first  to 
preach  the  distribution  of  our  torpedo-boats,  influenced  by  un- 
reasoning fear,  will  cast  stones  at  us  and  accuse  us  of  not  having 
known  how  to  make  use  of  our  forces 

And  this  time  they  will  be  right ;  for  our  first  duty  is  to  utilize 
our  vessels. 

Protection  of  Sea-Coast  Towns  by  Coast-Defense  Vessels 
AND  Armored  Gunboats. — The  French  Navy  has  the  good  for- 
tune to  possess  an  important  number  of  coast-defense  vessels  and 
armored  gunboats.  It  has  been  proposed  to  utilize  them  by  mak- 
ing them  assist  in  the  defense  of  places.  This  proposition  has 
even  had  a  beginning  of  execution,  since  we  find  the  Fusee, 
Mitraille  and  Phlegeton  at  Bizerta,  the  Styx  and  Acheron  at 
Saigon ;  but  yesterday  the  Flamme  was  at  Dunkirk,  and  it  is  pre- 
tended that  in  time  of  war  nothing  better  than  that  could  be  done. 

These  vessels  have  only  one  or  two  heavy  guns  ;  they  are,  there- 
fore, only  floating  gun  carriages  of  enormous  cost,  expensive  to 
maintain,  and  of  much  greater  vulnerability  than  a  sea-coast 
cannon,  since  it  is  only  necessary  to  damage  the  vessel  to  put  out 
of  action  the  gun  it  carries. 

If  all  the  guns  that  defend  a  great  maritime  place  are  enumer- 
ated, it  will  at  once  be  seen  that  the  battery  of  a  coast-defense 
vessel  will  be  but  an  insignificant  addition  to  the  defense  and  will 
not  compel  the  enemy  to  modify  sensibly  the  composition  of  his 
forces.  It  is,  therefore,  the  mobility  of  this  floating  gun  carriage 
that  is  counted  upon  to  justify  the  presence  of  a  naval  unit  in  the 
midst  of  shore  batteries. 

The  advantages  given  by  ability  to  move  about  are  not  evident 
in  the  actual  case.  If  the  coast-defense  vessel  wishes  to  go  out 
from  the  narrows,  it  separates  itself  from  the  land  defenses  and 
concentrates  upon  itself  alone  the  fire  of  all  the  ships ;  therefore, 

128 


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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy 

it  cannot  venture  out  to  sea  without  exposing  itself  to  being 
wrecked,  and  its  propeller  serves  to  take  it  into  port  rather  than 
for  anything  else. 

The  assignment  of  coast-defense  vessels  or  armored  gunboats 
to  the  protection  of  harbors  amounts  to  turning  naval  funds  over 
to  the  war  department.  The  land  defense  does  not  get  from  this 
lavishness  a  benefit  proportional  to  the  millions  such  vessels  rep- 
resent; with  the  same  sum  it  could  have  obtained  much  more  im- 
portant results.  On  the  other  hand,  the  navy's  loss  is  a  total  one : 
its  offensive  strength  is  diminished  by  an  equivalent  quantity.** 

Since  these  vessels  will  bring  to  the  defense  of  places  only  a 
trifling  aid,  let  us  inquire  what  better  disposition  can  be  made  of 
them. 

Concentrate  them  in  a  single  body.  Place  this  body  in  the 
neighborhood  of  a  strait  frequented  by  the  enemy,  since  their 
lack  of  radius  of  action  and  of  nautical  qualities  does  not  permit 
giving  them  an  extended  field  of  action.  We  will  thus  have  at  our 
disposition  a  very  considerable  force.  The  enemy  must  hold  it  in 
check  by  opposing  to  it  an  equal  or  superior  force ;  and  we  shall 
thus  have  immobilized  a  certain  number  of  vessels  and  so  will  not 
find  them  confronting  us  on  another  field  of  battle  or  before  our 
ports.  The  situation  will  not  even  then  be  brilliant,  but  it  will  be 
better  than  it  was.  This  concentration  will  contribute  more 
efficiently  to  the  protection  of  the  shore  than  would  distribution  in 
several  ports. 

If,  in  place  of  this  squadron  of  limited  steaming  capacity,  we 
had  offensive  ships  capable  of  being  utilized  under  all  circum- 
stances, we  would  immediately  perceive  a  series  of  new  combina- 
tions made  possible  by  this  additional  force.  We  could  thus  more 
easily  drive  the  enemy  from  our  coasts.  Moreover,  we  would  have 
increased  our  ofifensive  power  without  at  all  diminishing  our 
defensive  power. 

It  was  reserved  for  America,  the  inventor  of  the  coast-defense 
vessel,  to  be  the  first  to  make  proof  of  its  inefficiency. 

The  needs  of  the  war  with  Spain  revealed  to  the  United  States 
that  it  is  dangerous  to  construct  a  special  material  adapted  for  a 

°*  Evidently  the  commander  of  the  section  will  not  reason  in  this  way. 
Each  one,  in  his  sphere,  sees  only  the  immediate  interests  of  which  he  has 
charge,  and  as  regards  the  defensive  one  always  thinks  himself  not  suffi- 
ciently safe :  but  that  is  not  the  question. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

particular  form  of  war,  because  operations  cannot  at  will  be  given 
a  fixed  character.  Actually,  America  only  succeeded  in  having 
superiority  over  the  Spanish  by  taking  a  number  of  monitors  away 
from  their  original  application  in  order  to  reinforce  her  squadron. 
Then  it  was  perceived  that  they  were  troublesome  and  might 
become  dangerous.  Their  unfitness  to  meet  the  conditions  of  war 
was  such  that  Mahan  wrote  in  regard  to  them: 

"  In  the  recent  hostilities  we  had  26,000  tons  tied  up  in  monitors 
of  comparatively  recent  construction,  in  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific. 
From  the  beginning  to  the  end,  I  venture  to  say  that  there  was 
not  an  hour  when  we  would  not  willingly  have  exchanged  them 
all  six  for  two  battleships  of  moderate  displacement." '"" 

To-day  we  no  longer  need  to  fear  seeing  our  fleet  increased  by 
new  samples  of  this  sort;  but  doubts  subsist  as  to  the  best  use 
that  can  be  made  of  those  we  have.  Whatever  there  may  be  at- 
tempted to  get  from  them,  we  may  boldly  assert  that  their  distri- 
bution among  several  ports  is  the  method  by  which  they  will 
yield  the  least  return. 

We  also  have  a  lesson  to  take  to  heart  from  the  presence  of 
these  bastards  in  the  list  of  our  war  ships.  It  is  clear  that  we  only 
undertook  the  construction  of  our  coast-defense  vessels  in  imita- 
tion of  America  and  Germany,  and  that  not  until  after  having 
built  them  did  we  inquire  what  use  could  be  made  of  them.  Is  the 
French  Navy  so  ignorant  of  the  needs  of  war  as  to  be  reduced 
to  seeking  direction  from  her  younger  sisters  ?  If  our  neighbors 
make  an  error,  that  is  not  a  reason  for  imitating  them.  It  is  neces- 
sary to  know  what  one  is  doing  and  why  one  does  it;  without 
that  one  is  exposed  to  entering  upon  a  war  without  having  the 
means  of  waging  it. 

Defense  of  the  Coast  by  Ships  Grouped  in  Divisions. — This 
system,  which  we  find  advocated  in  Les  Guerres  navales  de  de- 
main,  is  the  most  perfect  application  of  the  fatal  method  of  doing 
things  piecemeal.  We  refer  to  it,  although  it  is  already  a  thing 
of  the  past,  to  show  clearly  to  what  aberrations  absence  of  a 
sound  doctrine  can  lead.    This  is  the  use  made  of  it  by  the  author : 

He  stations  at  Toulon,  Marseilles,  Cette,  Bizerta,  Bone,  Philip- 
peville,  Algiers  and  Oran,  divisions  composed  of  battleships  and 

"°It  is  known  that  the  coast-defense  vessels  had  to  be  towed  in  order 
to  go  to  Porto  Rico  and  that  their  replenishment  was  a  constant  source  of 
anxiety. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

cruisers ; ""  and  that  accomplished,  the  author  thinks  he  has  as- 
sured France's  preponderance  in  the  Mediterranean. 

If  we  go  back  to  the  period  when  this  original  plan  was  con- 
ceived, we  observe  with  pain  that  its  materials  were  furnished,  as 
far  as  armored  ships  are  concerned,  by  all  the  naval  forces  of 
France  except  three  new  battleships  and  three  station  ships. 

Let  us  now  note  the  consequences  of  this  plan. 

England  cannot  imagine  a  distribution  of  forces  that  would  be 
more  favorable  for  herself :  this  scattering  of  our  forces  is  such  as 
would  result  from  a  battle  lost,  followed  by  a  rout.  No  one  of 
these  divisions  is  a  source  of  annoyance  to  a  squadron  that  re- 
mains concentrated ;  not  one  has  sufficient  strength  to  constitute 
by  itself  alone  a  serious  danger.  The  English  squadron,  there- 
fore, is  mistress  of  the  Mediterranean.  That  is  something ;  it  is 
even  all  that  is  asked.  Nevertheless,  it  cannot  quit  its  field  of 
action,  for,  if  it  went  away,  English  interests  would  be  com- 
promised. 

Not  finding  himself  confronted  by  any  immediate  adversary, 
the  enemy  would  seek  to  utilize  this  inactive  force,  and,  as  has 
happened  whenever  a  condition  of  this  sort  has  existed,  he  will  be 
drawn  towards  the  coasts.  We  will  then  suppose  (though  it  is 
far  from  incontestable)  that  the  disposition  of  our  forces  has  an 
absolute  efficiency  and  forbids  any  attack  upon  the  cities  where 
our  divisions  are.""  The  enemy,  moreover,  has  something  better 
to  do  than  empty  his  magazines  upon  our  shores. 

He  finds  himself  opposed  to  a  very  extended  line  of  defense. 
Naturally  he  will  not  divide  his  forces  to  attack  everywhere  at 

"^  At  Toulon  :     Trident,  Ocean,  d'Estrees. 

At  Marseilles :  Richelieu,  Friedland,  Colbert,  Dupetit-Thouars,  Papin, 

Linois. 
At  Cette :     Acheron,  Mitraille,  Fusee  (3  guns  in  all). 
At  Bizerta :     Courbei,  Redoutable,  Devastation,  Sfax,  Forbin,  Davout. 
At  Bone  :    Terrible,  Dragonne. 

At  Algiers:  Baudin,  Formidable,  Troudc,  Bombe,  Dague. 
At  Oran  :  Caiman,  Milan. 
^"^  It  is  very  difficult,  from  the  tactical  point  of  view,  to  combine  the 
action  of  ships  with  that  of  batteries ;  in  practice,  the  first  will  be  led  to 
move  in  line  close  to  the  port  with  broadsides  bearing;  and,  as  they  have 
only  been  placed  there  to  make  up  for  an  insufficient  land  defense,  they 
will  support  the  principal  effort  and  receive  the  fire  of  a  double  or  triple 
force  without  being  able  to  profit  by  the  advantages  given  by  mobility. 

131 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

once ;  lie  will  take  the  weak  points.  Well,  at  one  of  the  extremi- 
ties lies  Tunis.  It  constitutes  a  guarantee  worth  taking  and  even 
keeping ;  and  it  does  not  dispose  of  the  same  means  of  resistance 
as  France,  or  even  Algeria. 

A  day  will  be  enough  to  take  12,000  men  at  Malta  and  land 
them  safely  on  one  of  the  numerous  deserted  beaches  that  are 
available  to  the  invader,  or  even  at  a  port  like  Sousse.  The  sole 
precaution  needed  will  consist  of  paralyzing  the  divisions  at 
Bizerta  and  Bone  by  means  of  detachments  of  superior  force. 

When  the  enemy  has  put  foot  on  the  soil  of  Tunis,  perhaps  then 
it  will  be  recognized  that  the  best  means  of  saving  our  colony  is 
to  cut  off  his  retreat  by  destroying  his  squadron.  Then  the  re- 
union of  all  our  scattered  forces  will  be  thought  of — that  is,  we 
will  end  where  we  should  have  begun ;  but  the  concentration  will 
present  insurmountable  difficulties,  the  enemy  holding  interior 
lines ;  and  it  will  suffice  for  one  or  two  divisions  to  be  crushed  in 
detail  for  all  hope  of  fighting  him  to  advantage  to  be  lost. 

Thus  this  initial  dislocation,  whose  object  is  to  protect  the 
coast,  will  attract  the  enemy  there  for  the  very  reason  that,  not 
being  solicited  in  another  direction,  he  will  have  nothing  better 
to  do. 

Protection  of  the  Coast  by  Squadrons. — ^We  come  now  to 
the  favorite  theme  of  grand  maneuvers :  the  assignment  of  squad- 
rons to  the  guard  of  a  fixed  stretch  of  coast.  Enough  experiments 
of  this  kind  have  been  made  to  enable  us  to  draw  precise  con- 
clusions from  them. 

This  is  what  takes  place : 

As  soon  as  hostilities  are  declared — I  mean  from  the  very  be- 
ginning of  the  maneuvers — the  defense  squadron  gets  under  way 
and  promenades  along  the  coast  like  a  sentinel  along  a  wall.  The 
enemy,  who  comes  from  seaward,  has  it  watched  by  his  scouts, 
and,  when  it  reaches  one  of  the  extremities  of  its  zone  of  surveil- 
lance, attacks  the  other.  His  presence  is  at  once  signaled  to  the 
defense,  which  turns  about — and  arrives  too  late. 

It  arrives  too  late  because  it  has  a  great  extent  of  coast  to 
guard,  and  it  cannot  be  everywhere  at  once. 

The  day  after,  the  enemy  appears  at  another  point ;  and  this 
game  of  hide-and-seek  lasts  as  long  as  the  maneuvers  last. 

Sometimes  the  defense,  tired  of  playing  this  part  of  dupe, 
divides  its  forces ;  it  commits  then  a  serious  error  that  only  the 

132 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

make-believe  of  the  maneuvers  excuses ;  for,  if  the  enemy  has 
remained  concentrated,  each  fraction  is  endangered. 

In  an  exercise  of  this  kind  the  coast-defense  squadron  will 
never  succeed,  and  never  can  succeed.  The  navy  must  not  be 
asked  to  perform  the  impossible. 

The  result  would  perhaps  be  completely  different  if  the  data  of 
the  problem  were  more  general. 

Instead  of  making  it  the  objective  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
approaching  the  coast,  the  aim  should  be  limited  to  destroying 
him  if  he  appears. 

The  coast-defense  squadron  would  then  maneuver  in  another 
fashion. 

As  soon  as  it  learned  of  the  enemy's  approach,  it  would  put  to 
sea  and  having  taken  position  on  his  line  of  retreat  would  wait 
for  the  attack  to  define  itself. 

Warned  at  once  by  scouts  left  in  the  ports,  it  would  endeavor  to 
cut  the  enemy  off  and  bring  him  to  a  stand  between  itself  and  the 
coast. 

If  the  enemy  waits  to  bombard  a  port,  he  contributes  to  his  own 
defeat ;  the  time  that  he  loses  gives  the  defense  time  to  come  up 
and  force  him  to  an  encounter  that  his  expenditure  of  ammunition 
and  his  injuries  would  make  disastrous.  But,  to  succeed,  the 
defense  needs,  just  as  m.uch  as  the  attack,  speed  and  steaming 
radius ;  while  it  is  always  assumed — I  know  not  why — that  on  the 
defensive  side  these  two  factors  can  be  sacrificed. 

It  is  unnecessary  to  conceal  the  fact  that  this  discussion  has 
only  a  platonic  interest.  It  is  always  supposed,  in  the  grand 
maneuvers,  that  the  defense  is  stronger  than  the  attack:  it  is  a 
quite  conventional  supposition.  On  the  one  hand,  the  enemy,  if 
he  knows  he  will  meet  superior  forces,  will  take  rare  not  to  come 
to  throw  himself  into  the  wolf's  jaws  ;  on  the  other  hand,  when 
one  is  the  superior,  the  idea  will  not  occur  to  him  to  immobilize 
his  ships  to  await  an  enemy  whose  every  interest  is  not  to  come. 
On  each  side,  therefore,  there  will  be  agreement  to  adopt  another 
solution. 

The  reality — the  sad  reality — is  that  a  squadron  assigned  to  the 
protection  of  a  fixed  extent  of  coast  and  constituted,  as  is  gener- 
ally supposed,  of  ships  few  in  number,  ill  armed,  and  having  but 
little  speed  and  a  small  radius  of  action,  is  condemned  in  advance 
to  inferiority,  and  consequently  to  destruction.     It,  therefore,  de- 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

fends  nothing.  The  attack,  in  truth,  may  adopt  two  procedures : 
either  it  will  make  two  parts  of  its  forces,  of  which  one  will  act 
against  the  shore,  while  the  other  will  combat  the  coast-defense 
vessels ;  or  better,  it  will  remain  concentrated  and  will  first  get 
rid  of  the  ships ;  after  which  it  will  turn  against  the  land.  In  the 
first  case  the  attack  on  the  coast  accompanies  the  destruction  of 
the  floating  defense  ;  in  the  second,  it  follows  it ;  in  neither  case  is 
it  prevented. 

How  is  the  unfortunate  coast-defense  squadron  to  escape  from 
the  fate  that  threatens  it?  Its  separation  from  its  base  of  opera- 
tions will  be  waited  for,  to  crush  it;  and  as  armored  ships, 
even  coast-defense  vessels,  cannot  enter  the  majority  of  commer- 
cial ports,  their  want  of  speed  will  force  them  passively  to  receive 
attack. 

There  remains  the  resource  of  shutting  themselves  up  in  a  port. 
This  is  not  a  solution :  the  navy  has  not  expended  hundreds  of 
millions  in  building  ships  to  shut  them  up  in  the  strong-box  of  a 
naval  arsenal ;  it  requires  dividends  from  them.    Moreover,  public  ^ 

opinion  would  at  once  force  our  squadrons  to  sea  when  the  enemy, 
by  a  feint,  has  made  an  appearance  that  masks  his  real  strength. 
Our  squadrons  will  be  uselessly  sacrificed. 

The  Unfitness  of  Ships  to  Give  Direct  Protection. — It 
will  doubtless  be  judged  that  ships  give  proof  of  singular  in- 
effectiveness.   Fortunately  nothing  of  the  sort  is  true. 

It  is  not  the  ships  that  are  inefifective :  it  is  the  proposed  method 
of  using  them  that  is  defective. 

It  is  proposed  to  condemn  them  to  give  direct  protection  by 
placing  them  between  the  coast  and  the  enemy.  We  find  our- 
selves then  faced  with  a  new  application  of  the  defensive  that  is 
worth  no  more  tlian  the  rest.  One  kind  of  vessel  only  would  be 
fit  to  make  it  effective :  that  is  the  submarine.  And  this  for  two 
reasons :  first,  because  it  is  invulnerable ;  second,  because  it  can- 
not be  combatted  with  elements  of  the  same  nature.  But  con- 
siderations that  we  shall  presently  examine  into  will  show  us  that 
only  a  moderate  use  of  submarines  is  necessary  for  the  protection 
of  the  coast. 

The  defensive  upon  the  sea  is  the  exact  opposite  of  the  defen- 
sive on  land. 

The  army  is  concentrated  within  the  frontiers  to  await  the 
enemy ;  the  navy  is  obliged  to  crumble  its  forces  outside  the  sea 

134 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

frontiers.  The  defensive  on  land  occupies,  so  to  speak,  the  center 
of  a  circle  whose  circumference  the  naval  defensive  would  occupy. 
One  acts  by  interior  lines ;  the  other  by  exterior  lines. 

This  comparison  reveals  to  us  the  dangers  and  difficulties  of 
direct  protection. 

The  disposition  along  the  coast  lets  the  enemy  know  with  almost 
perfect  accuracy  the  number  and  composition  of  the  forces  he 
will  find  in  each  center  of  defense ;  there  is,  therefore,  no  longer 
anything  unexpected  for  him.  Free  to  keep  off,  he  will  only 
attack  when  he  has  brought  together  destroyers  and  ships  in  suffi- 
cient numbers  to  have  an  overwhelming  superiority .^°' 

In  a  word,  to  have  superiority,  it  would  be  necessary  every- 
where to  offer  resistance  with  forces  at  least  equal  to  those  that 
the  enemy  can  collect  at  a  single  point:  which  is  impossible.  A 
squadron  taking  with  it  twenty  destroyers  will  have  enough  ele- 
ments to  provide  against  our  two  hundred  coast-defense  torpedo- 
boats,  since  it  will  only  have  to  do  with  one  single  mobile  defense 
at  a  time. 

In  practice,  only  limited  means  are  available  in  each  region.  If 
they  are  scattered,  the  protection  is  very  weak  and  becomes  in- 
effective ;  if  they  are  concentrated,  the  greater  part  of  the  terri- 
tory is  exposed  and  the  protection  is  unreal.  It  is  turning  in  a 
vicious  circle. 

The  complete  organization  of  direct  protection  for  the  coasts  of 
France  and  her  colonies  would  require,  to  be  efficacious,  expendi- 
tures that  are  in  contradiction  of  the  defensive  idea.  The  English 
naval  budget  would  not  be  enough  for  it.  That  is  why  submarines 
should  only  be  used  for  coast  defense  to  a  moderate  extent ;  so 
long  as  we  have  hopes  of  letting  them  loose  against  the  enemy, 
we  ought  to  employ  them  without  any  thought  of  the  defensive. 

Direct  protection  can  only  be  practised  by  elements  whose  value 
does  not  depend,  to  the  same  degree  as  that  of  ships,  upon  num- 
bers, and  whose  moderate  cost  does  not  task  too  heavily  our 
budget :  such  elements  are  constituted  by  iixed  defenses. 

"'  It  has  been  concluded  from  this  situation  that  England,  in  spite  of  her 
formidable  navy,  will  never  succeed  in  effectively  protecting  her  coasts. 
There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  she  will  adopt  a  procedure  so  mani- 
festly ineffective  as  that  of  dividing  her  squadrons :  that  would  be  con- 
trary to  all  her  traditions.  It  would  be  imprudent  to  found  hopes  upon 
an  error  that,  in  a  French-English  duel,  we  alone  have  wished  to  commit. 

135 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Protection  of  the  Coast  by  the  Offensive. — As  far  as 
naval  forces  are  concerned,  they  can  only  furnish  the  coast  with 
indirect  protection  by  turning-  aside  the  enemy's  attention,  that  is 
by  taking  the  offensive.^**  This  method  has  succeeded  in  the  past ; 
there  is  no  reason  why  it  should  not  do  so  in  the  future. 

And,  by  reflecting  upon  the  matter,  it  will  be  seen  that  this 
system  of  protection  must  be  efficacious.  In  order  that  it  should 
be  otherwise,  the  enemy  must  seek  to  deceive  the  vigilance  of  the 
forces  that  are  watching  him,  to  make  a  dash  at  the  coast.  What 
will  then  be  his  situation? 

If  a  landing  is  contemplated,  the  ships  and  the  troops  they  carry 
are  bound  together ;  so  long  as  the  expeditionary  corps  operates 
on  shore,  the  ships  are  obliged  to  remain  in  its  neighborhood  to 
support  it,  furnish  it  with  reinforcements,  watch  over  the  safety 
of  the  transports,  and  in  case  of  need  protect  the  re-embarkation. 
What  sort  of  a  squadron  is  it  then  that  will  expose  itself  to  attack 
under  such  unfavorable  conditions  ?  Yet  it  is  this  with  which  it  is 
threatened.  It  is  engaged  in  an  operation  of  uncertain  duration ; 
it,  therefore,  risks  giving  the  enemy  time  to  come  up,  even  from  a 
great  distance,  and  to  surprise  its  ships  in  an  undefended  anchor- 
age, stripped  of  part  of  their  forces ;  or  to  be  met  on  their  return 
voyage,  encumbered  with  troops  and  embarrassed  by  a  convoy. 
During  the  grand  maneuvers,  this  chance  can  be  taken,  because 
then  the  duration  of  the  operation  can  be  abridged  at  pleasure, 
and  above  all  because  there  is  certainty  of  not  being  destroyed; 
but  in  time  of  war,  it  will  not  be  attempted  without  a  great  deal  of 
reflection. 

If  a  bombardment  is  contemplated,  the  aggressor  finds  himself 
in  a  position  none  the  better. 

The  operation  in  itself  can  be  rapidly  carried  out,  and  it  may  be 
hoped  to  finish  it  without  hindrance.  But  afterwards  ?  It  will  be 
necessary  to  turn  back  with  magazines  empty,  with  ships  dam- 

^"^  What  constitutes  the  defensive  strength  of  a  fortified  place  is  that  the 
garrison  is  sheltered  behind  breastworks  or  in  forts.  If  it  was  attempted 
to  defend  a  city  by  stationing  the  garrison  outside  the  walls,  so  as  to  in- 
terpose between  the  enemy  and  the  point  to  be  defended,  nothing  at  all 
would  be  protected,  since  it  would  suffice  to  assemble  a  force  more  nu- 
merous than  the  garrison  to  drive  the  latter  away.  To  pretend  to  defend 
the  coast  by  interposing  ships  between  the  coast  and  the  enemy  is  equiva- 
lent to  defending  a  place  by  making  its  garrison  go  out  into  the  open 
country. 

136 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

aged ;  here  again  it  would  be  madness  to  contemplate  an  en- 
counter. In  both  cases,  a  very  powerful  motive  would  be  neces- 
sary to  justify  risking  one's  squadrons  in  such  a  venture  ;  but  there 
is  no  such  motive :  attacking  the  coast  does  not  lead  directly  to  the 
ends  of  war. 

Fleets,  like  armies,  are  the  only  instruments  that  have  hitherto 
been  able  to  decide  the  disputes  that  divide  nations.  From  the 
day  when  ships  ceased  to  play  the  part  of  a  bridge  by  which  to 
cross  arms  of  the  sea,  and  became  deadly  weapons,  the  whole  in- 
terest of  war  became  fixed  upon  them  ;  they  became  a  menace  that 
can  only  be  escaped  by  destroying  them.  That  is  why  they  attract 
to  themselves  the  hostile  forces.  The  struggle  between  elements 
afloat  is,  therefore,  a  necessity  from  the  first.  So  long  as  this  i »  i  i 
quarrel  is  not  settled,  the  coast  will  remain  in  peace,  and  we  have  U  * 
no  right  to  compromise  the  issue  by  detaching  a  part  of  our  fleet 
to  stand  guard  over  our  shore ;  all  the  ships  ought  to  participate 
in  the  operations.  It  will  always  be  time  to  bring  them  down  to 
the  coast  afterwards  if  fortune  betrays  us ;  but  it  Is  to  be  feared 
that  they  will  then  be  unable  to  raise  our  prestige  and  that  our 
loss  will  be  irremediable. 

It  is  a  grave  error  to  believe  that  the  offensive  has  not  a  direct 
and  immediate  effect  upon  the  defensive,  to  imagine  that  one  can 
with  impunity  disregard  what  is  going  on  on  the  sea  to  use  all  his 
exertions  on  shore.  This  error  has  led  to  looking  upon  naval 
warfare  as  merely  a  succession  of  disconnected  operations,  to 
devoting  part  of  one's  forces  to  offense  and  part  to  defense,  with- 
out its  being  perceived  that  in  this  way  the  former  is  endangered 
without  the  latter  being  made  safe.  As  if  the  best  way  of  de-  | 
fending  oneself  has  not  always  been  to  attack.  ' 

This  policy  has  given  us  what  may  be  called  the  fleet  of  "  the 
public  folly  " :  eighteen  coast-defense  vessels  and  two  hundred 
mobile-defense  torpedo-boats  that  are  tied  to  the  shore  by  lack  of 
steaming  radius  and  sea-going  qualities.  It  must  be  confessed 
that  so  large  a  share  has  been  given  the  defensive  that  any  offen- 
sive becomes  impossible. 

There  are  not,  therefore — or  rather  there  ought  not  to  be — two 
distinct  fleets,  one  fleet  for  attack  and  another  fleet  for  defense. 
There  is  but  one  of  them,  whose  objective  is  the  enemy  afloat,  and 
which  puts  in  action  all  the  resources  of  strategy  to  beat  him. 
without  looking  back  to  see  what  is  happening  to  the  coast. 


cA^-- 


137 


-f 


i\.  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

To  continue  the  comparison  between  land  and  sea  operations, 
we  will  say  that  on  the  sea  the  offensive  contributes  to  the  pro- 
tection of  the  coasts  to  the  same  degree  that  the  offensive  on  land 
contributes  to  the  protection  of  the  frontiers.  As  soon  as  the 
army  penetrates  into  the  hostile  territory,  it  secures  efficiently  the 
protection  of  its  own  territory,  and  renders  useless  all  the  defenses 
of  fortified  places ;  the  latter  no  longer  have  to  guard  themselves 
except  against  surprise  attacks. 

The  foregoing  is  what  we  wrote  in  the  first  edition  of  this 
study,  before  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  To-day,  after  a  recent 
experience,  we  have  nothing  to  change  in  it.  The  offensive 
played  the  same  preventive  part  during  this  war  as  in  the  past ; 
and  it  could  not  be  otherwise,  for  the  influence  of  naval  forces 
derives  from  the  very  nature  of  war. 

Indirect  Protection. — Indirect  protection  is,  therefore,  the 
only  kind  that  is  suitable  to  sea  forces ;  it  is  also  the  only  logical 
kind,  because  it  leaves  to  the  navy  its  freedom  of  action  in  carry- 
ing on  the  war.  It  forms  neither  a  barrier  nor  an  obstacle,  and 
for  that  reason  its  efficiency  is  not  clearly  apparent  unless  pains 
are  taken  to  disengage  it  from  the  teachings  of  history.  It 
does  not  oppose  the  enemy's  undertakings :  it  threatens  to  inter- 
rupt them  or  to  make  him  pay  dearly  for  them.  It  inspires  a  fear 
like  that  of  the  policeman,  who  does  not  prevent  robberies,  but 
arrests  the  robbers.  Just  as  civil  society  has  found  no  better  means 
of  guaranteeing  property  than  by  inspiring  a  salutary  fear  in 
those  who  wish  to  assail  it,  so  military  society  can  only  guarantee 
itself  against  certain  eventualities  by  making  the  enemy  run  risks 
greater  than  the  damages  he  can  cause. 

This  solution  is  not  absolute — who  can  flatter  himself  to  have 
given  such  to  any  problem  of  warfare? — but  any  other  would  be 
less  good. 

Evidently,  the  anxiety  to  find  a  favorable  field  of  battle  may 
force  us  to  abandon  completely  certam  regions.  An  Augusta  may 
profit  by  it  to  appear  on  our  coast,  but  that  will  no  more  compro- 
mise the  issue  of  the  war  than  a  cavalry  raid  compromises  the 
issue  of  a  campaign.  It  may  even  happen  that  a  more  important 
force  will  come  to  threaten  us,  though  this  is  much  less  probable, 
since,  when  the  enemy  is  kept  on  the  alert,  he  has  neither  desire 
nor  leisure  to  attack  the  coast.  But,  against  such  incursions,  the 
coasts  will  not  be  stripped  bare ;  they  will  have,  to  defend  them, 

138 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

batteries,  booms,  lines  of  torpedoes  and,  if  tbe  war  is  exclusively 
naval,  the  whole  French  Army.  With  similar  means  France  has 
for  two  centuries  repulsed — not  unsuccessfully — attacks  more  dan- 
gerous than  those  with  which  a  maritime  nation  can  threaten  us ; 
for  at  that  epoch  the  defense  of  most  of  our  sea-coast  towns  was 
only  in  embryo,  and  our  army  was  always  occupied  elsewhere. 

And  if  these  means  did  not  suffice,  if  a  few  houses  were  de- 
stroyed, some  villages  burned,  some  harvests  trodden  under  foot, 
it  would  not  be  necessary  to  cry  abomination  of  desolation :  war  is 
not  made  without  receiving  blows,  the  whole  thing  is  to  give  more 
of  them  than  one  receives,  and  above  all  to  strike  home.  Well,  if 
we  strip  a  part  of  our  coast  to  carry  the  theater  ol  war  onto  a 
distant  field,  it  is  because  usually — not  to  say  always — we  antici- 
pate elsewhere  a  superiority  that  will  assure  us  victory.  The 
enemy,  in  taking  advantage  of  the  momentary  freedom  of  the  sea 
to  attack  our  shores,  therefore  plays  our  game  ;  in  exchange  for 
material  damages,  he  renounces  a  decisive  result  or  gets  himself 
beaten.  What  do  bombardments  and  invasions  amount  to  then? 
The  dead  are  replaced,  the  losses  are  made  up ;  one  thing  alone  is 
irreparable :  the  ruin  of  the  fatherland. 

And  we  will  conclude :  the  best  way  to  protect  the  coast  is  still 
to  combine  the  direct  action  of  fixed  defenses  with  the  indirect 
action  of  squadrons. 

Protection  at  a  Distance. — When  possession  of  a  territory 
is  of  capital  importance,  either  temporarily  or  with  a  view  to  the 
future,  and  this  territory  is  not  in  condition  to  defend  itself,  it 
becomes  necessary  to  protect  it  with  ships.  In  truth  cases  of  this 
sort  are  extremely  rare :  it  is  generally  better  to  restrict  oneself 
to  bringing  the  adversary  to  an  agreement  rather  than  to  expend 
one's  forces  in  piecemeal  attacks.  When  the  time  of  settlement 
arrives,  demands  are  limited  only  by  the  degree  of  helplessness  to 
which  the  enemy  is  reduced.  But  after  all  the  event  can  happen, 
and  the  best  example  of  it  is  certainly  the  defense  of  Gibraltar  by 
the  English.  Let  us  see  how  they  went  to  work  to  preserve  their 
new  conquest,  without  suffering  the  dangers  of  direct  protection. 

The  Spaniards,  having  committed  the  error  of  leaving  a  garri- 
son of  only  150  men  in  Gibraltar,  Admiral  Rooke  had  seized  it  by 
surprise.  The  English  government  recognized  the  importance  of 
the  position  and  resolved  to  retain  it  at  any  cost.  But  to  put  the 
place  in  a  state  of  defense  required  extensive  works  and  in  the 

139 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

interval  until  they  were  executed,  although  the  rock  could  he  put 
out  of  reach  of  a  surprise,  the  fleet  alone  could  preserve  it  from  a 
prolonged  attack. 

The  English  squadron,  commanded  hy  Leake,  took  Lisbon  for  a 
base  of  operations.  It  is  probable  that  this  port  was  only  chosen  in 
the  absence  of  a  nearer  one ;  but  events  proved  that  in  spite  of  its 
distance,  or  rather  on  account  of  it,  the  protection  was  effective.'"'' 

In  fact,  so  long  as  Leake's  forces  were  not  pur  out  of  action, 
the  capture  of  Gibraltar  by  sea  was  impossible.  The  garrison, 
knowing  that  it  would  receive  assistance  in  the  course  of  time, 
would  hold  out  until  the  fleet  arrived ;  and  the  latter,  finding  the 
besiegers  engaged  in  combined  operations,  could  inflict  defeat 
upon  them,  even  if  inferior  in  numbers.  It  was  necessary  to 
station  oflf  Lisbon  a  covering  squadron  at  least  equal  in  force  to 
that  of  Leake,  which  required  a  deployment  of  forces  that  France 
was  incapable  of  accomplishing ;  or  to  destroy  the  English  squad- 
ron first  and  then  attack  Gibraltar.  But  how  could  ships  inside 
an  inaccessible  roadstead  be  reached? 

The  English  fleet,  established  at  Lisbon,  therefore  really  pro- 
tected Gibraltar ;  it  did  not  accomplish  indirect  protection,  but 
protection  at  a  distance.'"* 

The  French  government  did  not  appreciate  this  situation. 
Relying  upon  the  absence  of  Leake's  fleet,  it  paid  no  attention  to  it 
and  sent  Squadron  Commander  de  Pointis  to  Gibraltar  to  aid 
with  his  ships  the  land  operations  directed  by  Marshal  Tesse. 

Did  Pointis  comprehend  the  danger  he  was  going  to  run? 
It  may  be  doubted,  since  he  accepted  the  mission.  Things  are 
often  not  seen  in  their  true  light  until  after  arrival  on  the  spot. 
However  this  may  be,  when  he  reached  Gibraltar  he  perceived  the 
difficulties  of  his  task  and  wrote  of  them  to  Paris.  At  the  same 
time  he  withdrew  to  Cadiz,  leaving  his  light  vessels  off  the  place 
to  blockade  it.  This  light  squadron  was  captured  by  Leake,  who 
had  hastened  from  Lisbon  on  news  of  its  appearance ;  then  the 

"^  Colomb.    Naval  Warfare. 

^"*A  naval  force  compelled  by  circumstances  to  take  station  off  a  port 
which  it  cannot  use  as  a  base  is,  o  priori,  in  a  delicate  position;  it  is  never 
complete,  on  account  of  the  need  to  revictual  its  ships  and  to  maintain 
distant  lookout  vessels.  The  position  taken  by  the  English  squadron  had 
the  curious  result  of  making  the  attack  defend  itself  and  the  defense 
attack. 

140 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

English  fleet,  after  having  supplied  the  rock,  returned  to  its  post 
of  observation. 

The  blindness  of  the  French  government  having  forced  Pointis 
to  lend  more  effective  co-operation  to  the  troops,  the  latter  in- 
vested Gibraltar  by  sea  and  was  surprised  by  Leake,  who  arrived 
from  Lisbon  for  the  third  time.  Eight  of  his  ships  were  then  off 
to  leeward ;  the  five  that  remained  widi  him  were  captured. 

This  result  might  have  been  foreseen.  We  may  well  ask 
through  what  blindness  the  Versailles  Cabinet  assumed  to  under- 
take an  operation  of  long  duration  in  the  presence  of  a  naval 
force  specially  intended  to  oppose  it.  If  the  English  squadron 
could  have  been  destroyed,  the  besieged  would  perhaps  have  sur- 
rendered, because,  seeing  no  longer  any  possibility  of  being  aided, 
they  would  have  judged  it  useless  to  prolong  a  hopeless  struggle ; 
but  the  assurance  that  the  fleet  would  appear  gave  them  strength 
to  resist  until  all  means  of  resistance  were  exhausted. 

And,  since  v/e  are  speaking  of  Gibraltar,  let  us  observe  that  the 
English  have  never  believed,  either  on  that  occasion  or  on  any 
other,  that  a  bombardment  could  reduce  the  place,  because  they 
knew  that  the  batteries  would  defend  themselves  and  would  end 
by  having  the  best  of  it.     These  expectations  have  been  realized. 


141 


[The  following  chapter  was  translated  by  Commander  H.  S.  Knapp,  U.   S.  N.] 

11. 

The  Conquest  of  Territory  over  Seas. 

Should  a  nation  having  a  .strong  navy  wish  to  undertake  opera- 
tions of  war  on  land,  it  must  confine  its  aspirations  to  attempts 
upon  the  coast  of  the  adversary  if  its  army  is  numerically  weak. 
Not  having  at  disposal  means  sufficient  for  an  invasion  of  the 
enemy's  territory,  it  is  only  by  accident  that  it  can  take  possession 
of  an  island  or  of  a  position  on  the  coast,  the  occupation  of  which 
will  always  remain  precarious. 

On  the  other  hand,  a  nation  having  a  strong  military  organiza- 
tion, but  whose  navy  has  been  sacrificed  to  the  army,  will  always  be 
tempted  to  seek  upon  land  a  field  of  battle  that  it  does  not  find  on 
the  sea.  It  will  disdain  those  desultory  operations  that  attack  only 
the  material  interests  of  populations  on  the  littoral,  and  will  be  pos- 
sessed by  the  idea  of  throwing  great  masses  of  men  into  the 
enemy's  territory  in  order  to  make  use  of  its  army. 

For  this  reason  it  is  the  English  who  have  given  examples  of 
operations  against  the  coast :  wliile  it  is  France  that  holds  the 
stage  as  soon  as  the  question  is  one  of  attempting  an  invasion. 

The  history  of  the  Franco-English  duel  affords  the  most  re- 
markable example  of  the  efforts  made  by  a  countr\-  to  compensate 
for  its  maritime  inferiority  by  a  land  struggle.  We  purpose  re- 
viewing the  different  phases  of  this  long  drama. 

The  Landing  in  Ireland  (1689). — The  accession  of  William 
III  to  the  English  throne  marks  the  beginning  of  the  series  of 
maritime  wars  that  was  not  to  end  until  1815,  126  years  after. 

James  II,  dethroned  by  his  son-in-law,  had  taken  refuge  at 
the  court  of  Louis  XIV  and  had  sought  his  sujjport.  The  new 
king  of  England  himself  furnished  the  pretext  for  an  intervention 
by  entering  the  League  of  Augsburg. 

Attention  was  first  directed  to  Ireland.  Tyrconnel  had  suc- 
ceeded in  maintaining  that  island  under  the  authority  of  the 
Stuarts,  with  the  exception  of  L'lster.  It  was.  therefore,  decided 
that  James  II  should  betake  himself  to  Ireland,  and  that  he  should 
be  followed  by  a  small  army,  about  which  to  organize  the  poorly 
disciplined  Irish  troops. 

142 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy, 

The  king  left  Saint  Germain  February  28,  1689.  "  I  wish,"  said 
Louis  XIV  on  leaving  him,  "  never  to  see  you  again."  A  division 
composed  of  some  10  ships  under  the  orders  of  Gabaret,  Squadron 
Commander,  had  been  fitted  out  at  Brest  with  the  utmost  secrecy. 
James  II  embarked  with  400  French  officers  and  1200  Anglo- 
Irishmen;  he  took  with  him  a  good  quantity  of  arms  and  muni- 
tions. Gabaret  arrived  at  Kinsale  March  22.  After  having  dis- 
embarked the  troops  and  material  he  left  Captain  Duquesne-Mon- 
nier  on  the  spot  with  three  frigates,  and  returned  to  Brest  without 
having  encountered  a  single  enemy  vessel.  Such  happy  luck 
need  occasion  no  surprise.  War  had  only  just  been  declared ; 
nothing  about  the  projects  of  Louis  XIV  had  leaked  out;  finally 
it  was  the  custom  in  those  days  not  to  commission  ships  until 
spring.  By  sailing  at  the  beginning  of  March  one  was  almost 
certain  to  find  the  sea  entirely  free,  which  happened  in  this  case. 

In  the  meantime  the  fleet  was  put  in  commission  at  Brest  under ' 
the  command  of  Chateau-Renault.     It  was  composed  of  24  ships, 
2  frigates,  and  6  fireships.    On  May  6  it  sailed,  escorting  a  convoy 
that  carried  7000  men. 

The  attention  of  the  English  government  had  been  attracted  by 
the  landing  of  James  II  in  Ireland  and  the  fitting  out  of  the  ships 
at  Brest.  It  hastily  fitted  out  a  squadron  commanded  by  Admiral 
Herbert,  the  same  who  had  taken  over  William  of  Orange  from 
Holland  to  England.  Herbert  took  station  on  lookout  off  Ushant, 
where  he  learned  of  the  departure  of  the  French  and  laid  his 
course  for  the  Irish  coast. 

Chateau-Renault  had  orders  to  disembark  his  troops  at  Kin- 
sale  or  Galway ;  but,  on  March  9,  near  Cape  Clear,  he  had  infor- 
mation of  the  English  squadron.  The  nearness  of  the  enemy  and 
the  direction  of  the  wind  forced  him  to  abandon  his  plan ;  he  im- 
mediately resolved  to  take  his  convoy  into  Bantry  Bay,  where  he 
anchored  March  10  at  11  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

The  light  vessels  began  embarking  the  troops  in  order  to  trans- 
port them  to  the  head  of  the  bay  close  to  the  land.  About  four 
in  the  afternoon  the  scouts  signalled  2']  sails  which  were  tacking 
in  to  approach  the  land. 

Chateau-Renault  judging  that  the  enemy  would  not  arrive  at 
the  entrance  of  the  bay  before  24  hours,  kept  up  the  operations 
of  disembarkation  throughout  the  night.     The  next  day  he  got 

143 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

under  way  at  dawn  and  left  the  bay;  but  in  order  to  cover  his 
transports,  he  did  not  stand  far  off  shore.  The  action  began 
about  II  o'clock;  it  was  rather  confused,  but  finally  the  advan- 
tage rested  with  the  French.  Chateau-Renault  gave  up  the  pursuit 
of  the  enemy  in  order  not  to  separate  himself  from  his  convoy,  and 
took  his  squadron  back  to  Bantry.  After  having  picked  up  his 
frigates  and  fireships  he  endeavored  to  overtake  the  English ;  but 
as  they  had  taken  refuge  at  Spithead  to  repair  their  damages  he 
steered  for  Brest,  where  he  arrived  March  i8,  after  an  absence  of 
II  days. 

Without  drawing  premature  conclusions  from  this  single  expe- 
dition, we  shall  note  that  it  was  favored  by  special  conditions. 

Ireland  was  an  allied  country ;  the  disembarkation  could  thus  be 
effected  within  an  inclosed  anchorage  and  upon  any  part  of  the 
coast;  the  population,  instead  of  forcibly  resisting  the  descent  of 
the  troops,  favored  it  to  the  extent  of  its  power.  Had  it  been 
necessary  for  Chateau-Renault  to  undertake  the  disembarkation 
in  a  hostile  country  he  would  have  been  forced  to  do  it  on  an  unin- 
habited beach,  which  would  have  required  a  much  longer  time ; 
nor  would  he  have  been  able  to  modify  his  plans  at  the  last 
moment  by  selecting  Bantry  in  place  of  Kinsale,  because  it  is  not 
a  matter  of  indifference  to  arrive  at  one  point  rather  than  another 
when  gaining  a  foothold  on  territory  occupied  by  the  enemy. 
Despite  this  array  of  favorable  circumstances,  despite  the  great 
extent  of  coast  of  which  the  expedition  could  make  use,  our  squad- 
ron narrowly  escaped  meeting  the  English  at  sea ;  and  it  is  easy  to 
imagine  what  would  have  happened. 

What  became  of  the  little  army  landed  in  March  ? 

Upon  the  arrival  of  James  II  Ireland  arose,  and  the  principal 
towns  of  Ulster  quickly  fell  into  the  power  of  the  Jacobites.  The 
Protestants  shut  themselves  up  in  Londonderry  and  Enniskillen 
until  the  situation  in  England  should  permit  William  to  succor 
them.  James  II  laid  siege  to  Londonderry,  but  the  place  was  well 
defended,  and  after  three  months  the  siege  had  to  be  raised  (July 
28).  A  month  later  Schomberg  landed  with  several  thousand 
men,  relieved  Enniskillen,  and  pushed  James  II  back  to  the  borders 
of  Ulster  and  Leinster. 

Thus  the  war  dragged  on,  the  ex-king  fearing  to  give  battle, 
Schomberg  afraid  to  venture  into  the  insurgent  region, 

144 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

.  The  Second  Landing  in  Ireland  (1690). — In  November  the 
English  ParHament  voted  appropriations  in  order  to  push  the  war 
with  vigor,  and  WilHam  manifested  his  intention  of  going  to  Ire- 
land at  the  beginning  of  the  campaign.  Upon  the  urgent  request 
of  James  II,  Louis  XIV  had  decided  to  send  fresh  reinforcements 
on  condition  that  he  should  receive  an  equal  number  of  Irishmen  in 
exchange  for  his  regular  troops.  In  March,  1690,  Lieutenant- 
General  d'Amfreville  left  Brest  with  27  vessels,  escorting  a  con- 
voy carrying  6000  to  7000  troops  under  the  orders  of  the  Duke  de 
Lauzun,  and  also  a  great  quantity  of  arms  and  munitions. 

In  consequence  of  circumstances  that  would  take  too  long  in 
telling,  not  only  had  the  Dutch  fleet  not  yet  arrived  in  England, 
but  the  English  ships  themselves  were  not  in  commission.  D'Am- 
freville, therefore,  encountered  no  opposition ;  he  landed  his  troops 
at  Cork  on  March  23,  embarked  the  Irishmen  in  exchange,  and  re- 
turned to  Brest. 

After  the  arrival  of  Chateau-Renault,  who  brought  the  Eastern 
Squadron  from  Toulon,  Tourville  sailed  from  Brest  with  70  ships 
to  dispute  the  command  of  the  channel  with  the  English  and  the 
Dutch.  At  Beachy  Head  he  encountered  the  enemy's  fleet  com- 
manded by  Herbert,  and  defeated  it ;  but  the  very  next  day  James 
II  was  crushed  at  the  Boyne. 

William  III  had  reached  Ireland  the  day  of  Tourville's  sailing 
for  Brest.  He  at  once  put  himself  at  the  head  of  his  troops  and, 
with  40,000  men,  attacked  James  II,  who  had  less  than  30,000  men. 
Abandoning  his  army,  James  II  fled  precipitately  to  Kinsale, 
where  he  found  10  French  frigates.'"  He  embarked  at  once  and 
had  himself  taken  to  Brest,  and  from  there  he  went  to  Versailles  to 
ask  for  a  new  army.  But  Louis  XIV,  indignant  at  his  conduct,  re- 
fused him  any  aid  and  ordered  Tourville  to  send  ships  to  Ireland 
to  repatriate  the  troops. 

After  the  defeat  at  the  Boyne,  the  Duke  de  Lauzun  had  retreated 
to  Galway  while  a  simple  French  captain,  Boisselot,  shut  himself 
up  in  Limerick  with  a  handful  of  resolute  men  and  arrested  the 
victorious  march  of  William.  Lauzun  was  thus  able  to  await  the 
French  ships  without  anxiety ;  these  arrived  at  the  end  of  August 

"^  It  had  been  decided  that,  if  Tourville  should  be  the  victor,  he  would 
send  twenty-five  frigates  to  sweep  St.  George's  Channel  and  intercept  the 
reinforcements  crossing  to  Ireland;  the  frigates  at  Kinsale  were  a  part  of 
this  detachment. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

and  took  the  troops  back  to  Brest.  Scarcely  had  the  French  troops 
left  when  Kinsale  was  taken. 

At  this  time  the  alHed  fleet  had  taken  refuge  in  the  Thames, 
where  Herbert  had  caused  the  removal  of  the  buoys  marking  the 
entrance  to  the  Thames  in  order  to  stop  the  pursuit  by  the  French 
squadron.  The  victory  of  Beachy  Head  thus  had  a  direct  influence 
upon  the  security  of  sea  communications ;  and  it  is  beyond  question 
that  the  small  French  army  would  have  been  forced  to  capitulate 
if  Tourville  had  been  beaten. 

Attempt  to  Invade  England  (1692). — During  the  campaign 
of  1691  the  fleet  remained  on  the  defensive.  Tourville  made  his 
three  months'  sortie  in  the  Channel,  which  has  remained  celebrated 
under  the  name  of  the  "  deep-sea-cruise,"  during  which  time  he 
held  a  superior  enenn'  in  check  without  permitting  the  least 
damage  to  himself.  But  in  1692  there  came  a  reversion  to  the  idea 
of  invasion.  This  time  it  was  desired  to  land  in  England  itself  in 
order  to  finish  the  w-ar  at  a  single  blow.  James  H  repaired  to 
Havre  and  la  Hogue,  where  30,000  men  and  500  transports  were 
assembled.  The  army  was  commanded  by  Marshal  de  Bellefonds, 
and  Tourville  had  the  duty  of  covering  the  passage  with  the  fleet. 

The  disadvantages  of  the  geographical  situation  of  France, 
which  have  been  pointed  out  in  a  preceding  chapter,  then  made 
themselves  felt.  The  Toulon  detachment,  being  hindered  by  the 
weather,  was  not  able  to  arrive  at  the  date  fixed.  Tourville,  whose 
departure  had  already  been  delayed  nearly  a  month  by  reason  of 
strained  finances,  sailed  on  May  2y  with  only  44  ships.  Mishaps 
always  have  disastrous  consequences.  Troops  are  assembled, 
transports  are  ready  to  sail,  there  is  nothing  to  delay  departure 
except  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  escort ;  but  every  day  that  passes 
represents  an  added  expenditure  and  increases  the  enervation 
caused  by  delay.  It  results,  then,  that  patience  is  lost ;  and,  in 
order  that  all  these  preparations  shall  not  have  been  made  in  vain, 
some  hazardous  venture  is  attempted.    This  is  what  happened. 

The  delay  in  commissioning  the  fleet  had  left  to  the  Dutch  tim.e 
to  effect  their  junction  with  the  English ;  and  when  the  French 
fleet  had  doubled  Cape  la  Hogue  it  found  itself  in  the  presence  of 
99  enemy  ships.  Tourville  was  defeated  despite  a  magnificent 
resistance.    The  expedition  was  abandoned. 

We  shall  not  recall  here  the  melancholy  incidents  that  followed 
the  battle  of  la  Hogue  and  brought  about  the  loss  of  15  ships. 

146 


A  Study  of  Nav^al  Strategy. 

Suffice  to  say  that  the  result  of  this  battle  illustrates  well  that  a 
fleet  that  has  been  defeated,  but  not  destroyed,  is  completely  negli- 
gible for  a  long  time,  and  that  the  demoralization  that  attends  lost 
battles  permits  the  victor  to  undertake  with  impunity  the  most 
hardy  enterprises  without  running  any  risk. 

The  war  with  England  lasted  until  1712,  with  a  short  interval 
of  peace  from  1698  to  1702;  but  the  miscarriage  of  this  attempt  at 
invasion  took  away  from  Louis  XIV  all  idea  of  undertaking  an 
operation  of  this  sort  again.  It  required  30  years  of  peace  to 
weaken  the  bad  impression  that  it  had  left,  and  to  bring  minds  back 
toward  a  disembarkation. 

Second  Attempt  to  Invade  England  (1744). — England  had 
been  at  war  with  Spain  since  1739.  The  vexations  of  every  kind 
to  which  the  English  had  subjected  our  maritime  commerce  made 
it  plain  that  France,  in  spite  of  her  efforts,  would  not  long  be  able 
to  avoid  taking  a  part  in  the  struggle.  A  final  affront  made  the 
government  emerge  from  its  attitude  of  reserve  which,  if  pro- 
longed, would  have  wrought  injury  to  the  national  prestige.  The 
Spanish  fleet,  pursued  by  the  English,  had  sought  refuge  at  Tou- 
lon ;  and  the  English  ships  treated  our  coast  as  enemy  country 
under  pretext  of  watching  the  Spanish  squadron. 

Fitting  out  was  immediately  begun  at  Brest  and  Toulon,  and  it 
was  resolved  to  throw  an  army  corps  into  England,  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  fact  that  the  war  with  Spain  had  withdrawn  a  great 
part  of  the  English  ships  from  their  own  coast. 

While  transports  were  being  quietly  dispatched  to  Dunkirk, 
Calais,  and  Boulogne,  15,000  old  soldiers  were  concentrated  at 
Lille  and  Valenciennes.  The  Pretender,  Charles  Edward,  was  to 
accompany  the  troops,  which  were  put  under  the  command  of 
Marshal  de  Saxe. 

It  was  a  small  number  for  the  conquest  of  England — 15,000 
men ;  but  at  this  time  George  II  was  waging  war  in  Germany, 
whither  he  had  sent  his  best  troops,  and  there  were  remaining  in 
England  not  more  than  10,000  men.  The  discontent  that  was 
readily  taken  for  a  desire  for  the  restoration  was  also  counted 
upon,  and  it  was  believed  that  the  landing  of  the  Pretender  would 
be  sufficient  to  make  the  country  rise.  It  was  a  constant  mistake 
of  the  Versailles  cabinet  to  speculate  upon  a  revolution  in  England. 
The  exiled  princes,  living  in  retirement,  were  surrounded  by  a 
court  of  refugees  who  passed  their  time  in  commenting  upon  and 

147 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

in  exaggerating  events;  and,  in  their  haste  to  return  to  a  state  of 
affairs  that  should  restore  them  to  place  and  dignity,  they  took 
their  wishes  for  realities.  On  the  other  hand,  the  emissaries  kept 
in  England  by  the  court  to  keep  it  informed  of  opinion  exag- 
gerated the  slightest  incidents  in  order  to  justify  the  subsidies  they 
received ;  and  these  different  causes  brought  it  about  that  the  situ- 
ation was  viewed  in  a  false  light  in  France.  As  a  result  it  was 
ever  believed  that  the  landing  of  a  number  of  regiments  on  Brit- 
ish soil  would  be  sufficient  to  replace  the  Stuarts  upon  the  throne 
of  their  fathers. 

The  squadron  that  had  been  fitted  out  at  Brest  comprised  then 
25  ships  under  de  Roquefeuil  as  commander-in-chief ;  its  duty  was 
to  cover  the  passage. 

Count  de  Roquefeuil  got  under  way  on  February  14,  1744.  His 
object  was  to  make  a  reconnaissance  of  the  English  coast,  and, 
after  assuring  himself  that  no  English  fleet  was  in  the  Channel, 
to  regain  the  Strait  of  Dover  and  escort  the  convoy. 

Bad  weather  kept  the  French  squadron  off  shore  and  it  was  not 
until  the  end  of  the  month  that  it  appeared  off  the  Isle  of  Wight. 
Count  de  Roquefeuil  ascertained  that  there  was  no  naval  force  in 
the  roadstead  of  Saint  Helens ;  from  this  he  concluded,  a  little 
prematurely,  that  the  English  had  not  yet  fitted  out  their  ships. 
He  detached  several  ships  under  command  of  Baraith  to  inform 
Charles  Edward  and  Marshal  de  Saxe  that  the  passage  was  clear 
and  that  they  could  cross  the  Strait  under  the  protection  of  the  es- 
cort that  he  had  sent  them.  He  himself  anchored  on  the  evening 
of  the  226.  at  Dungeness  to  cover  the  passage.  The  next  day  his 
astonishment  was  extreme  to  see  34  enemy  ships  tacking  in  to 
reach  him.  This  is  what  had  happened.  Upon  his  sailing  from 
Brest,  Roquefeuil  had  been  sighted  first  by  the  Phoenix,  which  was 
cruising  in  the  vicinity  of  Ushant ;  and  then,  on  February  3,  by  the 
escort  of  a  convoy  coming  from  Jamaica.  The  Admiralty,  thus 
warned,  had  hastened  the  fitting  out  of  the  fleet ;  and  Admiral  Nor- 
ris  quickly  found  himself  in  the  Downs  at  the  head  of  49  sail,  of 
which  21  were  of  more  than  60  guns,  and  11  of  more  than  44. 

Thwarted  by  the  tide,  the  English  squadron  had  to  anchor  six 
miles  away  from  our  ships.  Roquefeuil  took  advantage  of  the 
circumstances  to  get  under  way.  Favored  by  the  fog,  he  had  al- 
ready succeeded  in  escaping  from  the  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  when 

148 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

a  storm  dispersed  his  squadron  and  sent  it  back  in  disorder  to 
Brest.  The  same  storm  prevented  the  convoy  from  setting-  out; 
the  Pretender,  Maurice  de  Saxe  and  ii  battahons  had  already 
embarked. 

When  the  bad  weather  was  over  the  EngHsh  forces  were  guard- 
ing the  passage;  the  expedition  was  abandoned. 

The  French  government  had  evidently  reckoned  upon  being  able 
to  surprise  the  English  because  of  the  war  with  Spain ;  but  the 
situation  was  too  tense  to  permit  of  the  vigilance  of  our  enemies 
not  being  fully  aroused. 

Landing  of  Prince  Charles  Edward  in  Scotland  (1745), 
Followed  by  a  Third  Attempt  to  Land  in  England. — Charles 
Edward  had  not  given  up  the  hope  of  reconquering  the  crown  of 
his  ancestors,  and  he  displayed  an  energy  at  this  time  that  would, 
no  doubt,  have  assured  the  success  of  his  grandfather  60  years 
earlier.  Left  to  his  own  resources  he  repaired  to  Nantes,  and  sailed 
from  there  with  one  ship  and  one  frigate  lent  him  by  an  Irish 
privateer.^**  He  landed  in  Scotland  June  4,  1745,  with  a  number  of 
followers,  some  arms  and  4000  louis,  entered  Edinburgh,  beat  the 
English  at  Prestonpans,  and  penetrated  to  within  30  leagues  of 
London.  The  situation  became  critical  for  the  English ;  the  king 
was  still  in  Germany  and  the  Council  of  Regents  was  at  its  wit's 
end.  The  French  government  deemed  the  occasion  a  favorable  one 
to  intervene ;  10,000  men  were  assembled  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
Strait  of  Dover,  and  the  Duke  of  Richelieu  was  selected  to  com- 
mand. But  action  had  been  too  slow ;  when  the  troops  were  ready 
to  embark,  at  the  end  of  December,  two  English  squadrons  were 
watching  the  Strait.  After  vainly  waiting  some  time  for  bad 
weather  to  sweep  away  the  English  ships,  the  troops  went  back  to 
their  respective  garrisons.    The  expedition  was  abandoned. 

For  a  second  time  (and  it  will  not  be  the  last)  we  note  the  im- 
possibility of  making  an  expedition  wait  that  has  required  lengthy 
preparations.  When  all  is  ready  it  is  necessary  to  set  out  or  give 
up  the  operation.  But,  as  the  coast  is  generally  watched  and  as  a 
storm  alone  can  clear  it,  the  departure  depends  upon  a  combina- 
tion of  circumstances  that  rarely  comes  to  pass. 

^"'  These  two  ships,  the  Dcntelle  and  the  Elizabeth,  belonged  to  the  king 
and  had  been  lent  to  the  Irishman  Walsh  to  use  in  privateering. 

149 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 


First  Conquest  of  Minorca  (1756). — As  always  happens 
after  a  fruitless  attempt,  the  war  ended  without  further  thought 
of  invading  English  territory;  but  the  idea  was  to  be  taken  up  on 
a  grander  scale  during  the  Seven  Years'  War. 

The  war  was  declared  May  15,  1756;  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  had 
been  going  on  for  several  years.  In  Canada  there  had  been  fight- 
ing ever  since  the  death  of  a  French  officer,  Jumonville,  assassi- 
nated by  the  English  in  contempt  of  the  law  of  nations.  Pitt  had 
caused  to  be  seized  in  the  ports  300  French  merchant  ships ;  and, 
while  Parliament  had  declared  the  captures  irregular,  the  English 
government  none  the  less  refused  to  give  them  up.  To  all  these 
annoyances  it  was  desired  to  make  an  energetic  reply,  and  while 
Lieutenant-General  Macnemara  sailed  from  Brest  for  Canada 
with  a  squadron,  an  expedition  was  fitted  out  at  Toulon  with  the 
object  of  seizing  the  island  of  Minorca,  which  had  been  left  in  the 
hands  of  the  British  by  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht.  That  power  was 
only  keeping  at  the  time  two  ships  and  three  frigates  in  the  Medi- 
terranean, stationed  usually  at  Mahon. 

Lieutenant-General  de  la  Galissonniere  sailed  from  Toulon  April 
9,  1756,  with  12  ships,  4  frigates  and  6  gunboats.  He  first  went 
to  Hyeres  Roads  where  he  joined  the  convoy  of  14,000  men  under 
the  command  of  Duke  de  Richelieu.  On  the  i8th  the  fleet 
anchored  before  the  little  town  of  Ciudadella,  where  the  landing 
took  place  with  no  attempt  at  opposition  on  the  part  of  the  enemy ; 
by  the  24th  the  artillery  and  all  the  material  was  on  shore.  The 
ships  of  war  then  went  to  sea  to  establish  the  blockade  of  the 
island,  the  French  already  being  masters  of  the  whole  territory 
except  Fort  St.  Philip,  which  commands  the  city  of  Mahon  and  in 
which  the  English  garrison  of  3000  men  had  taken  refuge. 

In  the  meantime  England  had  taken  alarm  at  the  preparations 
going  on  at  Toulon,  and  though  their  object  w^as  concealed  it 
seemed  probable  that  the  expedition  was  aimed  at  Minorca.  The 
Admiralty  immediately  prepared  a  squadron  for  the  Mediter- 
ranean. 

Admiral  Bing  left  Spithead  April  6  (three  days  before  the  de- 
parture of  the  French  fleet  from  Toulon)  with  ii  ships  and  4000 
troops.  Upon  arriving  at  Gibraltar  May  2,  he  learned  of  the  land- 
ing of  the  French  from  the  English  ships  that  had  fled  from  Mahon 
at  our  approach.  He  left  May  8,  having  then  13  ships,  and  arrived 
in  sight  of  Minorca  and  of  the  French  squadron  on  the  19th, 

150 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Defeated  by  la  Galissonniere  the  following-  day,  Admiral  Bing 
abandoned  the  relief  of  Minorca  and  sailed  away  for  Gibraltar. 
Nevertheless  he  had  not  lost  a  single  ship;  for  there,  as  at  Bantry, 
the  anxiety  of  the  French  not  to  abandon  the  expeditionary  corps 
forbade  them  to  fight  to  a  finish.  This  timidity  might  have  cost  us 
dearly  if  contentions  had  not  arisen  in  the  English  squadron  to 
paralyze  its  movements ;  as  a  matter  of  fact,  Bing  found  at  Gibral- 
tar on  June  19  five  ships  that  had  just  arrived  from  England  to  rein- 
force him,  and  with  which  he  might  have  taken  the  offensive  again. 

Fort  St.  Philip  capitulated  June  30.  The  troops  then  began  to 
embark,  and,  on  July  8,  the  fleet  set  out  for  Toulon  where  it 
arrived  the  i6th,  only  a  garrison  remaining  at  Minorca. 

As  is  known,  Bing  was  relieved  of  his  command,  brought  to 
trial  before  a  court-martial,  and  was  shot  on  the  poop  of  his  own 
ship. 

War  had  been  declared  three  days  before  the  battle  of  Mahon. 

It  is  curious  to  note  that  the  English,  who  were  constantly 
masters  of  the  sea,  made  no  attempt  to  retake  Minorca  throughout 
the  entire  course  of  the  war.  To  our  mind,  the  English  govern- 
ment held,  in  this  particular,  the  just  estimate  of  the  situation. 
The  means  were  certainly  not  lacking  to  our  enemy  of  landing  in 
security  at  the  Balearics  a  body  of  troops  capable  of  wresting  the 
island  from  the  garrison  in  occupation ;  but,  during  the  whole  of 
the  operation,  which  might  have  lasted  several  months  if  the 
French  had  sustained  the  siege  in  Fort  St.  Philip,  the  Balearics 
would  have  become  the  center  of  attraction  for  the  navies  of  the 
two  countries.  The  English  ships,  however,  would  not  have  found 
a  favorable  field  of  operations  on  those  coasts ;  at  that  time,  as  we 
have  already  said,  Gibraltar  did  not  yet  constitute  a  solid  point  of 
support,  and  England  was  more  concerned  then  to  keep  the  Rock 
than  to  utilize  it.  As  a  result  an  expedition  against  Minorca  could 
have  no  other  bases  than  the  home  ports,  which  were  far  away, 
while  France  had  in  the  neighborhood  one  of  her  principal  arse- 
nals. A  position  so  advantageous  offered  to  the  remnants  of  our 
navy  that  had  taken  refuge  at  Toulon  such  opportunities  of  thwart- 
ing all  attempts  against  Mahon  that  England  preferred  not  to  risk 
them.  Her  government  doubtless  thought  that  being  victorious  in 
the  end  would  suffice  to  constrain  the  vanquished  to  give  up  what 
he  had  taken,  and  that  is  the  very  tiling  that  happened  ;  at  the  con- 
clusion of  peace  Minorca  was  exchanged  for  Belle-Isle. 

151 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Fourth  Attempt  to  Land  in  England  (1759). — The  battle 
of  Mahon  marked  the  end  of  our  successes  during-  this  calamitous 
war.  The  navy  had  fallen  into  unworthy  hands  which  set  them- 
selves to  destroy  it  with  as  much  ardor  as,  and  more  hatred  than, 
the  enemy.  The  ships  remaining  to  us  were  laid  up,  their  crews 
disbanded.  Finding-  no  enemy  to  fight,  the  English  squadrons 
ravaged  our  coasts  and  took  possession  of  our  colonies ;  and  it 
seemed  as  if  the  navy  of  Colbert  was  about  to  perish,  suffocated 
by  shame,  when  affairs  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Duke  de  Choi- 
seul.  His  patriotism  could  not  put  up  with  such  humiliations ; 
but,  in  his  desire  to  raise  the  prestige  of  France  by  a  bold  stroke, 
he  only  cast  her  into  the  depths,  for  there  were  no  longer  at  dis- 
posal means  sufficient  for  his  purpose.  As  ever,  our  inability  to 
wage  war  on  the  sea  led  us  to  shift  the  war  to  the  land,  and  it  was 
thus  that  attention  was  centered  on  a  scheme  of  invasion.  Choi- 
seul,  at  the  instigation  of  Marshal  Belle-Isle,  proposed  at  first  to 
throw  50,000  men  on  to  English  soil  by  sending  them  over  from 
Boulogne  and  Ambleteuse  in  flatboats.  A  beginning  was  even 
made  on  this  plan ;  the  construction  of  a  flotilla  was  begun  and 
the  coast  was  armed  with  some  hundred  heavy  guns  designed  to 
protect  the  points  of  assemblage.  But  this  project  was  soon  aban- 
doned and  a  new  one  was  adopted,  due,  it  is  said,  to  Captain  Bigot 
de  Morogues.'™ 

The  descent  was  to  be  made  at  two  different  places ;  to  this  end 
two  armies  of  20.000  men  each  were  assembled,  the  first  in  Brit- 
tany under  the  Duke  d'Aiguillon,  the  second  in  Flanders  under 
Chevert.  At  the  same  time  a  general  concentration  of  all  squad- 
rons at  Brest  was  to  unite  35  or  40  ships.  This  fleet  was  first  to 
join  the  convoy  from  Morbihan  (Brittany),  and,  passing  to  the 
westward  of  Ireland,  was  to  detach  several  frigates  with  the 
transports  before  the  Gulf  of  the  Clyde ;  then  it  was  to  turn  the 
northern  end  of  Scotland  and  pick  up  Chevert's  army  at  Ostend 
and  escort  it  to  the  English  coast,  where  it  was  to  land  at  Breath- 
water,  some  leagues  from  London.  This  very  complicated  plan 
had  the  peculiarity  of  taking  no  more  account  of  the  enemy  than 
if  it  had  concerned  a  simple  ocean  promenade.  The  participa- 
tion of  the  English  squadron  was,  however,  acknowledged  by 
providing  that,  in  case  it  should  show  signs  of  interfering,  the 

"*  Author  of  a  treatise  on  naval  tactics. 

152 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

war  fleet  would  remain  in  the  Channel  to  paralyze  its  movements, 
while  the  two  convoys  should  cross  the  sea  under  escort  of  a  few 
frigates.  To  complete  these  dispositions  a  small  division  was  to 
be  sent  out  from  Havre  to  throw  a  landing  force  into  Ireland  with 
the  object  of  creating  a  diversion. 

If  the  division  of  the  expedition  into  three  parts,  composed 
of  the  two  landing  corps  on  the  wings  and  of  the  escort  in  the 
center,  had  only  for  its  object  to  force  the  enemy  to  divide  his 
forces  in  such  a  way  that  the  Brest  squadron  would  find  before 
it  a  number  of  ships  small  enough  to  be  fought  successfully — if 
such  was  the  object  of  this  peculiar  distribution  of  force — it  might 
be  justified  as  a  preliminary  operation.  But  if  it  was  expected 
that  the  passage  could  be  made  without  fighting,  the  question 
arises :  What  object  was  there  in  concentrating  the  troops  in  a 
port  at  a  distance  from  that  in  which  the  ships  were  to  concen- 
trate ?  This  added  one  difficulty  more  to  those  already  presented 
by  such  a  hazardous  operation. 

The  first  act  of  this  whole  scheme  was  to  get  the  Toulon  squad- 
ron out  of  the  Mediterranean  and  into  the  ocean.  De  la  Clue,  its 
chief,  was  watched  by  Boscawen  off  Toulon.  The  latter,  having 
occasion  to  repair  three  of  his  ships  that  had  been  badly  damaged 
in  a  hot  skirmish  in  the  outer  roadstead  of  Toulon,  returned  to 
Gibraltar  leaving  some  frigates  before  the  port.  The  French 
admiral  profited  by  his  absence  to  sail,  on  August  5,  1759,  with  12 
ships  and  three  frigates;  on  the  evening  of  August  17  he  was  at 
the  entrance  of  the  Strait.  The  same  date  the  English  squadron, 
consisting  of  16  ships  and  nine  frigates,  got  under  way  at  10 
o'clock  at  night,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  i8th  Boscawen 
sighted  the  enemy,  who  had  passed  through  the  Strait,  and  imme- 
diately started  in  pursuit.  De  la  Clue,  finding  himself  discovered, 
decided  to  go  on  past  Cadiz,  which  port  he  had  intended  to  enter ; 
but,  sailing  without  lights  in  order  not  to  betray  his  whereabouts. 
he  became  separated  from  five  ships  and  three  frigates,  which 
pursued  their  course  to  Cadiz  and  anchored  there  in  ignorance  of 
his  new  dispositions.  The  remainder  of  the  squadron  was  over- 
taken by  the  English  squadron  the  next  day,  and  had  to  abandon 
the  Centaure.  The  following  night  two  ships  steered  a  false 
course  and  thereby  succeeded  in  reaching  Rochefort;  the  others 
were  destroyed  in  the  roadstead  of  Lagos. 

153 


A  Study  of  N.wal  Strategy. 

There  is  a  temptation  to  throw  all  the  responsibility  upon  the 
actors  of  the  drama  when  passing  these  painful  events  in  review. 
Whv  did  not  the  admiral  signal  a  new  rendezvous  to  his  squadron 
when  he  decided  not  to  put  into  Cadiz  ?  Why  did  the  rear  guard 
lose  track  of  the  ships  in  the  van?  Upon  reflection  it  must  be 
recognized  that  the  cause  of  all  the  evil  lay  in  the  very  conditions 
under  which  this  unfortunate  squadron  labored.  For  a  naval 
force  there  is  no  more  ungrateful  situation  than  the  one  that  puts 
it  under  the  necessity  of  avoiding,  at  all  hazards,  coming  into  con- 
tact with  the  enemy.  The  least  incident  destroys  all  calculations, 
forces  sudden  and  unexpected  modifications  of  orders,  and  puts 
the  ships  under  sailing  conditions  that  are  abnormal.  Why,  then, 
be  astonished  that  mistakes  result  that  do  not  occur  at  ordinary 
limes?  The  disaster  resulting  from  this  separation  is  not  to  be 
imputed  to  de  la  Clue  but  to  the  false  position  in  which  circum- 
stances had  placed  him.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  difficult  to  ex- 
plain what  he  was  going  to  do  at  Cadiz,  in  the  immediate  vicinity 
of  a  superior  force.  If  the  French  had  had  the  good  fortune  to 
pass  through  the  Strait  without  being  discovered,  which  was  not 
impossible  since  they  went  through  the  Strait  at  night,  the  stop  at 
Cadiz  would  have  revealed  their  passage  and  have  made  them  lose 
the  benefit  of  their  lead. 

The  number  of  ships  at  our  disposition  in  European  waters  was 
reduced  to  21  by  the  disaster  at  Lagos,  and  the  plan  of  the  cam- 
paign was  modified.  Five  ships,  detached  from  the  Brest  squad- 
ron, were  to  escort  the  convoy  from  Brittany,  while  the  16  others 
should  occupy  the  attention  of  the  English  forces.  But,  at  the  last 
moment.  Marshal  de  Conflans,  who  commanded  the  squadron,  in- 
sisted that  his  force  should  not  be  divided,  and  it  was  decided  that 
he  himself  should  go  to  Morbihan  for  the  convoy. 

The  English,  who  were  attentively  following  all  the  preparations 
for  the  expedition,  had  25  ships  before  Ushant  under  Admiral 
Hawke,  while  Commodore  Duff  cruised  in  the  vicinity  of  Belle- 
Isle  with  four  ships  and  three  frigates  in  order  to  watch  the  move- 
ments of  the  transports.  The  season  became  well  advanced  with 
the  squadron  still  at  Brest.  Finally,  at  the  end  of  October,  a  storm 
forced  the  English  squadron  to  retire  upon  Torbay  and  left  the 
approaches  to  Brest  free.  Marshal  de  Conflans  sailed  at  ii  o'clock 
on  the  morning  of  November  14  and  set  his  course  for  Belle-Isle. 
Whv  had  he  waited  so  long?    It  is  impossible  that  the  storm  could 


154 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

have  lasted  15  clays.  At  all  events,  Admiral  Hawke  left  Torbay 
the  same  day,  and  learning-  from  his  scouts  of  the  sortie  of  the 
French,  he  sought  them  at  Morbihan  without  hesitation.  On  the 
20th  he  made  junction  with  Commodore  Duff,  and  he  came  upon 
the  French  squadron  at  the  moment  when  it  was  entering  the 
passes  of  Ouiberon  Bay.  The  result  of  that  unfortunate  battle  is 
well  known.    The  expedition  was  abandoned. 

Expedition  of  Thurot  to  Ireland  (1760). — Meanwhile  Cap- 
tain Thurot,  who  was  charged  with  the  diversion  in  Ireland,  had 
set  out  from  Dunkirk  on  October  6  with  a  flotilla  of  six  privateers 
carrying- 1400  troops.""  Happily  escaping  the  English  cruisers  that 
were  watching  the  northern  expeditionary  corps,  he  appeared  off 
Aberdeen  and  threw  Scotland  into  a  state  of  alarm.  Overtaken 
by  tempestuous  weather  he  lost  two  ships  and  laid  by  for  several 
months  in  Norway  and  the  Fairoe  Islands.  Finally  it  was  not  un- 
til February  21,  1760,  that  he  landed  at  Carrickfergus.  He  had  no 
trouble  in  seizing  the  castle,  which  had  a  garrison  of  only  200  men. 
But  having  learned  that  the  expedition  had  been  given  up  in  con- 
sequence of  the  battle  of  Quiberon,  he  judged  that  he  would  not  be 
able  to  do  anything  solely  on  his  own  resources ;  and,  three  days 
after  his  arrival,  he  set  out  again  for  France.  Moreover,  discord 
reigned  in  the  little  squadron  between  the  land  and  the  sea  officers, 
and  between  Thurot  and  his  captains.  Shortly  after  sailing  two 
ships  separated  ;  the  other  three  were  pursued  and  attacked  by 
English  frigates,  and  were  captured  near  the  Isle  of  Man. 

After  the  failure  of  this  attempt  at  invasion,  France  had  to  con- 
fess herself  beaten. 

Fifth  Attempt  to  Land  in  England  (1779). — When  France 
ranged  herself  on  the  side  of  the  English  colonies  in  America  that 
had  revolted  against  their  mother  country,  the  circumstances  were 
particularly  favorable  for  attempting  a  descent  upon  England. 
The  war,  which  had  been  going  on  several  years  on  land  in  Amer- 
ica, absorbed  all  the  regular  troops  of  the  United  Kingdom,  while 
on  the  sea  our  alliance  with  Spain  gave  us  a  considerable  superior- 
ity. Preparations  were,  therefore,  made  for  an  invasion  on  the 
following  bases :  ^" 

"°  He  had  left  Havre  the  moment  that  city  was  bombarded. 
"'  We  pass  by  in  silence  an  abortive  attempt  against  the  Channel  Islands 
undertaken  with  insufficient  means. 

155 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

The  two  allied  navies,  after  effecting-  junction,  were  to  crush  the 
English  forces  in  the  Channel  and  then  conduct  across  a  convoy  of 
40,000  men. 

We  shall  see  how  an  operation  appearing-  to  present  the  greatest 
chances  of  success  may  come  to  naught  by  the  one  fact  of  faulty 
preparation. 

Lieutenant-General  d'Orvilliers  left  Brest  on  June  3,  1779,  with 
30  ships  and  10  frigates,  and  sailed  for  the  Spanish  coast.  But 
the  Spanish  ships  were  not  ready ;  for  a  month  d'Orvilliers  cruised 
in  the  vicinity  of  Cizarga  waiting  for  them.  On  July  2  eight  ships 
and  two  frigates  came  out  from  Corunna  under  command  of 
Lieutenant-General  Don  Antonio  Darce  and  joined  the  French 
fleet.  It  was  not  until  20  days  later  that  Lieutenant-General  Don 
Luis  de  Cordova  arrived  from  Cadiz  with  the  rest  of  the  Spanish 
fleet — 28  ships,  2  frigates,  2  corvettes  and  8  fireships. 

Some  days  passed,  during  which  the  two  admirals  were  occupied 
with  the  organization  of  the  fleet.  One  important  question,  that 
of  signals,  had  been  entirely  neglected  during  the  negotiations  con- 
cerning the  assembling  of  the  two  squadrons.  "  I  was  greatly  sur- 
prised, my  Lord,"  wrote  Lieutenant-General  d'Orvilliers  to  the 
Minister,  "  to  find  that  the  signals  for  the  fleet  had  not  been  printed 
in  Spain,  and  that  M.  Mazzaredo  (chief  of  staff  of  the  Spanish 
fleet)  had  been  obliged  to  copy  them  by  hand  after  his  departure 
from  Cadiz.  I  can  assure  you  that  it  has  never  before  happened 
that  two  fleets,  making  junction  at  sea,  have  been  reduced  to  the 
improvisation  of  an  entire  code  of  signals  .  .  .  ."  On  the  28th 
and  29th  the  ships  that  had  been  detached  to  Ferrol  and  Corunna 
rejoined  the  flag  of  the  commander-in-chief.  On  July  30  the  com- 
bined fleet,  in  strength  66  ships  of  the  line,  of  which  36  were 
Spanish,  and  14  frigates  of  the  two  nations,  stood  away  to  the 
North.^'^ 

More  than  two  months  had  passed  and  the  ships  had  already 
consumed  a  large  part  of  their  stores ;  but  d'Orvilliers  counted 
upon  transports  loaded  with  provisions  being  sent  to  him  by  the 
^Minister,  who  knew  the  situation  of  the  fleet.  The  fleet  was  en- 
cumbered with  sick,  many  ships  had  sailed  without  doctors,  and 
medicines  were  wanting. 

'"Chevalier.    Histoire  de  la  marine  francaise  pendant  la  guerre  de  I'ln- 
dependence  americaine. 

156 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

On  August  7  the  combined  fleet  sighted  Ushant.  D'Orvilliers 
found  there  neither  provisions  nor  the  pilots  for  whom  he  had 
asked,  but  in  spite  of  this  he  entered  the  Channel.  On  August  i6 
he  received  orders  that  modified  the  plans  of  the  government ;  the 
landing,  instead  of  taking  place  in  the  neighborhood  of  Ports- 
mouth, was  to  be  made  at  Falmouth.  The  moment  was  poorly 
chosen  to  change  all  the  plans.  The  Minister  took  no  account  of 
the  objections  that  his  instructions  gave  rise  to :  Falmouth  had  an 
anchorage  insufficient  to  hold  the  fleet  and  it  did  not  offer  secure 
shelter.  D'Orvilliers  attempted  to  point  this  out,  but  it  was  too 
late  to  discuss  the  matter.  An  easterly  gale  blew  the  fleet  out  of 
the  Channel  and  solved  the  question.  As  soon  as  the  weather  mod- 
erated the  provisions  were  equally  divided  between  the  ships,  and 
the  subsistence  of  the  fleet  was  thus  assured  until  September  20. 

On  August  25  the  English  fleet  was  signalled.  It  comprised  35 
ships  and  was  sighted  near  the  Scilly  Isles,  having  also  been  driven 
to  leeward  by  the  easterly  winds.  A  real  admiral  (veritable 
homme  de  git  err e)  would  have  lost  no  time  in  undertaking  its 
pursuit  at  once ;  d'Orvilliers  preferred  to  call  a  council  of  war, 
and  it  is  easy  to  imagine  how  long  a  time  was  needed  to  gather  on 
board  the  admiral's  ship  the  flag  officers  from  a  fleet  of  80  sail. 
The  council  decided  that  the  fleet  should  abandon  its  cruise  on 
September  8  at  the  latest,  in  view  of  the  sanitary  conditions  and 
of  the  shortness  of  provisions ;  and  that,  in  the  meantime,  it  should 
go  to  meet  the  enemy.  But  the  enemy  had  not  delayed  for  the  end 
of  the  deliberations  to  make  his  escape ;  on  September  2  he  entered 
Portsmouth.  The  combined  fleet  continued  to  cruise  for  several 
days,  then  steered  for  Ushant,  and  anchored  at  Brest  on  September 
14. 

The  expedition  was  abandoned. 

This  unfortunate  cruise  brought  no  honor  to  the  allied  govern- 
ments, when  consideration  is  given  to  the  want  of  co-ordination 
shown  in  fitting  out  the  squadrons,  the  failure  to  establish  any 
understanding  for  sailing  in  company,  the  deficiencies  in  water 
and  provisions,  the  lack  of  surgeons  and  medicines,  the  defective 
hygiene,  and  the  unconcern  manifested  about  victualling  the  fleet 
when  it  had  pvit  to  sea.  Not  by  showing  such  incapacity  as  this 
can  it  be  hoped  to  give  a  fatal  blow  to  an  enemy  who  is  determined 
to  defend  himself.  The  expedition  was  thus  doomed  to  failure  at 
the  outset.     D'Orvilliers  fell  under  the  ban  of  disfavor  ;  but  the 

157 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Minister  of  ^Marine,  M.  de  Sartines,  deserved  to  have  followed 
him  into  retirement,  for  he  was  the  true  culprit. 

Though  the  war  was  to  go  on  for  several  years,  during  which 
our  superiority  in  the  Channel  became  only  the  more  marked,  yet 
the  idea  of  conquering  England  was  completely  given  up. 

It  is  a  curious  fact  that,  up  to  the  time  of  the  Empire,  our 
schemes  for  descent  were  prepared  with  the  least  energy  when 
our  navy  was  the  strongest.  From  this  it  may  be  concluded  that 
the  passage  of  an  army  offered  such  hazards  that  it  was  preferable 
to  keep  to  measures  exclusively  maritime  so  long  as  the  hope 
remained  of  being  victorious  on  the  sea ;  and  that  the  army  was 
only  permitted  to  take  a  part  when  there  were  no  other  means 
to  employ.  But  if  there  is  hesitation  about  entrusting  the  desti- 
nies of  troops  to  the  hazard  of  a  crossing  when  it  is  possible  to 
conquer  the  command  of  the  sea  beforehand,  then  it  must  be  ad- 
mitted that  disaster  is  inevitably  courted  if  the  same  operation 
is  ventured  across  a  sea  occupied  by  the  enemy. 

Second  Conquest  of  Minorca  (1781-1782). — The  manifold 
necessities  that  pressed  upon  the  English  navy  had  forced  the 
Admiralty  to  strip  the  Mediterranean  almost  completely,  and  the 
allies  found  the  occasion  a  propitious  one  for  retaking  Minorca. 
On  June  23,  1781,  Guichen  took  to  Cadiz  from  Brest  18  ships 
w^hich  were  placed  under  the  orders  of  Don  Luis  de  Cordova. 
They  were  joined  there  by  a  ship  and  a  frigate  from  Toulon,  and 
the  combined  fleet,  50  ships  strong  and  carrying  a  landing  force 
of  14,000  men,  weighed  from  Cadiz  on  July  22.  The  fleet  landed 
the  troops  at  Minorca  and  then  left  the  Mediterranean  for  the 
North.  The  Due  de  Crillon,  who  commanded  the  expeditionary 
corps,  easily  took  possession  of  the  island,  but  the  citadel  did  not 
surrender  until  February  4,  1782. 

The  Expedition  of  Hoche  to  Ireland  (1796-1797). — We 
now  come  to  the  wars  of  the  Revolution,  during  which  the  spirit 
of  enterprise  characterizing  this  epoch  led  inevitably  to  ideas  of 
invasion.  There  w^as  no  preoccupation  then  about  the  means ;  it 
was  willingly  believed  that  hardihood  of  conception  and  enthu- 
siasm in  execution  would  make  up  for  everything. 

The  leaven  was  ever  at  work  in  Ireland.  A  widespread  asso- 
Tciation  had  been  formed  in  the  island  to  shake  off  the  yoke  of 
the  English,  and  upon  the  outbreak  of  war  a  delegation  of  the 
principal  leaders  had  come  to  Paris  to  implore  the  aid  of  France. 

158 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

The  difficulties  of  every  kind  in  the  midst  of  which  our  country 
was  then  struggHng  had  prevented  the  Convention  from  acceding 
to  this  request;  but  in  1796,  new  emissaries  having  come  to  give 
assurances  that  the  appearance  of  the  French  would  occasion  a 
general  uprising  in  Ireland,  the  Directory  believed  the  moment 
favorable  for  action. 

Hoche  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  expedition;  Villa- 
ret-Joyeuse,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  Brest  squadron,  was  to 
command  the  naval  forces  and  remain  under  the  orders  of  the 
General. 

The  troops  that  had  been  engaged  in  the  pacification  of  the 
Vendee  were  sent  to  Brest,  and  orders  were  given  at  that  port 
to  fit  out  all  ships  that  were  sea-worthy.  Our  naval  material  was 
at  that  time  in  a  deplorable  state;  storehouses  were  empty,  and 
for  many  years  the  ships  had  not  been  kept  in  condition.  The 
personnel  left  quite  as  much  to  be  desired ;  the  attempt  to  get 
together  the  number  of  seamen  necessary  to  form  the  crews  of 
the  ships  had  not  succeeded,  and  those  who  were  present  had  no 
professional  instruction. 

The  danger  of  undertaking  an  expedition  under  such  faulty 
conditions  did  not  escape  the  attention  of  the  officers;  Villaret- 
Joyeuse  particularly  did  not  cease  to  represent  to  Minister  Tru- 
guet  the  rashness  of  such  an  expedition.  At  the  same  time  the 
lack  of  funds  impeded  the  fitting  out  of  the  ships.  Hoche  went 
to  Brest  to  hasten  the  preparations;  he  found  that  nothing  was 
going  on  in  a  way  to  accord  with  his  own  impatience,  and  he 
openly  accused  the  admiral  of  being  ill-affected.  The  Directory 
ended  by  displacing  Villaret,  and  Morard  de  Galle  was  named  in 
his  stead. 

Surely  Villaret  should  not  be  reproached  for  having  lifted  the 
voice  of  reason  and  for  having  advised  against  an  enterprise  in 
which  his  own  honor  was  engaged  as  well  as  that  of  France,  but, 
granted  that  the  government  had  decided  upon  the  crossing,  it 
was  good  policy  not  to  leave  Villaret  to  have  a  part  in  an  opera- 
tion of  which  he  disapproved.  Unfortunately,  Morard  de  Galle 
was  no  more  confident.  He  did  not  accept  the  command  given 
him  without  a  protest;  but  this  done  he  lent  to  Hoche  the  most 
devoted  assistance. 

Thanks  to  the  efforts  of  Hoche,  and  to  the  activity  of  Bruix, 

159 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

who  was  chief  of  staff  of  the  squadron,  the  expedition  was  ready 
to  set  out  in  the  early  days  of  December. 

The  original  plan  of  Truguet  consisted  in  concentrating  at 
Brest  all  the  French  and  Spanish  naval  forces ;  but,  as  the  neces- 
sity existed  of  dispatching  reinforcements  to  India,  he  thought  of 
having  the  squadron  leave  Brest  with  only  a  part  of  the  expedi- 
tionary corps,  and  of  dispatching  eight  ships  to  India  after  the 
landing  of  the  troops.  As  it  was  difficult  to  foresee  at  what  time 
it  would  be  possible  to  send  reinforcements,  this  advance  guard 
would  be  exposed  to  the  danger  of  succumbing  before  aid  could 
arrive.  Therefore  a  more  simple  idea  was  reverted  to,  which,  as 
the  season  was  advancing,  was  satisfied  by  sending  to  Brest  the 
division  of  Rear-Admiral  Richery,"*  which  had  come  from  New- 
foundland and  anchored  in  Aix  roadstead  November  5. 

On  December  15  the  squadron  weighed  from  Brest ;  it  was 
composed  of  17  ships,  14  frigates,  6  corvettes,  6  storeships  and  20 
transports.  It  carried  17,210  infantry,  iioo  cavalry  and  1200 
artillerymen.  Hoche  and  Morard  de  Galle  were  on  board  the 
frigate  Fraternite.  The  squadron  of  Admiral  Colpoys  had  been 
driven  off  by  a  violent  easterly  wind. 

On  the  evening  of  the  15th  the  fleet  anchored  in  Bertheaume 
Bay  to  await  two  ships  that  were  behindhand ;  it  finally  sailed  on 
the  afternoon  of  the  i6th,  steering  for  Sein  Race.  At  5  o'clock, 
owing  to  the  wind,  the  admiral  made  signal  to  go  through  the 
Iroise  Channel ;  but  the  signal  was  poorly  understood  because  the 
ships  were  unaccustomed  to  sailing  in  squadron  and  the  crews 
were  improvised.  To  add  to  the  confusion,  an  English  ship  cruis- 
ing in  the  Iroise,  the  Indefatigable,  ran  near  the  French  ships, 
firing  rockets  and  guns  and  burning  signals.  In  short,  the  greater 
part  of  the  fleet  passed  through  Sein  Race,  while  the  other  ships 
kept  on  with  the  admiral,  and  the  Seduisant  was  lost  on  Grand- 
Trevennec. 

On  the  morning  of  the  17th  eight  ships,  seven  frigates,  and  one 
transport  were  together;  they  placed  themselves  under  the  orders 
of  Rear-Admiral  Bouvet,  whose  flag  flew  on  the  Immortalite. 
The  Admiral  then  opened  his  instructions  which  directed  him  in 
case  of  separation  to  proceed  to  Cape  Mizzen  Head  and  cruise 
there  for  five  days.    On  the  19th  the  division  was  joined  by  Rear- 

"^  Only  two  ships  of  this  division  were  able  to  take  part  in  the  expedition. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Admirals  Richery  and  Nielly  with  seven  ships,  two  frigates,  and 
a  number  of  transports.  Only  one  ship,  three  frigates,  two  cor- 
vettes and  one  transport  were  missing;  unfortunately  the  two 
chiefs  of  the  expedition  were  on  board  one  of  the  missing  frigates. 

On  the  2 1st  the  fleet  was  at  the  entrance  to  Bantry  Bay  in  bad 
weather  with  snow  falling.  Rear-Admiral  Bouvet,  mistrusting  the 
inexperience  of  his  crews,  feared  to  remain  underway ;  he  anchored 
near  Bear  Island,  allowing  each  ship  to  act  at  discretion.  In  his 
vicinity  seven  ships,  six  frigates,  and  one  transport  anchored ; 
the  rest  lay  to,  and  the  fleet  was  once  more  divided. 

On  the  24th  the  wind  fell.  A  council  of  war  was  called  on 
board  the  Immortalite  under  the  presidency  of  General  Grouchy, 
in  which  it  was  decided  to  land  the  6000  troops  available.  The 
ships  got  underway  to  get  nearer  the  land ;  but  the  weather  became 
so  bad  on  the  25th  that  many  ships  had  to  go  to  sea  to  avoid  being 
cast  ashore,  and  among  them  the  Immortalite. 

During  the  afternoon  of  the  26th  the  wind  began  to  go  down. 
On  the  morning  of  the  27th,  Division-Commander  Bedout,  to 
whom  the  command  descended  by  reason  of  the  absence  of  Ad- 
miral Bouvet,  called  a  council  of  war  on  board  the  Indomptable. 
The  matter  of  landing  was  debated,  but  it  was  decided  to  be  im- 
possible, the  4000  men  remaining  having  neither  artillery,  muni- 
tions, provisions,  nor  money.  The  division  sailed  on  its  return  to 
France  and  anchored  at  Brest  on  January  12  without  having  seen 
the  enemy.  Several  ships  that  had  been  separated  from  the  others 
on  the  2ist  and  25th  were  already  there.  They  were  the  Pluton, 
the  Pegase,  the  Resolue,  and  the  Immortalite,  the  last  named 
carrying  the  flag  of  Admiral  Bouvet. 

The  Tourville  and  the  Foiigueux,  which  had  been  unable  to 
anchor  under  Great  Bear  Island,  had  remained  at  sea  laid  to ;  the 
former  arrived  at  Bantry  Bay,  December  30,  and  the  latter  Decem- 
ber 31.  The  Redoubtable,  which  had  left  the  anchorage  on  the 
night  of  December  22,  also  arrived  on  the  30th.  On  January  i 
the  Nestor  arrived ;  she  had  been  in  company  with  the  Fraternite 
until  December  20,  but  had  lost  her  on  the  night  of  December 
20-21  during  a  squall.  Again  the  question  of  a  landing  came  up. 
About  4000  men  could  be  put  ashore ;  but  there  was  a  rumor  that 
the  English  had  got  13,000  men  together  in  camp  since  the  appear- 
ance of  the  French ;  it  was  known  further  that  a  part  of  the  expe- 
ditionary corps  had  sailed  for  Brest ;  finally  the  ships  began  to  feel 

161 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

the  need  of  provisions,  and  they  could  not  delay  their  return  much 
longer.  It  appeared  imprudent  to  abandon  a  handful  of  men  to 
their  own  resources  under  the  circumstances,  and  the  idea  of  land- 
ing was  abandoned.  The  ships  sailed  for  Brest  on  the  5th  of 
January  and  arrived  on  the  13th,  with  the  exception  of  the 
Surveillante  which  was  in  such  bad  condition  that  it  had  been 
necessary  to  sink  her  in  Bantry  Bay. 

The  Trajan  and  the  Charente,  after  having  gone  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Shannon  (one  of  the  assigned  rendezvous),  anchored  on 
December  28  in  Kilkadia  Bay,  where  the  Trajan  furnished  some 
provisions  to  the  Charante,  which  was  short;  after  which  both 
ships  returned  to  Brest. 

What,  then,  had  become  of  the  Fraternite,  which  carried  the  two 
chiefs  of  the  expedition?  On  December  21,  the  frigate  found 
herself  alone  after  having  had  in  company  for  some  time  the 
Cocarde,  the  Romaine,  and  the  Nestor.  On  the  24th  she  was 
chased  by  an  enemy  ship  and  only  escaped  by  jettisoning  a  part 
of  her  artillery.  Going  on  then  toward  the  Irish  coast  she  met 
at  sea  the  Revolution  and  the  Scevola.  The  latter  was  in  a 
sinking  state  and  the  Revolution  took  off  her  crew  and  passengers. 
From  these  ships  the  Admiral  had  news  of  the  expeditionary  corps 
up  to  December  22.  He  then  decided,  the  General  agreeing,  to 
return  to  France  with  the  Revolution,  whose  condition  might 
become  critical  at  any  moment.  The  two  ships  anchored  at  Aix 
Island  on  January  13 ;  already  for  several  days  the  men  had  been 
on  reduced  rations. 

Such  was  the  end  of  this  unfortunate  expedition.  Of  the  forty- 
five  vessels  comprising  it,  twelve  were  lost.  The  Seduisant  had 
gone  ashore  on  Grand-Trevennec  upon  leaving  Brest;  the  Scevola 
had  foundered  at  sea ;  the  Surveillante  had  sunk  in  Bantry  Bay ; 
the  Impatiente  had  gone  upon  the  rocks  near  Cape  Clear ;  the 
Tortne,  the  Atalante  and  four  transports  had  been  captured  by  the 
enemy ;  finally  the  Droits-de-l' Homme,  chased  by  two  vessels  of 
the  enemy,  had  been  lost  in  Audierne  Bay,  carrying  with  her  to 
destruction  the  English  frigate  Amazone. 

At  first  sight  it  seems  as  if  the  enemy  had  had  only  a  secondary 
part  in  the  defeat  of  this  attempt.  The  striking  thing  about  it  is 
the  deplorable  state  of  the  ships,  which  were  unable  to  stand  the 
slightest  wind ;  and  the  insufficiency  of  provisions,  which  weighed 
upon  every  decision.    But,  though  hasty  and  insufficient  prepara- 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

tion  inevitably  tended  to  failure,  it  is  no  less  true  that  the  necessit)' 
under  which  our  ships  labored  of  being  unable  to  face  the  presence 
of  the  enemy  had  consequences  even  more  serious.  That  it  was 
that  caused  the  modification  of  orders  and  provoked  the  initial 
separation  of  the  expeditionary  corps ;  that  prevented  the  vessels 
arriving  successively  at  Bantry  from  awaiting  the  laggards ;  that 
forced  a  multiplication  of  rendezvous  and  that  led  ships  off  in 
false  directions. 

None  the  less  the  English  squadrons  were  unequal  to  their  task. 
How  was  it  that  the  French  could  successively  present  themselves 
on  the  Irish  coast  without  drawing  the  English  squadrons  thither? 
Here  is  something  that  appears  beyond  belief,  and  is  so  in  fact, 
The  expedition  had  to  fear  the  squadron  of  Colpoys,  which  was 
cruising  off  Ushant,  and  that  of  Bridport,  called  the  Channel 
Squadron,  which  was  anchored  at  Spithead.  Colpoys,  as  soon  as 
he  knew  that  the  French  had  come  out,  went  at  once  in  search, 
and  ran  across  the  division  of  Rear-Admiral  Villeneuve,  which 
was  on  its  way  from  Toulon  to  Brest.  This  diversion  led  him 
ofif  as  far  as  Groix  Island,  where  he  abandoned  the  chase,  return- 
ing afterwards  to  Plymouth.  As  for  the  Channel  Squadron, 
though  advised  on  the  20th  of  December  it  did  not  sail  until  the 
8th  of  January,  and  one  is  quite  at  a  loss  to  find  the  reasons  that 
condemned  it  to  inactivity.  Nothing  less  than  these  two  unlooked- 
for  circumstances  could  have  served  to  keep  the  expedition  from 
total  destruction. 

Preparation  for  a  Landing  in  England  (1797). — Hoche  had 
returned  furious,  but  with  unabated  enthusiasm.  Attributing  to 
the  elements  and  to  disaffection  what  was  only  the  consequence 
of  an  error  in  principle  and  of  the  disorganization  of  the  navy,  he 
pressed  the  Directory  to  make  ready  a  new  expedition.  After 
the  signature  of  the  Leoben  preliminaries,  the  government  appar- 
ently entered  into  his  views,  but  with  a  desire  this  time  to  get 
together  a  force  ample  to  try  conclusions  with  the  English.  To 
this  end  the  order  was  given  to  fit  out  all  the  available  ships  at 
Lorient  and  Rochefort  and  send  them  to  join  the  Brest  squadron, 
which  was  ready.  At  the  same  time  the  co-operation  of  Spain  and 
Holland  was  obtained.  The  former  was  to  send  its  squadron  from 
Cadiz  to  Brest  as  soon  as  it  found  a  chance  to  get  out,  and  the 
latter  was  to  attempt  a  diversion  by  throwing  into  England  a  corps 
of  13,000  men.     This  project  was  not  followed  up  in  France;  it 

163 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

was  the  time  of  the  Lille  conferences  that  ended  in  nothing. 
Holland  alone  made  a  beginning  in  its  execution.  From  the  begin- 
ning of  July,  1797,  13,500  men  were  embarked  in  her  fleet,  which 
consisted  of  fifteen  ships,  ten  frigates,  and  twenty-seven  transports. 
For  more  than  two  months  this  expeditionary  corps  waited  for  a 
favorable  opportunity  to  set  out ;  at  the  end  of  that  time  the  ships 
had  run  out  of  provisions  and  the  troops  had  to  be  landed. 

The  treaty  of  Campo-Formio,  by  establishing  peace  on  the 
continent,  left  to  France  the  free  use  of  her  army,  and  she  wished 
to  profit  thereby  by  turning  it  against  England,  which  alone  re- 
fused to  make  peace.  General  Bonaparte  took  the  place  of  Hoche 
(who  died  in  September)  at  the  head  of  the  Army  of  England, 
and  under  his  impulse  the  first  preparations  went  rapidly  forward. 

"  Vice-Admiral  Pleville  Le  Peley  recalled  to  the  service  the 
sailors  who  had  been  discharged  with  so  little  reflection  some 
months  before.  The  government  took  back  the  frigates,  corvettes, 
and  other  vessels  that  it  had  loaned  to  commercial  uses,  paying 
heavy  indemnities  therefor.  It  was  necessary  to  get  together  new 
crews,  and  it  was  then  that  the  extent  of  the  error  committed  in 
disbanding  them  was  realized.  The  sailors  of  the  maritime  inscrip- 
tion hid  themselves  and  only  a  small  number  of  them  were  found. 
The  government  had  no  money,  and  the  expedition  to  England 
required  a  great  deal.  The  Conseils  voted  a  loan  to  meet  this 
expenditure  on  the  proposal  of  the  Directory.  The  court  of 
Madrid  was  besought  from  Paris  to  assemble  at  Cadiz  as  many 
ships,  frigates,  and  light  vessels  as  possible.  This  squadron,  pro- 
vided with  three  months'  stores  and  carrying  a  landing  corps  of 
15,000  men,  was  to.be  ready  to  go  to  sea  at  the  end  of  April."* 
If  not  blockaded  by  superior  force  it  was  to  sail  at  that  time  for  a 
destination  to  be  arranged  by  the  two  governments  in  concert. 
The  Directory  also  asked  that  the  vessels  stationed  at  Ferrol, — 
ships,  frigates,  and  corvettes, — might  be  sent  to  Brest  with  provi- 
sions and  stores  for  three  months,  and  with  full  crews.  The  Dutch 
Republic  had  pledged  itself  to  take  a  part  in  the  expedition  to 
England.  It  gave  the  Texel  fleet,  some  troops  and  the  transports 
necessary  to  embark  them.  General  Andreossi  and  Engineer  For- 
fait  were  commissioned  to  ask  from  the  Dutch  government  200 
flat  boats  of  good  sailing  qualities  and  200  fishing  or  other  boats 


1798. 


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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

able  each  to  carry  from  80  to  100  men.  They  were  charged  to  see, 
besides,  that  the  gunboats  and  the  launches  and  other  armed  boats 
were  fitted  out  and  sent  to  Dunkirk.  It  was  the  intention  at  Paris 
to  have  at  Boulogne  50  launches,  400  or  500  fishing  boats,  100 
horse  boats,  and  25  vessels  of  100  tons.  Calais  was  to  shelter  400 
vessels,  and  the  small  ports  Etaples  and  Ambleteuse  50  fishing 
boats  each.  General  Caflfarelli  was  ordered  to  put  the  coast 
batteries  in  good  condition,  and  to  augment  their  number  should 
that  prove  necessary,  in  order  to  ensure  the  security  of  the  ports 
designated  to  receive  the  vessels  of  the  expedition.  Engineer 
officers  inspected  the  coast  of  England  between  Folkstone  and  Rye 
from  the  decks  of  privateers." 

"  At  the  beginning  of  February,  1798,  General  Bonaparte 
visited  the  coasts  of  the  Ocean,  the  Channel  and  the  North  Sea. 

j>  lie 

It  was  in  consequence  of  this  inspection  that  the  commander  of 
the  Army  of  England  was  convinced  that  the  expedition  could 
not  take  place  during  the  course  of  that  year,  and  that  he  sub- 
mitted to  the  Directory  the  plan  for  the  expedition  to  Egypt,  which 
was  accepted. 

The  Expedition  to  Egypt  (1798). — The  preparations  were  at 
once  pushed  with  feverish  activity.  At  Toulon  fifteen  ships  and 
thirteen  frigates  were  fitted  out,  and  transports  were  assembled  at 
Marseilles,  Ajaccio,  Genoa,  and  Civita  Vecchia.  Brueys,  who  had 
known  General  Bonaparte  in  Italy,  was  made  a  vice-admiral  and 
put  at  the  head  of  the  fleet. 

The  commander-in-chief  arrived  at  Toulon  May  9,  1798;  on 
the  19th  the  fleet  set  sail  after  a  delay  of  several  days  due  to  con- 
trary winds.  Joined  by  the  transports  from  Marseilles  it  steered 
with  the  wind  aft  for  Ajaccio,  then  for  Genoa,  to  pick  up  the 
convoys  assembled  in  those  ports.  As  contrary  winds  prevented 
it  from  going  to  Civita  Vecchia,  the  convoy  from  that  place  did  not 
join  until  later."'  On  June  10,  Bonaparte  captured  Malta.  On 
July  I  the  fleet  appeared  before  Alexandria.  Brueys  anchored  to 
the  westward  of  the  city,  facing  the  Marabout  Tower,  and  the 
landing  began  that  same  evening.  The  next  day  the  city  was 
captured.  The  convoy  and  light  vessels  profited  by  entering  the 
port  immediately,  while  the  squadron  proceeded  to  Aboukir. 

"°  Chevalier.     Histoire  de  la  marine  frangaise  sous  la  Revolution. 
"•  Before  Malta. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Thus  did  Bonaparte,  giiided  by  his  star,  succeed  in  transport- 
ing 33,000  men  and  800  horses  across  a  sea  occupied  by  the  ememy. 
Was  that  the  end  of  it  all?  The  outcome  will  teach  us  the 
answer.  But  first  it  is  interesting"  to  know  the  train  of  circum- 
stances by  which  this  fleet  of  four  hundred  sails  had  been  able  to 
cross  undiscovered. 

"  When  the  first  news  reached  England  of  the  preparations  that 
we  were  making  at  Toulon,  the  government  saw  in  these  measures 
only  a  stratagem  to  draw  Lord  Jervis  into  the  Mediterranean. 
Should  he  withdraw.  Admiral  Mazzaredo"^  would  get  to  sea. 
Consequently  there  was  no  desire  in  London  to  deviate  from  the 
line  of  conduct  being  followed  at  the  moment.  The  British  navy 
was  closely  blockading  the  Spaniards  in  Cadiz  and  the  Dutch  in 
the  Texel.  Considerable  forces  were  watching  Brest  and  the 
Channel  coast.  The  danger  of  an  invasion,  the  thing  regarded 
wiith  most  fear  by  the  English  nation,  seemed  to  be  provided 
against  by  these  measures.  Nevertheless  the  reports  of  English 
agents  in  Italy  gave  such  a  formidable  aspect  to  the  preparations  of 
the  French  that  the  British  government  deemed  it  necessary  to 
have  information  of  what  was  going  on  at  Toulon.  By  direction 
of  the  Admiralty  Lord  Jervis  sent  a  detachment  of  three  ships 
and  four  frigates  into  the  Mediterranean.  This  division,  com- 
manded by  Admiral  Nelson,  was  about  25  leagues  south  of 
Hyeres  Islands  on  May  19,  1798,  when  it  was  struck  by  a  violent 
gale  from  the  northwest.  The  Vanguard,  seventy-four,  flagship 
of  the  Admiral,  lost  all  her  masts.  The  enemy's  ships,  flying  before 
the  wind,  steered  for  the  coast  of  Sardinia.  On  nearing  land  the 
Vanguard  narrowly  escaped  being  lost,  but  Admiral  Nelson 
finally  reached  the  anchorage  of  St.  Pierre  Island  on  May  22.  On 
the  27th  the  Vanguard  had  rigged  jury  masts  and  repaired  her 
worst  injuries,  and  Admiral  Nelson  again  went  to  sea.  Arriving 
May  31  off  Toulon,  he  was  informed  of  the  departure  of  the 
French  squadron,  but  could  obtain  no  information  of  the  route 
it  had  taken.  On  June  5  he  was  joined  by  the  brig  Mutine  carry- 
ing urgent  dispatches.  The  English  government,  which  had  not 
paid  any  great  attention  to  our  preparations  up  to  then,  was  begin- 
ning to  get  alarmed.  They  were  asking  in  London  if  the  concen- 
tration of  troops  and  ships  made  at  different  points  of  the  Mediter- 

^"  Who  was  blockaded  at  Cadiz. 

166 


I 


I 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy, 

ranean  did  not  have  England  as  their  objective.  The  Admiralty 
with  considerable  effort  fitted  out  new  ships  and  sent  them  to 
Lord  Jervis,  who  received  at  the  same  time  an  order  to  raise 
to  fourteen  ships  the  squadron  detached  into  the  Mediterranean, 
.  .  ,  ,  Lord  Jervis,  in  the  instructions  that  he  sent  to  Nelson  by  the 
Mutine,  seemed  to  think  that  we  might  wish  to  attack  Naples  or 
Sicily.  Perhaps,  he  added,  we  might  have  in  mind  directing  upon 
some  point  of  the  Spanish  coast  an  army  with  which  we  could 
march  against  Portugal.  Finally,  examining  a  last  hypothesis 
that  was  of  especial  interest  to  England,  Lord  St.  Vincent  asked 
himself  if  our  real  object  were  not  to  pass  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar 
and  throw  troops  into  Ireland 

"  On  June  7  Admiral  Nelson  effected  his  junction  with  the 
eleven  ships  that  Admiral  Jervis  had  sent  him,  ten  seventy-fours 
and  one  fifty."  "' 

It  was  then  that  the  exasperating  pursuit  began  whose  end 
was  at  Aboukir.  The  English  squadron  doubled  Cape  Corso  June 
12;  it  was  at  Naples,  June  19,  where  Nelson  learned  that  the 
French  fleet  had  been  sighted  on  the  Sardinian  coast,  the  rumor 
being  that  it  was  on  its  way  to  Malta.  On  the  20th  the  English 
squadron  passed  through  the  Strait  of  Messina ;  on  the  22d  Nelson 
learned  from  a  merchantman  who  had  passed  through  the  midst  of 
our  fleet  that  it  was  then  to  the  eastward  of  Malta  steering  south- 
east. 

Convinced  that  Egypt  was  our  objective,  Nelson  hastened  in 
that  direction.  On  the  28th  of  June  he  was  off  Alexandria,  com- 
municated with  the  shore  and  learned  that  the  French  had  not 
appeared.  Uncertain  what  to  think,  he  decided  to  return  to  Sicily, 
little  suspecting  that  the  next  day  he  would  pass  within  a  short 
distance  of  our  fleet  as  he  worked  to  windward.  The  English 
squadron  anchored  at  Syracuse,  July  19,  for  water  and  provisions. 
Nelson  could  no  longer  doubt  the  destination  of  the  French  expe- 
dition and  he  again  set  his  course  for  Egypt.  On  the  ist  of 
August  the  Zealous,  which  was  scouting  ahead  of  the  fleet,  sig- 
nalled that  ships  were  at  anchor  to  the  eastward  of  Alexandria. 
That  night  our  squadron  was  annihilated. 

Two  questions  now  arise  : 

Why  was  it  that  the  Egyptian  expedition  alone,  of  all  those  made 

"*  Chevalier.    Histoire  de  la  marine  frangaise  sons  la  Revolution. 

167 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

with  important  bodies  of  troops,  was  able  without  hindrance  to 
cross  a  sea  occupied  by  the  enemy  ? 

Should  we  consider  that  the  object  of  the  expedition  was  at- 
tained by  the  fact  that  the  troops  took  possession  of  Egypt? 

When  Brueys  left  Toulon  the  Mediterranean  had  been,  since 
December,  1796,  abandoned  by  the  English  ships,  which  were 
drawn  into  the  ocean  by  the  preparations  for  a  descent  upon 
England;  neither  the  Admiral  nor  the  General  suspected  the  ar- 
rival of  Nelson  in  the  vicinity  of  Toulon  at  the  very  moment  of 
their  setting  out.  The  several  movements  necessary  to  pick  up 
the  convoys  were  thus  made  by  the  fleet  in  perfect  ease  of  mind — 
without  the  haste  that  breeds  disorder.  The  convoy  sailed  by 
easy  stages  and  was  able  to  remain  concentrated,  thanks  to  this 
lack  of  haste.  To  be  sure,  this  was  not  the  determining  cause  of 
the  success  of  the  passage,  but  paradoxical  as  it  may  appear  it  was 
one  of  its  elements,  because  with  the  conviction  that  the  sea  was 
free,  there  was  no  necessity  of  making  the  sort  of  decision  so 
often  attended  by  grievous  results.^'" 

The  thing  that  did  favor  the  French,  even  more  than  the  damage 
to  the  Vanguard,  was  the  place  chosen  for  the  landing.  So 
improbable  was  it  that  neither  the  English  Admiralty,  nor  Jervis, 
nor  Nelson  suspected  it  at  first.  We  were  not  at  war  with  Turkey 
and  it  was  not  apparent  that  the  occupation  of  Egypt  would  have 
great  weight  upon  the  issue  of  the  war.  Attention  had  not  been 
called  in  this  direction ;  consequently,  the  fleet  having  had  the 
good  luck  to  get  away  without  being  followed  up,  the  search 
made  in  quest  of  it  was  bound  to  go  amiss,  and  the  fleet  had 
against  it  only  the  chance  of  an  accidental  meeting  at  sea."" 

None  of  the  expeditions  of  which  we  have  spoken  hitherto  found 
themselves  under  like  conditions.  Some  were  able,  thanks  to  a 
gale  of  wind,  to  leave  port  without  being  observed ;  but  the  enemy 
always  knew  on  what  coasts  to  find  them  again. 

And  of  this  expedition  it  is  likewise  to  be  noted  that  the  very 

"'  Brueys  was  not  informed  of  the  presence  of  the  English  in  the  Medi- 
terranean until  the  second  part  of  the  passage,  by  an  express  dispatched 
from  Toulon. 

"°  This  meeting  just  missed  taking  place  on  June  22,  near  Cape  Passaro; 
the  English  squadron  sighted  and  had  in  plain  view  two  sails  that  were 
afterwards  known  to  have  been  a  part  of  the  French  fleet 

168 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

reason  that  contributed  to  the  success  of  the  passage  took  away 
its  efficacy  from  the  enterprise,  since  the  possession  of  Egy^pt  by 
France  did  not  imperil  the  fate  of  England. 

As  for  the  second  question  that  has  been  raised,  it  may  be  said 
that,  if  it  had  been  possible  to  sign  a  treaty  of  peace  with  England 
at  Cairo,  the  success  would  have  been  complete,  and  the  destruction 
of  Brueys'  squadron  would  have  been  only  of  secondary  import- 
ance. But,  since  the  expedition  to  Egypt  was  only  a  diversion,  the 
importance  of  which,  moreover,  is  not  evident,  since  the  naval 
war  went  on,  we  must  put  on  the  balance  sheet  of  this  undertaking 
the  influence  of  the  loss  of  our  squadron  upon  maritime  operations, 
the  capture  of  vessels  that  attempted  afterwards  to  establish  com- 
munications with  Egypt,'^  and  the  fruitless  attempts  to  re  victual 
the  expeditionary  corps,  like  that  of  Ganteaume.  The  army,  cut 
off  from  the  sea  and  abandoned  to  its  own  resources,  grew  weaker 
and  weaker  and  finally  was  forced  to  capitulate.  The  genius  of 
Napoleon  was  able  to  put  off  the  inevitable  day  of  reckoning ;  but 
that  day  was  bound  to  come  sooner  or  later,  and  come  it  did. 
From  every  point  of  view  the  expedition  to  Egypt  had  conse- 
quences that  were  calamitous ;  and  if  this  is  not  apparent  at  first 
sight,  it  is  because  our  attention  is  diverted  by  the  brilliancy  of 
Bonaparte's  victories  that  have  left  behind  them  so  luminous  a 
wake.  As  for  the  passage  itself,  its  success  can  not  make  us  forget 
the  dangers  to  which  the  army  commanded  by  our  greatest  captain 
was  exposed,  nor  reconcile  us  to  such  a  hazardous  operation. 

Expedition  of  General  Humbert  to  Ireland  (1798). — The 
great  invasion  of  England  had  been  postponed;  events  on  the 
continent  were  soon  to  cause  the  Directory  to  abandon  it.     The 

^^  The  expedition  to  Egypt  caused  the  loss  of  the  following  vessels  of 
war: 

Brueys'  squadron:  Orient,  Franklin,  Tonnant,  Aquilon,  Spartiate,  Con- 
querant,  Peuple-Souverain,  Guerrier,  Heureux,  Mercure,  Timoleon,  Ar- 
temise,  Serieuse. 

After  Aboukir :  Genereux,  Guillaume-Tell,  Sensible,  Anemone,  Alceste, 
Junon,  Courageux,  Alerte,  Ville-de-Marseille,  Entreprenant,  Redoubtable, 
Capricieuse,  Independant,  J eune- Alexandrine,  Justice,  Egypiienne,  Re- 
generee,  Causse,  Dunois,  Montenotte. 

To  this  long  list  must  be  added  all  the  ships  that  were  not  taken,  and 
that  could  not  take  part  in  the  operations,  being  devoted  exclusively  to 
transport  service  between  Toulon  and  Alexandria. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Directory  then  reverted  to  the  idea  of  stirring  up  Ireland  to  revolt 
by  grouping  the  inhabitants  about  some  thousands  of  French 
soldiers. 

The  advance  guard  of  this  small  expedition  left  Aix  '"  August  6, 
1798;  it  comprised  1200  men  under  the  command  of  General 
Humbert.  The  division  formed  of  the  three  frigates  Concorde, 
Franchise,  and  Medee,  was  under  the  orders  of  Division-Com- 
mander Savary.  He  arrived  on  the  coast  of  Ireland  without  hav- 
ing encountered  any  vessels  of  the  enemy,  and  on  the  21st  he 
landed  his  troops  at  Killala,  immediately  returning  to  France. 
He  entered  the  Gironde  September  5  with  the  same  good  fortune. 

At  first  General  Humbert  had  some  successes ;  then  later,  when 
the  English  had  assembled  troops,  he  was  overwhelmed  by  weight 
of  numbers  and  was  forced  to  surrender  on  September  8. 

On  the  7th  the  brig  Anacreon  left  Dunkirk  carrying  two  Irish 
officers  and  forty-five  men.  Delayed  by  contrary  winds,  the  vessel 
anchored  near  Great  Aran  Island,  where  news  of  General  Hum- 
bert's surrender  was  received.  The  Irishmen  deemed  it  useless 
to  land  and  the  brig  brought  the  detachment  back  to  France. 

While  General  Humbert  was  sailing  toward  Ireland  the  Brest 
Division,  carrying  the  major  part  of  the  contingent  (3000  men), 
vainly  tried  to  get  away.  It  was  composed  of  one  ship,  the 
Hoche,  and  eight  frigates  under  Division-Commander  Bompard. 
As  early  as  July  21  it  entered  the  Iroise  but  the  appearance  of  the 
enemy  forced  it  to  go  back  to  port.  A  second  attempt,  made 
August  19,  was  still  less  fortunate ;  the  ships  came  back  into  the 
Goulet  pursued  by  the  enemy's  shot.  Finally,  on  September  16, 
it  was  able  to  get  to  sea ;  but  from  the  moment  of  leaving  it  was 
followed  by  enemy  frigates  which  never  left  it  until  October  4. 
On  the  loth  it  was  in  contact  with  Commodore  Warren's  division 
composed  of  three  eighty-gun  ships  and  five  frigates,  and  on  the 
nth  it  was  obliged  to  accept  battle.  The  Hoche  and  three  frigates 
were  captured.    The  Immortalite  and  Resolue  succeeded  in  escap- 

'"Many  historians  have  it  that  Savary's  division  set  out  from  Brest.  I 
have  found  in  the  unpublished  papers  of  Admiral  Martin,  which  are  kept 
in  the  Rochefort  Library,  the  sea  journal  of  Commandant  Papin,  flag- 
captain  of  Division  Commander  Savary,  from  which  is  proved  that  the 
division  was  fitted  out  at  Brest  and  went  to  Rochefort  to  embark  the 
troops. 

170 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy, 

ing  and  anchored  on  the  i8th  in  the  Bay  of  Donegal,  where  they 
learned  the  fate  of  Humbert's  column.  General  Menage  gave 
up  the  landing  and  the  frigates  sailed  the  same  evening.  During 
the  passage  homeward  the  Resolue  was  taken  by  the  Melampus, 
and  the  Immortalite  by  the  Fishguard. 

The  Loire  and  the  Semillante  steered  for  Galway;  on  the  15th 
they  were  chased,  and  they  separated.  The  Loire  after  several 
brilliant  engagements,  surrendered  to  the  ships  Anson  and  Kan- 
garoo; the  Semillante,  more  lucky,  succeeded  in  escaping  and 
arrived  at  Lorient  October  26. 

The  Romaine  anchored  on  the  13th  on  the  Irish  coast  several 
miles  away  from  the  Immortalite  and  the  Resolue;  not  succeeding 
in  getting  information  she  returned  to  Brest  on  the  21st. 
,  The  French  government,  uneasy  about  the  situation  of  the 
division  of  Bompard,  decided  to  send  back  Division-Commander 
Savary  ^  with  fresh  troops.  He  left  the  Isle  of  Aix  on  October 
12,  with  four  frigates,  and  by  good  fortune  reached  Killala,  where 
he  learned  of  the  disaster  that  had  overtaken  Bompard.  He  sailed 
at  once  on  his  return  to  France  without  landing  his  troops. 
Chased  by  two  English  ships,  his  vessels  scattered.  The  Venus 
entered  the  Charente  November  6,  and  the  Concorde  on  the  9th ; 
the  Franchise  anchored  ofif  Saint-Martin-de-Re  on  the  6th,  after 
throwing  her  guns  overboard;  finally  the  Medee  reached  Basque 
Roads  on  the  7th  under  similar  conditions. 

It  is  hard  to  find  an  operation  more  badly  conceived.  Making 
the  doubtful  admission  that  4000  or  5000  men  were  sufficient  to 
maintain  themselves  in  Ireland,  the  best  way  to  drive  them  to  sur- 
render was  certainly  to  send  them  out  in  small  parties.  It  was 
actually  too  presumptuous  by  far  to  suppose  that  General  Humbert 
would  be  able  to  maintain  himself  in  that  country  with  a  thousand 
men ;  and,  as  the  landing  place  of  reinforcements  could  not  be  in- 
dicated in  advance  because  of  the  presence  of  enemy  forces  along 
the  coasts,  the  reinforcements  risked  being  separated  from  the 
advance  guard.  Further  the  greatest  difficulty  was  to  land  them ; 
and  circumstances  so  favorable  as  those  encountered  by  the  Savary 
division  are  not  met  more  than  once. 

^°^This  second  expedition  was  little  to  the  liking  of  Commander  Savary; 
he  wrote  several  letters  asking  to  he  relieved  from  the  doubtful  honor  of 
passing  a  second  time  across  the  English  cruising  ground. 

171 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Preparations  for  an  Invasion  of  England:  The  Boulogne 
Camp. — To  end  this  history  there  remains  only  the  mention  of 
Napoleon's  preparations  to  invade  England. 

From  the  rupture  of  the  peace  of  Amiens  the  First  Consul  had 
dwelt  upon  this  idea,  and  he  gave  to  his  plan  proportions  as  vast 
as  his  genius.  At  Boulogne  he  formed  a  camp  of  150,000  men. 
10,000  horses,  and  400  guns.  Here  is  something  far  removed  from 
the  timidity  of  the  Monarchy ;  this  time  it  is  to  be  a  duel  to  the 
death,  and  if  this  great  army  succeeds  in  setting  foot  on  English 
soil,  England's  day  has  come.  But  in  order  to  carry  over  such  a 
mass  of  troops  means  of  transport  were  required,  and  the  First 
Consul  busied  himself  without  loss  of  time  to  create  them. 

Three  kinds  of  vessels  were  built : 

ist.  Armed  launches  carrying  four  pieces  of  large  caliber.  They 
were  brig-rigged,  had  a  crew  of  24  men,  and  could  carry  a  com- 
pany of  infantry  of  100  men  with  their  munitions. 

2d.  Armed  boats  especially  intended  to  carry  artillery.  For- 
ward they  had  a  24-pounder,  and  aft  a  field  piece ;  amidships  there 
were  stalls  for  two  horses.  These  boats  had  crews  of  only  six 
men  and  could  carry  a  company  of  infantry  and  several  artillery- 
men. 

3d.  Pinnaces  of  about  20  meters  length,  provided  with  sixty 
oars  to  be  manned  by  soldiers ;  they  carried  only  a  small  howitzer 
and  a  4-pounder. 

Thus  fitted  out  the  army  could  land  in  spite  of  opposition,  thanks 
to  the  guns  of  the  launches,  and  immediately  afterwards  give 
battle ;  but  in  order  to  carry  on  the  campaign  there  would  be  need 
of  its  cavalry  and  its  trains.  To  this  end  a  commission  bought  all 
the  coasters  and  fishing  boats  along  the  coast  from  St.  Malo  to 
the  Texel. 

When,  after  three  years'  efforts,  the  Emperor  had  succeeded 
in  realizing  the  prodigious  task  of  assembling  two  thousand  three 
hundred  vessels,  the  only  thing  remaining  was  to  ensure  the  liberty 
of  the  sea  to  his  immense  flotilla.  In  a  later  chapter  we  shall  see 
the  different  combinations  that  the  Emperor  had  designed  to  sweep 
the  Strait,  and  the  causes  that  made  them  come  to  naught. 

This  attempt  at  invasion,  the  grandest  of  all  in  its  conception, 
was  also  the  last.  ^ 

*     * 

If  we  desire  to  draw  conclusions  from  this  array  of  facts,  whose 

172 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

results  are  often  contradictory,  it  is  necessary  at  the  outset  to 
distinguish  between  important  expeditions,  requiring  the  assem- 
blage of  a  great  number  of  vessels,  and  those  which  only  involve 
the  transportation  of  a  few  thousand  men. 

Conditions  Necessary  for  the  Transportation  over  Sea  of 
AN  Army  Corps. — In  the  former  case  recourse  is  necessary  to 
packets  and  merchant  ships,  and  consequently  an  encounter  with 
the  enemy,  however  feeble  he  may  be,  becomes  fatal  to  the 
expedition.  All  these  auxiliary  ships  are  unprovided  with  the 
necessary  means  for  sailing  in  squadron.  They  are  officered  by 
men  who  are  strangers  to  maneuvers  and  tO'  signals.  In  the  old 
days,  also,  the  convoy  was  nothing  but  a  mob  following  pell-mell 
after  its  escort.  Now  the  transports  are  placed  in  one  or  two 
columns,  with  ships  of  war  introduced  among  them  charged  with 
the  duty  of  guiding  them.  Naturally  the  speed  is  low  because, 
when  great  numbers  of  troops  are  to  be  transported,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  utilize  the  last  reserves  of  commercial  ports. 

If  the  enemy  runs  across  this  procession,  which  covers  a  great 
extent  of  sea,  the  situation  at  once  becomes  critical.  At  the  first 
shells  that  fall  about  them  the  transports,  destitute  of  every 
means  of  protection,  have  no  resource  save  flight.  Threatened  by 
the  danger  of  sinking  and  without  succor,  crews  and  passengers 
become  demoralized ;  disorder  ensues  and  soon  the  convoy  is 
dispersed  in  every  direction.  What  can  the  escort  do?  It  seeks 
to  concentrate  and  interpose  between  the  enemy  and  the  convoy ; 
but  it  can  neither  keep  the  shells  from  reaching  the  convoy  nor 
keep  the  light  vessels  from  rushing  in  pursuit  of  it.  Moreover  the 
ships  of  war  are  themselves  encumbered  with  troops  in  order  to 
keep  down  the  nimiber  of  auxiliaries,  and  they  find  themselves  in 
the  most  unfavorable  condition  for  battle.  In  every  way  the 
expedition  becomes  broken  up.  So  true  is  this  that  the  instructions 
given  to  our  squadron  commanders  under  circumstances  of  this 
kind  prescribed  that  they  should  always  carefully  avoid  the  enemy ; 
and  when  they  have  had  the  bad  fortune  to  be  met  at  sea  the  result 
has  always  been  lamentable.  The  Spaniards  are  perhaps  the  only 
ones  who  have  essayed  (in  the  sixteenth  century)  to  form  an 
assemblage  of  ships  formidable  enough  to  force  the  passage  of  a 
convoy  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  and  the  world  knows  what 
happened  to  the  Invincible  Armada. 

173 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Thus,  in  order  to  cross  the  sea  with  great  bodies  of  troops, 
there  is  only  a  choice  between  the  three  following  solutions : 

1st.  To  take  advantage  of  the  fact  that  the  sea  is  free,  whether 
temporarily  or  absolutely. 

2d.  To  destroy  or  paralyse  the  enemy  at  the  outset,  and  then  to 
cross. 

3d.  To  seek  to  make  the  crossing  by  surprise. 

First  Case. — The  sea  is  free.  The  success  of  the  crossing  can 
then  only  be  thwarted  by  bad  weather.  As  for  the  landing,  it  can 
always  be  effected  if  the  region  has  a  large  extent  of  coast ;  as  for 
the  rest,  everything  will  depend  upon  the  relation  of  the  means 
put  in  operation  to  the  elements  of  the  enemy's  resistance.  The 
two  expeditions  to  Minorca  were  carried  on  imder  these  conditions, 
and  both  were  crowned  with  success. 

Nevertheless,  when  the  freedom  of  the  sea  is  only  temporary 
.  an  offensive  return  of  the  enemy  must  be  foreseen,  and  sufficient 
forces  must  be  disposed  to  save  Avhat  has  been  acquired.  In  fact 
it  is  plain  that,  if  la  Galissonniere  had  been  defeated  off  Mahon, 
the  English  garrison  of  Fort  St.  Philip  would  have  been  rein- 
forced and  revictualed,  while  the  troops  of  Richelieu  would  have 
been  seriously  compromised. 

It  is  necessary  also  to  look  to  the  future.  Unless  the  landed 
army  obtains  overwhelming  results — a  desirable  but  improbable 
thing — it  will  need  to  have  its  ranks  filled  constantly  with  fresh 
troops,  and  above  all  to  be  resupplied;  for  in  our  day  munitions 
cannot  be  manufactured  on  the  spot  as  was  done  by  Napoleon 
in  Egypt.  It  is  necessary,  then,  to  remain  in  control  of  the 
communications  after  the  landing,  without  which  surrender  will 
be  the  consequence  at  the  end  of  a  longer  or  shorter  time.  If  it  is 
foreseen  that  the  communications  cannot  be  assured  it  is  best  to 
refrain  from  the  operations. 

Second  Case. — The  sea  is  not  free,  hut  the  naval  forces  at 
disposal  permit  risking  the  hazards  of  battle.  In  this  case  the 
landing  should  always  be  subordinated  to  a  contest  which  will 
decide  the  command  of  the  sea. 

One  is  confronted  then  with  the  following  alternatives :  either 
he  will  be  victorious,  in  which  case  he  can  cross  in  security, 
profiting  by  the  demoralization  (of  the  loser)  that  always  follows 
a  lost  battle ;  or  else  he  will  be  beaten,  and  then,  instead  of  losing 
a  fleet  and  an  army,  the  army  at  least  will  be  saved. 

174 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

When  one  has  a  marked  superiority  over  the  enemy  afloat  there 
may  arise  the  temptation  to  adopt  a  mixed  solution  by  dividing  the 
forces  into  two  parts :  one,  the  more  numerous,  designed  to  mask 
the  enemy  squadron  in  order  to  permit  the  other  to  conduct  the 
convoy  and  preserve  it  from  the  hardy  incursions  of  single  ships. 
This  was  the  solution  that  was  thought  of  in  1755.  It  can  have 
only  calamitous  results.  At  the  very  beginning  there  will  never 
be  too  much  force  to  clear  the  passage,  and  it  would  be  imprudent 
to  jeopardize  the  game  by  withholding  a  detachment.  Finally, 
whatever  care  be  taken  to  interpose  between  the  convoy  and  the 
enemy,  one  can  never  be  sure  of  succeeding  in  it  if  the  enemy  ma- 
neuvers rapidly  and  skilfully,  profiting  by  the  night  hours  to  steer 
false  courses,  or  if  he  masks  his  movements  behind  a  screen  of 
his  light  vessels.  On  the  sea  the  movements  of  forces  are  not 
subject  to  the  same  rules  as  on  land,  where  the  troops  can  only 
advance  by  known  routes.  It  is  preferable,  then,  instead  of  divid- 
ing the  forces  to  divide  the  operation  into  two  parts :  first  fight, 
then  cross  over. 

But  still  it  is  necessary  to  be  able  to  fight.  It  happens  most 
often,  however,  that  the  enemy,  when  he  is  in  inferior  numbers, 
prefers  not  to  face  the  battle  and  shuts  himself  up  inside  a  port. 
In  this  event  operations  cannot  be  held  up  until  he  shall  deign  to 
come  out;  for  every  delay  in  the  transportation  of  troops  may 
modify  the  situation  on  land  and  be  favorable  to  the  enemy,  who 
often  seeks  nothing'  else  than  to  gain  time.  One  is  then  content  to 
blockade,  or  at  least  to  watch  closely  the  enemy  forces,  in  order 
to  prevent  them  from  coming  out ;  and,  behind  this  covering  fleet, 
to  send  the  convoy  across  under  the  escort  of  several  ships  of 
war.    The  Americans  did  this  at  Santiago. 

If  the  enemy  has  retired  into  port  after  a  battle  in  which  he 
has  been  defeated  or  has  sufifered  severe  losses,  he  does  not 
constitute  a  serious  menace  because  he  is  then  demoralized  and  has 
no  other  object  than  his  security.  Such  was  the  case  with  the 
Chinese  at  Wei-hai-wei,  and  it  was  equally  the  case  with  the  Rus- 
sians in  the  recent  war  ;  it  is  this  that  justified  the  Japanese  land- 
ings in  the  vicinity  of  Wei-hai-wei  and  Port  Arthur. 

Third  Case. — The  sea  is  not  free,  and  there  is  insuificieivt  force 
to  clear  the  passage.  It  is  necessary  then  to  pass  over  by  evasion 
and  this  was  ever  the  hope  of  the  French  government.  But  we 
have  seen  that  this  hope  was  always  betrayed  excepting  in  the  case 

175 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

of  the  Egyptian  expedition,  and  there  the  meeting  took  place  after 
the  passage  of  the  convoy  instead  of  before  or  during  the  passage. 

Is  it  not  logical  to  conclude  that  it  is  always  a  mistake  to  risk 
an  entire  army  under  conditions  of  this  sort?  Such  persistent 
adversity  can  not  be  imputed  alone  to  mischance  or  to  faulty  exe- 
cution ;  it  is  rooted  solely  in  an  error  of  principle  easy  of  discovery. 
To  assemble  in  certain  ports  a  great  number  of  transport  vessels, 
to  direct  to  those  same  ports  columns  of  troops — these  things 
cannot  be  done  without  attracting  attention ;  thereafter  there  is  no 
further  chance  of  a  surprise  and  the  secret  of  the  operation,  which 
alone  can  assure  success,  is  divulged.  This  is  why  Tourville, 
Roquefeuil,  and  Conflans  were  beaten  or  dispersed  in  the  imme- 
diate vicinity  of  their  convoys,  the  English  knowing  perfectly  that 
they  would  find  them  there,  and  nowhere  else.  It  was  even  a 
happy  circumstance  for  us  that  the  contact  did  not  take  place  after 
the  departure  of  the  transports,  for  the  disaster  would  then  have 
been  greater  still. 

In  our  opinion  an  operation  presenting  itself  under  such  un- 
favorable conditions  should  be  absolutely  forbidden. 

Nothing  is  easier  than  to  build  plans  upon  paper  for  the  invasion 
of  England.  One  takes  a  chart,  notes  that  the  ocean  is  vast  and 
that  ships  get  lost  in  its  solitude,  and  therefore  concludes  that  the 
chances  of  crossing  without  being  seen  are  indefinitely  more  num- 
erous than  the  chances  of  being  met.  But  when  the  hour  of  execu- 
tion arrives  the  dangers  that  were  not  discernible  at  long  range 
come  to  mind  in  a  flood,  together  with  the  consequences  in  their 
train.  One  then  hesitates  to  stake  the  fortunes  of  the  country 
upon  a  throw  of  the  die.  The  expedition  is  not  given  up  but  one 
comes  to  think  that  everything  can  be  reconciled  by  having  it 
escorted  by  a  naval  force  for  its  protection,  and  thereby  one  courts 
disaster ;  because,  if  the  escort  were  sufficient,  the  issue  of  battle 
would  be  sought  beforehand. 

Let  us  formally  forbid  ourselves  to  build  schemes  of  invasion 
upon  a  passage  by  surprise.  When  the  moment  arrives  to  take  the 
sea  men  have  always  recoiled,  and  they  always  will  recoil ;  there 
are  responsibilities  that  are  beyond  human  strength.  Napoleon 
himself  did  not  dare  face  them.  If  the  thing  were  really  possible, 
how  can  it  be  explained  that  the  disasters  of  the  Hogue  and  of 
Quiheron  caused  the  projected  expeditions  to  be  abandoned ;  for 
the  army  and  the  transports  were  unharmed  ? 

176 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Think  of  the  state  of  mind  of  the  admiral  charg-ed  with  the 
duty  of  facing  all  the  unknown  possibilities  of  such  an  operation ! 
The  situation  flowing  from  it  is  not  one  that  can  be  laid  upon  the 
shoulders  of  a  leader.  To  convoy  an  inert  mass  that  is  certain 
to  succumb  to  the  least  attack  without  being  able  to  defend  itself ; 
to  have  charge  of  thousands  of  human  lives  without  means  of 
safeguarding  them ;  to  be  unable  to  anticipate  the  possibility  of 
flight,  even,  in  case  of  encountering  the  enemy ;  such  responsi- 
bilities are  beyond  human  strength. 

Ask  of  our  admirals  to  sacrifice  their  squadrons  to  assure  free- 
dom of  passage ;  none  will  refuse.  Demand  of  them  that  they  fight 
against  odds  of  two  to  one ;  it  has  been  done,  it  will  be  done  again. 
But  do  not  ask  of  a  man  that  he  be  an  impotent  witness  to  the 
annihilation  of  an  army  upon  which  the  destinies  of  the  fatherland 
depend. 

By  causing  the  expedition  to  set  out  from  two  or  three  different 
points  there  is  the  advantage  of  dividing  the  attention  of  the 
enemy.  But  unless  this  is  done  with  the  sole  object  of  seeking  an 
occasion  to  fall  in  force  upon  one  of  the  detachments  of  the  enemy, 
the  benefits  to  be  expected  do  not  compensate  for  the  attendant 
disadvantages ;  for,  the  several  corps  never  being  sure  of  being 
able  to  leave  at  the  desired  moment  or  to  land  at  the  chosen  place, 
the  result  is  compromised  from  the  beginning.  The  first  comer 
will  share  the  fate  of  General  Humbert. 

We  conclude,  then,  if  France  wishes  in  the  future  to  take  up 
once  more  her  ideas  of  invasion,  she  must  from  now  on  undertake 
the  sacrifices  necessary  to  clear  the  passage  instead  of  beginning 
again  the  fantastic  operations  that  have  made  of  the  Channel  and 
the  Atlantic  the  graveyard  of  our  navy. 

The  Fleet  in  Being. — Let  us  now  examine  the  problem : 
What  is  the  role  of  an  inferior  force  confronted  with  the  menace 
of  an  invasion  ?  Should  it  offer  battle  at  the  risk  of  being  defeated 
and  of  leaving  the  passage  clear  ? 

The  role  has  been  defined  by  Admiral  Colomb  in  the  theory  of 
the  "  fleet  in  being."  The  arguments  of  the  distinguished  English 
historian  may  be  summarized  as  follows :  So  long  as  a  naval  force 
exists  and  makes  its  existence  manifest,  an  enemy,  even  superior, 
cannot  undertake  a  landing;  and  if  he  persists  in  the  attempt  he 
places  himself  in  a  bad  position,  and  goes  to  his  defeat. 

Admiral  Colomb  bases  his  doctrine  upon  the  defense  of  Torring- 

177 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

ton  before  the  court-martial  that  tried  him  for  losing  the  battle 
of  Beachy  Head.  The  example  does  not  seem  to  us  to  have  been 
judiciously  chosen ;  the  argument  rests  upon  what  Torrington 
might  have  been  able  to  do  and  not  upon  what  he  did.  Then  too, 
the  author  credits  the  French  with  plans  of  invasion  of  which  no 
trace  can  be  found ;  ^'*  finally  the  English  fleet  really  left  the  sea 
free  after  its  defeat  by  shutting  itself  up  in  the  Thames.  It  can- 
not, therefore,  be  taken  as  a  model  of  the  fleet  in  being. 

Nevertheless,  the  considerations  that  Torrington  turned  to 
account,  after  having  planned  his  defense  at  leisure,  have  received 
the  confirmation  of  facts.  In  the  following  year  Tourville  gave  a 
luminous  demonstration  of  the  power  of  an  inferior  fleet  in  his 
famous  deep-sea  cruise,  during  which  he  prevented  the  English 
fleet  from  attacking  our  coasts  without  permitting  himself  to  be 
run  down.  Other  examples  might  be  cited,  such  as  that  furnished 
by  the  Invincible  Armada,'""  by  the  fleet  of  d'Orvilliers  in  1779,"" 
by  the  Italians  at  Lissa,'"  and  again  very  recently  by  Cervera's 
squadron,  of  which  we  shall  speak  again  later  on. 

The  fleet  in  being  should  then,  by  serving  as  a  menace,  paralyse 
the  movements  of  the  enemy.  It  acts  in  the  manner  of  troops 
operating  on  the  rear  or  flanks  of  an  enemy.  Its  entire  strength 
resides  in  its  activity  and  in  the  doubt  in  which  it  leaves  its  move- 
ments shrouded.  If  chased  it  necessarily  runs  away ;  as  soon  as  it 
is  left  in  quiet  it  should  seek  contact  again  to  keep  the  enemy 
under  tension.  But  it  is  not  as  easy  as  may  be  thought  to  play  at 
blindman's-buff,  even  with  superiority  of  speed.  Tourville  con- 
tended that  an  encounter  is  inevitable  when  two  fleets  are  within 
sight  of  one  another ;  and  the  reasons  that  he  gave  are  not  weak- 
ened by  the  advent  of  steam.'^  To  avoid  it  the  enemy  must  be  at 
a  considerable  distance,  which  implies  that  contact  is  only  made 

^^  There  is  nothing  in  question  about  them  in  the  correspondence  of 
Seignelay  and  Tourville  after  the  victory  of  Beachy  Head. 

'^  The  Invincible  Armada  attempted  to  get  its  convoy  across  without 
taking  account  of  the  weaker  English  fleet ;  it  was  defeated. 

"®  The  combined  fleet,  not  having  been  able  to  overtake  the  enemy,  had  to 
give  up  convoying  the  expeditionary  corps. 

''"  The  Italian  squadron  intended  to  capture  Lissa  without  taking  due 
account  of  the  Austrian  squadron ;  surprised  before  having  time  to  concen- 
trate, it  was  beaten. 

^^  They  rest  upon  the  lack  of  homogeneity  of  large  fleets. 

178 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

by  the  scouts.  Navigation  under  sail  permitted  engaging  in  what 
may  be  called  the  "  game  of  dead  sectors  "  by  utilizing  the  direc- 
tion of  the  wind  and  its  variations.  Now  only  steering  false  courses 
can  be  counted  upon  ;  but  that  resource  is  uncertain  enough,  espe- 
cially in  narrow  waters  ;  and  if  the  pursuit  is  active  the  fleet  in 
being  will  soon  be  compelled  to  take  refuge  in  port.  Thereafter 
it  is  reduced  to  impotence  ;  it  dies. 

Admiral  Colomb  contends  that  such  is  not  the  case ;  that  even 
shut  up  it  must  be  taken  into  account.  Captain  Mahan  holds  the 
contrary  opinion/'"  and  without  engaging  in  the  discussion  we 
may  say  that  Mahan  is  justified  by  the  facts. 

In  fact,  as  long  as  Cervera's  ships  were  at  sea  the  Americans 
put  ofif  the  execution  of  their  plans  for  landing ;  "*  and  the  influence 
that  a  mobile  force  can  exert  at  a  distance  is  the  more  remarkable 
in  this  instance  because  no  nation  ever  professed  the  same  degree 
of  disdain  for  its  adversary  as  did  America."^  But  as  soon  as 
Cervera  had  shut  himself  into  Santiago  his  squadron  had  no 
weight  in  the  flow  of  events. 

Similarly,  when  the  Russian  squadron  returned  to  Port  Arthur 
after  the  unfortunate  affair  of  May  lO,  the  Japanese  armies  could 
be  disembarked  without  risk. 

The  inferior  force  should,  then,  keep  the  sea  as  long  as  the 
enemy  does,  and  should  be  as  fast.  If  it  succeeds  in  holding  him 
in  check  until  his  bunkers  are  empty  the  situation  is  saved  for  the 
moment,  and  perhaps  definitely,  for  all  schemes  of  invasion  have 
been  abandoned  after  a  first  miscarriage.  Why,  then,  is  it  con- 
tended that  speed  and  radius  of  action  are  unnecessary  in  taking 
the  defensive? 

The  theory  of  the  fleet  in  being  is  attractive,  but  it  is  easier  to 
define  than  to  put  in  practice.  It  would  be  dangerous  to  build 
great  hopes  upon  its  employment ;  and  if  it  is  possible  to  avert 
the  danger  of  invasion  by  the  aid  of  a  diversion,  this  means  will 
always  be  preferable. 

'"^  Mahan,  Lessons  of  the  War  with  Spain;  and  Colomb,  Naval  Warfare, 
Preface. 

^^  This  is  said  by  Mahan  himself. 

^'^  The  crossing  of  the  Atlantic  by  Cervera's  squadron  had  consequences 
that  the  Spanish  government  had  not  foreseen  ;  if  it  had  suspected  them  it 
might  have  profited  in  order  to  gain  time  and  put  the  Pclayo  and  the 
Carlos  V  in  the  line. 

179 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Conditions  Necessary  for  the  Transportation  over  Seas 
OF  a  Body  of  Troops  of  Limited  Numbers. — Do  the  conclusions 
that  we  have  drawn  from  the  great  attempts  at  invasion  apply  to 
the  transportation  of  a  few  thousand  men  ? 

Conditions  are  here  very  different.  As  the  preparations  no 
longer  demand  considerable  movement  of  troops  and  of  ships  they 
can  remain  secret;  it  becomes  possible  to  do  without  the  aid  of 
the  merchant  marine,  the  elements  of  which  are  a  source  of  em- 
barrassment, and  to  make  up  a  homogeneous  and  fast  division  of 
several  ships  of  war.  Difficulties  of  navigation  are  thus  greatly 
simplified,  and  in  place  of  the  expedition's  setting  out  from  the 
nearest  point  to  the  enemy's  coast  in  order  to  diminish  the  diffi- 
culties due  to  a  slow  order  of  march,  a  point  of  departure  less 
under  observation  may  be  chosen  at  a  distance.  In  case  of  meeting 
the  enemy  the  expedition  will  doubtless  be  dispersed ;  but  it  will 
not  be  fatally  annihilated,  thanks  to  its  speed.  Finally,  and  above 
all,  the  consequences  of  a  failure  will  be  less  grave ;  they  will  not 
weigh  so  heavily  upon  the  issue  of  the  war.  It  may  then  be  ad- 
mitted that  it  is  possible  to  cross  seas  of  which  one  has  not  the 
command  when  the  operation  has  been  surrounded  with  all  these 
guarantees;  but  this  principle  is  subject  to  one  condition — the  ex- 
peditionary corps  once  landed  must  be  able  to  take  possession  of 
the  territory,  and  to  maintain  itself  there  on  its  own  resources  if 
the  communications  remain  cut. 

Without  speaking  of  Ireland,  into  which  we  have  been  able  to 
throw  detachments  on  several  occasions,  confirmation  of  this  rule 
will  be  found  in  the  operations  that  have  had  their  scene  in  the 
Antilles  at  different  times,  and  which  we  have  not  cited  in  order 
not  to  lengthen  our  narrative.  In  those  islands,  where  the  English 
and  French  possessions  were  so  closely  interspersed,  it  was  always 
possible  to  choose  a  propitious  moment  to  land  upon  the  shores  of  a 
neighbor ;  but  the  conquest  remained  precarious,  or  even  lacked 
the  time  for  its  accomplishment,  if  the  troops  landed  did  not  rest 
upon  the  support  of  naval  forces.  A  study  of  the  facts  discloses 
many  occasions  when  men  have  allowed  themselves  to  be  tempted, 
thoughtlessly  and  with  no  heed  of  the  morrow,  by  the  ease  with 
which  a  handful  of  men  could  be  transported  and  landed ;  among 
them  were  very  few  where  the  operation  procured  any  absolute 
benefits.  We  do  not  care  to  conclude  from  this  that  recourse  to 
such  operations  should  be  forbidden  ;  but  they  should  be  under- 

i8o 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

taken  only  with  forces  sufficient  to  overcome  the  resistance  of  the 
enemy  at  one  blow,  and  there  should  not  be  the  immediate  neces- 
sity to  send  reinforcements. 

After  having  studied  the  principles  that  should  govern  conquests 
of  territory  over  seas,  we  are  now  about  to  see  how  some  large 
landing  operations  have  been  carried  through.  From  this  point 
of  view  the  expeditions  to  Algeria  and  to  the  Crimea  were  well 
conducted  ;  that  to  Wei-hai-wei  by  the  Japanese  may  be  considered 
a  model  of  its  kind  ;  as  much  cannot  be  said  of  those  to  Madagascar 
and  to  Cuba, 

The  Expedition  to  Algiers. — The  fleet  that  carried  the  expe- 
ditionary corps  to  Algiers  left  Toulon,  May  23,  1830.  It  was 
composed  of  676  ships,  men-of-war  and  merchant  ships,  and 
carried  36,000  men  and  4000  horses.  The  army  was  commanded 
by  General  de  Bourmont  and  the  fleet  by  Admiral  Duperre.  In 
keeping  with  tradition  the  relations  between  the  two  chiefs  were 
far  from  cordial ;  moreover,  they  did  not  even  belong  to  the  same 
political  party. 

The  fleet  set  its  course  towards  Africa ;  but,  on  approaching  the 
coast,  bad  weather  made  it  turn  back  and  seek  refuge  at  the  Bale- 
aric Isles.  The  land  officers,  and  particularly  .the  commanding 
general,  were  made  impatient  by  this  delay.  There  were  sharp 
exchanges  between  the  two  chiefs,  and  altercations  arose  between 
the  land  and  sea  officers  that  ended  in  duels.  The  army  officers 
did  not  seem  to  comprehend  that  a  landing  is  impossible  with  the 
wind  blowing  on  shore,  and  that  even  vessels  at  anchor  are  often 
forced  to  put  to  sea  at  such  tim.es.  What  would  have  happened 
if  the  boats  loaded  with  troops  had  capsized ;  or  if  one  part  of  the 
expeditionary  corps  having  been  landed,  the  rest  had  been  carried 
ofif  to  sea  with  the  ships  ?  It  would  not  have  been  admitted  as  an 
excuse  that  the  Admiral  had  yielded  to  the  solicitations  of  the 
General.  Nevertheless,  had  the  Admiral  had  to  fear  an  attack 
by  sea,  he  would  doubtless  have  preferred  to  take  the  risk  of  land- 
ing rather  than  delay  in  the  Balearic  Isles ;  and  for  this  reason  the 
expedition  might  very  well  have  ended  before  it  began. 

The  fleet  remained  in  Palma  Roads  an  entire  week.  Finally  on 
June  13,  it  anchored  off  the  peninsula  of  Sidi-Ferruch,  and  the 

181 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

next  day  the  landing  of  the  troops  began  without  any  opposition 
from  the  army  of  the  Bey.  The  first  division  was  put  ashore  in 
half  an  hour,  and  the  36,000  men  were  landed  in  five  hours.  The 
same  day  the  Bey's  camp  was  taken. 

Several  days  were  necessary  to  land  the  material,  owing  to 
interruptions  due  to  bad  weather.  As  soon  as  the  operation  was 
completed  the  army  took  up  the  march.  After  this  time  the  part 
played  by  the  navy  was  only  secondary. 

The  Expedition  to  the  Crimea. — In  the  Crimean  expedition 
it  was  a  question  of  landing  27,000  French,  28,000  English,  and 
7000  Turks.  The  fleet,  numbering  more  than  four  hundred  vessels, 
set  sail  September  7,  1854,  and  anchored  at  Eupatoria  on  the  13th. 
The  landing  of  the  French  began  at  7.40  a.  m.,  September  14; 
at  9.20  a.  m.  9000  men  were  ashore ;  at  noon  the  three  infantry 
divisions  and  eighteen  guns  with  their  material ;  before  night  the 
three  divisions  with  their  trains  and  horses,  the  engineer  company 
and  all  its  outfit,  the  horses  of  the  Spahis,  and  the  horses  of  the 
Marshal  and  of  his  stafif. 

The  fourth  division  was  embarked  on  board  steamers  that  had 
been  to  the  Bay  of  Katcha  to  make  a  diversion ;  it  was  not  dis- 
embarked until  the  next  day. 

Such  a  rapid  operation  shows  preparation  to  minute  details ;  it 
was  a  contrast  to  the  confusion  that  had  attended  the  embarkation 
of  the  material  at  Marseilles.  It  was  doubtless  understood,  after 
a  first  experience,  that  order  is  a  primary  condition  of  every  com- 
bined operation. 

The  Expedition  to  Wei-hai-w^ei. — The  qualities  of  organiza- 
tion shown  by  the  Japanese  in  the  Chino- Japanese  war  were  never 
better  thrown  into  relief  than  by  the  expedition  to  Wei-hai-wei, 
which  was  carried  on  in  the  dead  of  winter  ( — 10°  C,  14°  F.). 
This  operation  was  peculiar  in  that  the  transportation  was  effected 
in  four  convoys,  of  which  only  the  first  was  escorted  by  the  fleet. 

Some  fifty  transports,  each  carrying  a  large  distinguishing  num- 
ber had  been  gathered  at  Talien-wan.  The  expeditionary  corps 
was  composed  of  25,000  men,  6000  of  whom  were  coolies,  and 
3000  horses. 

The  light  Japanese  squadron  began  by  making  a  diversion  to  the 
westward  of  Wei-hai-wei,  bombarding  the  city  of  Ting-chou-foo 
and  landing  there  2000  men ;  then  it  went  to  sea  off  Wei-hai-wei 
in  order  to  cover  the  crossing.     Meantime  the  first  convoy  of 

182 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

fifteen  ships  left  Talien-wan,  accompanied  by  the  Japanese  squad- 
ron and  fifteen  torpedo  vessels. 

Upon  approaching  land  the  torpedo  vessels  were  detached  to 
watch  Wei-hai-wei,  while  the  cruiser  Yayeyama  went  to  recon- 
noiter  Yung-Ching  Bay  where  the  landing  was  to  take  place.  This 
ship  arrived  at  dawn  January  20,  cleared  the  beach  with  the  fire 
of  her  guns,  and  dispersed  a  detachment  of  300  Chinese ;  then  it 
made  ready  for  the  anchorage  of  the  convoy,  which  arrived  at  6 
o'clock  in  the  morning.  Landing  stages  were  immediately  con- 
structed at  the  beach  by  the  carpenters,  and  the  disembarkation 
began.    All  the  troops  were  ashore  by  night. 

The  second  convoy  arrived  on  the  21st,  the  third  on  the  23d,  the 
fourth  on  the  25th,  and  on  the  26th  the  army  was  put  on  the 
march. 

During  all  this  time  the  Japanese  squadron  kept  the  Chinese 
ships  closely  blockaded  in  Wei-hai-wei. 

It  would  perhaps  have  been  prudent  to  blockade  them  earlier 
if  they  had  not  already  suffered  the  ordeal  of  the  battle  of  the 
Yalu ;  but  in  view  of  their  demoralized  condition  excessive  pru- 
dence was  not  a  demand  of  the  occasion. 

The  Expedition  to  Madagascar. — Although  we  have  only 
concerned  ourselves  here  with  landings  that  have  taken  place  in 
countries  where  the  invader  had  no  base  (expeditions  like  those 
to  Mexico,  China,  or  the  Transvaal  having  another  character), 
it  is  well  to  say  a  few  words  about  the  expedition  to  Madagascar 
because  of  the  teachings  of  a  general  character  that  it  affords. 

One  wonders  how  France,  which  was  not  without  experience 
in  combined  operations,  was  able  to  commit  so  many  faults  in  this 
unfortunate  affair. 

The  navy  had  made  the  preparations  for  the  expedition ;  at 
the  last  moment  it  was  turned  over  to  the  War  Department.  The 
navy,  wounded  in  its  dignity,  took  care  not  to  propose  its  co-opera- 
tion, which  for  that  matter  was  not  sought,  and  made  ready  to 
judge  results ;  the  spectacle  was  not  common-place. 

The  transports  were  chartered  and  loaded  with  material,  but  no 
care  was  taken  to  put  aboard  first  the  articles  that  should  be 
unloaded  last.  Then  the  transports  were  dispatched  in  succession 
at  fixed  intervals,  but  there  was  a  neglect  to  enjoin  any  date  of 
arrival,  so  that  the  ships,  not  having  the  same  speed,  arrived  at 
irregular  intervals.    There  being  no  arrangements  ready  on  shore 

183 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

to  receive  the  troops,  those  that  arrived  before  the  date  anticipated 
had  to  remain  on  board  ship  at  Majunga  Road,  where  there  was 
soon  an  extraordinary  congestion. 

The  unloading  of  the  material  presented  insurmountable  diffi- 
culties. The  lighters  had  not  arrived,  and  as  there  was  need  of 
articles  of  prime  necessity,  such  as  guns,  that  were  stowed  in  the 
bottom  of  the  hold,  it  was  necessary  to  empty  the  holds  upon  the 
decks  in  order  to  find  them.  There  resulted  a  tremendous  loss  of 
time  involving  demurrage. 

Lighters  were  lacking ;  but  to  make  up  for  them  six  thousand 
Lefevre  carts  had  been  sent,  and  were  found  to  be  in  fact  of  no 
manner  of  use. 

The  navy  had  provided  a  small  wharf  to  facilitate  the  operation 
of  landing.  The  army,  attempting  to  do  things  on  a  large  scale, 
extended  the  wharf — on  paper — in  order  to  permit  ships  to  lie 
alongside ;  but  it  had  neglected  to  investigate  the  nature  of  the 
bottom,  which  did  not  lend  itself  to  a  work  of  this  kind.  Besides 
there  was  not  enough  time  at  disposal  to  permit  undertaking  so 
considerable  a  work,  and  the  ironwork  for  the  wharf  went  to  the 
dump  alongside  the  Lefevre  carts. 

We  shall  forbear  to  speak  of  the  mistakes  made  by  the  expedi- 
tion on  its  march. 

Ever\-body  knows  that  the  sailor  loves  to  play  at  being  soldier, 
while  the  soldier  adores  to  play  at  being  sailor.  Here  it  was  the 
last  case  that  arose ;  instead  of  turning  over  entirely  to  the  navy 
the  maritime  part,  as  was  done  in  the  expeditions  to  Algiers  and 
the  Crimea,  the  army  had  the  ambition  to  act  all  by  itself.  The 
result  was  just  that  to  be  expected.  "  Let  us  not  overwork  our 
talent  .  .  .  .  "  says  the  fabulist. 

The  Expedition  to  Santiago. — If  the  faults  of  others  can 
console  us  for  our  own,  we  shall  find  satisfaction  in  the  way  the 
Americans  organized  the  transport  and  landing  of  the  expedi- 
tionary corps  to  Santiago. 

Thirty-five  transports  had  been  gathered  at  Tampa  to  transport 
15,000  men;  but  such  was  the  confusion  that  it  was  not  known 
exactly  how  many  men  had  set  out.  Baggage  and  material  were 
heaped  pell-mell  into  the  ships  as  fast  as  it  could  arrive  at  the 
wharf.  The  absolute  want  of  organization  may  be  judged  from 
the  two  following  facts.  The  several  elements  of  three  batteries 
of  artillery  were  scattered  among  five  transports,  which  divided 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

lip  among  them  the  guns,  carriages,  munitions,  mules,  and  artillery- 
men ;  it  is  a  question  if  these  batteries  were  ever  reassembled. 
The  order  having  been  given  to  put  on  shore  the  horses  of  two 
volunteer  regiments  whose  sailing  had  been  countermanded,  the 
horses  could  not  be  found ;  they  were  finally  discovered  on  board 
a  transport  that  was  already  in  the  stream. 

A  single  line  of  rails  ended  at  Port  Tampa,  but  it  belonged  to 
a  private  citizen  who  used  it  to  organize  excursions,  which  only 
served  to  make  things  worse. 

Finally,  on  June  8,  1898,  several  transports  sailed  off  by  them- 
selves, and  it  was  necessary  to  send  a  war  vessel  to  bring  them 
back.  On  June  14,  the  expeditionary  corps  at  last  got  started. 
The  transports  were  escorted  by  several  men-of-war ;  but  soon 
each  was  navigating  without  reference  to  the  rest,  and  the  fleet 
covered  an  extent  of  sea  of  more  than  ten  miles. 

If  only  one  of  the  Spanish  gunboats  then  scattered  among  the 
ports  of  Cuba  had  been  commanded  by  a  man  of  energy,  that 
would  have  sounded  the  knell  of  the  expedition.  It  would  have 
sufficed  to  disperse  all  the  rest  of  the  transports  if  one  or  two 
tardy  ones  had  been  sunk. 

The  convoy  proceeded  slowly.  The  average  speed  was  less 
than  seven  knots  although  the  weather  remained  good.  This  in- 
different result  is  nowise  surprising,  for  there  had  been  a  lack  of 
time  necessary  for  selection  among  the  merchant  ships.  Further- 
more all  express  steamers  had  to  be  converted  into  auxiliary 
cruisers. 

Finally,  on  June  20,  this  extraordinary  fleet  arrived  off  Santiago, 
after  passing  along  the  coast  to  the  end  that  nobody  should  be 
ignorant  of  its  presence.  On  the  22d  a  diversion  was  made  to  the 
westward  while  the  landing  began  east  of  the  city,  at  Daiquiri. 
It  was  made  under  the  same  conditions  as  the  embarkation.  Thus 
only  6000  men  were  put  ashore  the  first  day ;  it  is  true  that  the 
surf  greatly  hindered  operations  and  smashed  several  boats.  It 
was  not  until  the  26th  that  the  material  was  landed ;  but  already 
some  detachments  had  been  put  on  the  march,  without  order, 
taking  the  first  road  that  came  in  sight,  so  that  the  army,  whose 
objective  was  the  capture  of  the  heights  commanding  the  entrance 
to  Santiago,  came  out  under  the  walls  of  the  city.  To  complete 
the  confusion,  the  inevitable  quarrel  arose  between  the  Admiral 
and  the  General. 

i8s 


A  Study  of  N.wal  Strategy. 

Nothing-  is  more  curious  than  the  fact  that  this  expedition,  so 
badly  organized  and  so  badly  led,  was  crowned  with  full  success. 
At  the  moment  when  General  Shafter,  fearing  disaster,  was  debat- 
ing about  re-embarking,  Santiago,  defended  by  fatuous  g-enerals, 
laid  down  its  arms. 

In  the  midst  of  all  these  shortcomings  the  American  squadron 
did  its  duty.  Closely  blockading  Admiral  Cervera,  it  assured  the 
freedom  of  the  sea  and  guaranteed  the  safety  of  the  landing. 

No  one  of  these  landings  was  as  important  as  those  carried  out 
by  Japan  in  Korea  and  Manchuria ;  but  the  Japanese  government 
has  been  very  sparing  of  information  regarding  these  operations 
and  we  can  give  no  indication  as  to  the  manner  in  which  they  were 
executed. 

From  the  preceding  examples  we  can  deduce  the  general  rules 
that  should  govern  the  transportation  and  disembarkation  of  an 
expeditionary  corps  when  the  sea  is  free. 

The  preparations  require  the  constant  co-operation  of  the  army 
and  the  navy.  It  consists  in  the  determination  of  the  apportion- 
ment of  the  different  bodies  and  of  the  several  arms  on  board  the 
ships,  in  order  to  be  able  to  land  them  in  a  way  that  is  logical 
and  at  the  same  time  rapid;  in  the  distribution  of  material  to 
each  transport,  and  in  its  stowage  in  such  an  orderly  way  that  the 
articles  immediately  needed  will  arrive  first  on  the  beach ;  finally, 
in  assembling  the  greatest  possible  number  of  means  for  landing. 
Nothing  of  all  this  can  be  improvised.  It  is  work  that  demands 
long  and  painstaking  application,  and  it  ought  to  be  prepared  in 
times  of  peace,  at  least  in  its  broad  outlines. 

The  embarkation  will  always  be  easy  because  a  closed  port 
provided  with  wharves  will  be  available.  It  will  suffice  to  proceed 
with  method,  and  to  embark  the  material  first  in  order  to  obviate 
the  long  standing  about  so  wearisome  to  the  personnel. 

Let  us  now  follow  the  convoy  to  sea.  It  will  be  escorted  by  all 
the  warships  that  can  be  assembled  ;  although  we  are  supposing  the 
sea  free,  it  is  always  a  matter  of  concern  to  have  a  strong  escort. 
At  the  outset,  freedom  of  the  sea  does  not  imply  that  the  enemy 
has  no  longer  a  single  ship  in  a  condition  to  go  to  sea ;  it  means 
simply  that  he  is  unable  to  put  a  sufficient  force  in  line  to  inspire 

i86 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

serious  fears.  One  cannot,  therefore,  put  a  convoy  at  the  mercy 
of  a  single  cruiser,  nor  can  one  take  too  many  precautions.  Ships 
of  war  are  well  provided  with  means  to  facilitate  the  landing,  and 
this  is  an  added  reason  for  increasing  the  strength  of  the  escort. 

In  order  to  reduce  the  number  of  transports  and  to  accelerate 
the  landing,  troops  will  be  embarked  on  board  the  warships,  ex- 
cepting those  of  the  light  squadron  that  may  be  called  upon  to 
fulfil  special  missions.  The  Admiral  will  make  of  these  naval 
vessels  three  parts  ;  the  first,  composed  of  out-of-date  ships  will 
act  as  guides  for  the  convoy,  each  serving  as  file  leader  for  a  given 
number  of  transports ;  the  second,  divided  in  groups  if  the  convoy 
is  numerous,  will  form  the  escort ;  the  third,  composed  of  light 
vessels,  will  remain  available  for  any  duty. 

If  the  enemy  is  anticipating  invasion  it  will  be  well  to  make  a 
demonstration  in  order  to  divert  his  attention.  Even  though  the 
defense  may  have  enough  perspicacity  to  doubt  that  it  is  more  than 
a  feint,  it  will  none  the  less  be  obliged  to  guard  against  all  event- 
ualities. 

The  place  of  landing  will  be  preferably  a  beach  of  large  extent, 
and  one  that  is  not  too  near  any  large  center.  It  would  be  of 
advantage  to  make  use  of  a  closed  harbor,  but  the  safe  havens 
are  generally  provided  with  means  of  defense  in  civilized  countries, 
and  it  is  evident  that  a  landing  by  main  strength  is  to  be  avoided 
at  all  hazards.  It  is  almost  always  necessary  to  be  content  with 
an  open  roadstead,  and  then  weather  conditions  become  an  im- 
portant factor;  the  state  of  the  sea  may  necessitate  the  postpone- 
ment of  the  landing  for  several  days. 

The  landing  is  preceded  by  a  reconnaissance  made  by  a  light 
vessel  to  be  assured  that  the  beach  is  easy  of  approach  and  has 
not  been  put  in  a  state  of  defense. 

A  division  composed  entirely  of  warships  will  be  the  first  to 
anchor.  It  will  immediately  land  the  covering  force,  an  affair 
of  a  few  minutes,  and  will  mark  the  anchorage  of  the  convoy.  It 
is  not  desirable  to  make  up  the  covering  force  from  the  (naval 
ships')  landing  companies.  Besides  the  fact  that  sailors  make 
indifferent  soldiers,  the  men-of-war  will  need  all  their  own  com- 
plements for  the  discharge  of  the  ships,  and  the  service  of  the 
beach  and  of  the  boats. 

After  the  convoy  has  anchored,  the  first  division,  as  soon  as 
its  troops  are  landed,  will  get  underway  to  do  the  same  covering 

187 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

duty  on  the  ocean  side  that  the  force  landed  by  it  has  done  on 
land. 

The  beach  will  be  commanded  by  a  naval  officer,  who  will  have 
flags  placed  to  indicate  the  points  where  the  boats  of  each  transport 
shall  land,  and  the  points  of  assembly  for  the  several  corps.  A 
mixed  personnel  placed  at  his  disposition  will  give  permanent 
directions  to  the  detachments  for  their  guidance  as  soon  as  they 
arrive  at  the  beach. 

As  soon  as  this  preliminary  work  has  been  done  the  landing 
of  the  troops  will  begin,  the  landing  of  the  material  in  the  lighters 
going  on  at  the  same  time. 

The  rapidity  of  this  operation  will  depend  only  upon  the  means 
at  hand  and  upon  the  orderliness  governing  the  general  movement. 

According  to  the  indications  of  former  expeditions,  it  may  be 
reckoned  that  not  less  than  three  days  will  be  required  to  land 
all  the  impedimenta  of  an  army  of  more  than  30,000  men.  Never- 
theless much  time  may  be  gained  by  constructing  especial  material 
for  the  purpose,  and  by  numerous  exercises  in  time  of  peace.  As 
for  the  troops,  they  can  be  landed  in  a  few  hours. 

This  length  of  time,  three  days,  gives  an  idea  of  the  chances 
of  an  attack  developing  from  the  side  of  the  sea.  It  is  reasonable 
to  admit  that  the  enemy  will  hold  his  most  important  reserves  near 
his  own  coast  if  he  has  naval  forces  at  disposal  and  is  in  fear  of 
invasion ;  in  which  case  he  will  need  little  time  to  reach  the  landing 
place. 


In  the  transportation  of  an  expeditionary  corps  the  navy  comes 
in  only  to  conduct  the  troops  from  one  point  to  another ;  it  is 
an  intermediary.  Delicate  though  its  function  may  be,  it  is  none 
the  less  a  secondary  one,  and  the  principal  objective  must  be 
attained  by  the  land  forces.  It  is  therefore  entirely  natural  that 
the  supreme  command  should  be  lodged  in  the  general.  But,  none 
the  less,  the  admiral  retains  his  mdependence  in  the  execution 
of  the  program  devolving  upon  him,  which  is :  to  take  the  troops 
at  some  given  point  and  to  set  them  down  at  another  point. 

Once  the  troops  are  embarked  the  admiral  is  responsible  for 
their  safety.  He  may  be  assailed  from  one  moment  to  another 
by  a  tempest,  that  permanent  enemy  of  the  sailor ;  it  is  he  alone, 
then,  that  should  regulate  the  order  of  sailing,  give  the  route  to 


II 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

be  followed,  and  decide  whether  or  not  the  time  is  fit  for  the  land- 
ing. The  general,  on  the  contrary,  finds  himself  on  an  element 
with  which  he  is  not  familiar,  and  regrettable  consequences  might 
result  if  he  undertook  to  impose  his  will. 

We  have  seen  in  the  expedition  to  Algiers  a  remarkable  example 
of  the  situation  that  may  arise  for  an  admiral,  due  to  the  elements, 
and  we  believe  that  the  bad  part  fell  to  the  general  commanding  in 
chief,  at  least  in  this  instance. 

After  all  we  may  rest  assured  that  the  admiral  will  not  delay 
needlessly  on  the  way.  The  burden  of  conducting  large  assem- 
blages of  merchant  ships  is  too  thankless,  and  it  demands  too 
many  precautions  and  cares,  not  to  make  one  seek  to  reduce  its 
duration  to  a  strict  minimum ;  and  no  time  will  be  lost  except  in 
obedience  to  imperious  necessity.  Let  it  not  be  forgotten  that 
there  is  a  constant  risk  of  collision  among  all  these  transports, 
strangers  to  squadron  sailing,  and  that  the  admiral  will  count  his 
ships  every  morning  to  assure  himself  that  none  has  gone  wrong 
during  the  night. 

But  though  the  admiral  in  his  responsibility  is  free  to  conduct 
the  fleet  according  to  his  own  judgment,  that  is  no  reason  to 
relegate  the  general  to  a  merchant  steamer,  as  was  done  in  the  last 
combined  maneuvers.  He  is  properly  only  a  passenger,  but  he  is 
none  the  less  the  commander-in-chief;  and  if  he  refrains  from 
weighing  upon  the  decisions  of  the  commander  of  the  fleet,  he 
has  the  right  to  know  what  is  going  on,  and  the  reasons  for  it. 
It  is  even  to  be  desired  that  he  have  this  knowledge  in  order  to 
calm  his  impatience  or  his  uneasiness.  Moreover,  circumstances 
may  arise  to  impose  a  modification  of  the  original  program ;  the 
intervention  of  the  commander-in-chief  then  becomes  necessary. 
For  example,  if  persistent  winds  make  the  landing  place  fixed 
upon  unapproachable,  it  will  be  necessary  to  choose  another.  The 
admiral  will  then  propose  a  new  solution ;  but  it  ought  to  be 
accepted  by  the  general,  because  a  landing  on  hostile  soil  at  one 
place  or  at  another  is  not  a  matter  of  indiflference  from  the  military 
viewpoint.  Again  it  may  happen  that  the  convoy  is  partly  dis- 
persed by  gales.  The  admiral  will  tell  the  general  the  time  he  esti- 
mates necessary  to  gather  in  the  wanderers,  and  it  will  be  the 
general's  duty  to  decide  whether  to  land  with  his  forces  reduced,  or 
to  seek  the  vessels  that  have  strayed,  or  finally  to  give  up  the 
enterprise. 

189 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

In  a  word,  the  relations  between  the  two  chiefs  should  be 
permanent ;  and  this  is  not  possible  unless  they  are  on  board  the 
same  ship.  Can  the  possibility  be  admitted  of  their  being  separated 
by  the  chances  of  a  sea  voyage  ? 

When  combined  operations  have  only  a  secondary  importance, 
and  admit  only  of  reduced  numbers,  the  action  on  land  will  no 
longer  have  a  preponderating  influence  upon  the  issue  of  the  war. 
It  seems  reasonable  then  to  exchange  parts  and  give  to  the  navy 
the  supreme  direction.  In  a  naval  war  nothing  can  be  done  with- 
out ships ;  in  order  not  to  compromise  his  naval  forces  in  an 
isolated  attack  the  decisions  ought  to  be  made  by  the  naval  com- 
mander who  is  informed  about  what  is  going  on  on  the  sea,  and 
what  commands  the  line  of  retreat. 

It  is  astonishing  what  lamentable  results  have  arisen  simply 
from  dissensions  between  the  land  and  the  sea  commanders ;  and 
in  this  particular  other  nations  have  no  reason  to  envy  France. 
All  these  quarrels  seem  to  us  very  paltry  affairs,  and  it  is  to  be 
regretted  that  an  article  has  not  been  introduced  in  our  Regula- 
tions to  remind  officers  that  the  susceptibilities  of  individuals  must 
yield  to  the  good  of  the  service  and  the  end  to  be  attained. 


190 


A   STUDY  OF   NAVAL   STRATEGY. 

OPERATIONS.* 

III. 

Commerce  Destroying. 

Too  much  has  been  written  in  recent  years  upon  commerce 
destroying  for  it  to  be  necessary  to  explain  here  what  it  is  and 
what  its  avowed  object  is. 

The  EngHsh  were  the  first  to  try  this  system  of  warfare  which 
France  afterwards  used  so  frequently  against  them.  Charles  I, 
always  short  of  money,  found,  as  many  people  of  our  own  time 
have,  that  squadrons  are  very  costly ;  and,  since  Holland  was  an 
exclusively  commercial  nation,  since  she  drew  her  wealth  wholly 
from  her  sea  trade,  he  thought  there  was  no  need  to  maintain  those 
imposing  fleets  whose  armament  was  a  ruinous  expense ;  it  suf- 
ficed to  launch  frigates  and  light  vessels  in  pursuit  of  the  Dutch 
merchantmen,  and  thus  to  secure  the  double  advantage  of  drying 
up  the  source  of  the  enemy's  wealth  and  at  the  same  time  growing 
rich  upon  their  spoils. 

The  trial  was  made,  but  the  results  fell  short  of  the  hopes  to 
which  it  had  given  birth ;  and  the  English  Navy  renounced  once 
for  all  making  commerce  destroying  the  principal  objective  of  a 
naval  war.     It  was  France  that  inherited  the  method. 

It  began  to  be  put  to  full  use  under  Louis  XIV  by  the  first  of 
the  Pontchartrains,  and  for  an  identical  reason:  want  of  money. 
It  may  in  truth  be  observed  that,  at  least  in  the  reigns  of  Louis 
XIV  and  Louis  XV,  the  number  of  ships  in  commission  depended 
much  less  upon  the  actual  state  of  our  forces  than  upon  the  finan- 
cial resources  of  the  naval  budget.  It  was  not,  as  several  historians 
affirm,  the  disaster  of  La  Hogue  which  marked  the  decline  of  the 
navy,  since,  the  year  following,  Tourville  still  kept  the  sea  at  the 
head  of  seventy  ships ;  but  it  is  true  that  the  disarming  of  our 
squadrons  followed  close  upon  that  fatal  day,  and  the  sole  cause 
of  this  was  the  poverty  of  the  Treasury.      Pontchartrain  then 

*  The  second  section  of  Operations,  dealing  with  the  conquest  of  over- 
seas territory,  is  here  omitted,  a  translation  of  it  by  Commander  H.  S. 
Knapp,  U.  S.  N.,  having  already  been  published  in  the  Proceedings  (see 
No.  127). 

191 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

committed  the  enormous  error — not  to  use  a  stronger  term  which 
would  perhaps  be  more  just — of  alienating  the  nation's  material 
and  lending  its  ships  to  outfitters  for  carrying  on  privateering. 
Under  this  impulse  given  by  the  government,  the  number  of  priva- 
teers increased  to  fabulous  proportions.  Renouncing  all  com- 
merce in  order  to  capture  that  of  the  enemy,  having  the  crews  of 
the  King's  ships  at  their  disposal  for  arming  their  vessels,  the 
privateers  settled  down  upon  the  Channel  and  North  Sea  like  a 
flock  of  sparrows. 

Privateering  was  then  practised  either  with  single  ships  of  very 
light  scantling  or  with  small  divisions  composed  of  ships  formerly 
belonging  to  the  State ;  and  about  such  divisions  there  hung  inde- 
pendent privateers  who  profited  by  their  protection  and  seized 
upon  the  booty  they  let  slip. 

England,  little  prepared  against  a  kind  of  warfare  that  had 
never  until  then  been  practised  to  such  an  extent,  does  not  appear 
at  this  period  to  have  organized  a  system  of  methodical  defense. 
Instead  of  seeking  to  protect  her  commerce  and  to  prosecute  the 
destruction  of  our  privateers,  she  took  advantage  of  the  free  field 
left  her  by  our  squadrons  to  attempt  to  destroy  the  nests  where 
privateers  took  shelter.  Thus  she  attacked  Saint  Malo,  Dieppe, 
Dunkirk  and  Havre.  The  procedure  itself  might  have  been  justi- 
fied, if  it  had  succeeded,  but  places  as  strong  as  our  great  mari- 
time ports  are  not  to  be  reduced  by  shells  and  a  few  thousand 
men. 

However  that  may  be,  British  commerce  suflFered  immense 
losses.  It  is  said  that  there  were  4200  ships  captured  during  the 
war  of  the  League  of  Augsburg :  insurance  premiums  rose  to  30 
per  cent.  France  none  the  less  was  vanquished.  If,  therefore, 
privateering  had  some  efi'ect,  it  was  not  sufficient  to  bring  the 
adversary  to  terms. 

During  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  after  a  trial  of 
squadron  warfare  which  was  not  without  glory  (battle  of 
Malaga),  privateering  was  taken  up  again  with  energy.  We 
still  find  a  Pontchartrain  at  the  head  of  the  navy,  but  not  the  same 
one ;  it  is  his  son  Jerome :  and  it  appears  that  the  latter  does 
through  principle  what  his  father  could  argue  that  he  only  did 
through  necessity. 

The  Northern  division,  which  had  been  made  illustrious  by 
Jean  Bart  in  the  previous  war,  was  re-established,  and  at  first 

192 


I 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

several  other  small  divisions  were  fitted  out ;  but  soon  the  ships  of 
which  they  were  composed  were  successively  disarmed  and  there 
was  left  nothing  but  private  armed  vessels  to  carry  on  commerce 
destroying.  Jerome  Pontchartrain  seemed  to  have  taken  upon 
himself  to  completely  suppress  the  royal  navy."^  "  Not  only  did 
he  no  longer  replace,  no  longer  even  repair  the  ships  of  the  State, 
but  he  dismembered  them  and  sold  a  certain  number  piece  by  piece. 
Naval  officers  were  more  than  once  reduced  to  solicit  their  pay 
as  an  alms,  and  they  were  seen  condemned  to  serve  for  the  account 
of  private  ship-owners ;  the  soldiers  and  sailors  of  the  King's 
ships  did  the  same  so  as  not  to  die  of  hunger."  "^  On  the  other 
hand,  privateering  was  at  its  apogee:  practised  by  men  such  as 
Duguay-Trouin,  Forbin,  Du  Casse,  Cassard  and  the  Chevalier 
Saint  Pol,  it  never  had  been,  and  never  afterwards  was,  carried 
on  with  so  much  vigor  and  audacity.  And  yet  the  results  are 
already  inferior  to  those  of  the  last  war.  The  English  begin  to 
organize  to  combat  it ;  they  increase  the  escorts  of  convoys,  send 
frigates  against  the  privateers.  After  1702,  attacks  upon  the 
coasts  are  made  less  frequently ;  all  efforts  are  directed  towards 
protecting  convoys. 

Here,  according  to  Campbell,  is  the  result  of  the  first  five  years 
of  the  war:  "England  has  lost  30  warships  and  1146  merchant 
ships,  of  which  300  v/ere  recaptured ;  on  the  other  hand,  she  has 
captured  or  destroyed  80  warships,  1346  merchant  ships  and  175 
privateers."  "^  Throughout  the  whole  war  English  commerce 
continued  to  grow,  which  indicates  that  it  was  efficiently  pro- 
tected. 

What  was  the  final  result  of  the  war?  The  provisions  of  the 
treaty  of  Utrecht,  humiliating  to  France,  show  us. 

Under  Louis  XV,  the  economical,  but  inglorious  administration 
of  Cardinal  Fleury  had  permitted  the  navy  to  sink  to  the  lowest 
ebb.  When  the  war  of  the  Austrian  Succession  broke  out,  it  was 
necessary,  after  a  first  effort,  to  recur  to  privateering.  There  was 
no  longer  any  choice  of  means. 

"  Commerce  destroying  at  first  gave  satisfactory  results.  Pur- 
sued with  ardor  by  the  national  cruisers  and  by  numerous  private 

""  In  this  historical  sketch  we  shall  frequently  borrow  from  a  remarkable 
work  by  Commander  Lesquivit,  which  unhappily  has  not  been  made  public. 
^^Lesquivit,  Etude  historiqiie  ct  sirategique  de  la  guerre  de  course. 
"*  Lesquivit,  ibid. 

193 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

ships,  it  caused  very  great  losses  to  British  commerce  and  fur- 
nished occasion  for  single-ship  actions,  glorious  for  our  seamen, 
and  in  which  La  Motte-Picquet  and  Kersaint  won  fame.  Even 
in  distant  seas,  notably  in  the  West  Indies,  where  our  colonists 
put  all  their  capital  into  arming  privateers,  great  damages  were 
inflicted  upon  the  English,  not  less  than  950  vessels  being  taken 
from  them. 

■'  But,  after  the  disasters  of  1747,  the  French  flag  no  longer 
appeared  at  sea.  Twenty-two  ships  of  the  line  constituted  the 
whole  French  Navy,  which  sixty  years  before  counted  one  hun- 
dred and  twenty  such.  The  privateers  made  few  captures.  Pur- 
sued everywhere,  without  protection,  almost  all  of  them  fell  a 
prey  to  the  English.  The  British  naval  forces,  without  rivals, 
overran  the  seas  unmolested.  In  one  year,  it  is  said,  they  took 
French  commerce  to  the  value  of  nearly  i8o,cxx),ooo  francs.  The 
balance  of  captures  in  their  favor  was  estimated  at  2,000,000 
pounds  sterling.  '  Estimated  in  another  manner,'  says  Mahan, 
'  the  losses  amounted  to  3434  merchant  ships  for  the  French  and 
Spanish  against  3238  for  the  English ;  but  the  ratio  of  these  fig- 
ures to  the  total  ships  of  each  country  must  not  be  overlooked.'  "  "" 

This  time,  again,  did  commerce  destroying  give  victory  to 
France?  Did  the  treaty  of  Aix-la-('hapelle  efface  the  clauses  of 
the  treaty  of  Utrecht? 

The  efficacy  of  a  system  that  ended  in  a  result  diametrically 
opposed  to  the  one  proposed  to  be  attained  then  began  to  be 
doubted ;  and  the  ancient  ways  were  reverted  to.  During  the 
eight  years  of  peace  that  followed  the  war  of  the  Austrian  Suc- 
cession, as  many  ships  were  laid  down  as  the  poverty  of  our 
finances  permitted.  At  the  beginning  of  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
France  could  put  in  line  sixty  ships ;  but  what  could  be  done  with 
such  a  force  ?  After  a  fortunate  start,  nothing  more  was  done  to 
constitute  squadrons  except  some  unlucky  efl:orts  that  were  but 
the  death  struggles  of  the  navy.  Commerce  destroying  had  to  be 
again  recurred  to. 

"  From  1756  to  1760,  the  English  lost  2500  merchant  ships. 
This  figure  seems  enormous  and  yet  it  represents  but  a  tenth  of 
the  English  vessels.  In  return  we  lost  240  privateers  during  the 
same    period ;    our    maritime    commerce    had    completely    disap- 

"°Lesquivit,  op  cit. 

194 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

peared  ;  and  at  the  end  of  the  war,  in  spite  of  exchanges,  we  had 
25,000  seamen  prisoners  in  Eng'land,  while  the  Eng'hsh  had  only 
1200  in  France."  ^^  This  difference  is  characteristic  and  requires 
no  comment. 

What  were  the  hostile  squadrons  doing  then  while  our  priva- 
teers whitened  the  seas  ?  No  longer  finding  themselves  faced  by 
forces  capable  of  standing  up  against  them,  they  ravaged  our 
shores,  they  took  from  us,  one  by  one,  our  colonies ;  finally  they 
even  seized  upon  Belle-Isle.  France  could  not  keep  on  letting 
fragments  of  her  liesh  be  torn  from  her;  it  was  necessary  to  nego- 
tiate to  put  a  stop  to  this  dismemberment  that  risked  letting  the 
English  establish  themselves  at  our  gates,  in  the  islands  that  bor- 
der our  coast  and  form  part  of  the  centuries-old  heritage  of  our 
fathers.  The  conditions  were  hard  ;  we  had  to  give  up  all  that 
the  genius  of  Dupleix  had  won  for  us  in  the  East  Indies,  besides 
Canada,  Senegal,  St.  Vincent,  Dominica,  Tobago  and  part  of 
Louisiana.  Never  did  commerce  destroying  so  distinctly  show  its 
inefi(iciency. 

The  infatuation  with  this  system  had  so  completely  passed  away 
that  as  soon  as  Choiseul  succeeded  Berryer  as  Minister  of  Marine 
he  attempted  an  invasion  of  England  that  it  was  too  late  to  under- 
take and  devoted  himself  to  reconstructing  our  fleet.  The  excess 
of  our  misfortunes  had,  moreover,  operated  a  revulsion ;  on  all 
sides  the  building  of  ships  was  demanded.  "  Cities,  corporations 
and  individuals  contributed  to  pay  for  constructing  ships.  The 
estates  of  Languedoc  set  the  example  by  offering  to  the  King  an 
80-gun  ship.  Paris  followed  them  closely  by  causing  to  be  built 
at  Rochefort  the  fine  ship  Ville-de-Paris.  Several  other  prov- 
inces, towns  and  companies  followed  this  generous  and  patriotic 
inspiration,  and,  by  the  end  of  the  month  of  January,  1762,  the 
national  zeal  had  created  fourteen  new  ships  and  a  frigate.  A 
prodigious  activity  then  made  itself  felt  in  ports  but  recently 
silent ;  everywhere  there  was  building,  everywhere  repairing  of 
ships."  '''• 

It  was  too  late,  but  all  these  constructions  formed  the  nucleus 
of  the  navy  of  Louis  XVL  During  the  peace,  the  impulse  did  not 
slacken,  and  the  war  of  American  Independence  found  us  ready 
to  make  head  against  the  enemy. 

^''Lesquivit,  op.  cit.  ^'^  Lesquivit,  op.  cit. 

195 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

I  have  already  liad  occasion  to  say  tliat  in  my  opinion  the 
French  Navy  at  this  period  did  not  make  good  use  of  its  forces. 
It  was  ahnost  always  superior  in  numbers  on  the  field  of  battle, 
and,  if  it  had  employed  against  the  English  the  same  methods  of 
fighting  to  the  utmost  that  they  employed  against  us,  the  result 
would  have  been  quite  dififerent.  In  spite  of  all,  we  succeeded  in 
holding  their  navy  in  check,  and,  on  this  account,  commerce 
destroying  was  relegated  to  the  second  place  ;  it  became  the  acces- 
sory, and  no  longer  the  principal.  Practised  almost  exclusively 
by  individuals,  it  does  not  seem  to  have  had  a  great  development : 
the  allies  (French,  Spanish,  Americans,  Dutch)  took  from  the 
English  519  ships,  and  the  latter  took  from  them  534.  For  the 
first  time  the  treaty  of  peace  was  favorable  to  France. 

We  come  now  to  the  wars  of  the  Revolution  and  Empire,  and 
are  about  to  see  history  repeat  itself  as  it  were  automatically.  At 
first  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  struggle  in  the  lists  with  means 
that  are  insufficient,  not  in  respect  to  numbers,  but  as  regards 
quality ;  defeat  will  result  and  then  recourse  will  be  had  to  com- 
merce destroying;  from  time  to  time  squadrons  will  be  reconsti- 
tuted to  attempt  a  descent  upon  the  enemy's  territory ;  then,  in  the 
last  years  of  the  war,  commerce  destroying  and  such  enterprises 
as  depend  only  upon  chance  for  success  will  lose  favor ;  we  will 
begin  to  build  up  again  a  fighting  fleet,  but  France  will  be  worn 
out  before  the  task  is  accomplished.  Such  is  the  spectacle  that  the 
two  naval  wars  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XV  have  afforded  us ;  such 
is  the  spectacle  that  the  two  naval  wars  of  the  Revolution  and  the 
Empire  are  to  exhibit. 

Villaret-Joyeuse  is  beaten  in  the  battle  of  13  Prairial  and  Mar- 
tin loses  the  battle  of  Noli. 

The  Committee  of  Public  Safety  announces  to  the  country,  with 
that  emphasis  which  is  one  of  the  characteristics  of  the  period, 
that  it  inaugurates  a  new  method  of  warfare.  The  preambles  of 
the  decree  of  23  Thermidor,  year  III,  are  interesting  to  recall ; 
phraseology  takes  the  place  of  strategy  in  them :  "  The  new 
system  of  political  warfare  that  your  committee  has  adopted  is 
more  suitable  to  our  political  situation  and  will  procure  for  us  real 
advantages.  This  system  will  harmonize  much  better  with  the 
true  interests  of  the  nation  than  those  displays  of  naval  power 
that  do  but  flatter  personal  pride  and  uselessly  consume  the  re- 
sources of  the  Republic  ....  We  have    a  single  object  to  fulfil 

196 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

and  this  object  excites  all  our  solicitudes,  is  the  purpose  of  all  our 
plans :  it  is  to  protect  our  own  commerce  and  to  destroy  that  of 
our  enemies  ....  Tlie  English  government,  if  it  will,  may 
flaunt  its  squadrons  and  parade  them  in  tactical  order  (sic),  the 
French  will  limit  themselves  to  attacking  it  in  what  it  holds  most 
dear,  in  what  constitutes  its  happiness  and  its  existence,  in  its 
riches.  All  our  plans,  all  our  cruises,  all  our  movements  in  port 
and  at  sea,  will  have  for  object  only  to  ravage  its  commerce,  to 
destroy,  to  overturn  its  colonies,  to  force  it  finally  into  a  shameful 
bankruptcy."  "" 

"  The  results  obtained  seem  at  first  sight  satisfactorv.  Ac- 
cording to  a  table  of  Lloyd's  (London),  stopping  at  year  V,  the 
prizes  taken  by  the  two  nations  were  distributed  as  follows : 

Prizes  taken. 
Year.  By  Ens^lish.  Uy  French. 

1793     63  ships.  261  ships. 

1794    88       "  527      " 

1795     47       "  502      " 

1796    63       "  414      " 

1797    114       "  562      " 

Total    375       "  2,266     " 

"  We  cite  these  figures  because  they  are  constantly  reproduced 
by  all  academic  partisans  of  commerce  destroying,  in  support  of 
their  thesis  ;  we  shall  see  further  on  what  is  to  be  thought  of  them. 

"  To  protect  their  commerce  against  these  raids  of  our  priva- 
teers and  our  single  cruisers,  the  English  adopted  the  double  sys- 
tem of  convoys  and  of  patrol  by  light  divisions.  Merchant  ships 
were  assembled,  according  to  their  destination,  in  ports  designated 
in  advance,  and  from  these  set  sail  under  the  protection  of  ships 
of  war  charged  to  conduct  them  to  their  destination.  Three  hun- 
dred, five  hundred,  even  a  thousand  vessels  were  to  be  seen  sail- 
ing in  company  in  particularly  exposed  regions,  such  as  the  en- 
trance to  the  Channel  or  to  the  Baltic  Sea,  where  a  better  guard 
and  a  stronger  protection  were  needed.  This  system  had,  it  is 
true,  many  disadvantages :  time  lost  in  waiting  for  the  convoy  to 
assemble  ;  inability  to  follow  it  on  the  part  of  many  merchant  ships  ; 
great  lowering  of  the  price  of  goods  when  the  convoy  arrived, 
owing  to  the  large  quantities  thrown  on  the  market  at  one  time. 

"^  Lesquivit,  op.  cit. 

197 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Thus  many  ship-owners  preferred  to  run  the  risks  of  voyaging 
alone ;  but  they  were  not  thereby  left  completely  alone,  for  upon 
the  principal  trade  routes  were  stationed  fast  frigates,  each  with 
a  fixed  cruising  ground  and  accompanied  by  light  vessels,  specially 
charged  with  their  protection. 

"  Thus,  closed  around  on  all  sides,  receiving  no  help  from  our 
squadrons,  our  privateers,  after  struggles  that  were  often  heroic, 
but  almost  always  disastrous,  ended  by  falling  into  the  hands  of 
the  enemy.  Contemporary  English  writers  fix  at  743  the  number 
of  privateers  captured  from  the  opening  of  hostilities  to  December 
31,  1800.  Their  crews  went  to  crowd  the  English  hulks,  in  which, 
in  the  year  VI,  there  were  22,000  French  prisoners. 

"  As  for  warships,  the  French  Navy,  which  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war  possessed  86  ships  and  118  frigates,  lost,  according  to 
the  English  historian  W.  James,  34  ships  and  82  frigates  by  cap- 
ture, 1 1  ships  and  14  frigates  destroyed  by  incidents  of  war,  and 
10  ships  and  6  frigates  by  shipwreck.  This  is  a  total  of  55  ships 
and  102  frigates,  the  latter  taken  mostly  while  cruising,  in  en- 
gagements between  light  squadrons  or  single  ships.  If  to  these 
figures  are  added  150  smaller  warships  and  2000  privateers  or 
merchant  ships,  captured  during  these  ten  years  of  war ;  if  it  is 
considered  that  the  united  crews  of  all  these  vessels  amount  to 
about  70,000  sailors,  that  the  greater  part  of  these  unfortunates 
perished  in  combats,  in  shipwrecks  or  in  the  enemy's  prisons,  the 
frightful  voids  then  produced  in  the  lists  of  the  maritime  inscrip- 
tion can  be  estimated.  '  Out  of  80,000  sailors  formerly  enrolled, 
there  remained  scarcely  half  to  man  ships  with  at  the  end  of  the 
war.  So  we  may  conclude  that  though  privateering  enriched 
some  ship-owners  during  this  war  as  well  as  in  previous  wars,  it 
ruined  our  commerce  and  our  maritime  inscription.'  '^  Com- 
merce destroying  itself  had  not  been  to  our  advantage,  since, 
including  privateers,  our  merchant  marine  suffered  losses  equal 
in  number  to  those  of  English  commerce. 

"  Had  it  at  least  ruined  that  commerce,  had  it  led  to  the  shame- 
ful bankruptcy  spoken  of  by  the  decree  of  23  Thermidor,  year 
III?  See  what  Pitt  said  on  February  18,  1801 :  '  If  we  compare 
this  year  of  war  with  the  preceding  years  of  peace,  we  shall  see 
in  the  production  of  our  revenue  and  the  extension  of  our  com- 

""V.  A.  Bourgeois. 

198 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

merce  a  spectacle  as  paradoxical  as  inexplicable  and  well  formed  to 
astonish  us.  We  have  raised  our  internal  and  external  com- 
merce to  a  height  that  it  never  attained  before  and  we  can  regard 
the  present  year  as  the  most  satisfactory  ever  seen  in  this 
country.'  " 

In  fact,  external  commerce,  exportation  and  importation,  which 
in  1792,  the  last  year  of  peace,  amounted  to  £44,500,000,  increased 
in  1797  to  £50,000,000,  and  in  1800  to  £73,000,000. 

"  Although  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  loss  borne  by  English 
commerce  was  a  sensible  one,  it  was  no  more  than  a  war  tax  that, 
although  burdensome,  was  incapable  by  itself  alone  of  exercising 
a  decisive  influence  on  the  policy  of  a  powerful  and  rich  country 
like  England.  It  does  not  seem  to  have  exceeded  2  per  cent  or 
3  per  cent  of  her  total  commerce.  Taking  an  average  of  the 
figures  given  by  different  authors,  we  may  estimate  the  mean 
number  of  English  ships  captured  at  about  50D  per  year.  Well, 
in  the  three  years  1793- 1795,  the  annual  number  of  entries  and 
departures  of  English  ships  from  English  ports  was  21,560 ;  in  the 
three  years  1798-1800  it  was  21,369,  of  which  500  forms  but  2.4 
per  cent,  although  the  former  number  includes  neither  coastwise 
nor  colonial  commerce. 

"  If  the  total  number  of  ships  belonging  to  Great  Britain  and 
her  dependencies  is  taken,  it  v/ill  be  found  to  amount  to  16,728  in 
1795,  and  to  17,885  in  1800,  of  which  latter  number  500  is  about 
3  per  cent.  This  is  a  relative  loss  slightly  greater  than  that  occa- 
sioned by  accidents  of  the  sea  at  the  same  period  (from  1793  to 
1800  Lloyd's  lists  indicate  a  loss  of  2967  ships)  and  much  less  than 
the  loss  borne  by  French  commerce  in  the  earlier  years  of  the 
war.  It  must  be  added  that  this  loss  was  partly  made  up  for  to 
England  by  the  ships  and  goods  taken  by  her  own  cruisers  from 
the  enemy  and  by  the  extension  of  her  commercial  operations 
under  neutral  flags."  "" 

Such  was  the  balance-sheet  of  commerce  destroying  during  the 
first  war. 

Immediately  upon  the  rupture  of  the  Peace  of  Amiens,  Napo- 
leon turned  his  whole  attention  to  the  project  of  invading  Eng- 
land, and  naval  operations  were  conducted  with  a  view  to  assur- 
ing a  passage  to  the  Boulogne   flotilla.      Commerce   destroying 

""  Lesquivit,  op.  cit. 

199 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

was,  therefore,  at  first  only  practised  by  private  interests,  without 
any  well-defmed  system.  p]ut  when  the  disaster  of  Trafalgar  had 
dispelled  the  hopes  that  Napoleon  had  founded  upon  the  navy, 
and  it  had  been  demonstrated  once  more  that,  in  its  state  of 
dilapidation,  it  could  no  longer  stand  up  against  the  English,  the 
question  arose  as  to  how  the  remnants  of  our  squadrons  might 
be  employed  until  a  complete  reorganization  could  assure  him 
strength  together  with  numbers. 

The  Emperor  did  not  wait  for  Villeneuve's  arrival  at  Cadiz  to 
ask  his  minister  for  propositions  in  regard  to  the  employment  of 
his  forces.  Then  it  was  that  Decres  submitted  to  him  the  plan 
of  flying  divisions  which,  as  he  thought,  must  ruin  English  com- 
merce. "  Such,"  said  he,  "  was  the  sort  of  war  that  he  approved 
of."  It  was  commerce  destroying  again,  under  a  form  that  was 
not  new,  but  that  till  then  had  only  been  used  accidentally  and 
without  methodical  development.  The  model  for  it  was  furnished, 
at  this  precise  period,  by  Rear-Admiral  Allemand's  cruise.  It  is 
interesting  to  observe  what  the  fate  of  all  these  divisions  was. 

While  the  drama  of  Trafalgar  was  unrolled,  the  Brest  squadron 
remained  intact.  From  the  ships  that  composed  it,  two  divisions 
were  formed  under  the  orders  of  Admirals  Willaumez  and  de 
Leissegues,  put  out  from  Brest  together  on  December  13,  and 
separated  at  sea  to  carry  out  their  mission. 

The  first  division,  of  six  ships  and  two  frigates,  was  to  go  first 
to  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  then  to  cruise  in  the  neighborhood  of 
St.  Helena  to  capture  convoys  coming  from  India,  and  then  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  West  Indies.  After  having  ravaged  the  English  colo- 
nies of  those  islands,  Admiral  Willaumez  was  to  steer  for  New- 
foundland, where  he  was  to  destroy  the  fisheries ;  from  there  he 
was  to  go  to  Iceland,  Spitzbergen  and  Greenland,  where  English 
whalers  were  to  be  found,  and  he  was  not  to  return  to  France  until 
he  was  incapable  of  longer  remaining  at  sea. 

Willaumez  learned  while  at  sea  that  the  Cape  had  fallen  into 
the  hands  of  the  English:  he  had  to  change  his  program,  which 
made  him  lose  a  frigate,  the  Volontaire,  which  was  captured  in 
March,  1806,  at  the  Cape,  where  she  expected  to  find  the  division. 
The  other  vessels  had  gone  to  Guiana,  where  they  separated  into 
three  groups  which  reached  Martinique  one  after  the  other  in 
June,  1805,  after  having  barely  escaped  being  captured  by  the 
English.     On  July  i,  Willaumez  left  Alartinique  ;  but  very  soon 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

his  vessels  were  scattered ;  the  Foudroyant  went  into  Havana 
after  an  action  with  the  Anson;  the  hnpetuenx  ran  ashore  on  the 
coast  near  Chesapeake  Bay  to  escape  two  Enghsh  ships,  and  was 
burned  by  them  ;  the  Patriate  and  Eolc  entered  the  Chesapeake  ; 
the  Valenrcuse  took  refuge  at  Marcushook ;  the  Cassard  returned 
to  Brest.  As  for  the  Veteran,  she  cruised  on  the  Grand  Banks 
until  August  25,  waiting  for  her  companions,  and  then  steered  for 
Belle-Isle.  Chased  by  a  hostile  division,  she  took  refuge  at  Con- 
carneau,  where  a  ship  of  the  line  had  never  before  been.  She  did 
not  get  out  until  three  years  later,  on  April  20,  1809.'*^ 

Of  the  ships  that  stayed  in  America,  two  were  sold  on  the  spot, 
the  Eole  and  Valeureuse;  the  Foudroyant,  which  carried  Admiral 
Willaumez.  reached  Brest  on  February  7,  1807 ;  the  Patriote  did 
not  return  until  a  year  later,  in  January,  1808. 

The  division  had  captured  seventeen  prizes. 

Rear-Admiral  de  Leissegues  left  Brest  at  the  same  time  as 
Rear-Admiral  Willaumez,  with  five  ships,  two  frigates  and  one 
corvette.  The  division  reached  San  Domingo  in  January,  1806 ; 
but  its  presence  was  very  soon  made  known  to  the  English  forces 
stationed  in  the  West  Indies,  and,  on  February  6,  de  Leissegues, 
on  the  appearance  of  the  enemy,  had  to  get  under  way  by  cutting 
his  cables  and  to  accept  battle.  The  two  frigates  and  the  corvette 
alone  escaped. 

Commander  le  Due  set  out  from  Lorient,  at  the  end  of  March, 
1806,  with  three  frigates  and  one  brig  to  go  to  Spitzbergen  to 
destroy  English  whalers.  The  brig,  the  Nearque,  was  taken  im- 
mediately after  the  start  by  the  Niobe.  Le  Due  went  first  to  the 
Azores,  then  he  steered  for  Spitzbergen.  On  June  12,  the  Guer- 
riere  separated  from  her  consorts,  and  was  taken  on  the  i8th  by 
one  of  the  vessels  that  had  been  sent  in  pursuit  of  the  French 
division.  The  two  other  frigates  returned  to  France  at  the  end  of 
September.     They  had  made  thirty-nine  prizes. 

Five  frigates  and  two  brigs  set  sail  from  the  Island  of  Aix  on 
September  24,  1806.  Captain  Soleil,""  who  commanded  them,  had 
orders  to  proceed  to  Martinique  to  land  some  troops  there.  Seen 
immediately  on  its  departure,  the  division  was  followed  and  at- 
tacked by  the   English  blockading   squadron.     The  Infatigable, 

'"The  I'eieran  was  commanded  by  Jerome  Bonaparte. 
"^A  former  naval  surgeon. 


A  Study  of  Xaval  Strategy. 

Gloirc,  Mincrve  and  Armidc  were  captured;  one  frigate  and  the 
two  brig-s  succeeded  in  escaping. 

The  ill  success  of  all  these  cruises  slackened  the  zeal  of  Decres, 
and  we  must  go  to  the  year  1809  to  find  another  one. 

Captain  Troude  set  sail  from  Lorient  on  February  26,  1809, 
with  three  ships,  three  frigates  and  two  frigates  fitted  as  supply 
ships.  He  had  orders  to  revictual  Martinique  and  Guadeloupe, 
then  to  prey  upon  commerce  until  his  supplies  were  exhausted, 
and  then  to  return  to  the  Mediterranean.  On  the  voyage  Troude 
learned  that  Martinique  had  been  taken  by  the  English,  and,  not 
wishing  to  anchor  at  Guadeloupe,  which  affords  only  open  road- 
steads and  was  closely  watched,  he  went  to  Les  Saintes.  There 
he  was  at  once  blockaded  by  Admiral  Cochrane  with  five  ships, 
five  frigates  and  15  light  vessels.  Not  daring  to  force  the  en- 
trance, the  English  admiral  adopted  the  plan  of  compelling  the 
French  division  to  go  out  by  seizing  the  heights  that  overlook  the 
anchorage  ;  3000  men  were  put  on  shore  and  easily  drove  back  the 
little  garrison.  Troude,  seeing  that  he  w^ould  have  to  endure  a 
bombardment  to  which  he  could  not  reply,  decided  to  run  through 
the  English  blockade.  On  April  14,  the  three  ships  got  under  way 
at  10  o'clock  in  the  evening.  Follow- ed  immediately  by  the  enemy, 
two  ships  escaped  and  on  May  29  reached  Cherbourg;  the  third 
was  captured. 

The  dispersion  and  partial  destruction  of  all  these  divisions  pro- 
ceeded from  the  very  nature  of  their  mission.  As  soon  as  the 
ships  arrived  upon  their  cruising  ground,  they  were  obliged  to 
separate,  whether  to  cover  a  larger  extent  of  sea,  or  to  perform 
such  tasks  as  putting  ashore  the  crews  of  captured  ships.  They 
therefore  cruised  only  by  successive  rendezvous,  and  the  enemy 
bent  all  his  efforts  to  making  them  miss  these.  In  fact,  as  soon 
as  the  departure  of  a  division  became  known,  the  English  govern- 
ment sent  in  pursuit  of  it  a  greater  force,  which  co-operated  with 
the  naval  forces  permanently  on  the  station.  After  a  longer  or 
shorter  time,  the  French  divisions  were  overtaken,  because  the 
prizes  they  made  revealed  their  presence  in  the  region  where  they 
were  operating.  The  successive  captures  of  their  bases  of  opera- 
tions w^as  likewise  an  obstacle  to  their  movements.  We  have  seen 
that  Willaumez  and  Troude,  proceeding  one  to  the  Cape  and  the 
other  to  Martinique,  had  suddenly  to  change  their  plans  upon 
learning  of  the  English  captures  of  those  colonies ;  and  it  is  lucky 


A  Study  of  Xaval  Strategy. 

that  they  were  able  to  get  this  knowledge  from  neutrals  soon 
enough  not  to  fall  into  an  ambush.  The  capture  of  the  various 
ports  where  our  vessels  could  revictual  was  a  further  means  of 
cutting  short  cruises  against  commerce. 

Whether  for  lack  of  foreign  bases,  or  because  of  the  tragic  fate 
of  our  divisions,  or  perhaps  for  both  these  motives,  an  end  was  put 
to  Decres'  system,  and  commerce-destroying  raids  ceased  after 
1809;  they  were  only  really  energetically  carried  on  during  the 
two  years  following  Trafalgar.  Thereafter,  we  were  content  to 
send  out  frigates  in  pairs,  without  subjecting  them  to  too  rigid 
instructions,  and  they  were  ordered  to  seek  the  nearest  port  when 
they  could  no  longer  keep  at  sea.  Most  of  these  frigates  were 
captured. 

The  Emperor  had  accepted  Decres'  propositions  after  Trafalgar 
without  conviction.  For  a  long  time  he  had  his  mind  made  up  as 
to  the  effectiveness  of  commerce  destroying ;  but  he  saw  in  it  a 
means  of  training  crews  in  the  interval  tmtil  he  had  built  up  again 
a  navy.  Ships  were  being  built  in  all  the  ports  of  France,  as  well 
as  at  Antwerp,  in  Holland  and  at  Genoa.  In  1809  we  possessed 
already  60  ships.  When  the  Empire  fell,  there  were  44  of  them 
in  ports  outside  of  France,  of  which  we  were  able  to  retain  but  a 
part.  The  navy  of  the  Restoration  was  constituted  of  those  left 
to  us  by  the  enemies.  Napoleon,  therefore,  saw  no  other  way  of 
waging  war  at  sea  than  by  attacking  the  enemy's  naval  forces : 
after  an  experience  of  more  than  20  years,  he  reached  the  same 
conclusion  as  the  seamen  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XV. 

Such  are  the  facts.  It  remains  for  us  now  to  determine  what 
the  causes  are  that  have  always  made  commerce  destroying  fail, 
and  how  conditions  have  been  modified  by  the  use  of  steam  and 
the  relative  condition  of  modern  navies.  Finally  we  shall  have  to 
consider  how  effective  it  would  be  in  a  conflict  with  England. 

*     * 

The  discussions  to  which  the  question  of  commerce  destroying 
has  given  rise  have  often  led  its  partisans  to  search  out  somewhat 
curious  arguments  in  favor  of  their  thesis.  Thus  it  has  been 
asserted  that  the  preference  shown  by  admirals  for  squadrons 
originated  in  the  desire  to  hold  on  to  fine  commands.  I  doubt  if 
a  motive  of  this  sort  has  ever  influenced,  even  unwittingly,  the 
views  of  our  chiefs ;  but  this  reason,  if  it  existed,  would  not  suffice 

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A  Study  of  Xanal  Strategy. 

to  explain  the  repugnance  manifested  by  a  great  majority  of  offi- 
cers for  any  system  that  led  to  making  commerce  destroying  the 
prime  object  of  a  naval  war.  As  far  as  those  are  concerned  for 
whom  an  admiral's  stars  are  as  inaccessible  as  the  stars  that  glitter 
in  the  heavens,  and  their  name  is  legion,  such  a  consideration 
would  have  no  weight  with  them.  I  will  even  go  further :  if  we 
were  not  firmly  convinced  that  commerce  destroying,  raised  to  the 
estate  of  a  system,  would  compromise  the  maritime  destinies  of 
France,  our  sympathies  would  be  won  for  it  from  the  start.  There 
is  no  doubt,  in  fact,  that  a  direct  struggle  against  the  naval 
strength  of  a  country  which,  like  England,  has  and  will  for  a  long 
time  yet  have  an  incontestible  superiority  over  us,  would  be  a  diffi- 
cult part  to  play,  and  one  in  which  we  would  all  risk  losing  our 
lives  and  reputations.  Confronted  by  this  grave  danger,  we 
would  much  prefer  to  devote  ourselves  exclusively  to  pursuing  the 
enemy's  commerce  and  to  content  ourselves  with  avoiding  attack 
by  the  enemy's  cruisers,  if  we  did  not  think  that  we  should  thus 
be  playing  the  part  of  dupes.  We  must,  therefore,  have  argu- 
ments of  another  sort  to  influence  us,  and  such  I  shall  now  en- 
deavor to  set  forth. 

"  Naval  warfare,  we  are  told,  should  not  remain  indefinitely  cast 
in  the  same  mold,  and  direct  attack  upon  the  hostile  forces  has 
been  tried ;  to  it  we  owe  our  worst  disasters.  Is  it  not  foolish  to 
persist  in  practising  a  system  of  war  that  has  never  yielded  any- 
thing but  failures  ?  " 

The  reasoning  of  the  partisans  of  commerce  destroying  is  thus, 
we  believe,  faithfully  summed  up. 

This  way  of  putting  the  case  is  not  exact ;  although  squadron 
warfare  has  brought  us  disasters,  we  owe  to  it  and  to  it  alone 
our  naval  glory. 

In  what  periods  has  the  French  Navy  shone  with  the  most  bril- 
liant luster?  During  the  first  part  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV  and 
during  the  war  of  American  Independence ;  that  is  to  say,  in  the 
periods  when  it  held  the  enemy's  forces  in  check.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  blackest  pages  of  our  history  correspond  to  the  periods 
when  commerce  destroying  was  exclusively  practised.  It  is  true 
that  the  latter  usually  followed  a  defeat ;  but  it  was  not  always 
imposed  by  the  helplessness  of  our  navy :  the  poverty  of  our 
finances  was  often  much  more  its  cause  than  lack  of  vessels. 

It  should  not  be  held,  therefore,  that  France  has  persisted  in 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

wishing  to  struggle  in  the  lists,  when  it  is  manifest,  on  the  con- 
trary, that  on  several  occasions  she  has  abandoned  prematurely, 
and  after  a  single  reverse,  a  policy  that  had  not  been  without 
glory,  and  that  she  has  persisted  in  attacking  commerce  in  spite 
of  the  negative  results  thereby  gained.  And  if,  contemplating  the 
past,  there  is  something  we  may  regret,  it  is  less  the  principle  itself 
of  squadron  warfare  than  the  way  in  which  we  practised  it."^ 

In  any  event,  it  is  at  least  strange  to  propose  as  a  novelty  to-day 
a  system  that  France  practised  for  more  than  a  century  with  un- 
exampled fury  and  of  which  she  has  made  a  specialty. 

Of  the  two  schools  that  divide  the  navy,  neither  has  found  a 
new  formula :  one  is  inspired  by  the  traditions  of  Colbert,  Seigne- 
lay  and  Castries ;  the  other  has  entered  upon  the  heritage  of  the 
tribe  of  Pontchartrains,  Berryers  and  all  those  ministers  who  may 
be  considered  the  assassins  of  our  naval  power.  We  draw  no 
conclusion ;  we  merely  state  the  fact. 

When  the  partisans  of  commerce  destroying  point  out  how  vul- 
nerable England  is  in  her  commerce,  when  they  complacently 
enlarge  upon  the  number  of  merchant  ships  that  furrow  the  seas, 
upon  the  amount  of  food  supplies  that  they  carry,  upon  the  small 
provision  held  in  the  United  Kingdom,  etc.,  they  make  a  statement 
of  reasons  that  does  not  lack  impressiveness.  But  all  these  argu- 
ments are  but  the  statement  of  the  problem ;  they  do  not  furnish 
us  with  its  solution.  It  is  not  enough  to  say :  we  will  starve  out 
England ;  it  is  above  all  necessary  to  see  what  means  we  shall  have 
at  our  disposition  for  attaining  our  object  and  what  means  Eng- 
land has  to  oppose  them  with.  The  result  of  this  comparison  will 
give  us  a  correct  opinion  as  to  the  efficacy  of  commerce  destroy- 
ing. But  this  nub  of  the  question  has  always  been  put  aside  by 
partisans  of  commerce  destroying,  as  if  they  were  afraid  to  touch 
it. 

Yet,  when  a  cause  has  had  in  its  service  such  men  as  Jean  Bart, 
Duguay-Trouin,  Forbin,  Cassard,  the  Chevalier  Saint  Pol  and 
still  others  whose  names  are  less  known  (Thurot  for  example), 
when  we  see  so  much  heroism  and  perseverance  end  in  failure,  we 
have  the  best  of  reasons  to  think  that,  though  the  principle  of 
commerce  destroying  is  attractive,  its  application  presents  serious 

'"  We  have  sought  to  show,  in  the  first  part  of  this  stud}',  the  difference 
between  our  procedures  and  those  of  our  enemies  ;  we  shall  not  return  to 
the  subject. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

difficulties ;  that,  thoug-h  it  is  easy  to  capture  commerce,  it  is 
equally  possible  to  protect  it. 

How  can  any  sincere  man  fail  to  be  impressed  by  the  fact  that, 
during  war,  English  commerce,  instead  of  declining,  increased? 

If,  therefore,  to-day  we  hope  for  a  better  result,  it  is  either  be- 
cause a  navy  of  sailing  ships  was  not  as  well  adapted  to  commerce 
destroying  as  a  steam  navy,  or  because  in  the  past  the  thing  was 
badly  done.    We  will  now  examine  into  this. 

In  the  17th  century  the  respective  situation  of  each  side  was  as 
follows : 

England  had  a  war  fleet  and  a  commercial  fleet,  and  the  latter 
could  not  give  up  business  on  account  of  the  economic  situation 
of  the  country. 

France  had  a  war  fleet  and  a  commercial  fleet,  and  the  latter 
abandoned  traffic  to  prey  upon  the  enemy's  commerce. 

Thus  privateers  supplemented  our  fleet  with  a  swarm  of  light 
vessels  that  cost  the  State  neither  a  ship  nor  a  cent,  while  the 
English,  on  the  contrary,  had  to  divert  a  number  of  ships  from 
their  fighting  fleet  to  protect  their  commercial  fleet. 

As  long  as  the  French  squadrons  held  in  check  the  English 
squadrons  and  forced  them  to  remain  concentrated,  privateers 
could  with  impunity  chase  the  enemy's  commerce,  but  nothing  less 
than  this  diversion  could  permit  them  to  venture  to  sea,  since 
they  were  almost  all  of  small  size."'' 

Practised  under  such  conditions,  commerce  destroying  could 
not  but  be  advantageous  for  France.  If  by  itself  alone  it  did  not 
suffice  to  reduce  England,  at  least  it  did  her  serious  harm  and 
contributed  its  share  in  the  general  operations.  It  constituted  a 
net  gain,  without  any  counter  gain  to  the  adversary. 

But  as  soon  as  commerce  destroying,  ceasing  to  be  the  monop- 
oly of  private  interests,  became  more  and  more  the  objective  of  the 
navy,  which  devoted  its  own  ships  to  it,  England  could  divert 
from  her  fleets  a  sufficiently  great  number  of  ships  to  organize 

"^  Many  people  imagine  that  our  privateers  of  olden  time  were  capable 
on  occasion  of  fighting  against  the  enemy's  frigates.  There  actually  were 
some  vessels  built  by  ship-owners  of  Dunkirk  and  St.  Malo  which  had  quite 
heavy  batteries,  but  they  were  an  insignificant  minority  On  referring  to 
engravings  of  that  period,  we  note  with  astonishment  that  the  ordinary 
type  of  privateer  was  very  similar  to  our  present  Iceland  schooners.  That 
is  what  explains  the  great  number  of  privateers. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

a  systematic  protection  of  her  commerce,  without  ceasing  to  pos- 
sess superiority  on  the  field  of  battle.  So  the  period  of  full  devel- 
opment of  commerce  destroying  is  not  that  when  its  results  were 
most  considerable. 

To-day  letters  of  marque  are  done  away  with.  To  carry  on 
commerce  destroying,  it  will  be  necessary  to  devote  to  it  national 
vessels,  paid  by  the  State,  manned  by  crews  belonging  to  the 
State.  Consequently,  our  fleet  of  the  line  will  be  by  so  much 
diminished,  and  England  will  be  able,  as  well,  to  diminish  hers 
correspondingly  without  causing  any  change  in  the  ratio  of  forces. 
To  our  commerce  destroyers  she  will  oppose  cruisers.  The  result 
will  be  :  on  the  one  hand  a  fleet  of  the  line  opposed  to  a  fleet  of  the 
line ;  on  the  other  hand,  a  fleet  of  commerce  destroyers  chased  by 
a  fleet  of  cruisers.  The  situation  wall  no  longer  be  the  same :  it 
will  have  become  worse. 

France  can  diminish  the  number  of  her  battleships  to  increase 
that  of  her  commerce  destroyers :  England  will  do  the  same,  or 
rather  she  has  already  done  so.  By  consulting  a  list  of  the  Eng- 
lish fleet,  we  see  that  her  superiority  in  cruisers  is  as  great  as  her 
superiority  in  battleships,  because  every  time  that  we  lay  down 
fast  ships,  her  naval  program  is  augmented  by  a  greater  number 
of  cruisers  that  are  as  fast  as  ours  and  are  ready  before  them. 

And  if  France,  yielding  to  public  opinion,  decides  to  turn  whollv 
to  commerce  destroying,  she  will  cease  building  new  fighting  ships 
and,  after  a  while,  will  have  nothing  but  commerce  destroyers. 
England,  for  her  part,  will  likewise  have  only  cruisers.  And  then 
we  shall  find  ourselves  again,  in  the  matter  of  the  employment  of 
forces,  in  the  situation  we  were  in  under  Louis  XV  and  after 
Trafalgar,  with  this  double  difference  that  instead  of  employing, 
for  or  against  commerce  destroying,  ships  and  frigates,  each  side 
will  have  a  special  material,  and  that  we  French  will  no  longer 
have  the  help  of  the  privateers  that,  taken  all  together,  formed 
the  most  numerous  part  of  the  commerce-destroying  fleet.  As 
far  as  the  means  for  attacking  commerce  are  concerned,  the  navy 
of  to-day,  therefore,  affords  resources  for  commerce  destroying 
inferior  to  those  of  former  times. 

Will  we,  at  least,  find  compensation  on  the  side  of  commerce 
itself?    It  does  not  seem  so. 

With  steam  navigation,  merchant  ships  will  be  more  difficult  to 
find,  because  they  are  no  longer  to  the  same  extent  as  formerly 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

obliged  to  make  land  at  the  limits  that  mark  the  turning  points  of 
commercial  routes.'" 

Moreover,  although  British  commerce  has  increased  in  great 
proportions,  the  number  of  ships  that  transport  it  has  diminished, 
because  their  capacity  has  largely  increased. 

There  is  also  another  factor  that  will  sensibly  afifect  the  results 
of  war  upon  commerce. 

Formerly,  neutral  commerce  was  of  small  importance,  and  when 
it  fell  into  the  way  of  our  privateers  it  was  always  lawful  prize 
under  pretence  of  carrying  contraband  of  war.  As  the  nations  to 
which  it  belonged  had  no  navies  to  support  their  claims,  neutrals 
borrowed  the  English  flag  to  enjoy  its  protection.'**  But  to-day 
England  no  longer  has  an  exclusive  monopoly  of  maritime  trans- 
portation, and  in  time  of  war  this  circumstance  will  be  useful  to 
her.  We  shall  be  obliged  to  be  mindful  of  the  susceptibilities  of 
neutral  powers,  in  order  not  to  indispose  towards  us  navies  as 
strong  as  those  of  Germany  and  the  United  States.  A  part  of 
the  products  indispensable  to  Great  Britain  will  sail  under  neutral 
colors.  Under  this  aegis,  commodities  will  come  to  be  heaped  up 
in  the  storehouses  of  Germany,  Belgium  and  Holland,  whence 
they  will  only  have  to  cross  an  easily  guarded  arm  of  the  sea. 

Finally,  the  economic  conditions  of  the  life  of  nations  have  been 
profoundly  altered  in  a  century  and  have  their  retro-action  upon 
the  duration  of  conflicts.  But  commerce  destroying,  from  its  very 
nature,  requires  a  certain  period  of  time  ;  time  is  necessary  to 
make  its  influence  felt  and,  by  the  privations  it  engenders,  to  deter- 
mine in  the  country  that  suffers  from  them  a  current  of  opinion 
favorable  to  peace.  Can  war  last  long  nowadays,  seeing  the  sacri- 
fices that  it  exacts  ?  For  France  it  will  entail  an  absolute  stoppage 
of  maritime  transportation ;  the  colonies  will  be  completely  iso- 
lated ;  the  great  commercial  ports  will  remain  deserted.     At  the 

"^  Cape  Finisterre  and  Cape  Saint  Vincent,  for  example,  see  a  great 
number  of  ships  pass  daily;  but  as  soon  as  it  is  known  that  there  are 
privateers  there,  they  will  keep  well  out  to  sea,  and  all  those  vessels  that 
during  peace  are  to  be  found  concentrated  along  a  single  line  will  be  dis- 
persed over  a  width  of  50  or  even  100  miles.  Sailing  ships,  on  account  of 
their  crude  methods  of  navigating,  could  not  dispense  with  making  land 
at  certain  capes. 

^"  This  is  a  truly  extraordinary  fact  and  shows  to  what  an  extent  English 
commerce  was  protected. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

same  time  we  shall  lose  our  best  customer,  which  is  England  her- 
self. How  long  will  such  an  abnormal  condition  be  able  to  en- 
dure ?  Is  it  not  to  be  feared  that  in  seeking,  by  a  prolonged  effort, 
to  make  the  English  die  of  hunger,  we  shall  ourselves  succumb 
to  starvation? 

In  truth,  neither  the  steam  navy  nor  the  economic  conditions  of 
the  nations  can  bring  to  commerce  destroying  the  elements  of 
success  that  have  been  wanting  to  it  in  the  past. 

But  perhaps  we  have  not  known  how  to  practise  it. 

Commerce  destroying  is  a  guerilla  warfare  carried  on  upon  an 
immense  plain :  the  sea.  This  plain  is  furrowed  by  the  commercial 
routes  that  merchant  ships  follow.  If  we  trace  these  routes  on  a 
chart,  we  observe  that  in  certain  regions  traffic  is  very  dense,  and 
especially  so  in  the  vicinity  of  England's  shores.  Let  us  now 
shade  all  the  places  where  traffic  is  concentrated.  All  the  shaded 
parts  constitute  the  field  of  action  of  commerce  destroyers ;  they 
are  attracted  there  as  larks  by  a  mirror. 

So  long  as  they  remain  sole  masters  of  the  field,  they  operate 
quite  at  their  ease,  and,  if  affairs  continue  in  this  state,  there  is  no 
doubt  but  that  results  will  accord  with  forecasts  ;  but  as  soon  as 
hostile  cruisers  hasten  there  the  situation  is  altered. 

Part  of  the  commerce  destroyers  succumb ;  the  rest  quit  their 
field  of  action.  The  latter  are  then  obliged  to  fall  back  upon  other 
regions  less  frequented,  where  they  are  still  pursued,  and,  finally, 
those  that  escape  take  refuge  in  waters  so  deserted  that  their  cap- 
tures have  no  effect  upon  the  enemy. 

There  are,  therefore,  likewise  fields  of  battle  in  warfare  upon 
commerce,  just  as  in  no  matter  what  system  of  war ;  the  only 
difference  is  that  they  are  very  extensive.  If  they  are  easy  to  take 
possession  of,  they  will  be  the  more  difficult  to  keep  ;  and  there  as 
elsewhere  advantage  will  rest  with  numbers — that  is,  will  be  Eng- 
land's. 

Naturally,  vast  regions  cannot  be  swept  clear  in  an  instant ; 
time  and  method  will  be  needful.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  com- 
merce destroying  always  passes  through  a  period  of  great  profit  at 
the  beginning  of  a  war ;  but  bitter  disillusions  will  come  from  bas- 
ing calculations  on  the  results  of  the  early  phases  of  hostilities. 

The  weak  points  in  commerce  destroying  are  now  apparent. 

In  order  that  it  may  be  efficacious,  it  is  necessary  not  only  to 
occupy  the  field,  but  also  to  remain  master  of  it  by  force.    Well,  it 

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A  Study  of  Xaval  Strategy. 

has  not  succeeded  in  the  past  precisely  because  neither  privateers 
nor  flying  squadrons  were  of  sufficient  strength. 

If  we  admit  that  England  will  not  let  herself  be  starved  to 
death  without  using  every  possible  eftort  to  feed  herself,  we  are 
forced  to  this  same  conclusion  in  spite  of  ourselves. 

Let  us  first  fix  upon  the  type  of  commerce  destroyer  to  adopt, 
for  they  cannot  be  improvised  on  the  day  when  war  is  declared. 

Looking  at  commerce  destroying  from  our  former  point  of  view, 
we  need  a  vessel  whose  principal  qualities  are  speed  and  radius 
of  action.  These  two  elements  can  only  be  obtained  at  the  ex- 
pense of  armament  and  protection,  and  thus  we  shall  have  the 
Guichen  type. 

This  vessel,  in  the  presence  of  a  hostile  cruiser,  has  not  two 
courses  to  follow  :  there  is  but  a  single  one :  to  flee.  The  next  step 
would  be  to  examine  the  effects  produced  upon  the  results  of 
commerce  destroying  by  the  necessity  of  keeping  constantly  on 
the  qtd-vive  and  abandoning  one's  cruising  ground  to  avoid  being 
captured ;  but,  without  going  so  far,  it  is  more  than  doubtful  if 
speed  will  guarantee  impunity  to  the  commerce  destroyer,  since 
he  has  other  things  to  do  besides  fleeing;  he  is  there  to  stop 
merchant  ships  and  this  obligation  will  put  him  in  constant 
danger. 

Let  us  try  to  take  account  of  what  would  happen. 

We  are  cruising  on  board  the  Guichen.  Smoke  is  seen  on  the 
horizon;  we  run  down  towards  it.  Is  it  a  freighter?  or  is  it  a 
hostile  cruiser? 

It  is  a  freighter.  A  shot  is  fired  across  her  bows.  She  stops. 
A  boat  is  lowered  and  takes  a  boarding  officer  to  examine  her 
papers. 

The  vessel  is  English  and  so  is  good  prize.  A  prize  crew  is  put 
on  board  and  she  is  sent  to  France."' 

The  Guichen  resumes  her  cruising. 

A  second  smoke  appears.  This  time  it  is  a  fast  vessel ;  with  the 
telescope  three  funnels  are  seen  rising  above  the  horizon,  and  the 
ship  approaches  rapidly. 

Is  it  not  a  cruiser?  The  captain  becomes  cautious;  he  con- 
siders whether  he  shall  take  to  his  heels. 

"'  Or  she  might  be  sunk  after  taking  off  her  crew. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

At  this  instant  the  vessel  changes  course  ;  she  has  seen  us  and 
wishes  to  fly.    Full  speed. 

The  Guichen  fires  a  shot.  It  is  a  lucky  one  ;  the  shell,  fired  at 
extreme  range,  falls  close  by  the  steamer,  which  at  once  stops  and 
turns  her  broadside  to  show  she  has  done  so. 

The  same  formalities  as  before  take  place. 

But,  while  the  prize  is  being  manned,  which  threatens  to  take  a 
long  time,  since  it  is  necessary  to  transship  part  of  the  personnel,  a 
third  smoke  is  seen  to  appear.  It  is  another  big  ship,  doubtless  a 
German  transatlantic  liner :  she  has  four  funnels.  But  no,  she 
heads  for  the  Guichen.  Malediction !  It  is  an  enemy  cruiser  that 
was  following  the  steamer ;  we  have  fallen  into  a  snare.  Fire  up, 
full  speed  ahead,  and  let  us  fly  from  her. 

At  what  distance  will  the  commerce  destroyer  recognize  the 
cruiser?  When  guns  were  only  effective  up  to  500  meters  one 
could  always  take  flight  well  before  being  within  cannon  shot,  but 
now  ....  At  6000  meters  it  is  hard  to  tell  an  English  cruiser 
from  a  liner ;  for  France  is  the  only  country  that  has  given  its 
vessels  that  long  snout  which  reveals  their  identity  from  far  ofif. 
Thus,  our  commerce  destroyer,  before  she  is  under  full  head  of 
steam,  will  already  see  shell  raining  about  her ;  and,  as  she  has 
neither  guns  (or  so  few  as  to  count  for  nothing)  nor  protection, 
there  are  nine  chances  in  ten  she  wall  be  hit  and  have  her  speed 
reduced.    And  then  she  is  lost.'^ 

And  at  night  what  is  to  be  done?  No  doubt  boarding  vessels 
ought  not  to  be  practised,***  but  it  will  be  impossible  to  guard 
against  disagreeable  encounters. 

In  truth  these  vessels  that  will  have  the  double  care  of  w^atch- 
ing  for  merchant  ships — to  stop  them — and  for  warships — to 
escape  from  them — seem  to  me  of  no  account.  It  is  to  be  feared 
that  anxiety  for  self-preservation,  which  is  here  a  necessity,  will 
outweigh  desire  to  capture  commerce,  and  the  results  of  the  raid 
will  thereby  be  sensibly  affected. 

It  may  be  admitted  that  commerce  destroyers  ought  not  seek 
to  fight,  but  none  the  less  they  will  often  be  obliged  to  make  a 
stand,  and  it  is  not  permissible  that  they  should  be  constantly  com- 
pelled to  interrupt  their  cruising  or  to  abandon  prizes. 

"*  There  will  happen  what  happened  to  the  Rurik. 

'"  Which  in  itself  will  let  50%  of  the  commerce  escape. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Therefore  commerce  destroyers  must  have  means  equivalent  to 
those  of  cruisers  ;  that  is  why  the  Guichcn  and  Chateau-Renault 
are  absokitely  unfit  for  the  role  that  is  assii^^ned  them. 

This  conclusion  seems  now  to  be  admitted  ;  the  navy,  after  hav- 
ing sacrificed  32,000,000  francs  (actually  thirty-two  millions)  to 
meet  the  views  of  partisans  of  commerce  destroying",  has  re- 
nounced this  type  of  ship  to  take  up  with  armored  cruisers. 

Superiority  of  speed,  that  superiority  which  is  counted  upon, 
quite  wrongly,  to  give  escape  from  all  bad  places,  therefore,  no 
longer  exists  in  fact.  As  we  have  already  said,  no  power  holds  a 
monopoly  of  speed.  This  can  only  be  obtained  by  developing 
motive  power  at  the  expense  of  military  power,  and  to  equal  forces 
will  correspond  sensibly  equal  speeds. 

If  we  seek  an  increase  of  strength  by  an  increase  of  displace- 
ment,"" France  may  have  on  the  stocks  an  unrivaled  vessel,  like 
the  Jeanne-d'Arc,  but  she  will  be  immediately  followed,  caught 
up  with  and  distanced.  In  this  race  of  displacements,  she  will  not 
be  able  to  pretend  to  possess  a  collection  of  cruisers  of  a  mean 
value  equal  to  that  of  the  English  cruisers. 

It  is  not  to  our  interest,  moreover,  to  seek  the  *'  stronger," 
which  necessarily  ends  in  the  "  bigger."  Since  commerce  destroy- 
ing is  advocated  as  an  economical  system  of  making  war  and 
since,  from  its  very  nature,  it  demands  a  great  number  of  vessels, 
it  is  an  absurdity  to  practise  it  with  instruments  no  less  costly  than 
battleships.  Yet  despite  ourselves  we  are  drawn  into  the  fatal 
downward  path  by  solicitude  not  to  be  gotten  the  better  of,  and 
to  be  convinced  of  this  it  suffices  to  measure  the  advance  made 
from  the  Diipuy-de-Lome  to  the  Jeanne-d'Arc.  While  the  latter 
was  struggling  through  her  trials,  the  English  were  already  able 
to  oppose  to  her  the  cruisers  Bacchante,  Cressy,  Hague  and  Sutlej 
of  900  tons  greater  displacement.  The  Leon-Gambetta  of  12,500 
tons  was  then  begun,  but  the  Good-Hope  of  14,100  tons  was  in 
service  before  her.  So  a  cruiser  of  16,000  tons  is  talked  of.  And 
who  make  such  a  proposition  ?     The  partisans  of  commerce  de- 

""This  is  the  method  employed  by  the  Americans  in  1812.  Intervening 
in  the  midst  of  a  war  carried  on  with  instruments  and  methods  long  in  use, 
they  opposed  to  the  English  frigates  a  stronger  and  better  armed  pattern 
of  frigate.  That  was  the  cause  of  some  successes  that  they  obtained  in 
minor  operations. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

stroying,  those  who  have  not  ceased  to  protest  against  a  navy  of 
floating  millions,  the  adversaries  of  "leviathans.""' 

From  this  fact  may  be  judged  how  complex  the  problem  of 
commerce  destroying,  so  simple  in  its  conception,  becomes  when 
an  attempt  is  made  to  apply  it.  Even  if  we  devote  all  our  re- 
sources to  building  cruisers,  we  will  never  have  more  than  a  very 
restricted  number  of  such  dimensions. 

See  then  what  will  happen. 

Disposing  of  only  a  small  number  of  vessels,  we  shall  be  still 
more  imperatively  than  our  ancestors  under  the  necessity  of  going 
to  seek  merchant  ships  in  regions  where  traffic  is  very  dense  ;  and 
we  will  send  our  commerce  destroyers  to  cruise  upon  fixed  lines 
which  will  thus  become  barriers."^ 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  England  will  not  let  them  operate  in  peace 
without  doing  anything.  Disposing  of  a  greater  number  of  cruis- 
ers, she  will  launch  them  in  pursuit  of  ours,  a  part  of  which  will 
be  captured  :  the  rest  will  have  to  evacuate  a  region  where  there 
will  no  longer  be  any  safety  for  them."^ 

Yet  it  will  be  very  necessary  to  return  there,  for  if  our  cruisers 
undertake  to  traverse  the  seas  without  system,  they  will  separate 
themselves  from  the  zones  of  concentration  of  commerce  and  the 
number  of  their  prizes  will  at  once  fall  very  considerably.  They 
will  still  inflict  upon  the  enemy  losses,  but  they  will  only  amount  to 
4  per  cent  or  5  per  cent  of  his  total  commerce."* 

'^^  Our  battleships  are  as  yet  only  of  14,800  tons. 

^'"'  The  only  precise  suggestion  that  is  to  be  found  in  writings  upon 
commerce  destroying  as  to  the  way  to  employ  cruisers,  is  that  they  be 
sent  to  cruise  on  the  lines  Ouessant  to  Cape  Lizard  and  Oucssant  to  Cape 
Clear.  It  does  not  seem  that  this  disposition  would  produce  serious  results 
in  the  Channel  (leaving  out  of  account  hostile  cruisers).  Merchant  ships 
will  follow  the  English  coast,  and  the  whole  southern  part  of  the  Channel 
will  be  deserted.  (See  on  this  subject  C.  Ballard's  work:  Dc  la  Protec- 
tion du  commerce  en  temps  de  guerre.) 

"^  The  presence  of  cruisers  cannot  remain  unknown.  Ship-owners  know 
the  route  followed  by  their  vessels ;  they  are  notified  by  telegraph  at  each 
port  of  call.  The  least  delay  of  receipt  of  a  telegram  will  indicate  the 
presence  of  the  enemy  between  two  stopping  points.  Neutral  vessels  that 
cross  the  cruising  grounds  of  the  enemj'  will  not  fail  to  relate  what  they 
have  seen,  and  the  English  consuls  will  inform  their  government.  Finally, 
in  certain  regions,  the  sending  of  cruisers  will  not  be  delayed  until  com- 
merce destroyers  have  made  known  their  exploits. 

^"^  And  this  deficit  will  easily  be  made  up  by  neutral  commerce. 

213 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Thenceforth  commerce  destroying  will  have  been  truly  bank- 
rupted. Not  only  will  it  not  have  attained  its  object,  which  is  to 
starve  England,  but  it  will  have  left  us  wholly  disarmed  against 
all  the  enterprises  of  the  enemy,  who  will  take  our  colonies  one  by 
one ;  it  will  only  discount  a  war  tax  that  we  will  repay  when  peace 
is  made. 

Another  method  will  then  be  sought,  which,  by  increasing  the 
strength  of  the  commerce  destroyers,  will  permit  them  to  main- 
tain themselves  on  the  cruising  ground.  For  single  cruisers, 
groups  of  two  or  three  cruisers  will  be  substituted ;  and  even,  for 
full  measure,  they  should  be  accompanied  by  a  few  light  vessels. 
The  object  of  these  divisions  will  be  to  hold  their  own  on  the 
cruising  ground  while  the  light  vessels  spread  about  them,  hunt- 
ing for  merchant  ships. 

Already  the  principle  of  commerce  destroying  is  altered.  Its 
action  is  decomposed.  On  the  one  hand,  a  division  representing 
the  idea  of  force ;  on  the  other,  light  vessels  which  depend  upon  it 
not  to  be  captured  by  the  enemy's  single  cruisers."' 

For  a  time  these  new  arrangements  will  disturb  the  enemy's 
plans,  but  after  a  few  days  he  will  follow  the  movement  and  adopt 
a  like  distribution  of  forces.  Ours  will  end,  therefore,  by  being 
taken,  as  Decres'  divisions  were,  if  they  are  not  reinforced  in 
time,  and  thus,  from  thread  to  needle,  we  shall  be  led  to  collect,  in 
regions  constituting  fields  of  battle  of  commerce  destroying,  all 
the  forces  at  our  disposal,  of  whatever  nature,  in  order  to  remain 
in  control. 

Thus  commerce  destroying,  which  starts  out  to  be  a  war  of 
skirmishers,  would  in  the  long  run  end  in  a  war  of  squadrons,  if 
sufficient  means  were  available  to  prolong  the  struggle  in- 
definitely. 

From  the  moment  that  two  adversaries  contend  for  a  field,  each 
of  them  despite  himself  is  led  to  outbid  the  other  so  as  to  remain 
master  of  it,  until  all  the  resources,  on  each  side,  have  been  ex- 
hausted. The  encounter  of  two  masses  is,  therefore,  not  the  result 
of  a  more  or  less  correct  conception — it  is  a  consequence  of  the 
state  of  war,"" 

^'"^  These  auxiliaries  have  no  need  of  either  a  considerable  displacement 
or  fighting  strength. 

""  Whether  we  wish  it  or  not,  we  shall  never  be  able  to  attack  an  assem- 
blage of  forces  except  with  the  aid  of  another  assemblage  of  forces;  and 

214 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

We  have  a  striking  proof  of  this  in  the  Dutch-EngHsh  wars. 

No  struggle  between  nations  has  had  to  an  equal  degree  the 
character  of  an  economic  conflict.  Between  England  and  Hol- 
land, the  destruction  of  commerce  was  not,  as  it  was  later  on  for 
France,  a  means ;  it  was  the  very  object  of  the  war.  The  question 
at  issue  was  to  whom  should  belong  the  monopoly  of  maritime 
commerce.  Nevertheless,  no  other  war  ofters  us  the  spectacle  of 
so  great  a  number  of  pitched  battles  and  the  assemblage  of  such 
great  miasses.  And  the  two  adversaries  did  not  come  thus  to  con- 
tend in  the  lists  with  fixed  determination  through  a  tacit  under- 
standing. They  were  led  there  despite  themselves,  by  insensible 
degrees,  because  they  could  not  do  otherwise.  And  what  proves 
it  is  that  the  concentrations  took  place  especially  at  the  end  of 
each  war,  after  each  side  had  fruitlessly  endeavored  to  attack  and 
protect  commerce  directly. 

Here  then  is  how  we  look  at  industrial  warfare. 

The  objective  is  to  prevent  merchant  ships  from  leaving  ports 
without  being  captured  and  to  arrest  in  passage  those  that  are 
entering  them.  Against  England,  therefore,  it  would  be  necessarv 
to  occupy  in  force  the  Channel,  the  North  Sea  and  St.  George's 
Channel,  and  to  station  there  squadrons  in  sufficient  number  to 
hold  their  ground  while  light  vessels  radiate  from  them.'"  There 
would  necessarily  result  battles  in  which  we  would  be  worsted, 
because,  receiving  the  onset  instead  of  provoking  it,  we  would  be 
beaten  in  detail. 

Practically,  therefore,  it  is  necessary  to  abandon  temporarily 
commerce  destroying  and  to  employ  our  forces  in  defeating  squad- 
rons, not  in  the  Channel  or  the  North  Sea,  but  on  the  field  of 

» 

battle  that  offers  us  the  greatest  chance  of  success.  If  we  are 
conquerors,  we  will  then  bring  our  forces  back  to  the  field  of  com- 
merce destroying,  and  occup}'  it  in  sufficient  strength  to  prevent 
the  remnants  of  the  hostile  scjuadrons  from  driving  us  ofit'.'°'    As 

we  are  compelled  to  collect  vessels  in  squadrons  to  be  the  stronger  or  as 
little  weak  as  possible. 

^"  But,  then,  it  is  no  longer  necessary  to  construct  a  special  tj-pe  of 
vessel. 

^°*  Though  one  be  not  strong  enough  to  carry  the  field  of  battle  to  the 
vicinity  of  the  enemy's  coasts,  which  is  the  point  where  merchant  ships 
converge,  at  least  all  traffic  will  have  been  stopped  short  in  the  region 
where  one  has   superiority.      Suppose   a  victory  in   the   Mediterranean   so 

2IS 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

may  be  seen,  in  this  case  as  in  all  others,  the  final  object  will  only 
be  attained  after  a  contest ;  it  will  be  the  fruit  of  victory. 

I  anticipate  the  objection  here:  we  shall  be  beaten. 

It  is  probable.  When  a  navv  has  allowed  itself  to  be  distracted 
from  its  objective  by  devoting^  its  resources  to  the  chimerical  pur- 
suit of  direct  defense  of  the  coast  and  to  the  Utopia  of  commerce 
destroying,  it  finds  itself  taken  unaware  when  it  is  obliged  to 
descend  into  the  arena ;  but  if  we  could  restore  to  the  offensive 
and  to  battle  all  that  has  been  taken  from  them,  we  would  have  a 
strength  so  formidable  that  the  strongest  navy  would  not  engage 
in  a  struggle  against  us  without  apprehension.  None  the  less  we 
would  be  the  actual  inferior.  Even  so,  what  then?  That  would 
not  prove  that  guerilla  warfare  can  be  carried  on  in  an  open,  level 
country,  nor  that  the  necessity  of  fighting  can  be  evaded,  whether 
one  be  strong  or  weak.  War  would  verily  be  too  easy  if  a  formula 
were  enough  to  cause  the  specter  of  the  English  Navy  to  dis- 
appear. And  I  confess,  to  my  shame,  that  there  is  something  I 
cannot  comprehend  when  I  hear  this  theory  sustained  that  com- 
merce can  be  destroyed  without  having  to  fight  with  those  who 
defend  it. 

Between  advocates  and  opponents  of  commerce  destroying 
there  is  no  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  best  method  of  warfare 
to  adopt,  but  only  as  to  the  best  way  of  carrying  it  out.'™  Ought 
we  attack  directly  property  afloat  or  is  it  necessary  first  to  aim  at 
the  military  forces  that  are  the  safeguard  of  that  property?  The 
whole  question  lies  there. 

Here  we  are  then  back  at  our  point  of  departure ;  for  if  refer- 
ence is  made  to  the  opening  of  this  study,  it  will  be  seen  that  this  is 
the  question  that  arose  fti  the  first  days  of  modern  naval  warfare. 

So,  for  a  centurv  and  a  half,  maritime  nations  have  dispensed 
treasures  of  energy  to  reach  discovery  of  the  most  efficient  way 
to  destroy  maritime  wealth,  and  to-day  it  is  proposed  that  we 
should  make  the  same  experiment  over  again  at  our  own  expense. 
It  is  because  France  has  never  been  willing  to  admit,  or  has  not 
been  able  to  perceive  the  lesson  revealed  by  events,  because  for  so 

complete  as  to  force  the  English  to  evacuate  it ;  eight  or  ten  ships  of  any 
sort,  even  wooden,  will  suffice  to  cut  the  Mediterranean  in  two  between 
Tunis  and  Sardinia,  Corsica  and  Provence,  and  to  stop  all  merchant  ships. 
"*  For,  commerce  destroying  leading  to  the  ends  of  war,  there  is  no 
reason  to  reject  the  principle  of  it. 

216 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

long  a  time  she  has  recommenced  history  with  each  new  war. 
Persisting  in  indefinitely  pleading  the  same  process,  she  has  al- 
ways lost  it,  because  the  cause  was  bad. 

Does  this  mean  that  there  is  nothing  to  gain  from  direct  attack 
upon  the  riches  scattered  over  all  the  seas  of  the  earth? 

Perhaps  there  is,  but  only  on  condition  that  it  is  made  a  second- 
ary operation,  with  the  object  of  immobilizing  at  small  expense  a 
large  number  of  the  enemy's  vessels. 

We  have  said  that  it  was  the  necessity  of  always  keeping  the 
same  cruising  grounds  that  ruined  the  privateers ;  but  if  it  is  no 
longer  sought  to  starve  the  enemy,  if  we  limit  ourselves  to  threat- 
ening his  property  so  as  to  compel  him  to  protect  it,  it  is  apparent 
that  very  mobile  divisions  can  appear  in  a  region  which  they 
know  to  be  temporarily  unprotected  ;  then,  after  having  made  their 
presence  felt  so  as  to  attract  the  enemy,  they  can  suddenly  change 
their  field  of  action  and  appear  at  another  point  far  away.  Then 
the  enemy,  arriving  too  late,  will  remain  on  the  spot  for  fear  of  a 
return  to  the  attack.  Evidently  the  necessity  of  constantly  moving 
about  and  of  traversing  great  unoccupied  stretches  of  sea  will 
never  permit  doing  enough  harm  to  commerce  to  seriously  afifect 
the  fate  of  the  war ;  but  if  there  can  thus  be  created  a  sufficiently 
important  diversion  to  turn  the  enemy  aside  from  attack  upon  our 
colonies,  which  our  foreign  stations  are  too  weak  to  defend,  if, 
above  all,  he  is  forced  to  detach  part  of  his  cruisers  from  his 
squadrons,  the  general  operations  will  have  been  seconded. 

We  come  thus  to  a  system  which  resembles  that  of  the  light 
divisions  of  the  First  Empire,  but  which  must  be  perfected  so  as 
not  to  reach  the  same  result.  Those  divisions  ended  by  disin- 
tegrating, for  lack  of  maintenance ;  for  losses  always  occur  in  a 
naval  force  on  active  service,  even  when  it  does  not  meet  the 
enemy  (which  one  can  never  be  sure  of)  ;  moreover,  even  though 
moving  about,  they  delayed  too  long  in  a  single  region  and  ended 
by  being  come  up  with. 

In  order  to  avoid  these  disadvantages,  it  is  necessary  that  our 
divisions  be  more  mobile  and  that  they  be  strengthened  in  per- 
manent fashion  by  mutual  co-operation. 

But  the  effect  of  these  dispositions  can  have  but  a  limited  dura- 
tion ;  at  the  end  of  a  certain  time  the  enemy  will  always  finish  by 
seeing  into  our  game  and  by.  getting  at  the  commerce  destroyers. 
They  will  produce  their  effect,  therefore,  especially  at  the  begin- 

217 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

ning  of  a  war,  before  the  system  of  defense  has  been  organized ; 
if  they  escape  long  enough  to  enable  decisive  blows  to  be  struck 
on  another  field,  the  object  will  have  been  attained. 

But  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  weaken  oneself  by  building  a 
special  material  for  this  sort  of  diversion,  or  to  employ  in  it  ships 
of  the  first  class.  Everything  indicates  that  the  ships  on  foreign 
stations  should  be  devoted  to  this  role.  To  that  end  let  us  assign 
to  such  stations  vessels  of  reasonable  characteristics,  not  wooden 
ships  without  speed,  and  especially  without  radius  of  action. 

=1-- 

We  cannot  close  this  chapter,  written  before  the  Russo-Japan- 
ese w^ar,  without  adding  to  it  the  conclusions  to  be  drawn  from 
that  conflict  in  respect  of  commerce  destroying. 

The  belligerents  adopted  different  attitudes  with  regard  to  the 
destruction  of  commerce. 

Japan  occupied  herself  first  with  securing  freedom  of  the  sea, 
and  completely  neglected  attacks  upon  commerce.  She  only 
began  to  stop  commerce  by  cutting  ofif  access  to  the  two  Russian 
ports  of  Vladivostok  and  Port  Arthur  after  there  were  no  more 
hostile  ships  to  fight. 

Russia  preferred  to  divide  her  efforts ;  she  wished  to  carry  on 
concurrently  militar}^  action  wath  the  Port  Arthur  squadron  and 
commercial  action  with  the  Vladivostok  cruisers.  She  thus 
w^eakened  herself  in  the  principal  theater  of  operations  without 
doing  appreciable  damage  to  Japan ;  since  the  cruiser  division, 
pursued  from  the  moment  its  presence  was  revealed  by  captures, 
was  obliged  to  quit  its  field  of  operations  and  hastened  to  return 
to  port. 

One  fine  day  there  happened  what  must  inevitably  happen :  the 
cruisers  had  to  accept  battle  and  one  of  them  succumbed.  From 
that  moment  it  was  all  over  with  commerce  destroying. 

What  a  lesson  for  the  advocates  of  war  upon  commerce ! 


218 


IV. 

Blockades. 

Blockades  consist  of  stationing  in  the  vicinity  of  a  port  a  naval 
force  charged  with  watching  its  approaches  so  that  no  vessel  can 
enter  or  leave  without  being  seen  and  pursued. 

The  system  of  blockading  dates  from  the  wars  of  the  Revolu- 
tion and  Empire.  Until  then  France  had  often  seen  English  fleets 
cruising  ofif  Ouessant  to  watch  the  going  out  of  our  ships  or  to 
intercept  the  Levant  contingent  on  its  arrival ;  but  these  appear- 
ances were  only  momentary,  and  they  never  had  either  the  per- 
manence or  the  duration  that  characterize  true  blockades.  Under 
the  Monarchy,  vessels  had  not  yet  acquired  the  nautical  qualities, 
the  endurance  and  the  self-dependence  necessary  to  guard  the 
entrance  of  a  hostile  port  in  all  seasons  and  through  all  weathers. 
We  know,  moreover,  that  fleets  were  accustomed  to  disarm  at  the 
end  of  the  autumn ;  so  that  naval  operations  only  lasted  for  a  few 
months  and  began  again  on  a  new  basis  each  spring. 

These  customs  had  a  direct  influence  on  the  fitting  out  of  ships 
and  on  the  rules  of  naval  warfare.  Fleets  of  many  ships  never  had 
enough  provisions  for  cruises  of  considerable  duration ;  vessels 
were  not  arranged  to  carry  great  quantities  of  food  and  water, 
and  to  that  cause  should  be  attributed  the  epidemics  that  so  often 
flourished  on  board  of  them  and  hindered  their  operations. 

When,  in  1793,  a  new  period  of  naval  wars  opened,  which  until 
1814  was  only  broken  by  the  short  peace  of  Amiens,  the  nautical 
art  was  already  in  evident  progress.  The  hydrography  of  the 
most  frequented  shores  was  better  known,  and  the  long  voyages 
of  exploration  undertaken  after  the  American  war  had  brought 
about  modifications  in  the  construction  of  ships  that  made  them 
more  manageable  instruments  ;  at  the  same  time  there  were  formed 
officers  and  crews  capable  of  encountering  the  elements  instead  of 
letting  themselves  be  enslaved  by  them. 

But  it  was  the  special  character  assumed  by  the  war  which, 
more  than  any  other  cause,  forced  England  to  enter  upon  a  new 
way.  The  government  of  the  Revolution  did  not  conceal  its  in- 
tention of  taking  up  on  the  sea  the  gage  flung  down  by  England, 

219 


A  Study  of  Xaval  Strategy. 

just  as  it  had  not  feared  to  stand  up  against  all  the  continental 
powers  on  land ;  and  it  had  proved,  by  Hoche's  abortive  attempt 
in  Ireland,  by  General  Humbert's  expedition  and  by  that  to 
Egypt,  that  it  would  not  stop  at  the  most  risky  operations  and 
also  the  most  unexpected. 

Little  anxious  to  experience  again  so  disagreeable  a  surprise  as 
the  conquest  of  Egypt,  fearing  all  from  a  nation  so  enterprising, 
uneasy  lest  she  might  see  renewed  on  the  ocean,  and  at  her  ex- 
pense, the  prodigies  that  national  enthusiasm  had  raised  up  on 
land,  England  saw  herself  forced  to  abandon  the  old  methods  that 
until  then  had  sufficed  to  give  her  dominion  over  the  sea  and  to 
guarantee  the  safety  of  her  territory.  For  a  new  situation,  new 
means  were  necessary.  And  it  was  then  that  she  thought  of  para- 
lyzing our  navy  and  that  of  our  allies  by  holding  the  fleets  shut 
up  in  port.  According  to  an  expression  now  in  use,  she  aspired 
to  carry  her  frontier  to  the  enemy's  shores ;  and,  behind  that 
frontier,  the  sea  would  belong  to  her. 

What  is  stranger  is  that  after  having  conceived  this  gigantic 
plan  she  succeeded  in  realizing  it,  if  not  completely,  at  least  in  an 
efficient  form. 

But  the  Admiralty  did  not  have  recourse  to  this  extreme  means 
at  the  very  first  by  intuition ;  the  necessity  of  it  appeared  little  by 
little.  The  war  began  on  the  old  basis ;  the  squadrons  of  the  two 
sides  went  out  and  in  without  being  watched  ;  they  encountered 
one  another  when  opposing  interests  led  them  to  the  same  place. 

But  when  Villaret-Joyeuse  is  beaten  at  Groix,  at  the  end  of 
June,  1795,  Bridport,  who  has  a  convoy  of  emigres  to  land  at 
Ouiberon,  blockades  him  at  Lorient.  The  blockade  lasted  till  the 
day  when  the  Count  d'Artois  left  the  island  of  Yeu,  definitely 
renouncing  putting  foot  in  France.    It  had  lasted  five  months. 

It  was  an  indication.  From  this  moment  Brest  is  constantly 
watched ;  but  the  bulk  of  the  English  forces  continue  on  station 
in  England.  The  sortie  of  Morard  de  Galle,  with  a  fleet  of  45 
ships,  shows  the  need  of  a  stricter  watch ;  and  after  1797  the  look- 
outs of  Ouessant,  save  for  short  intervals,  will  lose  sight  of  the 
English  fleet  no  more. 

The  blockade  w^as  extended  to  Toulon,  Rochefort  and  Lorient 
in  succession ;  then,  as  new  enemies  threw  themselves  into  the 
arena,  it  enveloped  the  Texel,  Ferrol  and  Cadiz.  The  English 
Nav^■  has  never  done  anything  greater. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

To  form  an  idea  of  the  effort  required  by  such  a  task,  the  situa- 
tion of  these  squadrons  must  be  imagined,  cruising  far  from  any 
base,  during  entire  years,  winter  and  summer,  and  threatened  at 
each  instant  with  being  driven  upon  a  hostile  coast  by  an  on-shore 
gale. 

The  solution  adopted  by  England  was  not  perfect.  It  was 
exempt  neither  from  disadvantages  nor  from  dangers  ;  but  under 
the  circumstances  it  was  still  the  best. 

At  first  the  blockades  were  never  permanent ;  bad  weather  al- 
ways ended  by  sweeping  away  the  blockading  force  and  opening 
the  entrance  to  our  ports.  Bruix  and  Ganteaume  in  this  way  were 
enabled  to  go  out  from  Brest ;  Brueys  and  Villeneuve  from  Tou- 
lon. And  the  success  that  seemed  to  favor  these  admirals,  at  the 
beginning  of  their  operations,  might  make  us  doubt  the  efficacy 
of  blockades.  But  when  we  reflect  that  the  war  lasted  twenty 
years,  we  are  astounded  that  during  such  a  lapse  of  time  our 
squadrons  were  able  to  find  only  five  or  six  opportunities  of  escap- 
ing". And,  furthermore,  under  what  conditions?  The  bad  weather 
that  drove  ofif  the  English  squadron  visited  our  ships  as  soon  as 
they  went  out ;  and  as  their  long  inaction  inside  had  not  prepared 
them  to  struggle  with  the  elements,  their  mission,  scarcely  begun, 
was  endangered.  The  xery  tempest  that  permitted  Morard  de 
Galle  to  leave  Brest  dispersed  his  ships.  Bruix  likewise  saw  his 
ships  dispersed,  and  it  is  a  miracle  that  he  was  able  to  reassemble 
them.  Villeneuve  experiences  such  damage  on  his  sortie  from 
Toulon  that  he  is  forced  to  return. 

In  order  to  realize  how  vigorous  the  blockades  of  this  period 
were,  we  must  call  to  mind  that  our  squadrons,  and  particularly 
those  of  Brest  and  Ferrol,  remained  in  port  whole  years  when 
they  should  have  been  constantly  at  sea,  only  returning  to  port 
for  supplies  or  after  an  action.  We  ought  also  to  take  into  con- 
sideration the  complete  stoppage  of  all  coastwise  communications, 
which  made  it  very  difficult  to  supply  and  provision  our  ports.""* 

160  a  -pj^g  distress  of  the  ports  was  extreme ;  it  was  impossible  to  replace 
the  anchor  cables  that  had  been  carried  away  by  heavy  weather  in  the 
roadstead  (l79S)."  "During  the  whole  summer  this  obstinate  blockade 
that  reduces  the  port  of  Brest  to  extreme  want  is  kept  up.  The  fortunate 
arrival,  on  January  14,  of  a  convoy  from  Nantes  that  succeeds  in  escaping 
the  English  cruisers  is  all  that  prevents  a  famine  (1797)."  "Until  the 
abandonment  of  the  plan  of  an  expedition  under  Bonaparte,   rope  will  be 


A  Study  of  Xaval  Strategy. 

One  of  the  advantages,  and  not  the  least  one,  of  the  blockades 
was  the  moral  ascendency  that  they  gave  to  the  blockaders.  By 
everywhere  rnshing  to  meet  the  enemy,  challenging-  him  to  com- 
bat, England  showed  her  superiority  and  demoralized  her  adver- 
saries. She  did  not  hesitate  to  take  advantage  of  this  situation  to 
diminish,  in  cases  of  urgency,  the  strength  of  her  blockading 
forces.^"'  The  English  ended  by  having  such  self-confidence  that 
they  ceased  to  take  precautions  any  longer ;  they  anchored  in  our 
roadsteads  and  set  up  their  rigging  there.'" 

Let  us  now  consider  the  dangers  that  flow  from  the  system  of 
blockades. 

All  the  English  forces  were  scattered  and  isolated  from  one 
another,  without  powder  to  sustain  each  other ;  so  that  if  one  of 
our  squadrons  succeeded  in  escaping  and  all  trace  of  it  was  lost, 
it  could  fall  unexpectedly  upon  one  of  the  blockading  squadrons 
of  less  force  and  free  the  blockaded  ships  ;  during  this  interval  the 
detachments  sent  in  pursuit  in  wrong  directions  would  be  wholly 
out  of  touch  with  the  operations.'"'  After  that  the  whole  system 
would  go  to  pieces  like  a  house  of  cards.  England  had  the  good 
luck  to  escape  this  danger,  but  she  owed  it  only  to  the  disorganiza- 
tion of  our  navy  and  to  the  deadly  fear  that  her  ships  inspired  in 
our  admirals,  wdiich  would  tend  to  demonstrate  to  us  that  under 
normal  conditions  it  would  have  been  necessary  to  renounce  block- 
ading.   Two  examples  will  make  us  see  this. 

lacking  at  Brest,  and  ships  will  remain  unable  to  get  under  way  because 
they  have  been  unable  to  secure  cables  for  their  anchors."  "  Brest  not 
receiving  anything  was  now  in  straits  (1799)."  ("  Le  Blocus  de  Brest  de 
1793  a  1805,"  Revue  d'Histoire,  October,  1902.) 

'^  The  Dutch  were  the  only  ones  who  dared  deliberately  to  offer  battle 
to  the  squadron  blockading  the  Texel  (Camperdown). 

"*  Admiral  Ganteaume,  at  the  instigation  of  one  of  his  captains,  consid- 
ered taking  advantage  of  this  negligence  to  attack  the  English  squadron 
in  the  anchorage  of  Douarnenez,  but  he  did  not  carry  out  his  plan. 

^^  Thus  Calder  stays  in  the  West  Indies  five  months  looking  for  Gan- 
teaume, who  was  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  Bridport  went  to  seek  Bruix 
on  the  Irish  coast.  At  the  moment  when  Villeneuve  left  the  Mediterra- 
nean, the  order  had  been  given  to  detach  ten  ships  from  the  Channel  to 
pursue  him.  If  the  order  had  not  been  countermanded  as  soon  as  it  was 
known  that  Nelson  had  decided  to  go  to  the  West  Indies  on  his  own 
responsibility,  the  forces  that  were  watching  Ganteaume  would  have  been 
reduced  to  verv  little. 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

We  have  already  seen  that  Bruix,  after  having  left  Brest  with- 
out being  followed  by  Bridport,  appeared  suddenly  before  Cadiz. 
Lord  Keith  was  blockading-  Mazzaredo  there.  Bruix  could  oppose 
25  ships  to  18.  Logically  he  ought  to  carry  off  a  brilliant  success. 
But  it  was  needful  to  fight ;  he  did  not  do  it.  Therefore,  the 
maneuver  had  no  serious  consequences,  but  it  might  have  had 
such,  if  25  French  ships  iiad  been  able  to  beat  18  English  ships. 

Later,  Villeneuve,  who  was  returning  from  the  West  Indies 
after  having  escaped  the  blockade  of  Toulon,  fell  upon  Calder, 
who  was  blockading  Ferrol.  The  same  disproportion  of  forces : 
20  ships  against  15.  If  Calder  had  been  beaten,  the  blockades  of 
Brest  and  Rochefort  would  have  been  broken,  but  he  was  the 
victor ! ! !     Such  a  result  is  disconcerting.'^* 

The  situation  of  all  these  squadrons  was  so  perilous  that  his- 
tory has  recorded  the  apprehensions  of  the  English  admirals. 
"  Calder,"  wrote  Collingwood,  "  is  reduced  to  a  skeleton." 

At  this  period,  everybody  in  France,  Napoleon  included,  had 
complete  contempt  for  the  consequences  entailed  upon  each  side  by 
the  system  of  blockades.  The  current  opinion  was  that  the  English 
were  wearing  themselves  out  in  thus  keeping  the  sea  while  we 
were  maintaining  our  material  in  good  condition.  Certainly  such 
perpetual  cruising  entailed  excessive  fatigue ;  certainly  the  ships 
were  greatly  taxed  ;  but  this  cruising  formed  incomparable  crews 
and  officers.  The  monotony  of  this  duty,  the  continual  watchful- 
ness, exasperated  the  men,  but  they  engendered  a  state  of  mind 
that  favored  the  Admiralty's  designs.  Each  one  saw  the  end  of 
his  sufferings  only  in  a  battle  which,  by  suppressing  the  cause, 
would  suppress  the  effect ;  an  encounter  came  thus  to  be  ardently 
desired.     Thenceforth  victory  was  assured. 

Our  squadrons,  on  the  contrary,  were  worn  out  with  inaction ; 
the  ships,  manned  by  green  crews,  put  to  sea  only  to  be  the  sport 
of  the  elements ;  the  least  bit  of  a  gale  reduced  them  to  the  state 
of  wrecks.     Between  the  crews  of  the  two  nations  there  was  the 

^"  Here  is  a  third  example  that  we  have  not  referred  to  because  it  has 
not  the  same  bearing.  Admiral  Willaumez  leaves  Brest  on  February  21, 
1809,  to  break  the  blockades  of  Lorient  and  Rochefort.  He  succeeds,  but 
allows  the  two  hostile  blockading  forces  to  escape.  Would  he  have  done 
this  if  our  ships  had  been  as  well  handled  as  those  of  the  English? 


223 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

difference  that  exists  between  the  newly  enUsted  soldier  and  the 
veteran  whose  arms  are  rusted  and  garments  worn. 


Blockades  were  not  carried  out  everywhere  in  the  same  manner. 

At  Brest,  under  Bridport  and  Cornwallis,  the  bulk  of  the  forces 
remained  off  Ouessant,  while  a  light  squadron  that  was  called  the 
Inshore  Squadron  was  stationed  in  the  Iroise,  pushing  in  as  far 
as  the  narrow  entrance  and  placing  some  vessels  in  the  Bay  of 
Douarnenez  to  watch  the  Sein  Race.  When  the  weather  was  fine, 
the  fleet  anchored  at  the  entrance  of  the  Iroise  or  at  Douarnenez. 
Finally,  a  certain  number  of  ships  went  periodically  to  an  English 
dockyard  to  be  repaired  and  resupplied. 

When  Nelson  was  charged  w'ith  the  blockade  of  Toulon,  in 
1803,  he  proceeded  differently.  He  stayed  off  the  port  with  all 
his  forces  during  an  entire  month ;  then  he  withdrew  to  Magda- 
lena  to  give  his  crews  a  rest,  leaving  only  some  frigates  on  guard. 
The  line  of  conduct  adopted  by  Nelson  was  perhaps  imposed 
upon  him  by  the  circumstances ;  in  any  event,  it  was  thoroughly 
accordant  with  the  opinion  he  held  concerning  his  role.  He  main- 
tained, in  his  letters  to  the  Admiralty,  that  his  object  was  not  to 
prevent  the  French  from  coming  out,  but  only  to  fight  them  if 
they  did  come  out.  This  way  of  looking  at  things  was  the  correct 
one,  for,  if  he  succeeded  in  meeting  our  ships  at  sea  and  in  de- 
stroying them,  the  question  was  settled  in  the  Mediterranean,  and 
the  forces  employed  in  blockading  became  available  for  other  uses  ; 
but  it  was  necessary,  nevertheless,  to  maintain  a  sufficient  guard 
not  to  let  the  blockaded  force  get  wholly  away.  And  this  was  not 
done. 

On  a  first  occasion  Villeneuve  was  able  to  go  out  and  to  return 
three  days  later  without  being  molested ;  and  on  a  second  Nelson 
went  in  a  wrong  direction  to  look  for  him.  Therefore,  Magdalena 
was  a  base  too  far  removed  from  Toulon. 

Moreover,  it  is  not  clear  how  frigates  could  cruise  with  im- 
punity off  Toulon  without  being  supported  by  their  squadron. 
There  are  always,  in  a  naval  force,  vessels  of  speed  greater  than 
the  rest ;  nothing  v.'ould  have  been  easier  than  to  send  out  some 
ships  at  night,  without  lights,  to  bring  the  English  frigates  to  a 
stand  against  the  coast  and  to  force  them  to  fight.     If  Villeneuve 

224 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

had  persistently  pursued  the  scouts  that  watched  him  during 
Nelson's  absence,  the  latter  would  have  had  to  take  them  with 
him  whenever  he  withdrew  to  Magdalena.  Nor  does  it  appear 
that  Villeneuve  thought  of  profiting  by  the  enemy's  absence  to  go 
out  arid  put  his  vessels  through  exercises  which  they  certainly 
greatly  needed  before  taking  the  sea. 


With  steam  navies  all  thought  of  blockading  disappeared.  At 
first,  no  possibility  was  seen  of  making  long  cruises  with  vessels 
that  had  but  a  small  supply  of  coal  and  whose  machinery  was  fre- 
quently in  need  of  overhauling.  The  blockade  of  a  hostile  port 
verv  near  the  English  coasts,  such  as  Brest,  alone  would  have 
been  possible ;  and  it  would  still  have  been  necessary  to  employ 
forces  at  least  double  those  blockaded. 

Long  years  passed  thus,  but  a  day  came  when  English  publi- 
cists, supported  by  politician  admirals,  gave  warning  that  England 
was  without  defense.  Pamphlets  set  forth  the  invasion  of  British 
soil,  London  besieged,  the  navy  annihilated,  etc. 

It  has  always  been  enough  to  press  the  spring  of  invasion  to 
open  the  purse  of  the  islanders.  Such  was  the  origin  of  the 
enormous  development  of  the  English  fleet.  When  they  had 
ships,  they  took  thought  how  to  use  them  and  quite  naturally  came 
back  to  the  old  ways  that  had  proved  their  efficiency ;  but  then  a 
new  element  had  to  be  reckoned  with — the  torpedo-boat. 

This  latter,  when  it  first  appeared,  did  not  have  very  brilliant 
nautical  qualities  ;  scarcely  could  it  quit  the  immediate  neighbor- 
hood of  the  shore.  Built  to  attack  battleships  by  surprise,  it  had 
no  chance  of  encountering  them  unless  they  themselves  came 
within  reach  of  its  blows.  Blockades  were,  therefore,  particularly 
favorable  to  the  employment  of  torpedo-boats,  and,  in  purposing 
to  watch  our  battleships,  England  risked  losing  her  own.  These 
considerations  determined  the  construction  of  the  flotilla  of  de- 
stroyers. But  if  danger  from  the  torpedo-boat  was  thus  dimin- 
ished, it  was  not  wholiv  removed ;  and  the  questions  raised  by  the 
use  of  steam  remained  living  ones,  even  though  improvements  in 
the  economy  of  the  machinery  had  considerably  increased  the 
radius  of  action  of  ships.  The  system  of  distant  blockade,  which 
is  only  an  extension  and  perfection  of  Nelson's  method,  thus 
came  into  existence. 

225 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

ITerc  is  what  it  consists  in. 

The  blockading  squadron  takes  for  a  base  an  anchorage  de- 
fended against  the  approach  of  torpedo-boats,  in  proximity  to  the 
hostile  coast.  It  detaches  a  flotilla  of  destroyers  to  cruise  in  the 
immediate  vicinity  of  the  blockaded  port,  supporting  them  with 
a  few  cruisers.  Finally,  a  line  of  communications  connects  the 
fighting  body  with  the  advance  guards,  and  keeps  the  fomicr 
informed  of  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 

Thus  single  ships  that  come  to  enter  the  port  will  run  upon  the 
cruisers  ;  and,  if  the  blockaded  forces  make  a  sortie  in  a  body,  they 
will  be  followed  by  scouts  that  will  bring  the  squadron  into  touch 
with  them. 

It  has  even  been  said  that  England,  to  increase  the  rapidity  of 
coiumunications,  has  in  view  the  laying  of  a  cable  one  end  of 
which  would  lead  on  board  a  vessel,  or  perhaps  onto  one  of  our 
sea-coast  inlands. 

A  variation  of  this  form  of  blockade  consists  in  supporting  the 
light  vessels  and  cruisers  by  a  battleship  division  that  is  period- 
ically relieved. 

Thus,  for  example,  to  blockade  our  Northern  squadron  in  Brest, 
the  English  squadron  would  take  the  Scilly  Islands  as  base  of 
operations  (it  is  said  to  be  for  this  purpose  that  they  have  been 
made  an  advanced  base)  ;  the  destroyers  would  be  stationed  in  the 
Iroise,  and  the  cruisers  between  Ouessant  and  Sein  bridge,  with 
detachments  in  the  Race  and  the  Four ;  finally,  a  chain  of  scouts 
or  a  cable  would  connect  the  blockaders  with  their  squadron. 

Such,  it  appears  (though  we  know  nothing  certain  in  this  re- 
spect), are  the  ideas  that  are  current  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Channel.  liut  the  carrying  out  of  this  program  raises  many 
objections;  happily  we  do  not  lack  means  of  opposing  these 
ingenious  arrangements. 

As  far  as  direct  blockade  is  concerned,  that  is  not  to  be  thought 
of ;  though  the  battleships  may  be  sufficiently  protected  from  tor- 
pedo-boats by  destroyers,  to-day  they  must  reckon  with  sub- 
marines, which  will  go  to  seek  them  much  further  than  is  com- 
monly supposed.  These  latter  will  find  it  all  the  easier  to  show 
their  power  because,  blockades  being  lengthy  operations,  it  will 
be  allov/able  to  wait  the  most  favorable  conditions  for  attacking. 

For  the  same  reason,  the  idea  of  supporting  the  blockaders  by 
a  battleship  division  must  be  renounced. 

226 


I 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

The  cruisers  and  destroyers  will,  therefore,  find  themselves  face 
to  face  with  all  the  blockaded  forces.  They  will  be  constantly 
exposed  to  sudden  sorties  of  the  light  squadron,  supported  by 
some  battleships,  and  it  appears  doubtful  that  they  would  always 
succeed  in  withdrawing  without  losses.  Moreover,  even  in  the 
case  we  are  considering,  the  submarines  will  have  a  part  to  play. 
Admitting  that  the  destroyers  may  be  safe  from  torpedoes  (which 
is  not  proved),  cruisers  and  scouts  are  not ;  and  these  vessels  must 
anticipate  being  blown  up. 

Furthermore,  will  the  English  be  able  to  take  possession  of  an 
island  on  our  coast  to  land  a  cable  there?  That  would  suppose  a 
singular  incapacity  on  our  part.  And  how  will  they  keep  it,  unless 
by  protecting  it  with  their  entire  squadron,  which  would  mean 
direct  blockade? 

No,  blockades  will  have  no  more  fears  for  us  when  our  flotilla 
of  submarines  has  attained  its  full  development.  We  might  even 
welcome  one,  at  the  beginning  of  a  war,  to  cut  ofif  from  the  hos- 
tile force  some  of  its  units,  if  there  were  not  advantage  in  im- 
pressing upon  the  operations  the  desired  direction  by  a  vigorous 
oflfensive. 

* 

We  cannot  leave  this  subject  without  saying  a  few  words  con- 
cerning the  blockade  of  Santiago  by  the  American  squadron  and 
that  of  Port  Arthur  by  the  Japanese  Navy. 

Contrary  to  all  precedents,  Admiral  Sampson  distributed  his 
ships  on  an  extended  line  that  doubled  the  cordon  of  light  vessels 
and  enclosed  the  narrow  entrance  of  the  harbor ;  that  is,  he  estab- 
lished a  military  blockade  upon  the  principle  of  commercial 
blockades. 

It  does  not  seem  that  this  method  ought  to  be  retained.  It  had 
no  serious  consequences,  because  the  Spaniards  had  made  their 
minds  up  not  to  fight :  but  if  they  had  fallen  in  a  body  on  one  end 
of  the  line,  the  Americans  might  have  suffered  useless  losses. 

Admiral  Togo,  on  the  contrary,  carried  out  during  ten  months, 
and  with  full  success,  a  distant  blockade,  such  as  has  been  de- 
fined above.  He  took  as  base  the  Elliot  Islands,  which  are  only 
65  miles  from  Port  Arthur,  and,  from  this  anchorage,  he  per- 
manently detached  his  torpedo-boats  and  light  vessels  to  maintain 

227 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

a  watch  over  the  approaches  of  the  port.  The  blockade  was  never 
absolute,  in  the  sense  that  a  few  junks  loaded  with  provisions 
succeeded  from  time  to  time  in  getting  through  the  line  of  guards  ; 
but  it  was  none  the  less  effective  as  far  as  results  go. 

As  the  Russians  had  no  submarines  at  Port  Arthur,  we  see  no 
reason  for  modifying  our  previous  conclusions. 


228 


V. 

Passages  by  Main  Force. 

The  object  of  passages  by  main  force  is  to  get  through  the 
passes  that  give  access  to  a  harbor  or  river.  The  operation  is 
always  a  daring  one,  on  account  of  the  concentration  of  defenses, 
and  the  greatness  of  the  result  alone  can  justify  the  sacrifices  it 
entails. 

Examples  of  this  kind  are  not  abundant ;  we  will  content  our- 
selves with  citing  two  that  may  be  considered  the  most  note- 
worthy. 

To  reach  Mobile,  Farragut  was  obliged  first  to  reduce  the  outer 
works.  A  first  attack  being  without  result,  the  American  admiral 
determined  to  force  a  passage  into  the  bay.  It  was  not  his  first 
essay  of  the  sort,  but  the  difficulties  had  never  been  so  great. 

On  August  5,  1862,  at  5.40  a.  m.,  tlie  Federal  squadron  got 
under  way.  Seven  corvettes,  each  having  a  gunboat  lashed  to  it 
on  the  port  side,  formed  in  column,  with  the  corvette  Brooklyn 
in  the  lead ;  immediately  aftei:  her  came  the  flagship  Hartford. 
Four  monitors  formed  a  second  column  to  starboard  of  the  squad- 
ron and  consequently  between  the  latter  and  Fort  Morgan. 

We  cannot  give  a  better  account  of  this  passage  by  main  force 
than  by  reproducing,  in  part,  the  official  report  of  Admiral 
Farragut : 

"  It  was  only  at  the  urgent  request  of  the  captains  and  com- 
manding officers  that  I  yielded  to  the  Brooklyn  being  the  leading 
ship  of  the  line,  as  she  had  four  chase  guns  and  an  ingenious 
arrangement  for  picking  up  torpedoes,  and  because,  in  their  judg- 
ment, the  flagship  ought  not  to  be  too  much  exposed.  This  I 
believe  to  be  an  error,  for  apart  from  the  fact  that  exposure  is  one 
of  the  penalties  of  rank  in  the  navy,  it  will  always  be  the  aim  of 
the  enemy  to  destroy  the  flagship,  and,  as  will  appear  in  the 
sequel,  such  attempt  was  very  persistently  made,  but  Providence 
did  not  permit  it  to  be  successful. 

"  The  attacking  fleet  steamed  steadily  up  the  main  ship  channel, 
the  Tecumseh  firing  the  first  shot  at  6.47.    At  7.06  the  fort  opened 

229 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

upon  us  and  was  replied  to  by  a  g-un  from  the  Brooklyn,  and 
immediately  after  the  action  became  general. 

"  It  was  soon  apparent  that  there  was  some  difficulty  ahead. 
The  Brooklyn,  for  some  cause  which  I  did  not  then  clearly  under- 
stand, but  which  has  since  been  explained  by  Captain  Alden  in  his 
report,  arrested  the  advance  of  the  whole  fleet,  while  at  the  same 
time  the  guns  of  the  fort  were  playing  with  great  effect  upon 
that  vessel  and  the  Hartford.  A  moment  after  I  saw  the  Tecum- 
seh,  struck  by  a  torpedo,  disappear  almost  instantaneously  beneath 
the  waves,  carrying  with  her  her  gallant  commander  and  nearly 
all  her  crew.  I  determined  at  once,  as  I  had  originally  intended, 
to  take  the  lead,  and  after  ordering  the  Metaconiet  to  send  a  boat 
to  save,  if  possible,  any  of  the  perishing  crew,  I  dashed  ahead 
with  the  Hartford,  and  the  ships  followed  on,  their  officers  be- 
lieving that  they  were  going  to  a  noble  death  with  their  com- 
mander-in-chief. 

"  I  steamed  through  between  the  buoys  where  the  torpedoes 
were  supposed  to  have  been  sunk.  These  buoys  had  been  previ- 
ously examined  by  my  flag-lieutenant,  J.  Crittenden  Watson,  in 
several  nightly  reconnoissances.  Though  he  had  not  been  able 
to  discover  the  sunken  torpedoes,  yet  we  had  been  assured  by 
refugees,  deserters,  and  others  of  their  existence,  but  believing 
that  from  their  having  been  some,  time  in  the  water,  they  were 
probably  innocuous,  I  determined  to  take  the  chance  of  their 
explosion. 

"  From  the  moment  I  turned  to  the  northwestward  to  clear  the 
Middle  Ground  we  were  enabled  to  keep  such  a  broadside  fire 
upon  the  batteries  at  Fort  Morgan  that  their  guns  did  us  com- 
paratively little  injury." 

"  With  the  exception  of  the  momentary  arrest  of  the  fleet  when 
the  Hartford  passed  ahead,  the  order  of  battle  was  preserved,  and 
the  ships  followed  each  other  in  close  order  past  the  batteries  of 
Fort  Morgan,  and  in  comparative  safety,  too,  with  the  exception 
of  the  Oneida.  Her  boilers  were  penetrated  by  a  shot  from  the 
fort,  which  completely  disabled  her ;  but  her  consort,  the  Galena, 
firmly  fastened  to  her  side,  brought  her  safely  through,  showing 
clearly  the  wisdom  of  the  precaution  of  carrying  the  vessels  in 
two  abreast." 

********* 

230 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

"  Our  ironclads,  from  their  slow  speed  and  bad  steering",  had 
some  difficulty  in  getting  into  and  maintaining  their  position  in 
line  as  we  passed  the  fort." 

The  reports  of  the  commanding-  officers  attribute  the  com- 
paratively small  number  of  injuries  to  the  rapid  fire  of  the  squad- 
ron and  the  smoke,  and  they  note  that  the  broadsides  of  grape 
delivered  by  several  vessels  as  they  passed  close  by  the  fort  re- 
duced entirely  to  silence  the  Confederate  batteries. 

The  losses  of  the  squadron  amounted  to  52  killed  and  180 
wounded,  without  counting  the  120  men  who  went  down  with  the 
Tecumseh.^^'^ 

The  dispositions  taken  by  Admiral  Farragut  are  noteworthy. 
Every  naval  force  that  may  desire  in  the  future  to  force  a  passage 
should  draw  inspiration  from  them. 

Let  us  now  consider  the  feat  performed  by  two  French  gun- 
boats, of  wood,  with  no  protection.  I  follow  the  account  of  the 
vessels'  officers  whom  I  had  occasion  to  see  a  few  days  afterwards. 

The  Inconstant  and  the  Comet e  presented  themselves  at  the 
Mei-Nam  bar,  on  July  13,  1893,  on  their  way  up  to  Bangkok. 
The  Inconstant  called  for  a  pilot,  and  met  with  a  refusal.  The 
captain  of  the  J ean-Baptiste-Say ,  a  French  steamer  making  regu- 
lar runs  between  Saigon  and  Bangkok,  went  on  board  to  act  as 
pilot  and,  as  soon  as  there  was  enough  water  on  the  bar,  the  ves- 
sels stood  for  the  mouth  of  the  river. 

At  4000  meters  the  Siamese  forts  opened  fire.  Commander 
Borie  had  not  expected  this  attack ;  he  could  still  have  turned 
back,  but  he  did  not  think  of  such  a  thing.  His  orders  directed 
him  to  go  up  to  Bangkok — he  executed  his  orders.  The  masts 
were  housed,  magazines  opened,  and  as  soon  as  ready  the  vessels 
replied  to  the  fire. 

As  they  draw  near  the  light-ship  that  marks  the  entrance  of  the 
river,  a  torpedo  explodes  ahead  of  the  Inconstant  without  doing 
her  any  harm.  The  gunboats  cross  the  bar  and  pass  through  the 
midst  of  the  Siamese  fleet  drawn  up  in  two  lines. 

Night  falls. 

The  most  difficult  task  had  not  been  accomplished.  It  was  still 
necessary  to  pass  at  200  meters  distance  under  the  fire  of  Paknam 
fort,  which  is  at  mid-distance  between  Bangkok  and  the  mouth  of 

"°  Grasset,  La  Defense  des  cotes. 

231 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

the  river.  The  Comete,  which  saw  it  first,  fires  a  shot.  The  fort 
deHvers  its  broadside  too  soon ;  the  boats  pass.  At  9  o'clock  they 
anchored  ofiF  the  French  consulate.  On  the  following-  day,  at 
colors,  they  dressed  ship  in  honor  of  the  14th  of  July.  Two  killed, 
three  wounded. 

Many  officers  think  that  under  present  conditions  passages  by 
main  force  are  no  longer  possible.  The  Inconstant  and  Comete 
have  given  a  striking  denial  of  this.  It  may  be  argued,  however, 
that  they  had  affair  with  Siamese  and  that  things  would  have 
happened  differently  with  Europeans.  We  will  be  satisfied,  there- 
fore, with  feeling  proud  of  this  feat  of  arms,  without  drawing 
conclusions  from  it.^^ 

What  basis  exists  for  interdicting  the  forcing  of  passages? 

Lines  of  torpedoes  are  a  hindrance ;  they  are  not  a  prevention. 
It  is  true  that  they  sunk  one  of  Farragut's  vessels ;  but  all  com- 
bats occasion  losses,  and  the  forcing  of  a  passage  is  a  combat ;  all 
that  is  asked  is  to  be  the  victor. 

Coast-defense  cannon  are  more  powerful  than  they  were  forty 
years  ago ;  but  ships  are  better  protected,  and  after  all  batteries 
have  no  other  armament  than  that  used  by  ships  in  conflict  with 
them.  Let  us  not  forget  that  it  is  not  a  question  here  of  a  regular 
contest  in  which  the  batteries  must  have  the  best  of  it,  but  of  a 
rapid  passage  during  which  a  hail  of  fire  is  poured  upon  the  works 
to  stop  their  fire  momentarily.  Well,  ships  are  not  annihilated  as 
quickly  as  one  juggles  a  pea.  And  then  very  little  is  needed  for  a 
torpedo  not  to  explode  at  the  moment  or  place  intended,  for  a 
shell  not  to  reach  the  mark.  There  will  also  be  a  certain  period, 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  when  all  the  batteries  will  not  yet 
have  been  fully  manned. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  all  passages  by  main  force  have  succeeded. 
It  would  be  absurd  to  conclude  from  this  that  all  passages  can  be 
forced ;  let  us  be  satisfied  with  allowing  that  the  operation  is  not 
a  priori  impossible.  All  passages  are  not  defended  like  the  en- 
trance of  Brest  or  like  the  approaches  to  our  naval  arsenals ; 
there  are  even  some  that  have  no  lines  of  torpedoes. 

Still,  if  Duguay-Trouin,  after  having  cleared  the  narrow  en- 
trance of  Rio-de-Janeiro,  had  not  been  sure  of  having  nothing 

^^  We  may  be  permitted,  nevertheless,  to  remark  that  had  the  conditions 
been  different  the  government  would  not  have  taken  the  chance  with  unpro- 
tected ships. 

232 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

more  to  fear  for  his  ships,  he  would  perhaps  have  given  up  the 
expedition  ;  if  the  Inconstant,  after  having  passed  under  the  forts 
of  the  Mei-Nam  entrance,  had  found  at  Bangkok  batteries  that 
it  would  have  been  necessary  to  reduce  one  after  the  other,  she 
would  without  doubt  have  succumbed  ;  if  Admiral  Courbet  had 
not  known  that  there  was  no  interior  defense  abreast  Fouchou 
arsenal,  he  would  not  have  run  into  such  a  trap. 

It  is  the  inner  defenses,  therefore,  those  with  which  it  will  be 
necessary  to  undertake  a  regular  contest,  that  will  prevent  the 
forcing  of  passages.  The  others  will  wound  the  enemy ;  these 
latter  will  finish  him. 

These  considerations  show  us  in  what  spirit  the  defense  of  our 
places  ought  to  be  organized.  I  insist  upon  it,  because  reason  has 
not  always  been  respected  in  the  arming  of  secondary  places. 


233 


FOURTH  PART 


THE  AUXILIARIES  OF  STRATEGY 


\ 


The  Plan  of  Campaign. 

We  have  seen,  in  the  first  part  of  this  study,  that  the  manner 
of  distribution  of  one's  forces  is  not  an  immaterial  matter,  and 
that,  for  equal  effort,  the  result  varies  according  to  the  direction 
impressed  upon  operations.  A  well-matured  plan  of  campaign  is, 
therefore,  necessary. 

When  war  breaks  out  is  not  the  moment  for  asking  oneself 
what  must  be  done.  In  the  entire  naval  sphere  each  one  will  then 
be  overwhelmed  by  the  cares  of  mobilization ;  the  central  depart- 
ment will  have  to  provide  for  imperious  necessities  and  will  be 
burdened  with  the  solution  of  thousands  of  questions ;  no  one  will 
any  longer  have  the  calm  and  coolness  indispensable  for  the  com- 
plete working  out  of  a  plan  of  operations. 

If,  at  this  critical  instant,  nothing  has  been  prepared  ;  if  there 
are  no  orders  all  ready ;  if,  in  a  word,  the  whole  machinery  can 
only  be  set  going  by  throwing  everything  out  of  gear,  we  shall  be 
carried  away  by  events  in  spite  of  ourselves  and  will  rush  our 
squadrons  to  sea,  shutting  our  eyes  to  what  happens. 

To  establish  a  plan  of  campaign,  the  general  direction  that  it  is 
wished  to  give  to  operations  is  first  determined,  with  a  view  to 
securing  the  maximum  effect.  An  outline  is  thus  sketched,  then 
the  number  and  kind  of  forces  necessary  for  carrying  out  the  plan 
with  chances  of  success  are  inquired  into,  keeping  in  view  all  the 
elements  of  strategy  that  are  of  a  nature  to  strengthen  the  action 
of  the  ships. 

These  preliminary  labors  bring  to  light  defective  features, 
whether  in  the  disposition  of  ships  or  in  their  strategical  qualities. 
Thus  the  plan  of  campaign,  has  an  influence  upon  building  pro- 
grams and  upon  the  characteristics  of  vessels. 

As  new  units,  designed  upon  a  more  rational  basis,  come  into 
service,  the  work  little  by  little  is  perfected.  It  is  not  enough  to 
ask  what  can  be  done  with  the  material  at  one's  disposal ;  it  is 
necessary  that  it  be  the  material  that  is  adapted  to  the  conditions 
of  war,  as  they  spring  from  general  laws. 

The  plan  of  campaign  also  has  the  advantage  of  connecting 

237 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

together,  with  a  view  to  a  precise  object,  the  different  problems 
that,  in  peace  time,  seem  to  us  to  be  independent  of  one  another 
because  they  are  studied  separately.  Thus  we  avoid  attaching-  an 
exaggerated  importance  to  operations  that  have  but  a  secondary 
influence  upon  the  final  issue. 

It  does  not  seem  to  be  difficult,  if  we  do  not  let  ourselves  be 
taken  unawares,  to  draw  up  a  rational  plan  t  f  campaign."'  We 
have  to  guide  us  the  advice  of  men  of  the  greatest  competence, 
and  we  have  leisure  to  study  the  means  at  the  enemy's  disposition 
and  the  manner  in  which  he  can  use  them.  Nevertheless,  war  con- 
stantly shows  us  enormous  faults  that  are  due  much  more  to 
errors  of  principle  than  to  a  condition  of  inferiority.  This  results 
in  the  first  place  from  generally  not  attaching  enough  importance 
to  reflex  actions,  to  the  reactions  that  events  have  upon  each 
other,  which  leads  to  making  fruitless  efforts  that  waste  forces 
without  any  gain.  But  the  initial  cause  of  those  queer  conceptions 
that  have  no  result  comes  from  the  fact  that  as  much  energy  and 
moral  worth  are  necessary  to  plan  war  as  to  carry  it  on.  Radical 
solutions  are  generally  repugnant,  yet  without  such  no  success  is 
possible ;  it  is  sought  to  conciliate  opposing  interests  and  diffuse 
plans  are  thus  arrived  at. 

When  P'rance  declared  war  against  England  in  1778,  the  gov- 
ernment of  Louis  XVI  was  in  possession  of  a  plan  of  campaign 
to  the  elaboration  of  which  a  man  of  great  worth,  the  Count  de 
Broglie,  had  devoted  twenty  years  of  his  life.  Constantly  perfect- 
ing his  work,  guided  by  the  exclusive  sentiment  of  the  object  to  be 
attained,  he  had  made  something  that  could  stand  by  itself.  Well, 
during  the  war,  on  several  occasions  ideas  were  taken  from  this 
work,  but  without  reflecting  that  they  had  no  value  excepting  as 
forming  part  of  the  whole.  Thus  we  had  a  badly  built  structure, 
because  all  that  made  it  strong  had  been  taken  a.way  from  it. 

*     * 

What  is  the  part  that  belongs,  in  the  drawing  up  of  plans,  to  the 
principal  agents  of  execution? 

^"  It  must  be  understood  by  this  that  it  ought  to  be  possible  to  secure 
the  best  utilization  of  one's  forces;  for,  as  far  as  results  are  concerned,  the 
skill  of  the  enemy  has  to  be  reckoned  with,  also  faults  in  execution,  and 
finally  the  balance  of  forces,  which  will  always  make  the  task  difficult  for 
the  weaker  side,  and  sometimes  even  impossible. 

238 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

In  China,  Admiral  Courbet  was  constantly  obliged  to  follow  a 
line  of  conduct  that  he  disapproved ;  and  the  despatches  that  he 
received  prove  that  the  government  had  no  very  exact  ideas  about 
the  economic  and  social  situation  of  the  Celestial  Empire,  any 
more  than  about  the  geographic  conditions  of  those  regions. 
These  false  ideas  were  the  cause  of  our  vessels  and  troops  being 
uselessly  wasted  against  Formosa. 

The  correspondence  exchanged,  before  and  during  the  Spanish- 
American  war,  between  Admiral  Cervera  and  the  Minister  of 
Marine,  revealed  a  perpetual  divergence  of  opinions  between  these 
two  general  officers,  and  it  is  very  difficult  to  decide  which  of 
them  was  right.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  the  minister's  singular 
optimism  testified  to  an  absolute  ignorance  of  the  material  that  he 
had  charge  of,  of  the  enemy's  resources  and  of  the  elementary 
principles  of  war ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  chief  of  squadron's  ever- 
lasting complaints  do  not  seem  to  have  sensibly  bettered  the  situa- 
tion. Finally,  Admiral  Cervera  had  to  yield  with  groans,  which, 
it  will  be  agreed,  is  not  a  guarantee  of  success. 

Disagreements  of  this  sort  can  have  only  fatal  consequences. 
In  principle,  a  chief  ought  never  to  be  obliged  to  do  what  he  thinks 
bad,  because  nothing  is  done  well  that  is  not  understood.  More- 
over, all  officers  have  not  the  same  qualities,  nor  the  same  faculties 
rendering  them  fit  for  the  accomplishment  of  all  missions ;  only 
what  they  are  capable  of  can  be  demanded  of  people.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  departments,  from  which  the  plans  of  campaign 
emanate,  have  a  tendency  always  to  measure  too  nicely  and  they 
thus  demand  impossible  things ;  situated  far  from  the  scene  of 
war,  they  do  not  take  account  exactly  of  the  difficulties  of  execu- 
tion, because  they  lack  m.eans  of  estimating  at  its  true  value  the 
coefficient  of  utilization  of  the  naval  forces.  Everyone  knows 
that  at  a  distance  things  always  seem  easy  and  that  assurance  is 
lost  in  proportion  as  one  draws  near.  Finally,  the  departments 
have  no  effective  responsibility ;  if  an  operation  fails,  they  are 
not  the  ones  who  go  before  a  court-martial,  and,  in  spite  of  them- 
selves, this  immunity  influences  their  decisions  and  makes  them 
demand  things  the  execution  of  which  they  themselves  would  not 
accept.  Quite  to  the  contrary,  he  who  is  on  the  spot,  who  sees 
things  close  at  hand  and  who  risks  his  life,  and  above  all  his  repu- 
tation, that  one  is  prone  to  fall  into  the  opposite  excess  and  to 

239 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy, 

see  obstacles  everywhere.  It  is  not  everyone  that,  like  Admiral 
Conrbet,  has  an  exact  appreciation  of  the  situation  and  of  the 
advantages  that  can  be  drawn  from  it. 

There  is  but  one  method  of  conciliating  everything;  that  is  to 
put  everywhere,  in  the  departments  as  well  as  in  the  field,  fJie 
right  man  in  the  right  place. 


240 


II. 

Public  Opinion. 

Present-day  governments  have  to  contend  with  a  very  powerful 
adversary  that  sometimes  will  not  leave  off  making  the  conduct 
of  operations  difficult.    I  mean  public  opinion. 

It  is  well  known  that  the  public  does  not  look  upon  war  from 
the  same  point  of  view  as  professionals ;  its  attention  is  turned 
aside  by  what  is  going"  on  close  at  hand,  and  it  perceives  only 
vaguely  the  far-off  horizons  where  the  objective  is  hidden.  Well, 
there  is  no  use  in  saying  that  the  notion  formed  by  the  masses  as 
to  the  scope  of  operations  is  not  the  true  one ;  if  it  were,  the  mili- 
tary art  would  not  exist,  and  genius  would  be  within  everybody's 
reach.  All  that  was  powerful  in  Napoleon's  campaigns  only 
becomes  apparent  to  us  after  the  act,  when  occurrences  have 
illumined  our  minds  and  revealed  to  us  new  aspects  of  which  we 
would  never  have  thought. 

The  public,  when  it  estimates  events,  is  much  more  solicitous 
of  the  evils  that  threaten  it  than  of  the  object  to  be  attained  ;  mili- 
tary men,  on  the  contrary,  think  that  war,  being  an  evil  in  itself, 
can  engender  only  evil,  and  that  the  sole  excuse  for  making  it  is 
to  do  so  successfully. 

This  divergence  of  views  determines  from  the  beginning  a  mis- 
understanding between  those  who  are  spectators  of  the  war  and 
those  who  have  the  grave  responsibility  of  directing  it. 

As  soon  as  the  first  encounter  takes  place,  the  population  loses 
its  head,  the  journals  constitute  themselves  the  spokesmen  of  its 
complaints ;  the  government  is  attacked,  and  the  admirals  are  not 
let  off.  If,  then,  there  is  at  the  head  of  affairs  a  man  who  is  not 
energetic  enough  to  stand  fast  against  the  storm,  or  who  is  not 
capable  of  explaining  his  acts,  because  he  himself  does  not  know 
their  scope,  all  the  dispositions  taken  will  be  reversed.  A  poor 
arrangement  will  be  adopted ;  sacrifices  will  be  made  to  public 
opinion  by  giving  over  a  part  of  one's  forces  in  order  to  meet  its 
views.  It  is  known  to  be  an  error,  but  it  is  done  all  the  same.  It 
would  be  better  not  to  wage  war  than  to  do  so  in  such  a  way,  for 

241 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

what  is  the  end  of  it  all  ?  Everything  is  compromised  without 
satisfying-  the  public ;  when  defeat  comes,  it  will  no  longer  be 
possible  to  protect  anything ;  therefore,  it  is  only  going  back  to 
start  over  again. 

During  the  Spanish-American  war,  the  influence  of  public 
opinion  was  manifested  on  both  sides. 

As  far  as  the  United  States  are  concerned,  the  Naval  Council 
thought  itself  obliged  to  divide  their  forces  in  order  to  satisfy  the 
northern  sections,  which  were  unwilling  to  remain  unprotected ; 
and  A'lahan,  who  was  a  member  of  the  Council,  frankly  confesses 
that  this  solution  was  absolutely  contrary  to  military  interests. 
No  harm  resulted  from  this,  for  the  reason  that  the  Spaniards  did 
not  think  of  attacking  either  the  coast  or  the  hostile  ships ;  but, 
on  the  part  of  Spain,  the  public  apprehension  had  more  serious 
consequences. 

What  a  sad  history  is  that  of  that  poor  Spanish  squadron! 
Blockaded  in  Santiago  by  superior  forces,  demoralized,  it  was 
destined  to  certain  destruction  if  it  went  out.  In  Spain,  the  jour- 
nals were  wroth  at  such  inaction ;  they  did  not  comprehend  that 
four  cruisers,  poorly  armed,  could  not  measure  themselves  against 
so  many  battleships,  supported  by  several  cruisers.  Politics  inter- 
vening, the  squadron  ceased  to  be  anything  but  a  means  for  batter- 
ing down  the  government.  At  first  the  Minister  of  Marine  put  a 
good  face  on  the  matter.  He  explained  to  the  Cortes  that  ships 
were  not  made  to  be  destroyed ;  but  his  resistance  was  of  short 
duration.  He  sent  to  Cuba  the  order  to  make  the  squadron  go 
out  and,  in  signing  that  order,  he  signed  the  death-warrant  of  his 
sailors. 

Admiral  Cervera's  vessels  were  marked  in  advance  with  the 
seal  of  destiny.  Nevertheless,  would  it  not  have  been  better  to 
let  them  stay  in  port,  thus  preserving  the  single  chance  of  saving 
Santiago,  rather  than  to  sacrifice  them  stupidly  to  the  contentions 
of  the  press  ? 

The  tone  of  the  sea-coast  journals,  during  the  grand  maneuvers 
of  1889,  gives  us  but  a  feeble  idea  of  what  will  happen  in  case  of 
war.  Not  a  squadron  will  be  able  to  go  out  of  sight  of  shore 
without  there  arising  cries  of  treason.  And  what  will  happen  on 
the  day  when  an  admiral  requisitions  coast-defense  vessels  to  take 
them  with  him? 

What  is  the  remedy  for  this  state  of  afifairs?    To  educate  the 

242 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

nation ;  to  show  it  what  its  true  interests  are.  There  is  nothing" 
to  conceal  in  the  principles  that  govern  warfare.  What  neither 
the  enemy  nor  the  public  ought  to  know  is  only  the  manner  in 
which  it  is  intended  to  apply  them. 

Well,  it  is  not  impossible  to  form  public  opinion  and  to  turn  it 
in  the  direction  of  the  general  interests  of  the  country.  Admiral 
Colomb  calls  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  English  people  were 
never  more  tranquil  than  when  their  squadrons  were  at  sea,  be- 
cause they  had  a  sufficiently  clear  comprehension  of  the  affairs  of 
war  to  know  that  naval  forces  can  only  give  protection  by  acting. 

During  the  hostilities  against  Russia,  the  Japanese  government 
was  able  to  make  the  nation  accept  a  line  of  conduct  that,  in 
France,  would  have  raised  recrimmations  without  end  and  might 
have  caused  a  modification  of  the  plan  of  campaign. 


243 


III. 

Preparation. 

It  is  not  enoiic^h  to  send  one's  squadrons  out  to  fight ;  it  is  also 
necessary  that  they  be  of  such  strong-  composition  that  equality  of 
numbers  may  secure  equality  and,  if  possible,  superiority  of 
strength. 

Historians,  who  are  principally  concerned  in  recounting  facts, 
distribute  praise  or  blame  among  chiefs  of  squadrons  according 
to  the  results  of  their  encounters.  Rarely  do  they  take  pains  to 
inquire  whether  the  means  at  the  disposal  of  the  vanquished  per- 
mitted doing  anything  else  than  what  they  did.  How  many, 
among  those  whom  fortune  betrayed,  would  have  left  the  reputa- 
tion of  skilful  leaders,  if  the}-  had  only  had  means  equal  to  those 
of  their  adversaries !  It  is  very  difficult  not  to  commit  errors 
when  one  finds  himself  disarmed  by  mediocrity  of  material  and 
insufficiency  of  personnel ;  what  it  is  needful  to  do  is  easily  seen 
then,  but  it  cannot  be  done."' 

The  humiliations  of  battlefields  are  but  too  often  an  effect 
whose  causes  are  due  to  lack  of  preparation. 

Between  combatants  of  two  hostile  nations,  there  is  frequently 
to  be  noted  a  different  state  of  mind,  which,  by  itself  alone, 
is  the  best  presage  of  the  result  of  the  struggle.  On  one  side,  the 
confidence  that  engenders  courage  and  gives  birth  to  bold  plans ; 
on  the  other,  apprehension,  mother  of  discouragement  and  of 
bastard  solutions.  This  difference  of  moral  state  could  have  been 
observed  between  the  Austrians  and  Italians,  before  Lissa;  be- 
tween the  Japanese  and  Chinese,  before  the  Yalu  and  Wei-hai- 

^^  We  do  not  assert  that  there  have  not  often  been,  among  the  van- 
quished, leaders  unequal  to  their  tasks ;  but  even  this  may  be  charged 
against  bad  organization.  In  a  numerous  body,  there  are  always  officers 
endowed  with  the  qualities  necessary  for  exercising  the  chief  command ; 
if  squadrons  are  entrusted  to  incapables,  it  is  because  they  have  been 
placed  there  from  considerations  foreign  to  the  good  of  the  service — that 
is,  because  the  organization  is  defective.  When  defeat  results,  it  is  these 
men  that  are  blamed.  This  is  wrong.  They  are  not  responsible;  they  have 
given  the  measure  of  their  abilities.     The  guilty  are  those  who  chose  them. 

244 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

wei ;  between  the  Americans  and  Spaniards,  before  Cavite  and 
Santiago ; ""  between  the  Japanese  and  the  Russians.  The  con- 
fidence on  one  side  had  its  source  much  more  in  training  than  in 
numerical  superiority,  since  the  more  numerous  were  not  always 
the  victors.  The  swagger  with  which  admirals  like  Barrington, 
Hood  and  Cornvvallis  used  to  withstand  the  attacks  of  greatly 
superior  forces  "°  gives  us  a  measure  of  the  moral  influence  exer- 
cised by  the  consciousness  of  strength. 

The  naval  greatness  of  a  nation,  therefore,  depends  principally 
upon  the  manner  in  which  its  forces  are  prepared  and  trained. 

* 

In  this  connection,  it  is  well  to  call  particular  attention  to  the 
question  of  personnel. 

The  numerical  insufficiency  of  crews  was,  in  the  past,  one  of  the 
main  causes  of  the  weakness  of  the  French  Navy.  Even  during 
the  American  war,  ships  never  had  their  full  complements.  It 
was  much  worse  during  the  Revolution  and  Empire ;  the  custom 
grew  up  of  making  up  shortages  of  seamen  with  soldiers.  Marked 
inferiority  in  gunnery  was  an  immediate  consequence  of  this. 

To-day,  the  naval  enlistment  is  functioning  normally,  and  it  is 
admitted  that  we  have  more  sailors  to  carry  on  a  war  with  than 
we  need.  It  is  possible ;  but  what  is  certain  is  that  in  peace  time 
we  are  still  reduced  to  expedients.  Crews  never  attain  the  regu- 
lation number,  neither  at  ordinary  times,  nor  during  grand  maneu- 
vers,^'^ in  spite  of  the  addition  of  reservists.  Men  of  one  specialty 
are  embarked  to  take  the  places  of  those  of  another  specialty,  and 
it  will  be  understood  that  that  does  not  fill  the  bill. 

The  question  of  personnel  in  our  navy  has  always  been  rele- 
gated to  a  secondary  place  ;  it  is  preferred  to  man  more  vessels 
and  to  man  them  badly.  With  reduced  efifectives,  the  old  ways 
would  reappear  in  a  new  form,  like  corpses  that  rise  to  the 
surface. 

"'See,  upon  this  subject,  Admiral  Cervera's  letters. 

*™  Barrington,  with  seven  ships;  is  attacked,  at  St.  Lucia,  by  d'Estaing, 
who  has  twelve.  Hood  fights  at  anchor,  at  St.  Kitts,  with  twenty-two 
ships  against  de  Grasse,  who  has  twenty-six  (see  Part  I).  Cornwallis,  with 
five  ships,  has  a  running  fight  with  Villaret-Joyeuse's  whole  squadron. 

"^  During  the  grand  maneuvers,  the  squadron  had  to  stop  at  sea  and  send 
people  aboard  a  ship  that  could  not  keep  up. 

245 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

The  idea  that  has  led  to  having  ships  that  are  manned  and  yet 
not  manned  is  not  without  its  attractions.  With  crews  reduced  one- 
half,  the  material  is  as  well  taken  care  of  as  in  a  condition  of  full 
armament ;  and  as  organized  and  enrolled  forces  are  thus  provided, 
it  suffices  to  fill  up  the  complements  to  make  them  ready  to  put  to 
sea  almost  immediately,  if  the  depots  are  capable  of  furnishing  the 
necessary  contingent;  mobilization  is  reduced  to  its  very  simplest 
form. 

The  misfortune  is  that  ships  manned  with  reduced  crews  can- 
not cruise,  and  it  is  at  sea  that  seamen  and  officers  are  trained. 
When  the  whole  French  fleet  has  to  be  mobilized,  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  call  upon  the  reservists ;  all  the  more  necessary  is  it  that 
they  be  not  joined  to  men  whose  experience  has  been  confined  to 
harbor  work. 

All  historians  agree  in  recognizing  that  the  English  crews  were 
trained  by  prolonged  blockades,  and  that  Nelson's  prodigious  suc- 
cesses had  their  source  in  those  cruises,  while  our  ships,  station- 
ary in  harbors,  were  like  beings  all  of  whose  members  are  be- 
numbed by  inaction.  Well,  the  vessels  of  our  Northern  squadron 
that,  yesterday  still,  had  only  reduced  crews,  those  vessels  were 
blockaded,  though  only  by  their  own  state ;  they  got  under  way 
only  to  have  target  practice,  and  were  incapable  of  making  a  pas- 
sage of  any  length.  When,  in  the  spring,  they  put  to  sea,  they  had 
crews  that  were  afraid  of  the  sea,  borrowed  officers,  an  admiral 
who  perhaps  knew  how  to  lead  his  squadron,  but  who  did  not  know 
what  could  be  gotten  out  of  it.  When  this  squadron  met  with 
that  of  the  South,  as  in  1900,  the  difference  between  the  two 
forces  was  striking. 

The  system  of  reduced  crews  is  dangerous ;  it  gives  the  illusion 
of  a  state  of  preparation  that  does  not  exist.  The  further  we  go 
in  reducing  the  length  of  military  service,  the  more  the  complexity 
of  our  material  increases  (alas!),  the  more  necessary  it  is  to  give 
our  men  sea  experience.  Well,  vessels  cannot  go  to  sea  without 
crews. 

The  normal  complement  of  vessels  is  ample  to  satisfy  all  re- 
quirements ;  it  would  even  be  inconvenient  to  increase  it  during 
peace  time ;  the  men  would  no  longer  have  sufficient  occupation. 
But  in  time  of  war  it  would  be  advantageous  to  have  an  addition 
to  the  personnel,  if  it  be  true  that  we  dispose  of  reserves  for  whom 
we  shall  have  no  employment. 

246 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

The  idea  of  forming  on  board  ship  supplementary  crews  who 
would  serve,  as  far  as  required,  to  replace  dead  and  wounded,  has 
already  been  put  forward.  Perhaps  the  author  of  this  project 
exaggerated  its  application ;  in  any  case  it  is  regrettable  that  the 
principle  was  not  preserved,  with  freedom  to  reduce  it  to  the  right 
proportions.  It  is  difficult  to  admit  that  during  a  combat  guns 
may  be  out  of  action  for  lack  of  men,  while  there  are  idle  seamen 
on  shore.  But,  setting  fighting  aside,  there  is  a  whole  class  of 
men  whose  number  ought  to  be  quite  doubled  at  the  very  begin- 
ning of  war,  if  it  is  wished  to  utilize  all  the  resources  of  strategy. 
It  is  that  of  firemen. 

Movement,  as  we  have  said  elsewhere,  is  the  soul  of  strategy. 
Well,  the  fireman  is  the  soul  of  movement. 

Our  vessels  seldom  cruise  with  all  their  fires  lighted.  Solici- 
tude to  conserve  the  machinery  and  the  allowances  of  coal  allotted 
to  squadrons  do  not  permit  making  high  speed  frequently.  The 
complements  of  firemen  are  calculated  accordingly.^'* 

When  squadrons  have  power  trials,  the  vessels  have  only  to 
make  a  spurt,  and  an  effort  is  then  required  from  the  whole  fire- 
room  personnel  that  could  not  be  kept  up ;  but  when  a  single  ves- 
sel has  to  maintain  high  speed  for  a  long  time  on  account  of  some 
special  mission,  it  becomes  necessary  to  send  men  from  the  deck 
force  into  the  bunkers.  Such  conditions  as  this  are  not  permis- 
sible in  time  of  war. 

It  is  well  known  that  there  are  in  the  navy  convinced  partisans 
of  speed,  who  imagine  that  it  can  make  up  for  anything.  This  is 
an  evident  exaggeration,  for,  though  speed  can  make  force  effect- 
ive, it  cannot  take  its  place ;  but,  after  all,  it  cannot  be  denied  that 
the  faculty  of  moving  rapidly  from  one  place  to  another  is  an 
element  of  success.  Well,  it  is  necessary  that  it  be  known  that 
our  vessels,  and  particularly  torpedo-boats,  are  incapable,  under 
existing  conditions,  of  doing  their  best  on  account  of  lack  of 
firemen. 

"^  There  is  no  other  navy  in  which  machinists  are  so  numerous  and  fire- 
men so  few  as  in  the  French  Navy. 


247 


IV. 

The  Doctrine. 

To  build  the  ships  that  are  needed,  and  no  others ;  to  give  them 
the  armament  suitable  to  each  and  to  equip  them  properly,  it  is 
needful  to  know  what  it  is  wished  to  do  and  how  it  is  to  be  done  ; 
an  aim  and  a  doctrine  are  necessary. 

How  many  millions  would  be  saved  every  year,  if  we  could 
come  to  an  agreement,  not  about  all  types  of  ship  (that  would  be 
asking  too  much  in  the  existing  anarchy  of  ideas),  but  merely 
about  a  single  one.  We  would  then  have  a  vessel  whose  char- 
acteristics would  be  well  defined,  which  would  respond  to  a  pre- 
cise object  and  fulfil  fixed  conditions  ;  each  new  unit  would  be 
but  the  improved  reproduction  of  the  preceding  one.  Then  by 
specializing  constructions  by  public  and  private  shipyards,  we 
should  arrive  at  having  a  division  of  labor  and  an  industrial 
organization  that,  according  to  some  engineers,  would  procure 
a  saving  of  25  per  cent ;  our  naval  strength  would  find  itself  in- 
creased by  a  quarter.  While  now  each  new  ship  represents  a  new 
work,  new  models,  new  installations,  new  principles,  new  bargains. 

And  progress? 

Let  us  understand  one  another.  Naval  material  is  not  the 
result  of  the  more  or  less  ingenious  conceptions  of  various  per- 
sons ;  it  ought  to  derive  from  the  needs  of  warfare.  Therefore, 
all  units  of  the  same  type  ought  to  have  points  in  common.  Prog- 
ress will  not  consist  in  always  making  something  new ;  it  will  con- 
sist in  perfecting  the  old.  Thus  we  shall  have  more  powerful 
guns  on  a  less  weight,  stronger  machinery  in  less  space,  more 
resisting  armor  of  less  thickness  and,  finally,  better  lines ;  but  the 
general  dispositions  of  the  plan  will  remain  the  same.  Neither 
is  it  necessary,  on  each  new  vessel,  to  turn  all  the  arrangements 
upside  down  so  that  six  months  are  needed  to  know  one's  ship. 

Well,  where  can  there  be  found  any  continuity  in  passing  from 
the  Redoutable  to  the  Suifren,  through  the  Duperre,  Formidable, 
Magenta^  Brennus,  Bouvet  and  Charlemagne ,  without  counting 
the  Requin,  Jemmapes  and  Bouvines?  They  all  have  dififerent 
forms,  dififerent  systems  of  armor  protection,  a  dififerent  battery 
arrangement,  etc. 

248 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

What  happened,  between  the  first  and  the  last,  that  necessitated 
this  incoherent  diversity  ?  Nothing,  except  that  each  of  those  who 
contributed  to  the  bringing  forth  of  these  ships  worked  for  his 
own  account  and  had  his  own  special  point  of  view,  without  there 
appearing  anywhere  a  guiding  principle.  Thus  we  have  Mr.  X's 
ship,  Mr.  Y's  ship but  we  are  still  waiting  for  the  im- 
personal ship  that  meets  the  requirements  of  war.  It  is  clearly 
to  be  seen  that  each  constructor  has  sought  the  solution  of  a 
problem  that  interested  him ;  usually  he  has  found  it ;  but  he  has 
remained  outside  of  the  question. 

And  so  it  is  that  our  navy  is  composed  of  sexless  vessels,  the 
degenerate  products  of  hybrid  conceptions. 

Seeing  the  usage  that  has  been  made  of  progress,  one  is 
tempted  to  believe  that  it  sometimes  marches  backwards. 

Where  is  progress  when,  beyond  17  knots,  the  Massena  wastes 
in  vain  efforts  the  power  of  her  machinery?  Where  is  progress 
when,  after  having  abandoned  on  the  Boiivet  and  Charlemagne 
the  battery  arrangement  of  the  Brenniis,  it  is  returned  to  on  the 
Suifren?  Where  is  progress  when  there  is  thought  of  adopting 
to-day  a  form  of  conning-tower  that  was  to  be  found  on  the 
Gloire  thirty  years  ago.  Does  progress  prevent  coming  to  an 
understanding,  once  for  all,  as  to  the  arrangement  of  piping,  of 
auxiliary  engines,  of  subdivisions,  of  the  drainage  system,  of  the 
handling  of  boats,  of  ventilation,  of  superstructures,  of  interior 
fittings  ? 

What  happens,  in  the  midst  of  this  anarchy?  Just  this, — as 
soon  as  a  vessel  is  commissioned,  line  officers  and  engineers  take 
possession  of  her  to  change  her  from  top  to  bottom,  and,  until  her 
death,  this  martyr  to  transformation  will  never  moor  off  an  ar- 
senal without  becoming  the  prey  of  workmen.  They  interpose, 
juxtapose,  superpose ;  they  add  but  never  take  away.  Then  the 
vessel  sinks  deeper,  always  deeper.  After  a  few  years,  her  armor 
belt  becomes  useless ;  sunk  beneath  the  water,  it  no  longer  is  any- 
thing but  an  enormous  useless  burden. 

Each  modification,  taken  by  itself,  seems  to  increase  the  value 
of  the  vessel ;  all  joined  together  diminish  it,  because  the  ship, 
built  to  have  fixed  arrangements,  does  not  accommodate  itself  to 
those  that  are  afterwards  added,  and  because  each  one  pulls  in  his 
own  direction  without  regard  to  harmony. 

All  this  costs  dear,  all  the  dearer  that  the  work  is  done  under 

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uneconomical  conditions,  taking  advantage  of  short  stays  in  har- 
bors to  send  on  board  workmen  who  lose  half  their  time  in  coming 
and  going.  And  it  may  well  be  asked  if  it  would  not  have  been 
better  to  utilize  all  our  vessels,  such  as  they  were,  and  to  devote 
all  those  millions  to  building  new  ones.  Our  naval  strength  would 
certainly  have  been  greater  than  it  now  is. 

Do  you  know  what  our  mania  for  change  cost  us  at  the  time  of 
the  Fashoda  incident?  The  disability  of  six  battleships,  of  an 
entire  squadron !    We  could  cite  their  names. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  be  too  exclusive :  it  must  not  be  made  a 
fixed  principle  not  to  touch  a  vessel  any  more  after  she  has  finished 
her  trials. 

Reconstructions,  when  they  are  carried  out  according  to  a  com- 
plete plan  in  which  everything  is  made  to  harmonize,  can  give 
renewed  youth  to  old  vessels  of  no  value;  but  then  it  is  needful 
to  execute  them  at  one  time,  and  rapidly.  Well,  since  vessels  are 
periodically  laid  up  by  the  need  of  new  boilers,  that  is  plainly  the 
time  to  do  other  work  on  board.  Except  at  this  period,  work 
should  be  limited  to  making  repairs,  and  the  moment  of  going 
into  dock  ought  even  to  be  waited  for  except  when  they  are  of  an 
urgent  character. 

The  complexity  and  variety  of  present-day  material  are  such 
that  vessels  are  no  longer  properly  fitted  out ;  it  has  become  im- 
possible to  find  one's  way  in  the  labyrinth.  Some  ships  put  to  sea 
with  their  material  incomplete ;  on  others  the  arsenals  mask  their 
poverty  by  putting  on  board  them  rejected  articles,  made  for  other 
vessels,  and  whose  sole  use  is  to  fill  the  blanks  in  the  equipment 
sheets.  And  this  distressful  state  comes  from  the  fact  that, 
nothing  being  interchangeable,  not  even  the  simplest  objects,  it  is 
impossible  to  constitute  storehouses  that  will  function  properly. 

The  coming  into  use  of  steam  and  steel,  by  turning  our  naval 
material  topsy-turvy,  must  inevitably  throw  ideas  into  some  con- 
fusion ;  but  this  disorder,  the  consequence  of  a  period  of  transi- 
tion, ought  to  have  ended  with  the  latter;  and  it  has  remained 
permanent.  Yet  it  would  seem  that  steam,  armor,  rifled  cannon, 
and  torpedoes  are  of  sufficiently  ancient  date  for  the  rules  that 
ought  to  direct  their  employment  to  have  been  fixed  upon.  For 
fifteen  years  there  has  been  nothing  apparent  that  might  have 
prevented  the  organization  of  our  forces  in  a  reasonable  and 
economical  manner ;  nothing  except  the  absence  of  a  doctrine. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

There  exist,  nevertheless,  general  principles  that  are  inde- 
pendent of  new  inventions,  and  that  might  have  served  as  a  guide. 
Here  are  some  of  them. 

The  power  of  guns  is  one  thing ;  the  intensity  of  their  fire  is 
another ;  one  has  no  value  without  the  other.  If  we  allow  our- 
selves to  be  hypnotized  by  power  alone,  we  will  build  bigger  and 
bigger  guns  that  will  naturally  be  less  and  less  numerous.  The 
preponderance  of  power  will  soon  end  in  an  absurdity,  under  the 
form  of  Tonnerres  and  Caimans. 

Speed  is  a  factor  in  strength ;  but  still  it  is  necessary  that  it 
should  not  require  an  increase  of  personnel  that  vessels  do  not 
possess  in  regular  service ;  otherwise  one  finds  himself  in  the 
position  of  a  capitalist  who  has  a  great  fortune  but  whose  posses- 
sions are  sequestrated. 

It  is  the  same  with  the  radius  of  action.  The  arrangement  of 
bunkers  ought  to  permit  getting  the  coal  to  the  furnaces  ;  in  war 
time  the  personnel  will  be  worn  out  by  constant  vigils,  and  it  will 
not  be  possible  to  employ  it  every  day  in  transporting  coal  from 
one  bunker  to  another. 

Neither  is  the  speed  with  which  a  vessel  can  fill  up  with  coal  a 
matter  of  indifference ;  it  plays  a  part  in  military  operations,  and 
the  author  of  plans  ought  to  take  account  of  it. 

Supplying  a  fleet  with  ammunition  is  so  much  the  easier  as  the 
material  is  less  various.  It  is  time,  therefore,  to  put  a  curb  upon 
this  debauch  of  novelty  that  has  cost  us  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
eight  different  projectiles.  Progress  can  perhaps  manifest  itself 
less  continuously  and  proceed  by  successive  leaps,  so  that  before 
loading  our  shell  rooms  and  magazines  with  a  new  projectile  we 
may  be  sure  of  an  appreciable  advance.  People  do  not  seem  to 
have  realized  the  effect  that  this  motley  material  will  have  upon 
strategy.  It  will  interdict  every  displacement  of  forces  because 
for  each  squadron  there  will  be  but  a  single  port  capable  of  renew- 
ing the  contents  of  its  magazines. 

Nobody  doubts  the  utility  of  armor ;  still  it  is  necessary  that  its 
weight  should  be  in  proportion  to  the  offensive  power  whose 
value  it  enhances.  In  the  equation  of  displacement  of  a  ship  there 
is,  therefore,  a  fixed  relation  between  the  two  terms,  protection 
and  armament. 

The  ventilation  of  warships  ought  to  take  account  of  battle  con- 
ditions ;  well,  on  certain  battleships  where  the  ventilators  have 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

inlets  on  the  battery  deck,  it  has  been  completely  lost  sight  of  that 
the  noxious  gases  from  bursting  shell  will  be  drawn  down  into  the 
engine  and  fire  rooms  and  will  compel  their  abandonment. 

A\'hen  the  needs  of  taking  stations  for  battle  require  the  pres- 
ence of  ten  persons  in  a  conning-tower,  it  is  regrettable  to  be  able 
to  accommodate  only  half  that  number. 

Finally,  simplicity  and  strength  are  two  military  factors  whose 
importance  is  often  preponderant. 

Considerations  of  this  sort  apply  not  only  to  the  interior  organi- 
zation of  a  ship,  but  also  to  the  part  it  is  intended  to  play. 

It  has  never  been  considered  doubtful  that  the  light  vessels 
which  radiate  from  squadrons  should  have  a  radius  of  action 
superior  to  that  of  the  force  to  which  they  are  attached.  All  the 
scouts  of  Condor  type,  which  are  incapable  of  keeping  the  sea  as 
long  as  a  battleship,  are,  therefore,  only  dead  and  useless  capital. 
These  observations  could  be  continued  indefinitely. 
\Mience  comes  it  then  that  it  has  taken  several  generations  of 
ships  to  elucidate  a  part  of  these  questions,  and  that  others  still 
remain  without  solution? 

In  the  first  place,  uncertainty  of  ideas :  we  shall  never  possess  a 
material  appropriate  to  the  conditions  of  war  so  long  as  we  do  not 
know  exactly  how  it  will  be  employed.  Then,  from  the  applica- 
tion of  a  defective  method.  In  the  conception  of  a  ship,  there  are 
two  different  points  of  view  to  consider :  power  and  efficiency, 
theory  and  practice.  Well,  all  the  anachronisms  we  have  pointed 
out  merely  reveal  the  struggle  between  these  two  factors,  a  strug- 
gle in  which  power  tends  always  to  absorb  efficiency  because  it 
manifests  itself  more  directly  to  the  eyes  of  the  constructor. 
Efficiency,  on  the  contrary,  is  a  modest  personage  whose  qualities 
only  reveal  themselves  after  much  acquaintance.  But  to  obtain  a 
harmonious  product,  these  two  rival  elements  must  be  joined 
together. 

Before  undertaking  to  lay  down  a  ship,  therefore,  a  sort  of  list 
of  conditions  ought  to  be  drawn  up  that  would  not  only  indicate 
its  characteristics,  but  would  show  under  their  various  aspects  the 
elements  of  efficiency  and  would  impose  absolutely  such  solutions 
as  were  already  acquired. 

The  day  when  this  ideal  shall  have  been  attained,  a  progress 
will  have  been  realized  much  more  important  than  that  which 
consists  of  doing  the  opposite  of  what  has  been  done  before.    We 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

shall  then  be  guided  by  a  common  idea  that  will  economize  much 
money  and  much  labor. 

There  is  complaint,  and  with  good  reason,  that  the  French 
Navy  takes  five  years  instead  of  two  to  build  a  ship,  so  that  ves- 
sels are  out  of  date  before  entering  active  service.  The  reason  for 
this  is  quite  simple :  the  workmen  who  build  our  fleet  are  the 
same  who  worked  on  the  tower  of  Babel. 


This  confusion  would  not  exist  if  we  had  a  doctrine.  But 
wdiat  is  this  famous  doctrine  then? 

It  is  the  bond  thanks  to  which  all  those  who  participate  in  a 
common  work  act  in  accordance  with  common  ideas  and  prin- 
ciples. If  we  do  not  possess  this  connecting-link,  each  will  act 
according-  to  his  own  inspirations  ;  and  there  are  a  great  manv 
chances  against  hitting  on  the  true  solution.  For,  as  we  have 
already  said,  war  is  not  a  matter  of  improvisation ;  it  is  something 
to  be  learned.  It  is  subject  to  very  definite  laws  that  disengage 
themselves  from  the  results  of  previous  struggles  ;  and  it  is  this 
aggregate  of  rules  that  constitutes  the  doctrine. 

Some  fifteen  years  ago  the  navy  was  flooded  with  articles  and 
anonymous  pamphlets  whose  authors  thought  they  were  inventing 
naval  war.  Under  the  pretence  of  modernizing  military  science, 
they  assumed  to  free  themselves  from  the  past ;  and  thev  did  not 
perceive  that  they  were  thus  making  war  as  children  do  when  they 
amuse  themselves  with  lead  soldiers.  It  was  they  who  preached 
that  scattering  of  our  forces  which  the  Minister  of  Marine  has 
called  a  sanitary  cordon,  and  who  thought  they  had  found  the  true 
formula  when  they  had  placed  a  fraction  of  our  forces  everywhere 
where  the  enemy  could  appear.  What  remains  of  these  lucubra- 
tions to-day,  in  the  realm  of  ideas?  Scarcely  a  memory,  because 
they  did  not  rest  upon  a  solid  base.  But  as  far  as  our  material  is 
concerned,  the  influence  of  these  amateurs  has  been  considerable. 
Nobody  had  set  forth  the  principles  of  naval  warfare,  and  we  had 
no  doctrine  to  oppose  to  these  childish  conceptions.  The  result 
was  that  the  public  adopted  them,  and  they  had  sufficient  effect  to 
give  a  trend  to  our  naval  construction  that  has  fatally  damaged 
the  navy. 

Fortunately,  the  War  College,  newly  created,  came  to  act  as 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

counterpoise  ;  and  little  by  little  the  doctrine  has  emerged  from  the 
teaching  of  this  school.  Well,  its  mere  existence  sufficed  to  arrest 
the  development  of  ephemeral  ideas ;  for  its  teaching"  does  not 
rest  upon  affirmations,  like  works  of  pure  imagination,  but  upon 
demonstrations.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  the  doctrine  takes  a 
long  time  in  developing  and  requires  the  co-operation  of  a  suc- 
cession of  professors  each  of  whom  brings  his  contribution  to  the 
common  edifice.  The  building  is  already  well  advanced,  and  it 
must  be  said  that  the  exclusive  credit  for  it  belongs  to  the  War 
College,  whose  teachings  have  spread  even  outside  of  the  navy ; 
we  have  had  proof  of  this  in  the  discussion  of  the  naval  appropria- 
tion bill.'" 

We  can,  therefore,  face  the  future  with  confidence ;  for  the 
moment  we  have  to  liquidate  a  past  whose  debt  is  very  heavy. 

* 

We  possess  all  the  elements  necessary  for  constructing  as  well 
and  even  better  than  no  matter  what  nation ;  our  sea-coast  popu- 
lation, so  devoted,  is  capable  of  supplying  incomparable  crews. 
What  we  have  lacked  is  guidance.  We  do  not  succeed  in  agree- 
ing as  to  what  we  need ;  and  thenceforth  it  becomes  impossible  to 
introduce  the  spirit  of  continuity  into  our  organism. 

The  English  admirals  are  not  those  who  built  up  the  naval 
power  of  their  country.  If  England  has  had  Rodney,  Hawke  and 
Nelson,  we  have  had  Duquesne,  Tourville  and  Suffren.  It  is  that 
impersonal  being  that  is  called  the  English  Admiralty ;  it  is  that 
which  has  prepared  all  the  elements  of  British  greatness  ;  it  is  that 
which  has  known  how  to  create  homogeneous  fleets,  to  arm  them, 
equip  them,  enlist  crews  for  them  (God  knows  at  the  price  of 
what  sacrifices)  ;  to  place  at  their  head  the  m>ost  capable  men. 
Its  severity  has  often  been  excessive  ;  but,  in  exchange,  it  has 
never  haggled  with  admirals  for  its  support. 

What  a  spectacle  the  French  Navy  afforded  us  during  this 
time !  Directed  alternately  by  men  of  genius  and  by  incapables, 
it  described   a   sinusoid,   passing  alternately   from   greatness   to 

'"  In  this  discussion,  M.  Benazet  has  done  me  the  great  honor  of  quoting 
me  as  professor  of  strategy  at  the  War  College.  It  is  all  the  more  pleasant 
to  render  homage  to  the  professors  of  this  school  that  I  have  only  been 
there  as  a  pupil. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

nothingness/"  While  army  officers,  such  as  d'Estrees ""  and 
d'Estaing,  commanded  its  fleets,  men  like  La  Motte-Picquet  and 
Suffren  remamed  in  subordinate  positions.  But  what  was  most 
fatal  was  letting  ourselves  be  dazzled  by  the  charm  of  figures, 
seeking  number  without  strength.  Hence  those  squadrons  that 
put  to  sea  with  incomplete  crews,  an  incomplete  armament,  incom- 
plete supplies.  In  brief,  under  the  Monarchy,  indifference  or  ill- 
will  ;  under  the  Revolution,  anarchy  ;  under  the  Empire,  impotence. 

To-day,  it  is  another  affair.  The  magic  of  words  has  replaced 
the  magic  of  figures.  We  have  a  scientific  school  that  integrates 
war.  From  all  this  jumble,  vague  formulae  disengage  themselves : 
defensive,  police  of  the  seas,  coast  defense,  commerce  destroying. 
All  this  while  war  is  forgotten,  that  work  of  force  and  destruc- 
tion ;  war,  with  its  laws,  its  necessities,  its  exigences.  Each 
wishes  to  dress  the  navy  in  his  own  fashion,  and,  adding  a  piece  to 
its  cloak,  contributes  to  dressing  it  out  like  a  harlequin. 

A  Minister  of  Marine,  contemplating  all  this  disorder,  cried 
out :  "  Our  fleet  is  a  fleet  of  samples."  The  phrase,  struck  like  a 
coin  from  the  die,  has  remained — the  thing  also."° 

"*  But  for  the  Knights  of  Malta,  who  furnished  France  with  a  perma- 
nent reserve  of  officers,  the  navy  would  never  have  been  able  periodically 
to  raise  itself  from  its  ruins. 

"'  It  is  not  necessary  to  be  acquainted  with  naval  history  to  baptize 
ships  with  the  names  of  d'Estrees  and  d'Estaing. 

"*  The  institutions,  traditions  and  social  condition  of  a  country  often 
have  an  unexpected  reaction  upon  military  history.  In  the  eighteenth 
century,  the  system  of  storehouses,  so  opposed  to  the  mobility  of  armies, 
was  a  consequence  of  the  method  of  recruiting  of  that  period;  it  gave  rise 
to  prejudices  and  traditions  still  more  fatal.  Linear  tactics  itself  arose 
from  the  necessity  of  always  keeping  the  mercenary  troops  under  the 
immediate  authority  of  their  leaders. 

There  were  facts  of  the  same  kind  in  the  old  navy.  The  prejudice  of 
birth  caused  commissions  as  officers  to  be  given  to  people  who  had  no  sea 
experience.  The  defective  enlistment  of  crews  was  connected  with  the 
social  state  of  the  realm.  In  the  matter  of  tactics,  we  shall  point  out  in  a 
subsequent  volume  the  conventions  that  perverted  its  spirit. 

Even  to-day  the  influence  of  considerations  foreign  to  war  makes  itself 
felt.    It  will  be  enough  to  cite  two  examples  of  this. 

Any  seaman  who  knows  the  principles  of  the  composition  of  squadrons, 
unless  blinded  by  custom  and  tradition,  would  be  astonished  to  see  the 
Formidable  at  the  head  of  coast-defense  vessels  that  have  absolutely  dif- 
ferent characteristics.  Yet  that  is  what  could  have  been  seen  only  a  few 
years  ago.    This  assemblage  was  the  very  negation  of  the  good  utilization 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

of  forces.  Every  one  understands  this,  but  tradition  requires  tliat  a  vice- 
admiral  shall  fly  his  flag  on  a  battleship  of  large  size ;  so  much  the  worse 
for  tactics  and  strategy. 

It  is  agreed  that  torpedo-boats  ought  to  be  commanded  by  young  officers. 
The  conditions  of  life  on  board  them  can  only  be  supported  by  the  insou- 
ciance of  youth,  while  the  adventurous  side  of  their  sort  of  attack  requires 
that  its  character  shall  not  have  been  too  deeply  considered.  Well,  since 
their  creation,  three  mobile  defences  (those  of  Algeria,  Tunis  and  Corsica) 
have  been  monopolized  by  old  lieutenants.  It  is  wholly  a  question  of 
money.  These  commands  are  allowed  table  expenses,  and  officers  who 
have  only  their  service  to  make  the  most  of  must  have  reached  a  certain 
age  in  order  to  have  a  share  of  this  earthly  manna. 

When,  in  a  military  organization,  acts  are  no  longer  in  accord  with 
principles,  disorganization  is  near  at  hand. 


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V. 

Grand  Maneuvers. 

The  grand  maneuvers  have  been  of  incontestable  advantage  to 
the  navy.  They  have  been  the  means  of  stirring  the  torpor  of  our 
squadrons,  which,  without  them,  would  waste  away  in  inaction, 
since  they  have  been  deprived  of  the  coal  and  personnel  necessary 
for  cruising.  It  is  only  during  these  periods  of  activity  that  some 
of  the  necessities  of  war  can  be  taken  account  of.  They  train 
crews  and  officers  ;  they  show  commanders  that  in  war  time  they 
will  be  obliged  to  give  over  a  part  of  their  authority  in  order  to 
rest,  while,  during  short  sorties,  they  assume  to  do  everything 
themselves.  From  all  these  points  of  view  there  is  only  benefit  to 
be  derived  from  annual  maneuvers. 

As  far  as  strategy  is  concerned,  they  furnish  indications  rather 
than  conclusions.  The  sole  fact  that  the  guns  are  not  loaded  gives 
the  operations  a  conventional  form.  When  it  is  sure  that  an 
encounter  with  the  enemy  will  not  have  irreparable  consequences, 
it  costs  nothing  to  attempt  the  most  unlikely  adventures  ;  and  the 
rules  that  impose  themselves  immediately  one  risks  the  fate  of  his 
ship  are  thus  deviated  from. 

It  is  above  all  exercises  of  getting  and  keeping  contact  that  are 
given  a  false  aspect  by  the  fictitious  character  of  maneuvers.  It 
can  be  foreseen  that  when  shell  are  fired  a  new  light  will  be  shed 
upon  the  conclusions  of  times  of  peace. 

The  frequency  of  attacks  upon  batteries  seems,  for  example,  to 
indicate  that  naval  material  could  be  freely  risked  in  an  operation 
of  this  sort,  whereas  the  Chinese-Japanese,  Spanish-American 
and  Russo-Japanese  wars  seem  to  prove  the  contrary.  Moreover, 
the  fashion  in  which  these  attacks  have  sometimes  been  conducted 
leads  to  the  supposition  that  what  is  sought  is  less  to  extinguish 
the  fire  of  the  batteries  than  to  be  safe  from  their  shots,  in  which 
case  the  only  logical  conclusion  is  that  it  would  be  better  to  ab- 
stain altogether. 

But  a  greater  danger  comes  from  the  choice  of  themes  when 
they  are  false  a  priori.  They  then  reveal  regrettable  tendencies 
and  completely  falsify  the  spirit  of  the  maneuvers.    Admiral  Aube, 

257 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

to  whom  belongs  the  honor  of  having  introduced  these  annual 
tests  into  our  navy,  would  be  greatly  astonished,  if  he  were  living, 
to  see  the  use  that  has  been  made  of  them. 

At  a  certain  period,  the  question  of  protecting  the  coast  with  a 
force  superior  to  the  enemy's  could  not  be  escaped  from.  What 
was  sought  to  be  proved  ?  That  the  principal  role  of  the  navy  is 
coast  defense?  Or  even  that  we  have  no  better  use  to  make  of 
our  forces  than  to  immobilize  them  along  the  coast,  even  with 
numerical  superiority?  The  result  has  been  to  spread  abroad  false 
ideas  that  some  day  will  return  to  trouble  us. 

The  officers  themselves  are  influenced  by  these  dangerous  prac- 
tices. By  repeating  indefinitely  the  same  exercises,  they  end  by 
persuading  themselves  that  things  ought  to  be  just  so ;  that  they 
cannot  happen  otherwise ;  and  this  impression  becomes  a  part  of 
them  without  being  discussed.  The  day  when  one  passes  from 
convention  to  reality,  one  quite  naturally  recurs  to  giving  the 
same  solution  to  the  same  problems. 

It  is  important,  therefore,  to  put  in  practice  only  likely  themes, 
and  to  apply  them  in  a  likely  manner. 

Thank  heaven  we  are  speaking  of  a  time  already  long  past ;  in 
the  periods  when  the  fleet  was  formed,  the  importance  of  the 
effectives  permitted  enlarging  the  circle  of  combinations,  and  it 
was  sought  to  elucidate  questions  of  greater  interest  than  the  ever- 
lasting coast  defense ;  but,  there  again,  the  details  of  execution 
brought  out  regrettable  consequences. 

The  cycle  of  our  maneuvers  is  not  yet  closed.  Many  points 
upon  which  there  is  need  of  throwing  a  ray  of  light  still  remain 
obscure.  For  example :  there  have  already  been  several  attempts 
to  break  blockades ;  but  it  ought  first  to  be  ascertained  if  they*  are 
still  possible  with  submarines  in  existence,  and  under  what  con- 
ditions.'" Commerce  destroying  itself  also  affords  a  vast  field  for 
investigations.  Almost  nothing  is  known  of  the  problems  that  its 
application  raises ;  hitherto  it  has  only  been  pointed  out  to  us 
through  economic  considerations  that  relegate  it  to  the  domain 
of  pure  theory."* 

"^  This  exercise  can  only  be  productive  if  it  lasts  long  enough  to  put  the 
destroyers  to  the  proof  and  if  it  includes  periods  of  calm  and  of  bad 
weather. 

"*  Ought  commerce  destroyers  to  act  singly  or  in  groups  ?  In  the 
latter  case,  how  should  they  cruise?    At  what  distance  will  they  distinguish 

258 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Finally,  it  has  been  so  much  repeated  that  it  is  possible  to  assure 
the  protection  of  the  coast  solely  with  flotillas  of  torpedo-boats 
and  submarines  that  it  is  time  to  justify  the  assertion.  We  possess 
in  the  Mediterranean  numerous  defense  flotillas  and  a  veritable 
fleet  that  would  be  capable  of  playing  the  part  of  assailant.  We, 
therefore,  have  in  hand  all  the  elements  needed  to  clear  up  this 
question. 

For  a  long  time  yet  we  have  plenty  to  give  an  always  new  in- 
terest to  our  maneuvers. 

a  merchant  steamer  from  a  hostile  cruiser?  Will  this  distance  be  sufficient 
to  permit  escaping?  How  long  will  it  take  to  visit  a  vessel?  What 
should  be  done  with  vessels  that  are  captured?  Will  not  the  time  lost  in 
visiting  vessels  allow  cruisers  to  interfere  with  the  operations  of  com- 
merce destroyers  and  to  endanger  their  safety?  Will  visiting  be  kept  up 
at  night?  If  so,  how  may  unlucky  encounters  be  avoided?  How  long  will 
it  take  for  cruisers  to  clear  a  region  of  commerce  destroyers? 


VI. 
The  War  Game. 

In  default  of  grand  maneuvers,  the  war  t^ame,  wliich  is  within 
the  reach  of  all  purses,  can  be  employed ;  with  it  the  whole  fleet 
can  be  mobilized  and  an  unlimited  duration  can  be  given  to  opera- 
tions ;  but  it  should  be  used  with  discretion. 

P>om  the  tactical  point  of  view,  distractions  of  this  sort  ought 
to  be  repudiated.  Battle  depends  wholly  upon  the  intelligence  of 
the  commander ;  and  tactics  is  only  the  slave  of  this  intelligence. 
Well,  it  is  impossible,  with  toys,  to  approach  even  remotely  to  the 
reality;  and  there  is  risk  of  warping  one's  judgment  by  taking 
what  is  only  a  game  seriously. 

In  strategy,  on  the  contrary,  the  war  game  can  render  some 
service.  Thus,  it  will  show,  better  than  maneuvers,  what  be- 
comes of  scouting  lines  as  soon  as  narrow  seas  are  left.  But  it 
must  not  be  forgotten  that  on  the  board  the  sea  is  always  calm ; 
vessels  can  always  give  their  full  speed  without  ever  suffering 
from  scale  in  the  boilers ;  in  short,  damages  to  the  machinery 
need  not  be  feared.  Here  again  general  indications  must  be 
sought  rather  than  precise  conclusions. 


260 


FIFTH  PART 


EXAMPLES 


*  The  Russo-Japanese  War  has  not  been  considered  under  this  head 
because  it  has  been  the  subject  of  a  special  work  (La  Luttc  four  I'ciiifirc 
de  la  mer),  to  which  we  refer  the  reader. 


The  War  of  American  Independence. 

We  shall  begin  by  drawing  a  comparison  between  the  War  of 
American  Independence  and  Napoleon's  great  strategic  enterprise. 
We  have  chosen. these  two  examples  on  account  of  the  considerable 
development  of  forces  that  they  occasioned ;  and,  although  the 
final  result  seems  to  be  in  favor  of  the  principles  that  directed  the 
war  of  1778,  we  think  that  an  attentive  examination  of  the  differ- 
ent conditions  of  our  navy  at  the  two  periods  will  give  quite 
another  impression. 

The  War  of  American  Independence  opens  with  the  sending  of 
d'Estaing  to  America,  with  twelve  ships  carrying  troops.  There 
was  urgent  need  of  sending  help  to  the  insurgents,  in  order  to 
weaken  England's  military  strength  and  to  oblige  her  to  maintain 
an  important  naval  force  at  a  great  distance.'™  In  July  took  place 
the  encounter  between  d'Orvilliers  and  Keppel  off  Ouessant.  The 
action  was  indecisive,  but  it  enabled  the  two  sides  to  estimate  their 
respective  strengths. 

In  August  operations  began  to  take  on  the  character  of  inde^ 
cision  and  incoherence  that  they  continued  to  have  throughout  the 
war. 

D'Orvilliers,  after  having  repaired  his  injuries,  started  out 
again  on  August  16  and  established  himself  on  a  cruising  ground 
between  Cape  Finisterre  and  Ouessant ;  then  he  returned  to  Brest 
without  having  either  sought  or  met  the  enemy.  The  squadron 
v/as  then  broken  up  into  small  divisions  that  cruised  in  the  Channel 
and  the  Gulf  of  Gascony  until  winter. 

^~^  A  naval  writer  has  given  out  the  opinion  that  it  would  have  been  better 
to  send  d'Estaing  to  Brest  to  reinforce  d'Orvilliers'  squadron.  But 
d'Estaing's  departure  precedes  the  sortie  of  the  Brest  squadron  by  more 
than  three  months,  and  it  seems  that  it  was  of  more  importance  to  aid  as 
soon  as  possible  the  American  colonies  so  as  not  to  run  the  risk  of  seeing 
them  succumb,  which  would  have  enabled  England  to  recall  her  troops  and 
vessels.  Moreover,  we  have  seen  that  the  junction,  under  existing  condi- 
tions, was  an  operation  difficult  to  bring  about,  and  the  very  one  that 
Keppel  was  instructed  to  prevent. 

263 


A  Study  of  Navai.  Strategy. 

Thus  the  Navy  Department  fell  back  into  its  old  ways ;  at  first 
it  pretended  to  intercept  convoys  by  means  of  a  fleet  of  sufficient 
strength  not  to  fear  an  encounter ;  then,  seeing  the  feeble  result 
obtained,  it  sought,  by  means  of  small  divisions,  to  cover  a  more 
extensive  area  of  the  sea.  The  two  solutions  were  equally  bad. 
So  long  as  the  French  squadron  remained  concentrated,  its  action 
only  made  itself  felt  at  the  place  where  it  was ;  as  soon  as  it  was 
divided,  it  lost  its  strength  and  ran  the  risk  of  being  destroyed  in 
detail.  The  role  of  squadrons  is  to  fight  the  enemy  to  win  command 
of  the  sea ;  light  vessels  can  then,  in  full  security,  attack  commerce, 
without  prejudice  to  all  the  other  advantages  that  flow  from  the 
suppression  of  the  adversary's  military  forces. 

Since  France  did  not  have  sufficient  strength  on  the  coast  of 
Europe  to  adopt  this  course,  she  ought  to  have  sought  another 
field  and  to  have  sent  d'Orvilliers'  vessels  to  the  West  Indies,  tak- 
ing everv  precaution  to  conceal  their  departure.  She  could  do  so 
without  interference,  since  England,  stripped  of  troops,  was  unable 
to  attempt  any  important  enterprise  against  our  shores,  and,  in 
fact,  never  thought  of  doing  so  during  the  following  years,  when 
our  vessels  remained  whole  summers  on  the  Spanish  coast. 

From  the  mere  fact  of  Spain's  alliance  wnth  France,  England 
found  herself,  in  1779,  threatened  with  attack  in  her  home  waters 
by  forces  double  those  that  she  could  oppose  to  the  coalition.  The 
Allies,  instead  of  profiting  by  the  opportunity  that  offered  to  strike 
a  deadly  blow-,  gave  England  her  sole  chance  of  safety  by  pursuing 
two  objects  at  the  same  time ;  the  siege  of  Gibraltar  and  an  in- 
vasion of  England.  In  spite  of  this  disjunction,  d'Orvilliers  could 
enter  the  Channel  with  seventy  ships,  where  the  English  had 
scarcely  forty.  But  the  dispositions  had  been  so  ill  taken  that  this 
immense  armament  dispersed  without  having  done  anything. 

In  the  beginning  of  1780,  there  happened  to  Admiral  Don  Juan 
de  Langara  one  of  those  adventures  to  which  divisions  sent  to 
cruise  where  merchant  ships  make  a  landfall  are  exposed.  Having 
only  nine  ships,  he  was  surprised  by  Rodney,  who  was  going  to 
Gibraltar  with  twenty-one  ships  to  revictual  that  place.  Only  two 
vessels  succeeded  in  escaping. 

Though  it  is  impossible  wholly  to  escape  the  surprises  that  con- 
stitute one  of  the  fortunes  of  war,  the  chances  of  untoward  en- 
counters at  sea  can  nevertheless  be  lessened  by  the  aid  of  informa- 
tion as  to  the  force,  position   and  probable  objective  of  hostile 

264 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

squadrons.  But  when  a  weak  squadron  is  obliged  to  take  station 
in  a  region  that  is  in  itself  a  center  of  attraction,  it  ought  to  expect 
to  be  attacked  there  by  superior  forces,  because  it  cannot  for  long 
conceal  its  presence. 

In  the  spring,  twenty  French  vessels  were  sent  to  Cadiz,  where 
they  placed  themselves  under  the  orders  of  Don  Luis  de  Cordova. 
This  admiral  made  two  sorties  of  short  duration,  and  had  the  luck 
to  capture  a  convoy.  It  was  the  sole  use  that  he  succeeded  in 
making  of  the  immense  forces  at  his  disposal.  Impatient  at  the 
inaction  of  its  vessels,  the  Versailles  Cabinet  sent  Vice-Admiral 
d'Estaing  to  Cadiz,  where  he  took  command  of  the  French  squad- 
ron and  brought  it  back  to  Brest. 

On  December  20,  1780,  England  declared  war  against  Holland. 
The  entry  of  the  United  Provinces  into  the  coalition  gave  France 
the  reinforcement  of  a  navy  less  numerous  than  that  of  Spain,  but 
much  more  dependable.  Never  had  conditions  appeared  more 
favorable,  and  it  seemed  as  though  the  campaign  of  1781  ought  to 
terminate  the  war.  Nothing  of  the  sort  happened,  and  the  Allies, 
who  could  have  covered  themselves  with  glory,  covered  themselves 
with  shame. 

Holland  made  war  on  her  own  account,  and  fought  a  useless 
battle  off  the  Dogger-Bank.  As  for  the  sailors  of  the  Bourbons, 
they  again  concentrated  at  Cadiz,  and  the  fleet,  nearly  fifty  vessels 
strong,  entered  the  Mediterranean,  whence  it  stood  up  the  Channel, 
after  having  landed  14,000  men  at  Minorca.^'^" 

The  situation  of  Derby,  who  commanded  the  English  Channel 
Squadron,  was  very  critical.  Having  returned  some  months  before 
from  Gibraltar  (which  he  had  revictualed  without  the  great  Cadiz 
fleet  having  thought  of  molesting  him),  he  had  been  able  to  collect 
no  more  than  thirty  vessels.  Forced  to  withdraw  before  the  com- 
bined fleet,  he  anchored  in  Torbay  Bay  and  made  arrangements  to 
fight.  Upon  the  decision  taken  by  the  Allies  depended  the  issue 
of  the  war.  With  the  exception  of  seven  ships  that  were  operating 
in  the  North  Sea  under  Parker,"^  Derby's  fleet  was  the  sole  de- 

""  Port  Mahon  capitulated  on  February  6,  1782.  It  was  the  sole  advan- 
tage gained  in  Europe  during  the  five  years  of  war.  Such  a  result  would 
tend  to  throw  doubt  upon  the  efficiency  of  navies,  if  we  adopt  the  opinion 
of  those  who  consider  that  the  War  of  American  Independence  was  a 
glorious  period  for  us. 

^^^  Protecting  convoys  from  the  Baltic. 

265 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

fence  that  England  could  oj^jpose  to  an  army  of  invasion  and  to  the 
enterprises  of  our  coniincroe  destroyers.  Would  the  Allies  decide 
to  fight?  Until  then  they  had  hcen  ahle  to  claim  that  the  cam- 
paigns of  1779  and  1780  had  not  heen  favorable  for  an  encounter; 
but  this  time  the  enemy  was  there,  inferior  by  almost  half,  and  he 
could  not  escape. 

Then  it  was  that  the  disintegrating  influence  of  councils  of  war 
made  itself  felt.  A  leader  who  has  confidence  in  his  valor 
and  his  strength  goes  to  the  enemy,  without  following  other  coun- 
sels than  those  that  honor  and  duty  dictate  to  him  ;  a  timid  or  cow- 
ardly leader  takes  advice  from  his  subordinates  only  to  shelter 
himself  behind  them  for  decisions  that  he  knows  to  be  bad.  Don 
Luis  de  Cordova,  who  was  commander-in-chief,  had  recourse  to 
this  expedient.  The  council  of  war  decided  that  it  was  not  neces- 
sary to  fight,  and  England  was  saved,  without  effort  on  her  part, 
from  the  sole  fact  that  the  councils  of  the  Allies  had  a  majority 
who  declared  that  ships  of  war,  carrying  cannon,  were  not  made 
to  fight.  In  the  course  of  the  discussion  that  took  place  on  board 
the  Spanish  flagship,  there  was  a  French  officer  who  dared  to  main- 
tain the  paradoxical  opinion  "  that  the  allied  fleets  ought  to  turn 
their  whole  attention  towards  the  object,  easy  to  attain  as  well  as 
important,  of  intercepting  the  British  fleets  returning  home  from 
the  West  Indies.  This  measure  could  not  fail  to  succeed  since 
they  had  command  of  the  sea.  It  would  be  a  terrible  blow  to 
England,^*""  from  which  she  would  not  recover  during  the  war  ;"  and 
no  one  was  found  to  reply  to  M.  de  Beausset  that  these  convoys 
would  be  intercepted  so  much  the  easier  if  the  English  squadron 
could  not  protect  them ;  that  freedom  of  the  sea  does  not  exist  so 
long  as  the  enemy  occupies  it ;  that  attack  upon  commerce  was  not 
as  efficacious  a  method  as  was  claimed,  since  during  three  years  it 
had  produced  no  efitect ;  that  finally  the  terrible  blow  from  which 
England  could  not  recover  was  the  destruction  of  the  sole  im- 
portant force  behind  which  she  was  taking  shelter. 

The  combined  fleet  made  a  useless  cruise  of  short  duration  in 
the  Channel  and  on  September  5  broke  up.  Guichen  returned  to 
Brest  and  Don  Luis  de  Cordova  took  his  impotent  armada  back 
to  Cadiz. 

^*"  It  is  interesting  to  compare  these  words  with  the  phrase  of  Ramatuelle 
that  we  have  quoted',  and  with  theories  in  present  vogue. 

266 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

The  Dogger-Bank  action  was  fought  on  August  5,  at  the 
moment  when  the  events  we  have  just  spoken  of  were  happening. 
The  presence  of  the  Dutch  in  the  North  Sea  then  took  away  from 
Derby  seven  ships,  but  it  deprived  the  allied  fleet  of  an  equal  num- 
ber of  vessels.  Diversions  only  have  a  useful  efifect  on  condition 
that  they  are  made  with  forces  inferior  to  those  they  immobilize 
away  from  the  principal  theater  of  operations,  and  at  such  a  dis- 
tance that  the  return  of  the  latter  cannot  alter  the  state  of  affairs."' 

The  year  1782,  the  last  of  the  war,  was  to  add  still  another 
humiliation  to  all  those  tha,t  the  Allies  had  already  suffered. 

On  June  4,  Don  Luis  de  Cordova  left  Cadiz  with  thirty-seven 
ships,  of  which  live  were  French,'"  and  stood  northward.  In  the 
Channel  he  was  joined  by  La  Motte-Picquet  with  eight  ships,  and 
the  fleet,  forty-five  strong,  began  again  for  the  last  time  its  useless 
cruising.  Howe  was  sighted  at  the  head  of  twenty-two  ships ;  he 
had  no  difficulty  in  escaping.  At  the  beginning  of  August,  the 
combined  fleet  returned  to  Cadiz  ;  on  September  10,  it  anchored  at 
Algeciras,  where  it  took  part  in  the  fruitless  attempt  against 
Gibraltar  that  was  undertaken  at  that  time.'""  On  October  1 1 , 
Lord  Howe  appeared  in  the  Strait,  escorting  an  immense  convoy 
with  thirty-six  ships ;  on  the  14th  he  succeeded  in  getting  his  mer- 
chant ships  within  the  shelter  of  the  guns  of  the  fort,  before  the 
very  eyes  of  fifty  hostile  ships,'*"  and  left  the  Mediterranean,  un- 
molested. It  was  the  third  time  that  England  had  succeeded  in 
revictualing  the  Rock. 

The  capture  of  Gibraltar  was  the  dominant  care  of  the  Spanish 

^*^  The  efficacy  of  diversions  is  not  always  positive.  Their  object  usually 
is  to  force  the  enemy  to  weaken  himself  in  a  certain  region  by  threatening 
him  in  another ;  but  this  result  can  rarely  be  attained  without  being  obliged 
to  weaken  oneself,  and  then  the  gain  is  not  evident. 

Operations  are  often  called  diversions  that  are  not  such.  M.  de  Sartines' 
plan  of  campaign  included  four :  in  America,  in  the  West  Indies,  in  India 
and  in  the  Mediterranean.  Their  object  was  to  separate  the  English  from 
their  coasts.  They  were  wrongly  named,  for  these  diversions  absorbed 
almost  the  whole  French  fleet,  which  could  no  longer  threaten  the  enemy's 
shores  without  recalling  the  forces  detached  to  Spain. 

'^^*  These  vessels  had  been  led  to  Cadiz  by  Guichen  at  the  end  of  the 
preceding  year. 

^^  We  allude  to  the  attack  that  was  to  be  made  by  land  and  by  sea  and 
that  was  interrupted  by  the  failure  of  the  floating  batteries. 

""The  combined  fleet  had  been  reinforced  by  the  vessels  that  were 
stationed  on  the  spot. 

267 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

government  throug-hout  the  war ;  and  the  question  now  arises 
whether  the  method  that  it  adopted  to  realize  its  object  was  the 
best  one. 

Independent  of  direct  attacks,  the  Spanish  proposed  to  reduce 
the  place  by  famine.  To  this  end  they  always  kept  considerable 
forces  in  the  Strait.  Well,  with  apparent  inconsistency,  Rodney, 
Derby  and  Howe  revictualed  Gibraltar  at  the  precise  periods 
when  the  whole  Spanish  fleet  was  concentrated  at  Cadiz ;  so  that 
England  appeared  to  select  the  least  favorable  moment  for  per- 
forming an  operation  that,  in  itself,  presented  serious  difficulties. 
She  could  not  do  otherwise.  As  soon  as  the  Allies  appeared  in  the 
Channel,  England  needed  all  her  forces  to  avert  the  danger  that 
threatened  her  and  she  was  obliged  to  subordinate  her  secondary 
objectives  to  her  principal  objective.  As  soon  as  the  season  re- 
moved from  her  shores  all  immediate  danger,  she  reunited  all  her 
available  vessels,  joined  to  them  those  that  were  assigned  to  her 
foreign  stations,  and  sent  them  to  the  Strait.  After  that  only  a 
tactical  operation  was  required  for  success,  and  she  rightly  trusted 
in  the  skill  of  her  admirals  to  accomplish  it.  There  is  good  reason 
to  think,  therefore,  that  it  would  have  been  advantageous  for 
Spain  to  have  stationed  some  light  vessels  at  AJgeciras  to  inter- 
cept single  ships,  and  to  have  joined  the  blockading  squadron  to 
the  combined  fleet  when  the  latter  went  north.  If  England  had 
taken  advantage  of  this  to  revictual  the  Rock,  she  would  have  been 
obliged  to  weaken  her  fleet  in  the  Channel  at  the  moment  when  her 
shores  were  threatened.  Eurthermore,  it  is  unnecessary  to  say 
that,  if  the  English  squadron  had  been  destroyed  in  the  Qiannel 
in  the  summer,  it  would  not  have  been  able  to  go  to  Gibraltar  in 
the  winter ;  nevertheless,  this  obvious  proposition  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  seen  by  the  Allies. 

The  events  that  took  place  in  the  West  Indies  and  on  the  Ameri- 
can coast  had  a  direct  reaction  on  the  conduct  of  the  war,  since 
they  were  the  determining  cause  of  the  weakness  of  the  English  in 
the  Channel ;  the  French  government's  error,  therefore,  was  not  in 
sending  forces  there,  but  in  having  wished  to  settle  the  affair  in 
that  remote  region.  The  whole  interest  of  the  war  was  transferred 
there  ;  and  it  appeared  as  if  the  capture  of  a  small  island  might 
topple  over  England's  power.  Since  circumstances  favored  direct 
action  against  our  rival,  since  it  was  in  Europe  that  we  were  the 
stronger  and  she  the   weaker,   the  key   to  the   situation   was   in 

268 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Europe.  What  mattered  it  then  if  the  Enghsh  took  some  islands 
from  us  and  we  took  from  them  some  others  ?  The  two  important 
matters  in  the  Atlantic  were  first  to  support  the  war  on  land  by 
furnishing  the  insurgents  with  troops  and  the  aid  of  our  vessels 
for  their  operations,  and  then  to  keep  as  great  a  number  as  pos- 
sible of  English  vessels  away  from  home.  This  result  obtained,  a 
favorable  occasion  should  have  been  seized  to  bring  the  vessels 
sent  to  the  West  Indies  across  the  Atlantic  and  to  make  them 
participate  in  operations  in  the  Channel.  It  was  easy  to  do,  because 
the  respective  positions  of  the  two  sides  were  not  the  same.  The 
English,  engaged  in  a  continental  war  that  required  the  transport 
of  troops  by  sea,  and  obliged  to  protect  their  West  Indian  posses- 
sions, did  not  have  free  disposition  of  their  forces  to  the  same 
extent  that  we  did  of  ours.  Moreover,  the  perpetual  coming  and 
going  of  our  squadrons  between  the  American  coasts,  the  West 
Indies  and  the  shores  of  France,  kept  up  as  to  the  movements  of 
our  forces  doubts  that  it  was  easy  to  profit  by.  When  d'Estaing 
left  Boston,  November  4,  1778,  to  go  to  Martinique,  Howe  had  no 
knowlege  of  it,"'  and,  even  if  he  had  had,  would  probably  have 
been  unable  to  follow  him.  When  Guichen  left  the  West  Indies 
to  return  to  France,  Rodney  thought  he  had  gone  to  America  and 
hastened  in  that  direction  in  pursuit  of  him. 

It  therefore  seems  that  it  would  have  been  possible,  in  order  to 
strike  a  decisive  blow,  to  make  the  return  of  our  ships  concord  with 
operations  in  European  waters,  or  even  to  retain  in  Europe  the 
detachments  intended  for  the  colonies,  after  having  them  make  a 
feint  at  departure.  De  Grasse  got  under  way  from  Brest  on 
March  22,  1781,  with  twenty-six  ships,  of  which  twenty  were 
under  his  direct  command.  If  he  had  returned  to  Europe  at  the 
beginning  of  May,  we  would  have  been  able  to  get  along  without 
the  help  of  the  Spaniards,  which  was  so  fatal  to  us.  The  following 
year,  the  same  de  Grasse  was  in  the  West  Indies  ;  if  he  had  been 
able  to  escape  Rodney's  vigilance,  the  latter  would  probably  have 
looked   for   him.   at   Jamaica,   against   which   an   expedition   was 

'"At  the  same  time  that  d'Estaing  left  Boston,  a  division  of  five  ships 
left  New  York  to  attack  St.  Lucia.  It  was  a  coincidence ;  and  we  have  a 
right  to  suppose  that,  if  he  had  known  d'Estaing's  plan  of  going  to  the 
West  Indies,  Howe  would  not  have  judged  it  opportune  to  choose  that 
moment  for  attacking  St.  Lucia.  Hotham  arrived  before  d'Estaing  and 
took  the  island. 

269 


A  Study  of  Xaval  Strategy. 

planned,  and  the  Uiirt\-thrcc  ships  that  fought  the  battle  of 
Dominica  would  have  found  a  more  favorable  field  of  action  on  the 
English  coast.  But,  to  carry  out  movements  of  forces  of  this  sort, 
a  plan  was  necessary ;  well,  the  Allies,  after  having  made  several 
for  the  execution  of  which  they  had  neglected  to  prepare,  lived 
from  day  to  day. 

The  details  of  operations  in  the  West  Indies  and  in  America 
matter  little  from  the  general  point  of  view  that  we  are  here  tak- 
ing. We  have  already  had  occasion  to  point  out  the  special  char- 
acter that  they  assumed  in  the  islands.  It  is,  therefore,  enough  to 
say  that  they  evidenced  the  same  faults :  substitution  of  secondary 
objectives  for  the  principal  objective,"'  exaggerated  respect  for  the 
enemy  afloat. 

The  Indian  campaign  was  equally  unproductive.  For  two  years 
Suffren  expended  treasures  of  energy  and  activity,  and,  in  that  far- 
off  region,  with  very  weak  forces  and  insufficient  resources,  he 
established  the  true  principles  of  warfare.  Local  conditions  did 
not  lend  themselves  to  transcendent  plans  ;  Suilfren's  entire  strategy 
consisted  in  conquering  the  empire  of  the  land  by  that  of  the  sea, 
and  he  employed  the  sole  efficient  means  of  settling  the  question 
by  pursuing  the  hostile  squadron  without  respite.  Not  to  leave  his 
prey  for  a  single  instant,  he  refused  to  quit  India  and,  lacking  a 
base  of  operations,  he  seized  one.  Unhappily  he  acted  too  far  from 
Europe  to  be  able  to  weigh  upon  the  issue  of  the  struggle.  In  fact, 
the  preliminaries  of  peace,  signed  January  23,  1783,  re-established 
in  that  region  the  statu  quo  mite  helium,  although  hostilities  did 
not  cease  in  India  until  July  8.  The  battle  of  Cuddalore  was 
fought  in  the  interval.  This  glorious  campaign  served  only  to 
show  what  the  genius  of  one  man  can  accomplish  with  imperfect 
means. 

Looking  back  over  the  past,  v/e  see  that  France  never  had  had, 
and  has  not  since  had,  so  fine  an  opportunity  to  break  down  for  a 
long  time  the  power  of  her  rival.  Since  1775  England  had  been 
exhausting  herself  in  keeping  her  American  colonies  in  subjection  ; 
in  1778  France  comes  to  the  aid  of  the  insurgents  with  her  troops 

'*'  Yet  we  cannot  resist  the  desire  to  cite  the  following  occurrence. 
D'Estaing  fights  a  successful  action  against  Byron,  whose  vessels  are  much 
damaged ;  content  with  having  thus  protected  Grenada,  he  neglects  to  pur- 
sue him,  in  order  to  secure  his  new  conquest.  See,  upon  this  subject, 
Mahan's  remarks,  p.  402,  and  Suffren's  letter. 

270 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

and  her  fleet;  Spain,  in  1778,  and  Holland,  in  1781,  unite  with 
France.  Thus  England,  still  clinging  to  the  hope  of  not  losing  her 
colonies,  had  no  more  troops  at  home,  and  had  to  make  head 
against  three  navies.  It  was  impossible  for  her  to  attempt  any- 
thing important  against  the  Allies  ;  she  could  at  the  best  only  hope 
to  maintain  her  position.  France,  on  the  contrary,  was  free  to  dis- 
jjose  of  her  whole  army  without  reserve  and,  thanks  to  her  allies, 
had  numerical  superiority  on  the  sea.  Was  not  this  the  moment, 
after  having  supplied  the  insurgents  with  the  contingent  of  troops 
that  they  needed  to  continue  the  struggle  and  to  operate  a  diver- 
sion, was  not  this  the  moment  to  strike  at  England's  heart  and  to 
make  everything  converge  to  that  end  ? 

The  Allies,  on  the  contrary,  carried  on  only  a  petty  warfare.  In 
Europe,  they  exhausted  themselves  against  the  wall  of  Gibraltar ; 
in  the  West  Indies,  they  expended  their  strength  in  small  expedi- 
tions which,  when  successful,  were  immediately  compensated  by 
equivalent  reverses. 

The  war  went  on  thus  during  five  years,  at  the  cost  of  consider- 
able financial  sacrifices  ;  and  the  most  important  maritime  event "' 
was  a  disaster  for  us. 

It  was  the  general  lassitude  and  the  crushing  of  the  English 
troops  in  America  that  put  an  end  to  hostilities ;  so  that  we  have 
a  right  to  assert  that,  if  England  had  from  the  very  beginning 
made  a  sacrifice  of  her  colonies,  instead  of  using  herself  up  to 
keep  them,  she  would  have  made  the  three  navies  that  had  leagued 
themselves  against  her  pay  dearly  for  their  aggression. 

What  then  was  the  cause  of  the  impotence  of  our  squadrons, 
that  were,  nevertheless,  gommanded  by  ofiicers  of  merit?  As  far 
as  the  execution  is  concerned,  it  must  be  attributed  to  an  erroneous 
conception  of  war,  and  this  initial  fault  was  aggravated  by  a  lack 
of  understanding  between  the  Allies  which  entailed  disconnected 
efforts.  Each  country,  with  the  exception  of  Holland,  had  entered 
the  coalition  with  its  own  special  object.  The  Americans  desired 
their  independence ;  the  Spaniards  meant  to  recapture  Gibraltar 
and  Minorca  ;  France  sought  the  revision  of  the  disastrous  treaty 
of  1763.  The  individual  pretensions  of  the  Allies  were  legitimate : 
nations  do  not  go  to  war  for  sentimental  reasons,  but  for  gain. 
Their  error  was  in  believing  that  the  best  means  of  attaining  their 

^^'  The  battle  of  Dominica. 

271 


A  Study  of  Xaval  STRA'ii-:nv. 

objects  was  by  systematically  prosecntino-  the  conquest  of  all  the 
points  they  desired  and  not  by  undertakinq;  a  common  action  that 
would  have  given  them  in  i)lock  what  they  sou,c;ht  to  o;et  in  detail. 
The  Spaniards  onl\'  followed  us  with  regret ;  they  went  northward 
with  looks  turned  back  towards  the  Mediterranean. 

It  was  the  fatal  determination  to  wish  at  any  cost  to  retake 
Gibraltar  that  ham]>ered  most  the  movement  of  the  allied  squad- 
rons. Mahan,  in  his  masterly  exposition,  shows  us  how  much  this 
position  weighed  upon  the  English  plans  ; '""  but  it  weighed  much 
more  upon  those  of  the  Allies.  While  England  contented  herself 
with  revictualing  the  place  from  time  to  time  with  squadrons  that 
at  once  proceeded  to  another  destination,  the  Allies  for  four  years 
immobilized  important  forces  in  keeping  up  a  useless  blockade  ; 
and  IVIahan  concludes  that  Gibraltar  was  a  powerful  diversion  in 
favor  of  England."^ 

After  all,  France,  with  the  advantage  of  the  offensive,  with 
superiority  of  numbers,  with  a  material  in  many  respects  com- 
parable with  that  of  England,  with  a  body  of  brilliant  and  well- 
instructed  officers,  gained  in  this  long  and  distressing  war  nothing 
but  the  restitution  of  Senegal  and  the  little  island  of  Tobago.  It 
was  a  far  cry  from  the  hopes  that  accompanied  the  opening  of  hos- 
tilities. Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  all  the  accumulated  errors,  in 
spite  of  the  lack  of  understanding  between  the  Allies,  in  spite  of 
the  disconnectedness  of  operations,  this  war  would  have  been 
glorious  and  productive  for  France,  if  her  sailors  had  had  for  their 
sole  line  of  conduct  to  seek  before  all  else  the  enemy  afloat  and  to 
engage  him  seriously  each  time  that  conditions  allowed  of  it. 

To  cite  only  examples  where  the  disproportion  of  forces  made 
victory  certain,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  results  would  have  been 
much  more  important  if  Byron  had  been  beaten  at  Grenada,  Bar- 
rington  at  St.  Lucia,  Hood  at  St.-Kitts,  Derby  at  Torbay. 

We  have  not  spent  so  much  time  in  reviewing  the  War  of  Ameri- 

'""  The  importance  of  Gibraltar  only  made  itself  felt  during  wars  in  which 
England  had  to  maintain  squadrons  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  squadrons 
went  there  to  get  supplies  and  to  refit.  As  soon  as  circumstances  forced 
the  English  vessels  to  evacuate  the  Mediterranean,  Gibraltar  became  a 
burden. 

^"^  A  surprise  attack  that  might  have  taken  the  Rock  in  a  few  days  could 
be  understood;  but  there  was  no  justification  for  paralyzing  whole  squad- 
rons in  keeping  guard  over  a  few  battalions. 

272 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

can  Independence  for  the  purpose  of  criticizing  those  who  con- 
ducted it.  At  that  period  an  action  carried  on  with  Napoleonic 
energy  would  not  have  been  thought  justifiable;  but  though  we  do 
not  accuse  individuals,  it  is  our  duty  to  profit  by  events.  The  les- 
sons that  they  furnish  will  enable  us  eventually  to  demonstrate  to 
our  allies  the  necessity  of  not  seeking  divergent  objects  and  of  not 
sacrificing  the  general  interest  to  special  interests. 


I 


273 


II. 

Napoleox's  X.wal  Strategy. 

In  1803  Xapoleon  took  up  again  the  plan  of  invadinjy  Eng^land 
to  which  the  Alhes  had  i^^iven  some  thought  in  1779,  and  we  shall 
now  see  how  he  made  all  efforts  converge  upon  a  single  end, 
impressing  upon  operations  that  unity  of  action  which  had  been 
so  completely  lacking  in  the  war  of  1778.  We  shall  likewise  see 
with  what  fertility  of  mind  he  derives  advantage  from  an  un- 
promising situation,  modifying  his  plans  according  to  circum- 
stances, and  never  being  at  a  loss  to  utilize  his  forces. 

The  flotilla  of  gunboats  had  completed  its  concentration  in  the 
northern  ports,  and  the  moment  was  approaching  when  the  150,000 
men  collected  at  Boulogne  would  need  nothing  more  but  a  free 
passage  in  order  to  cross  the  Strait.  The  Emperor's  solicitude  was 
then  to  bring  to  the  Strait  of  Dover  sufficient  forces  to  drive  off 
the  English  cruisers. 

There  were  then  eighteen  ships  at  Brest,  five  at  Rochefort,  five 
at  Ferrol,  one  at  Cadiz,  and  eight  at  Toulon.  All  ports  excepting 
Cadiz  were  blockaded.  Nelson  was  off  Toulon,  Cornwallis  off 
Brest. 

Napoleon,  who  thought  he  could  get  his  army  across  in  the 
month  of  February,  1804,  counted  upon  the  winter  storms  to 
break  the  blockade  of  Brest.  That  squadron  was  then  to  proceed 
to  Ireland,  to  land  a  body  of  troops  there  and  to  appear  suddenly 
in  the  Channel.  Its  force  was  sufificient  to  secure  freedom  of  the 
Strait  for  a  few  days. 

Preparations  not  having  been  finished  for  the  winter,  all  hope 
was  lost  of  being  able  to  leave  Brest  in  the  milder  weather  of 
summer,  which  made  the  hostile  force  more  active ;  on  the  other 
hand,  the  strong  mistrals  that  sometimes  blow  in  the  warm  season 
forced  Nelson  from  time  to  time  to  take  refuge  in  lee  of  Corsica. 

Napoleon  then  thought  to  entrust  the  Toulon  squadron  with  the 
role  previously  assigned  to  that  of  Brest,  and,  with  this  object,  he 
placed  Latouche-Treville  at  its  head. 

The  latter  was  to  set  sail  from  Toulon  with  ten  ships,"'  to  steer 

'*' Two  vessels  had  been  fitted  out  during  the  winter. 

274 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

to  the  south  so  as  to  deceive  the  EngHsh  cruisers,  then  to  stand  for 
the  Strait  of  Gibraltar,  to  pick  up  the  ship  Aigle  at  Cadiz  in  pass- 
ing, to  unblock  the  Rochefort  division  and  to  enter  the  Channel 
with  sixteen  ships. 

To  mislead  Nelson  as  to  the  true  destination  of  the  squadron,  a 
camp  was  established  near  Toulon,  the  troops  of  which  were  offi- 
cially destined  to  go  to  the  Levant. 

Meanwhile  Ganteaume  would  keep  the  squadron  blockading 
Brest  occupied  by  feigned  sorties.  If  Cornwallis,  nevertheless,  re- 
ceived information  of  Latouche-Treville's  passage  and  hastened  to 
pursue  him,  Ganteaume  was  to  go  out ;  and  one  or  the  other  of  the 
two  squadrons,  perhaps  both,  would  be  able  to  get  into  the  Channel. 
The  death  of  Latouche-Treville  prevented  the  execution  of  this 
plan.  Villeneuve  took  command  of  the  Toulon  squadron,  while 
Missiessy  replaced  Villeneuve  at  Rochefort. 

All  these  changes  had  taken  time,  and  there  was  no  longer  hope 
of  doing  anything  that  year. 

For  the  third  time  Napoleon  modified  his  plans.  Villeneuve's 
character  appearing  to  him  not  to  be  sufficiently  resolute,  he  re- 
turned to  his  first  idea  of  entrusting  the  principal  role  to  the  Brest 
squadron,  under  Ganteaume's  command.  The  approach  of  winter, 
moreover,  drew  attention  to  the  north. 

Villeneuve  and  Missiessy  were  to  set  out  from  Toulon  and 
Rochefort,  to  make  a  junction  in  the  West  Indies,  to  do  what  harm 
they  could  to  the  English  colonies,  and  then  to  return  together  to 
Rochefort  when  their  sortie  had  drawn  the  English  squadrons  in 
their  pursuit.  On  their  return  they  had  orders  to  unblock  Ferrol 
and  to  join  to  themselves  the  French  vessels  that  were  there. 
Ganteaume,  setting  out  from  Brest  last,  was  to  throw  a  body  of 
troops  into  Ireland  and  then  to  go  to  Boulogne,  either  directly  or 
by  the  north  of  Scotland. 

Missiessy,  in  fact,  set  sail  on  January  ii,  1805,  and  Villeneuve 
on  January  18 ;  but  ten  days  later  the  latter,  damaged  by  the 
storm  that  had  facilitated  his  exit,  was  back  again  at  Toulon  and 
asked  two  months  to  make  repairs. 

In  the  meantime  Spain  declared  war  against  England,  and 
Napoleon,  wishing  to  profit  by  the  reinforcement  given  him  by 
the  Spanish  Navy,  enlarged  still  further  the  scope  of  his  com- 
binations. He  wished  to  bring  about  in  the  West  Indies  a  general 
concentration  of  all  the  allied  forces  and  to  bring  this  enormous 

275 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

mass  into  the  Channel,  while  the  English,  misled  by  the  rumor 
that  had  begun  to  spread  of  a  great  expedition  to  India,  uncertain 
as  to  the  true  destination  of  all  these  squadrons  starting  from  all 
points  at  once,  would  scatter  to  the  Orient,  to  India  and  to  the 
West  Indies. 

To  put  into  execution  this  gigantic  scheme,  Villeneuve  was  to 
set  out  from  Toulon  on  the  first  favorable  occasion,  to  pick  up  oflf 
Cadiz  Admiral  Gravina's  six  or  seven  ships,  as  well  as  the  Aigle, 
and  to  proceed  to  Martinique.  There  he  would  form  junction  with 
Missiessy,  who  was  already  there,  and  would  await  the  arrival  of 
Ganteaume.  The  latter  would  set  out  from  Brest  with  twenty-one 
ships  and  would  unblock  the  Ferrol  French-Spanish  division  in 
passing.  There  would  thus  be  fifty  or  sixty  ships  brought  together 
in  the  West  Indies.  All  precautions  were  taken  to  insure  secrecy. 
Villeneuve  and  Ganteaume  alone  received  instructions  from  the 
Emperor,  which  they  were  not  to  open  until  at  sea,  and  which  they 
were  forbidden  to  communicate  to  their  captains.  As  for  the 
Spaniards,  they  had  to  be  content  to  go  where  they  were  led. 
Finally,  Napoleon  himself  went  to  Italy,  in  order  to  take  away 
from  the  Admiralty  any  immediate  cause  for  anxiety. 

As  is  known,  the  first  part  of  the  program  was  carried  out  with- 
out hindrance.  Villeneuve  set  out  from  Toulon  on  March  29, 
1805,  joined  Admiral  Gravina  at  Cadiz,  and  the  combined  squad- 
ron steered  for  the  West  Indies.  Already  the  presence  of  Missiessy 
had  drawn  the  attention  of  the  English  in  that  direction,  and  they 
had  set  about  reinforcing  the  two  single  ships  that  were  there. 
But  Missiessy  awaited  in  vain  the  arrival  of  Villeneuve;  after 
having  made  numerous  prizes,  destroyed  the  fortifications  of 
Dominica  and  St.  Christopher,  and  thrown  500  men  into  the 
stronghold  of  San  Domingo,  he  had  returned  to  Rochefort  without 
being  interfered  with.  This  mischance  was  not  serious,  since  the 
Rochefort  division  only  consisted  of  five  ships.  What  was  more 
serious  was  that  Ganteaume  did  not  succeed  in  getting  out  of 
Brest :  by  a  sort  of  fatality  the  weather  continued  fine,  making  any 
attempt  at  evasion  impossible.  All  hope  of  a  concentration  in  the 
West  Indies,  where  Villeneuve  could  not  stay  indefinitely,  very 
soon  had  to  be  given  up.  Napoleon  then  made  his  plan  over  again 
once  more.  At  first  he  thought  of  making  Villeneuve  come 
directly  from  the  West  Indies  to  the  Strait  of  Dover,  going  by  the 

276 


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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

north  of  Scotland.  Cornwallis  kept  off  Brest  by  Ganteaume,  and 
Calder  held  off  Ferrol  by  the  French-Spanish  division,  Villeneuve's 
twenty  ships  ought  to  suffice  to  secure  the  Grand  Army's  passage 
of  the  Strait.  But  Napoleon  thought  to  increase  his  chances  of 
success  by  having  Villeneuve  joined  by  the  Ferrol  and  Rochefort 
vessels  (the  latter  having  returned  from  the  West  Indies),  and  he 
finally  decided  on  the  following  plan :  Ganteaume  was  ordered  to 
wait  to  be  unblocked  by  Villeneuve  before  going  out ;  the  latter, 
leaving  the  West  Indies,  would  touch  at  Ferrol  to  free  the  five 
French  and  seven  Spanish  vessels  that  Calder  was  watching ;  then 
he  would  appear  off  Brest,  after  having  picked  up  in  passing  the 
five  Rochefort  ships ;  Ganteaume,  freed,  would  join  the  allied 
squadron,  which,  fifty-six  ships  strong,  would  enter  the  Channel. 

These  new  arrangements  were  communicated  to  Villeneuve  by 
Rear-Admiral  Magon,  who  left  Rochefort  on  May  2  with  two 
ships.  Villeneuve  at  once  set  sail  for  Europe  (June  10),  happy  at 
escaping  the  English  squadron  whose  arrival  had  just  been  an- 
nounced to  him :  it  was  Nelson's  squadron. 

"  Informed  by  his  frigates  of  Villeneuve's  departure,  this  gal- 
lant seaman  had  waited  for  him  several  days  between  Sardinia 
and  the  African  coast ;  his  anxiety  was  so  much  the  greater  be- 
cause a  convoy  of  troops  that  had  left  England  for  the  Mediter- 
ranean might  be  intercepted  by  our  ships.  As  soon  as  he  had  been 
undeceived  as  to  the  route  the  latter  had  taken,  he  proceeded  to 
Gibraltar,  learned  there  of  Villeneuve's  departure  for  the  West 
Indies,  and  with  one  of  the  finest  impulses  that  marked  his  career, 
without  hesitation  hastened  in  his  pursuit.^"  Nelson  anchored  on 
June  4  in  the  Barbados,  picked  up  two  of  Rear-Admiral  Coch- 
rane's  ships  there,  and  went  to  Trinidad,  where  he  expected  to 
find  the  combined  fleet.  Deceived  in  his  hopes,  he  set  sail  for 
Antigua.  Informed,  on  June  12,  of  Villeneuve's  departure  for 
Europe,  convinced  moreover  that  the  latter  was  returning  to  the 
Mediterranean,  he  hastened  to  Gibraltar.  Arriving  at  that  anchor- 
age on  July  18,  Nelson  was  much  astonished  to  learn  that  no 
French  ships  had  passed  through  the  Strait.  Soon  apprised  of  the 
route  followed  by  our  fleet,  he  went  towards  the  Island  of  Oues- 

^^  Nelson  left  Lagos,  where  he  filled  up  with  water,  on  the  very  day  that 
Villeneuve  arrived  in  the  West  Indies. 

V7 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

sant,  left  nine  shi]:)S  with  Admiral  Cornwallis.  who  was  blockading 
Brest,  and  returned  to  England." '" 

Villeneuve's  progress  w^as  so  slow  that  the  brig  Ctirieiix,  sent 
by  Nelson  to  England,  met  the  allied  fleet  at  sea ;  on  July  8  the 
Admiralty  was  warned  of  his  return  to  European  waters.  Still 
ignorant  of  his  destination,  the  Admiralty  contented  itself  with 
reinforcing  its  blockading  squadrons  ;  but  all  it  could  do  in  that 
line  was  to  raise  Cornwallis'  forces  to  twenty-four  ships  and 
Calder's  to  fifteen,  by  the  addition  of  the  division  that  was  cruis- 
ing olT  the  Straits.  It  was  this  squadron  of  Calder's  that  \'il- 
leneuve  came  upon  in  the  vicinity  of  Cape  Finisterre.  He  lost 
two  ships  in  the  action,  and  the  wind  took  him  to  Vigo,  where  he 
anchored  on  July  28.  He  set  out  again  on  the  31st,  and  on  August 
2  reached  La  Corogne,  where  he  joined  forces  with  eleven  vessels 
that  he  found  there. 

There  he  received  the  Emperor's  last  instructions,  which  urged 
him  to  betake  himself  to  Brest. 

Thus,  in  spite  of  an  unfortunate  battle,  in  spite  of  a  slowness  of 
progress  that  enabled  the  English  Admiralty  to  forsee  the  danger. 
Napoleon's  previsions  were  realized,  and  all  that  was  left  to  do 
was  for  the  allied  fleet  to  appear  before  Brest  to  free  Ganteaume. 
Supposing  it  should  meet  Cornwallis  before  reaching  Brest  and  be 
crushed  in  spite  of  its  numerical  superiority,  Ganteaume  would 
remain  untouched  and  could  enter  the  Channel  with  twenty-one 
ships. 

On  August  14,  Villeneuve  left  Ferrol.  What  was  the  situation 
of  the  hostile  forces  on  this  date? 

On  that  very  day  Nelson  had  just  rejoined  Cornwallis  and  im- 
mediately went  to  Portsmouth,  where  he  arrived  on  the  i8th ; 
Calder,  for  his  part,  joined  his  chief  off  Brest  with  his  damaged 
division.  Cornwallis  thus  had  thirty-five  ships,  which  he  at  once 
divided  into  tw^o  parts ;  one  fleet  of  seventeen  vessels  remained 
with  him  before  Brest ;  another,  of  eighteen  vessels,  under  Calder, 
stood  for  Ferrol,  but  only  arrived  there  after  the  departure  of  the 
Allies.  Therefore,  if  Villeneuve  had  continued  his  route  towards 
Brest,  he  would  have  met  Allemand,  who  had  the  sea  free  since 
Calder  had  been  reinforced,  on  the  way.  and  would  have  fallen 

^^*  Essai  historique  sitr  la  strategie  ct  la  tactiquc  dcs  Aottcs  modernes,  by 
Chabaud- Arnault. 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

upon  Cornwallis  with  thirty-four  ships  against  seventeen.  Eng- 
land would  then  only  have  had  the  eighteen  ships  of  Calder  that 
were  in  the  south  as  a  serious  force  to  meet  sixty  ships  of  the 
Allies.  Never  had  an  admiral  so  fine  a  chance  of  carrying  off  an 
easy  success.  Yet  it  was  at  this  moment  that  Villeneuve  despaired 
of  the  Emperor's  fortune :  he  stood  for  Cadiz,  where  he  arrived  on 
August  20. 

Thus  failed  the  greatest  strategic  enterprise  that  was  ever 
attempted  on  the  sea. 

Ought  we  to  conclude  from  Villeneuve's  retreat  that  the  Em- 
peror's plans  were  ill  conceived  or  that  they  were  badly  executed? 

Yes,  all  Napoleon's  naval  conceptions  were  tainted  with  an 
initial  defect  that  in  advance  made  them  unfruitful :  the  allied 
ships  were  not  fit  to  make  war  with.  Strategy,  let  us  not  forget, 
is  only  one  of  the  factors  of  war ;  it  is  powerless  if  it  is  not  com- 
pleted by  tactics,  which  permits  profiting  from  the  advantages 
that  strategy  prepares,  and  by  the  organization  of  naval  forces, 
thanks  to  which  a  vessel  or  a  collection  of  vessels  can  meet  the 
requirements  of  war.  So  far  as  equality  of  numbers  does  not  pro- 
cure equality  of  strength,  war  becomes  an  insoluble  problem ; 
numerical  superiority  is  no  longer  anything  but  a  deceptive  screen 
masking  the  abyss.  Well,  the  action  of  Cape  Finisterre,  and  still 
more  that  of  Trafalgar,  which  was  fought  a  few  months  later, 
proved  that  the  allied  fleet  was  but  an  inert  mass,  capable  of  re- 
ceiving blows,  incapable  of  giving  them.  The  whole  campaign 
was  interfered  with  by  the  defective  outfitting  of  the  ships,  and 
especially  of  the  Spanish  ships  ;  to  such  an  extent  that  it  seems  as 
if  Villeneuve's  unhappy  squadron  was  only  sustained  by  the 
tenacious  will  of  Napoleon,  who  from  the  continent  urges  it  on 
and  directs  it  despite  itself.  Only  at  the  end  does  the  invisible 
bond  that  unites  Villeneuve  to  his  master  finish  by  breaking,  and 
the  admiral  gives  himself  up  to  discouragement,  the  forced  con- 
sequence of  the  deplorable  state  of  his  ships. 

It  was  the  disorganized  state  of  our  naval  service  that  occa- 
sioned damages  after  every  storm  and  forced  Villeneuve  to  return 
to  Toulon ;  it  was  that  that  retarded  the  progress  of  the  squadron  ; 
it  was  that  that  engendered  sickness ;  it  was  that  above  all  that 
created  an  unhealthy  fear  of  meeting  the  enemy,  however  weak 
numerically  he  might  be.  and  prevented  \"illeneuve  from  retaking 
from  Calder  two  of  his  shijjs. 

279 


A  Study  of  Xa\al  Stkategv. 

Tlie  English  Xavy,  at  this  epoch,  had  just  undergone  a  transfor- 
mation analogous  to  that  which  the  Revolution  had  stamped  upon 
our  armies  and  which  was  the  origin  of  Napoleon's  prodigious 
successes.  War  had  taken  on  a  harsh  character  such  as  it  had  not 
had  for  a  long  time :  a  strug'gle  for  existence  had  replaced  strug- 
gles for  power  and  for  dynasties.  Operations  were  no  longer 
suspended  during  the  bad  season ;  it  was  necessary  to  keep  the 
squadrons  constantly  fitted  out  and  to  make  them  keep  the  sea 
winter  and  summer,  without  rest  or  let-up.  This  new  situation 
demanded  a  radical  change  in  the  conditions  of  cruising.  England 
understood  this.  Hygiene,  so  defective  on  board  ship,  was  im- 
proved by  a  series  of  effective  measures,  while  long  cruises  trained 
crews  and  developed  the  readiness  of  officers  to  an  extent  until 
then  unknown.  Cornwallis  could  thus  blockade  Brest  during 
whole  years  without  interruption,  and  Nelson  could  accomplish 
those  gigantic  raids  that  would  have  appeared  impossible  a  few 
years  before.  During  this  tim.e,  our  ships,  immobilized  in  port, 
wasted  away  in  an  inaction  that  did  not  make  clear  the  necessity 
of  no  longer  relying  upon  those  hap-hazard  crews  and  improvised 
armaments  which  had  managed  to  be  sufficient  in  the  period  when 
fleets  left  harbor  to  fight  and  returned  immediately  afterward.'"' 
Under  Louis  XVI,  a  French  ship  was  as  good  as  an  English  ship ; 
twenty  years  later  the  French  Navy  could  not  stand  up  against  the 
English  forces.  All  the  more  must  we  be  crushed  when  incapable 
captains  had  been  substituted  for  our  experienced  officers,  when 
sailors  were  replaced  by  soldiers,  when  ships  were  rushed  to  sea 
with  incomplete  equipments  and  worn-out  rigging. 

Napoleon's  plan,  therefore,  made  default  in  the  means  of  execu- 
tion ;  but,  from  an  abstract  point  of  view,  it  seems  to  us  that  it 
was  correct  in  its  conception.  Perhaps  the  Emperor  will  be  re- 
proached with  having  given  such  a  development  to  his  plans  that 
concordance  in  the  movements  of  the  different  forces  was  difficult 
to  obtain.     But  this  reproach  does  not  apply  to  the  last  form  that 

"'It  was  one  of  the  errors  of  the  time  to  imagine  that  the  English  wore 
themselves  out  in  keeping  the  sea,  while  our  material  remained  in  good 
condition  in  port.  The  English  ships  wore  themselves  out  in  the  fashion 
of  the  Emperor's  veterans,  who  swept  over  all  the  battle-fields  of  Europe. 
The  inactive  ships  were  for  the  French  a  new  tool  that  they  did  not  know 
how  to  use.  This  same  idea  is  actually  to  be  found  in  the  minds  of  many 
people  to-day. 

280 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

the  operation  took,  since  all  the  Atlantic  detachments  were  to  wait 
to  be  successively  unblocked,  and  since  they  were  near  enough 
together  to  be  reached  by  orders  regulating  their  movements. 

To  justify  the  Emperor's  orders,  it  would  be  easy  to  say  that,  if 
such  or  such  a  circumstance  had  not  come  to  pass,  all  would  have 
happened  as  provided.  It  can  be  said,  for  example,  that  if  Vil- 
leneuve  had  not  had  to  return  to  Toulon,  he  would  have  found 
Missiessy  in  the  West  Indies,  or  even,  if  the  Curieiix  had  not 
reached  Europe  before  Villeneuve,  Calder  would  have  had  only 
nine  ships  off  Ferrol,  and  so  forth.  This  manner  of  judging  things 
would  wholly  warp  the  lessons  of  history:  accidents  of  the  sea  are 
factors  that  ought  to  be  taken  account  of,  and  it  is  necessary  always 
to  make  proper  allowance  for  them.  It  is  precisely  because  Vil- 
leneuve's  situation  was  never  compromised  (as  far  as  the  relation 
of  forces  is  concerned)  and  was  even  particularly  brilliant  at  the 
moment  when  he  gave  up  in  despair,  in  spite  of  a  succession  of 
mischances  that  better  organized  forces  would  have  escaped  ;  it  is 
for  that  reason  that  we  have  a  right  to  say  that  there  never  was  an 
operation  better  conceived. 

As  soon  as  the  Toulon  squadron  cleared  the  Strait  of  Gibraltar, 
all  immediate  danger  disappeared :  the  junction  with  Gravina  gave 
\"illeneuve  numerical  superiority,  and  he  kept  it  to  the  end.  be- 
cause in  his  progress  he  was  reinforced  by  the  detachments  from 
Ferrol  and  Rochefort  before  meeting  Cornwallis.  whose  forces 
constituted  the  principal  hostile  fleet.  The  sole  critical  moment 
was  the  passage  through  the  Mediterranean  to  Cadiz ;  after  that 
the  operation  rested  on  a  firm  foundation,  strength,  the  only  basis 
for  the  tranquillity  of  mind  necessary  to  a  chief  to  assure  success. 
Unhappily,  the  state  of  his  ships  took  away  all  assurance  from 
Villeneuve  and  confused  all  his  faculties. 

It  is  noteworthy  that  England  never  kept  off  Boulogne  but  a 
very  small  number  of  ships  (four),  and  this  manner  of  acting 
appears  to  have  been  reasonable.  If  the  flotilla  proposed  to  cross 
without  the  support  of  a  squadron,  light  vessels  would  be  enough 
to  destroy  it.  The  true  danger  lay  in  our  ships  of  the  line,  and  the 
most  efflcacious  way  of  preventing  them  from  doing  any  harm  was 
to  blockade  them  in  their  harbors  or  to  follow  them  if  they  came 
out.  England  did  not  have  sufficient  forces  to  concentrate  ships 
in  the  Strait  of  Dover,  to  watch  our  squadrons  and  to  protect  her 
colonies.     The  event  proved  that  the  distribution  of  the  English 

281 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

forces  did  not  exclude  all  daiijjcr  ;  but,  in  the  critical  situation  in 
which  the  threat  of  invasion  and  the  necessity  of  protecting  her 
colonies  placed  England,  any  other  solution  would  have  been  more 
dangerous. 

We  ought  also  to  bear  in  mind  the  perturbation  that  the  evasion 
of  ten  French  ships  produced  in  the  English  squadrons.  The  ap- 
prehensions of  Calder  off  Ferrol,  the  conjectures  of  Collingwood 
at  Gibraltar,  Nelson's  despair  on  his  return  to  Portsmouth,  must 
be  recalled  in  order  to  form  a  correct  idea  of  the  influence  of 
Napoleon's  strategic  operation. 


282 


III. 

The  American  Civil  War. 

We  have  no  intention  of  here  passing  in  review  the  long  series 
of  attacks  upon  the  coast  that  distinguished  the  War  of  Secession  ; 
moreover,  though  the  details  of  all  these  operations  cannot  be  too 
minutely  studied  by  the  tactician,  who  will  find  in  them  an  inex- 
haustible miine  of  information,  from  the  point  of  view  of  strategy 
this  enumeration  would  be  of  no  utility.  The  important  thing  is 
to  examine  into  causes,  not  to  describe  effects. 

The  War  of  Secession  is  remarkable  in  this  respect — it  shows 
in  striking  fashion  the  impotence  of  a  passive  naval  defence. 

The  two  adversaries  had  a  common  land  frontier ;  but  by  reason 
of  a  grouping  of  the  population  around  a  few  centers  far  removed 
from  one  another,  by  reason  likewise  of  geographic  conditions,  the 
sea  was  the  most  practicable  and  the  shortest  road  by  which  the 
belligerents  could  meet.  In  conseqi;ence,  the  war  must  have 
begun  with  a  contest  on  the  sea,  having  as  its  object  the  command 
of  the  means  of  communication,  if  the  two  sides  had  had  navies 
capable  of  fighting  for  control  of  the  sea  ;  but  the  federals  alone  had 
sea-going  vessels,  while  the  confederates  had  only  gunboats  and 
monitors  lacking  radius  of  action,  unseaworthy,  and  whose  action 
only  made  itself  felt  at  river  mouths  and  inside  bays. 

The  sea  was  therefore  free  for  the  federals,  to  whom,  on  this 
account,  the  offensive  part  belonged ;  the  confederates  were  re- 
duced to  keeping  on  the  defensive  and  waiting  for  the  attack  to 
define  itself.  The  latter's  situation  was  very  disadvantageous. 
They  had  to  defend  a  considerable  extent  of  coast,  and  the  diffi- 
culty of  communications  by  land  left  each  of  the  Confederate  States 
to  its  own  resources,  as  an  island  would  have  been.  The  federals, 
on  the  contrary,  masters  of  the  sea,  were  at  liberty  to  choose  their 
objective  and  to  concentrate  on  a  single  point  sufficient  forces  to 
overcome  all  resistance.  Under  these  conditions,  the  issue  of  the 
struggle  could  not  be  doubtful :  the  confederates  must  succumb. 
Their  heroism  might  retard  the  moment  of  their  fall ;  it  could 
neither  prevent  it  nor  change  the  aspect  of  affairs. 

In  fact,  the  federals  overthrew  in  succession  all  the  confederates' 
defences  by  accumulating  at  each  point  forces  immensely  superior 

283 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

to  those  that  thcv  knew  would  be  met  there,  and  by  proceeding 
methodically,  at  the  most  convenient  time,  under  the  most  favor- 
able conditions.  In  vain  did  the  confederates  accumulate  tor- 
pedoes, monitors,  batteries ;  nothing  availed,  because  there  is  a 
limit  beyond  which  numbers  always  win. 

Let  it  be  supposed  now  that  the  confederates,  instead  of  moni- 
tors of  small  radius  of  action  and  incapable  of  going  to  sea,  had 
possessed  a  sea-going  navy  the  units  of  which  had  the  necessary 
qualities  to  move  about  and  to  concentrate :  the  situation  would 
have  been  different.  The  sea  would  no  longer  have  been  free; 
consequently  the  Northern  States  would  have  had  to  renounce 
installing  the  commercial  blockade  which  was  their  first  act  and 
which  took  away  from  the  Southern  States  the  greater  part  of  their 
resources.  Before  attacking  the  coasts  and  undertaking  that  series 
of  operations  which  made  the  principal  confederate  places  fall  one 
by  one,  the  federals  would  first  have  been  obliged  to  destroy  the 
Southern  Navy,  which  would  have  been  able,  even  though  inferior 
in  numbers,  to  interrupt  all  the  combined  attacks  and  to  inflict 
serious  losses  upon  the  federals.  It  suffices  to  call  to  mind  the 
considerable  time  that  the  federals  required  to  destroy  the  sea- 
coast  defences,  to  become  aware  that  operations  of  this  sort  are 
not  possible  so  long  as  there  is  a  mobile  force  in  the  vicinity.  No 
dovibt,  if  the  sea-going  navy  of  the  confederates  had  been  numer- 
ically inferior,  it  would  have  had  to  succumb,  and  the  coasts  would 
have  been  left  open  to  attack.  But  in  all  ways  their  situation 
would  have  been  better.  In  the  first  place  we  know  (see  the  dis- 
cussion of  the  "  fleet  in  being  ")  that  a  mobile  force,  even  inferior, 
can  paralyze  superior  forces ;  in  the  second  place,  inferiority  makes 
itself  less  felt  when  one's  forces  can  be  concentrated  than  when 
they  are  distributed  in  small  bodies ;  for,  in  one  case  as  in  the 
other,  the  enemy  can  always  appear  with  the  whole  of  his  forces  ; 
finally,  the  Confederate  Navy  would  not  have  been  destroyed  at  a 
single  blow  without  inflicting  serious  losses  upon  the  federals 
(which  would  have  permitted  the  Southern  States  to  retard  the 
attacks  upon  the  coast  and  to  augment  their  resources),  whereas, 
with  its  fleet  of  monitors,  the  Southern  Navy  was  incapable  of  pre- 
venting a  single  attack.  From  the  naval  point  of  view  it  may  be 
said  that  this  fleet  played  no  part  at  all;  and  the  federals,  being 
free  to  attack  at  their  convenience  and  making  their  expeditions 
at  intervals,  could  repair  their  losses  according  as  they  occurred. 

284 


4 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

In  short,  what  the  confederates  lacked  was  a  sea-going  navy, 
capable  of  disputing  command  of  the  sea;  for  upon  that  command 
depended  the  protection  of  their  seacoast.  That  is  the  true  lesson 
to  be  derived  from  the  War  of  Secession. 

A^ery  well,  this  lesson  has  not  been  understood.  To  be  sure,  it  is 
not  the  first  time  that  false  conclusions  have  been  drawn  from  a 
war.  This  one,  which  ought  to  have  caused  the  disappearance  of 
monitors,  whose  impotence  had  been  manifest,  on  the  contrary 
only  increased  their  vogue.  All  the  powers  set  to  work  building 
them,  in  imitation  of  the  United  States.  People  said  that  they 
had  been  unable  to  defend  the  coast  because  they  were  too  small 
and  too  few  in  number ;  and  so  they  built  bigger  ones  and  more  of 
them.  But  vessels  built  for  offence  also  grew  larger  and  condi- 
tions remained  unchanged.  It  needed  the  war  with  Spain  to  dis- 
gust the  United  States  with  monitors  and  to  make  them  perceive 
their  error. 

This  error  arose  from  the  preponderance  accorded  by  all  mari- 
time powers,  except  England  perhaps,  to  the  tactical  element  over 
the  strategic  element.  In  fact,  if  you  will  consider  only  the  opera- 
tion in  itself — the  attack  upon  a  point  on  the  coast — the  more 
means  the  defence  has  the  better  the  chance  of  repelling  the  at- 
tack ;  and  as  a  means  of  defence  the  monitor  is  not  negligible : 
therefore,  they  must  be  multiplied.  The  problem  of  defence  as 
thus  laid  down  is  insoluble  because  it  is  impossible  to  collect  at 
each  important  point  of  a  coast  naval  defences  capable  of  resisting 
the  totality  of  the  enemy's  forces.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to 
look  at  things  from  a  higher  view-point ;  that  is  to  say,  from  the 
strategical  point  of  view.  Totally  dift'erent  conclusions  are  then 
arrived  at.  Instead  of  awaiting  the  enemy  in  port  with  forces  scat- 
tered over  the  whole  extent  of  the  seacoast,  one  is  led  to  seeking 
him  on  the  sea ;  instead  of  dispersing,  one  endeavors  to  concen- 
trate ;  in  place  of  monitors,  sea-going  vessels  are  desired. 

Up  to  the  present  time  the  naval  passive  defensive  has  not  yet 
been  wholly  renounced,  and  most  nations  make  two  divisions  of 
their  forces :  one  which  is  supported  by  fixed  defences,  the  other 
which  acts  at  sea.  This  bastard  solution  has  no  other  effect  than 
to  diminish  the  strength  of  all  the  forces  devoted  to  the  passive 
defence  as  well  as  of  those  devoted  to  the  active  defence,  so  that 
both  are  compromised. 


285 


IV. 

The  War  between  Chile  and  Peru. 

A\"hcn  w  c  read  history,  we  look  above  all  for  facts  ;  our  whole 
interest  is  concentrated  on  the  im|)ortant  events  whose  recital 
causes  a  dramatic  emotion.  The  reading"  over,  there  remain  in  the 
reader's  mind  only  the  names  of  battles,  and,  if  he  seeks  to  form 
an  opinion,  it  will  be  influenced  by  those  episodes  that  are  written 
in  large  letters.  Well,  in  a  war,  battle  itself  is  only  a  conclusion  ; 
what  is  as  important  as  the  battle  is  the  manner  in  which  it  was 
made  ready  for  and  the  causes  that  have  determined  the  victory. 
In  order  to  apply  himself  to  this  search  the  critic  is  obliged  to  look 
more  closely  into  things,  and  he  then  perceives  that  the  events 
that  occupy  the  most  space  are  not  always  those  that  have  had  the 
most  influence. 

For  example,  in  the  war  between  Chile  and  Peru,  we  cannot  help 
being  struck  by  the  tours  dc  force  that  the  Chilean  Army  had  to 
accomplish  to  reach  Lima  across  the  deserts  ;  we  recall  the  names 
of  the  battles  of  Dolores,  Tarapaca,  Los  Angeles,  Tacna,  Arica, 
Chorrillos  and  Miraflores  ;  and  we  are  tempted  to  conclude  that  it 
was  the  Chilean  Army  that  decided  the  victory  for  Chile  and  that 
the  war  was  above  all  a  land  war. 

Well,  this  war  was,  above  all,  naval,  because  victory  must  in- 
evitably belong  to  the  side  that  remained  in  command  of  the  sea. 
From  the  geographical  point  of  view  there  is  a  striking  similarity 
between  this  war  and  that  of  Secession. 

Peru  and  Chile  are  separated  by  immense  deserts ;  the  two  coun- 
tries have  no  means  of  communication  except  by  the  sea,  and  the 
provinces,  as  well  of  Chile  as  of  Peru,  are  equally  without  means 
of  intercommunication,  all  the  railroads  being  perpendicular  to  the 
coast ;  they  are  abandoned  to  themselves,  they  are  unable  to  lend 
support  to  one  another.  Therefore,  that  one  of  the  two  adver- 
saries who  is  master  of  the  sea  can  concentrate  and  attack  in  mass, 
while  the  other  will  have  his  forces  scattered  without  their  being 
able  to  unite :  the  latter  will  necessarily  be  vanquished. 

It  was  the  Chileans  who  had  command  of  the  sea,  and  they  then 
carried  their  army  from  Chile  to  Lima  in  three  successive  bounds : 
First,  from  Valparaiso  to  Antofagasta ;  second,  from  Antofagasta 
to  Pisagua ;  third,  from  Arica  to  Curayaco. 

286 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Each  of  these  bounds  was  across  the  sea  and  could  not  be  other- 
wise :  for,  although  the  Ch.ilean  Army  traversed  only  relatively 
short  distances  over  land,  the  difficulties  of  its  marches  reached 
the  limits  of  human  endurance. 

If  the  Chileans  had  not  had  a  navy,  they  would  doubtless  have 
been  able  to  land  troops  at  Antofagasta  with  merchant  ships,  as 
they  did,  since  this  operation  took  place  in  full  peace  and  Bolivia 
had  no  vessels  with  which  to  prevent  it ;  but  they  would  not  have 
been  able  to  go  any  further. 

Inversely,  if  Peru  had  been  supreme  on  the  sea,  she  would  have 
protected  her  territory  without  having  need  of  a  single  soldier ; 
for  it  was  only  after  the  capture  of  the  Hnascar,  succeeding  to  the 
loss  of  the  Independencia,  that  the  Chileans  dared  to  enter  upon 
Peruvian  territory."" 

It  was,  therefore,  truly  upon  its  navy  that  the  destinies  of  each 
country  depended. 

Let  us  now  see  how  Chile  won  command  of  the  sea. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  naval  forces  of  the  two  adver- 
saries were  sensibly  equal.  Two  small  armored  vessels  form  the 
basis  of  each  navy — for  the  Chileans,  the  Blanco-Encalada  and 
Cochrane;  for  the  Peruvians,  the  Independencia  and  Huascar. 
The  two  Chilean  armorclads  are  similar,  and  their  strength  is 
midway  between  that  of  the  Independencia  and  the  Huascar. 
Each  nation  also  possesses  a  few  wooden  ships  without  military 
value,  and  Peru  has  besides  two  small  armored  coast-guard  vessels 
that  cannot  go  to  sea. 

A  little  after  the  opening  of  hostilities  the  two  Peruvian  armor- 
clads attack  off  Iquiqui  two  wooden  vessels,  the  corvette  Esmeralda 
and  the  gunboat  Covadonga,  which  had  imprudently  been  left  on 
blockade  off  that  port.  The  Huascar  sinks  the  corvette  by  ram- 
ming her ;  the  Independencia,  the  strongest  vessel  of  either  navy, 
in  pursuing  the  gunboat,  is  stupidly  run  upon  the  rocks  and  lost. 

Thenceforth  the  Huascar  remains  alone  and,  forced  to  avoid 
any  encounter,  has  to  be  satisfied  with  hindering  the  enemy's 
operations  during  four  months  by  disquieting  his  coast.  She  made 
a  few  lucky  strokes,  but  finally  was  forced  to  fight  and  had  to 

^*^  It  is  for  this  reason  that  Peru's  first  care  after  the  war  should  have 
been  to  reorganize  her  navy,  whereas  she  devoted  her  resources  to  the 
army. 

287 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

surrender.  The  Chileans  then  remain  uncontested  masters  of  the 
sea  and  beo:in  to  transport  tlieir  army.     Such  are  the  simple  facts. 

The  brilliant  manner  in  which,  for  four  months,  the  Huascar 
bafifled  the  enemy's  efforts,  and  her  heroic  end.  were  the  cause  of 
her  dominatinoc  the  whole  naval  part  of  the  war  and  made  her  cap- 
ture appear  its  most  important  event.  But  nothing  of  the  sort  is 
true.  The  gravest  event  of  this  war  was  the  loss  of  the  Indepcn- 
dencia.  Through  this  occurrence,  command  of  the  sea,  until  then 
contested,  passed  over  to  the  Chileans  and,  except  by  a  miracle, 
the  final  victory  must  be  theirs.  The  commander  of  that  vessel, 
in  running  her  on  the  rocks  by  an  error  in  navigation,  caused  his 
country's  ruin."' 

Thereafter  the  Huascar' s  fate  is  sealed :  it  is  only  a  question  of 
time,  unless  she  destroys  herself  or  shuts  herself  up  in  port.  Cer- 
tainly, so  long  as  she  keeps  the  sea,  her  presence  influences  events. 
The  Chileans  are  as  yet  only  at  Antofagasta,  as  in  the  first  days 
of  the  war :  they  dare  not  adventure  their  troops  at  sea  since  one 
transport  has  been  captured,  and,  if  the  Peruvians  had  been  able  to 
profit  by  this  respite  to  put  in  line  new  naval  units,  the  Huascar 
might  have  saved  the  day.  But,  under  the  conditions  in  which 
Peru  finds  herself,  she  does  nothing  more  than  delay  an  inevitable 
result,  since  the  situation  does  not  change.  She  prevents  the 
enemy  from  doing  harm  for  the  time  being,  but  herself  does  none, 
because  solicitude  for  her  own  preservation  forces  her  to  act 
cautiously :  she  plays  a  negative  part.  Therefore,  the  services 
rendered  by  the  Huascar  must  not  be  exaggerated.  She  did  what 
she  could,  but  she  could  do  but  little. 

Peru  had  two  small  armored  coast-guards  that  played  no  serious 
part  because,  to  make  them  useful,  they  would  have  had  to  go  to 
sea  and  move  about.  If.  in  the  place  of  these  cripples,  Peru  had  had 
a  single  mobile  vessel,  though  only  of  the  strength  of  the  Huascar, 
which  w'as  but  a  very  small  ship,  she  would  have  won  supremacy 
on  the  sea  from  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  this  fact  alone  might 
have  modified  the  conduct  of  the  Chileans  and  made  them  more 
circumspect ;  in  that  case  the  loss  of  the  Independencia  would  not 
have  been  irreparable.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Peru  had  more  ships 
than  Chile,  but  the  useful  part  of  her  fleet  was  not  superior  to 
that  of  her  opponent. 

"'  There  is  a  lesson  here  for  those  who  assert  that  seamanship  is  a 
secondary  quahty  in  the  navies  of  to-day. 

288 


V. 

The  Spanish-American  War. 

Too  frequent  allusions  have  been  made  to  this  war  in  the  course 
of  our  study  to  make  it  necessary  to  dwell  at  length  upon  the  par- 
ticular lessons  that  derive  from  it.  We  shall,  therefore,  content 
ourselves  with  speaking  of  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  general 
conduct  of  operations. 

If  ever  a  war  might  have  been  foreseen  and  discounted  in  ad- 
vance, it  is  truly  this  one.  And  yet  it  took  Spain  unawares.  It 
happened  as  it  so  frequently  does  that  the  nation  that  did  not  wish 
war,  because  it  saw  no  means  of  carrying  it  on  successfully,  per- 
suaded itself  that  war  would  not  break  out  and  neglected  to  make 
ready  for  it.  When  the  Spanish  government  was  driven  to  a 
rupture,  it  was  still  ignorant  of  what  to  do  with  its  forces. 

It  is  true  that  the  situation,  for  Spain,  was  really  not  a  promis- 
ing one.  She  was  about  to  find  herself  threatened  at  both  extremi- 
ties of  her  colonial  empire,  in  Cuba  and  in  the  Philippines ;  and 
these  two  colonies  were  in  full  revolt.  In  the  Philippines,  the 
naval  forces  at  Admiral  Montojo's  disposal  were  not  equal  to  con- 
tending with  Commodore  Dewey's  modern  cruisers  ;  and  the  army 
had  too  much  difficulty  in  holding  the  insurgents  in  check  to  be 
able  to  pretend  to  repel  a  landing.  In  the  West  Indies,  Spain  had 
only  small  vessels  charged  with  police  duties  ;  the  United  States 
was  mistress  of  the  sea.  It  was  therefore  going  to  be  necessary 
to  bring  into  this  far-removed  theater  a  squadron  capable  of  re- 
conquering command  of  the  sea,  in  order  to  prevent  the  Americans 
from  landing  and  to  re-establish  communications  with  the  mother 
country.  But  the  two  most  powerful  units  of  the  fleet,  the  Pclayo 
and  the  Carlos  V ,  were  not  ready  for  sea. 

In  short,  a  geographical  situation  clearly  unfavorable  ;  a  marked 
naval  inferiority. 

Spain  held  but  a  single  trump :  the  immense  army  of  occupation 
that  she  maintained  in  Cuba  and  that  seemed  capable  of  with- 
standing the  American  attempts  at  disembarkation.  But  it  was 
necessary  for  this  army  to  be  fed  with  fresh  troops  and  supplies, 

289 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

and  the  sea  was  the  sole  way  of  communication.    As  in  all  colonial 
wars,  the  sea  was  to  play  a  prepondcratini;-  part. 

*     * 

The  first  encounter  took  place  in  the  Philippines.  On  April  30. 
1P98.  the  Far  Eastern  American  division,  under  the  command  of 
Commodore  Dewey,  appeared  off  the  coast  of  the  Island  of  Luzon : 
the  following  day  it  destroyed  the  Spanish  division  anchored  at 
Cavite  under  the  feeble  protection  of  two  batteries  of  two  guns  each. 
Commodore  Dewey  covered  himself  with  glory  cheaply ;  but  it 
cannot  be  denied  that  he  showed  a  spirit  of  decision  that  reveals 
m  him  the  qualities  of  the  true  warrior. 

Perhaps  Subig  Bay  would  have  afforded  the  Spanish  vessels  a 
more  favorable  position  than  Cavite  for  awaiting  the  enemy ;  its 
approach  was  easy  to  defend  and  torpedoes  could  be  moored  in  the 
entrance.  What  is  certain  is  that  Admiral  Montojo  went  to  estab- 
lish himself  there  as  soon  as  war  was  declared ;  afterwards  he  re- 
turned to  Cavite.  If  it  be  true,  as  has  been  asserted,  that  the 
Spanish  division  was  recalled  in  order  to  cover  Manila  more 
effectively,  this  order  was  unfortunate.  Commodore  Dewey  had 
and  could  have  no  other  objective  than  the  Spanish  ships  ;  the 
proof  of  it  is  that  he  appeared  first  of  all  off  Subig  and  only  after 
making  sure  of  the  absence  of  hostile  vessels  went  on  to  Manila 
Bay.  If  then — which  we  do  not  know  about — Subig  Bay  offered 
advantages  from  a  defensive  point  of  view,  the  Spanish  division 
should  have  waited  for  the  enemy  there  and  not  at  Cavite.  Since 
the  appearance  of  American  ships  off  Manila  was  what  was  feared, 
they  would  be  kept  away  much  more  surely  by  sending  away  the 
Spanish  division  which  was  the  object  of  the  enemy's  pursuit. 

Commodore  Dewey  was  not  accompanied  by  a  landing  force. 
His  undertakings  against  the  land  must  therefore  be  limited  to 
the  bombardment  of  Manila  and  Cavite.  For  that,  he  had  first  to 
get  rid  of  the  Spanish  division.  If  he  could  not  destroy  it  at  Subig, 
he  was  obliged  to  blockade  it  there  ;  but  he  did  not  dispose  of  sufifi- 
cicnt  forces  to  carry  on  at  once  a  blockade  and  an  attack  upon 
shore  batteries.  Even  if  it  had  been  otherwise,  he  would  have 
hesitated  to  expend  his  ammunition  against  breastworks  so  long 
as  the  enemy  afloat  had  not  been  destroyed.  Therefore,  as  long 
as  the  Spanish  vessels   were  afloat,  they  protected   ]\Ianila  and 

290 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Cavite ;  the  one  thing-  of  importance  was  to  place  them  where  they 
had  the  best  chance  of  resisting-  the  enemy's  attack. 

The  Spanish  authorities  would  doubtless  have  reasoned  in  this 
manner  if  they  had  been  cool.  But  weakness  is  a  poor  counsellor ; 
as  it  scarcely  permits  finding  an  absolutely  satisfactory  solution, 
it  engenders  indecision  and  provokes  changes  in  resolutions.  In 
war  the  weaker  is  like  a  sick  man  who  thinks  to  find  relief  by 
constantly  changing  position. 

After  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish  division,  the  operations 
have  no  further  interest  from  a  naval  point  of  view.  The  Ameri- 
cans, protected  by  the  insurgents  who  were  besieging  Manila, 
occupied  Cavite  arsenal  and  established  a  blockade  of  Manila  while 
awaiting  the  arrival  of  an  expeditionary  corps.  The  latter  arrived 
during  the  month  of  July  in  successive  detachments.  On  August 
13,  the  place,  attacked  by  land  and  sea,  capitulated. 

It  was  in  the  West  Indies  that  the  decisive  part  was  to  be 
played. 

As  soon  as  diplomatic  relations  were  broken,  the  United  States 
established  a  commercial  blockade  of  a  part  of  the  Cuban  coast. 
At  this  moment,  the  only  squadron  at  Spain's  disposal  in  the 
Atlantic  was  at  the  Cape  de  Verde  Islands,  waiting  orders.  It  was 
composed  of  four  armored  cruisers  and  three  torpedo  destroyers, 
under  the  command  of  Rear-Admiral  Cervera. 

If  this  squadron  crossed  the  Atlantic,  it  would  sooner  or  later 
run  ag-ainst  much  superior  forces  and  would  have  no  other  alterna- 
tives than  either  to  let  itself  be  beaten  or  to  shut  itself  up  in  port. 
The  Spanish  government  well  knew  that  the  efifective  strength  of 
the  squadron  was  much  less  than  its  apparent  strength.  It  was 
incompletely  equipped,  and  the  Cristobal-Colon,  lacked  her  heavy 
guns.  It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  wait  until  it  could  be  rein- 
forced by  the  Pelayo  and  the  Carlos  V.  Meanwhile,  what  could 
happen  ?  Before  thinking  of  conquering  Cuba,  the  United  States, 
which  had  no  army,  would  have  to  begin  by  forming  an  expedition- 
ary corps,  an  operation  that  could  not  be  carried  out  in  a  few 
days.  That  done,  they  would  hesitate  to  risk  the  expedition  at 
sea  before  being  sure  as  to  the  Spanish  squadron,  which  might 
come  inopportunely  to  interfere  with  the  operations  of  landing. 
Still,  the  Americans,  who  are  not  timid  people,  might  attempt  the 

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A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

enterprise ;  and  then  it  could  be  hoped  that  Marshal  Blanco,  hav- 
ing an  immense  army  at  his  disposition,  would  be  able  to  prevent 
the  army  of  invasion  from  advancing  until  communications  with 
the  home  country  had  been  re-established  by  the  arrival  of  the 
squadron. 

The  Spanish  government  ought  to  have  speculated  upon  this 
situation  to  delay  Admiral  Cervera's  departure.  Such  a  determina- 
tion did  not  imply  the  im.mobility  of  the  squadron  at  the  Cape  de 
Verde  Islands ;  it  should  have  been  caused  to  make  a  feigned  de- 
parture and  to  leave  the  public  in  ignorance  of  its  movements  as 
long  as  possible.  So  long  as  the  Americans  did  not  know  what  to 
expect  from  it,  they  would  hesitate  to  play  their  big  trump  card. 
Thus  time  would  have  been  gained. 

Without  due  consideration.  Admiral  Cervera  was  made  to  de- 
part. He  set  sail  from  the  Cape  de  Verde  Islands  for  the  West 
Indies  on  April  29.  It  would  be  interesting  to  know  the 'details 
of  his  orders.  I  understand  very  well  that  he  was  directed  to  go 
to  the  West  Indies  and  preferably  to  Havana.  But  afterwards, 
what  was  he  expected  to  do? 

*     * 

As  soon  as  it  became  aware  of  the  departure  of  the  Spanish 
squadron,  the  American  government's  solicitude  must  be  to  con- 
centrate all  its  fighting  ships  and  to  await  the  event.  It  would 
thus  be  in  shape  to  oppose  the  enemy.  As  Admiral  Cervera  must 
be  irresistibly  drawn  towards  the  Spanish  possessions,  where  his 
only  bases  of  operations  and  supply  were  to  be  found ;  and  as,  on 
the  other  hand,  it  was  important  to  support  the  fleet  of  light 
vessels  that  were  carrying  on  the  blockade,  the  main  body  should 
take  position  in  the  south. 

If  Admiral  Cervera  set  these  previsions  at  naught  by  appearing 
off  the  American  coast,  the  situation  would  in  no  wise  be  com- 
promised thereby.  Threatened  with  being  cut  off  from  the  Span- 
ish West  Indies,  he  would  not  delay  making  demonstrations ;  and 
all  the  ammunition  of  his  four  cruisers  could  not  put  in  peril  the 
fortunes  of  the  United  States. 

Well,  in  an  attack  of  nerves  that  is  surprising  on  the  part  of  a 
phlegmatic  people,  the  American  government,  instead  of  concen- 
trating its  forces,  divided  them  into  three  sections,  while  thirteen 
old  monitors  were  distributed  in  the  ports.     In  truth.  Admiral 

292 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Cervera  was  solicitous  of  quite  other  things  than  seeking  to  meet 
the  enemy ;  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  an  unhoped-for  chance  of 
success  was  thus  offered  him.  And  this  curious  spectacle  was 
afforded :  while  the  people  of  the  American  seacoast  were  tremb- 
ling- at  the  thought  of  seeing  the  Spanish  squadron  appear,  the 
latter  was  in  fear  of  not  being  able  to  arrive  without  hindrance 
in  a  well  defended  harbor;  its  thoughts  were  very  far  from  the 
American  coast. 

Thus  neither  of  the  belligerents  followed  the  line  of  conduct 
that  would  appear  the  most  reasonable. 


Steaming  at  economical  speed,  Admiral  Cervera  entered  San- 
tiago on  May  23,  without  having  had  any  unlucky  encounter.  It 
is  curious  that  this  arrival  was  considered  by  public  opinion  and 
by  the  Spanish  government  to  be  a  success  for  Spain  ;  and  nothing 
shows  better  what  a  false  idea  the  public  has  of  naval  war.  Yet 
it  was  neither  a  success  nor  a  failure ;  it  was  merely  an  occurrence 
that  was  favorable  to  the  United  States.  In  fact,  the  latter  had 
no  fear  of  a  contest  with  the  Spanish  squadron.  What  troubled 
them  was  not  knowing  its  position ;  so  that  they  might  fear  seeing 
it  come  unexpectedly  to  interrupt  the  blockading  operations  and 
the  plans  of  invasion.  The  arrival  of  Cervera  at  Santiago  put  an 
end  to  this  provoking  uncertainty.  Thus,  from  this  moment,  the 
American  government  recovered  itself.  Further  errors  of  execu- 
tion may  be  pointed  out,  but  there  will  be  no  more  faults  of  con- 
ception. The  naval  forces  are  concentrated  under  the  command 
of  Admiral  Sampson,  who  blockades  Cervera  at  Santiago.  It  is 
decided  to  land  the  expeditionary  force  in  the  vicinity  of  Santiago. 
A  double  result  will  thus  be  obtained :  on  the  one  hand,  the  forces 
that  blockade  Santiago  will  serve  at  the  same  time  as  a  protection 
against  a  possible  sortie  of  the  Spanish  squadron  during  the  land- 
ing operations ;  on  the  other  hand,  the  capture  of  the  heights  that 
dominate  the  city  will  force  the  hostile  ships  to  leave  their  refuge. 
All  this  is  very  good. 

In  the  Spanish  squadron,  less  resolution  is  shown.  The  vessels 
entered  Santiago  on  May  23  ;  not  until  the  31st  do  the  first  hostile 
ships  make  their  appearance  off  the  bay.  In  the  interval  it  cer- 
tainly seems  as  if  Admiral  Cervera  had  time  enough  to  supply  his 
ships  and  leave  the  port.     It  was  not  doubtful  that  the  prime 

293 


A  Study  of  X^.wal  Strategy. 

necessity  was  not  to  let  himself  be  blockaded  and  to  put  to  sea 
ag-ain  without  leaving  any  traces.  In  the  squadron's  precarious 
situation,  this  solution  did  not  lead  to  a  positive  result,  but  it  threw 
the  American  plans  into  confusion  again  and  permitted  gaining 
time.  To  gain  time !  Ts  not  that  the  only  thing  to  do  when  driven 
into  a  position  without  issue  ? 

After  June  i,  the  favorable  moment  for  coming  out  had  gone. 
It  was  necessary  to  come  to  a  decision  ;  to  look  at  the  situation 
from  a  new  point  of  view  and  to  seek  another  use  for  the  Spanish 
squadron.  Well,  on  June  22.  the  expeditionary  corps  had  begun 
to  disembark  at  Daiquiri,  and  on  July  2  the  enemy's  troops  arrived 
under  the  city's  walls.  What  was  to  be  done?  To  go  out  was  to 
succumb  to  the  fire  of  the  American  squadron  and  to  deprive  the 
city  of  the  ships'  powerful  artillery.  Marshal  Blanco  was  sending 
reinforcements  by  land  to  the  besieged  garrison  ;  it  sufficed  per- 
haps for  the  town  to  hold  out  a  few  days  to  cause  the  siege  to  be 
raised  and  to  force  the  Americans  to  re-embark.  If  Santiago  was 
obliged  to  capitulate,  it  would  be  time  enough  then  to  go  out ; 
while  waiting,  the  ships  could  take  an  efficient  part  in  the  defence 
of  the  city. 

Marshal  Blanco  looked  differently  at  the  situation,  and  on  July  2 
he  sent  the  squadron  an  imperative  order  to  go  out.  The  3d,  at 
10  a.  m.,  the  Spanish  vessels  cleared  the  pass  and  sought  to  escape  ; 
at  1.20  p.  m.  they  were  all  destroyed.  The  i6th  Santiago  surren- 
dered. If  the  governor  of  the  place  had  had  the  moral  and  mate- 
rial assistance  that  the  presence  of  the  squadron  would  have  as- 
sured him,  perhaps  he  would  not  have  yielded  at  the  very  moment 
when  General  Shafter  was  considering  re-embarking. 


The  Spanish  squadron  succumbed  under  the  weight  of  accumu- 
lated errors.  It  was  a  first  error  to  send  it  prematurely  to  the 
West  Indies ;  it  was  a  second  to  let  it  be  blockaded  in  Santiago ;  it 
was  a  third  to  make  it  go  out  from  there. 

Thereafter  the  United  States  are  in  undisputed  command  of  the 
sea.  They  profit  by  it  to  land  in  Porto  Rico  on  July  25.  Peace 
put  an  end  to  operations  on  August  12.  In  less  than  four  months 
Spain  lost  her  colonial  empire.  What  a  lesson  for  those  who  do 
not  comprehend  the  utility  of  a  navy ! 


294 


Conclusion. 

In  this  study,  we  have  endeavored  to  justify  ourselves  by  his- 
tory, that  is  by  actual  occurrences.  Doubtless  the  navy  of  to-day 
has  no  more  relationship  with  that  of  fleets  under  sail ;  but  the 
objective  has  not  altered.  The  sole  difference  consists  in  solving- 
with  battleships  and  torpedo-boats  the  problem  that  was  formerly 
set  to  wooden  ships  ;  the  needs  of  war  have  remained  the  same. 

What  has  particularl}-  struck  us  is  that  all  the  operations  of 
naval  war,  whatever  they  may  be,  reduce  themselves  to  a  single 
one  :  to  occupy  a  field  of  battle. 

If  it  is  a  question  of  attacking-  the  enemy's  coast,  it  is  necessars'. 
first  of  all,  to  clear  the  field  in  the  region  where  one  wishes  to 
operate. 

If  it  is  intended  to  carry  an  army  across  the  sea,  the  safety  of 
the  passage  must  be  assured. 

If,  on  the  contrary,  the  capture  of  commerce  is  preferred,  im- 
punity must  be  guaranteed  to  the  commerce  destroyers  by  keeping 
hostile  cruisers  away  from  the  cruising  grounds. 

In  every  case  where  it  is  wished  to  operate  in  a  sea  not  free  from 
the  enemy,  only  operations  of  short  duration  and  little  scope  can 
be  imdertaken.  They  may  contribute,  if  they  succeed,  to  aid  the 
general  operations  by  creating  a  diversion,  but  they  will  not  do 
sufficient  harm  to  the  enemy  to  weigh  upon  the  issue  of  the  war. 

But  this  field  of  battle  that  constitutes  the  principal  aim  must 
first  of  all  be  conquered.  The  stronger  side,  confident  of  its 
strength,  will  plant  itself  there  from  the  beginning,  defying  its 
weaker  adversary  to  come  to  dislodge  it.  The  latter,  not  being 
able  to  attack  directly  the  main  bodies  of  the  enemy,  will  seek  at 
first  to  detach  portions  of  them  to  weaken  them ;  then,  when  it 
judges  itself  strong  enough,  it  will  draw  them  into  a  region  where 
it  disposes  of  all  its  resources  and  will  strike  a  decisive  blow.  If 
it  succeeds,  this  first  victory  will  bring  others  in  its  train. 

To  obtain  a  first  victory,  movement  will  be  necessary — much 
movement ;  it  will  be  necessary  to  go  to  seek  the  enemy  wherever 
he  may  be.  To  profit  by  the  victory,  it  will  be  necessary  to  move 
again,  to  change  the  field  of  action,  in  order  to  utilize  vessels  that 
become  available.    These  necessities  fix  the  nature  of  naval  forces 

295 


A  Study  of  Na\al  Strategy. 

and  the  qualities  that  they  oug-ht  to  have.  When  the  navy  shall 
have  finally  adapted  to  the  construction  of  its  material  an  organiza- 
tion that  secures  the  maximum  return  from  its  resources,  it  will 
have  done  all  that  it  can  do  while  awaiting  the  supreme  moment. 

This  will  be  much.  In  the  domain  of  things,  order  will  have 
been  substituted  for  disorder;  simplicity,  an  indispensable  factor 
of  every  military  organism,  will  have  taken  the  place  of  com- 
plexity and  variet}\  In  the  domain  of  ideas,  pseudo-science,  which 
attributes  a  fixed  and  precise  value  to  essentially  variable  elements, 
will  have  been  driven  out  by  simple  good  sense,  which  is  guided 
by  special  circumstances  and  takes  account  of  times  and  places. 

But  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the  navy  be  constituted  upon  rational 
foimdations ;  it  is  necessary  that  it  dispose  of  sufficient  means  to 
fulfil  its  role  ;  it  imtst  be  victorious.  It  is  the  country,  therefore, 
that  has  to  determine  the  magnitude  of  its  forces,  after  their 
nature  has  been  indicated  to  it. 

What  is  the  use  of  developing  over-sea  commerce,  of  conquering 
new  colonies,  if  war  is  abruptly  to  bring  us  back  to  our  natural 
frontiers?  All  the  accumulated  millions  in  naval  material  and  in 
the  enhanced  value  of  our  colonial  domain  will  be  lost  at  a  single 
blow. 

The  nation  knows  the  strength  of  those  who  covet  our  riches ; 
it  ought  to  take  upon  itself  the  sacrifices  needful  to  preserve  them, 
under  pain  of  enriching  its  neighbor. 

Surely  navies  are  costly  organisms  ;  they  are  the  luxury  of  par- 
venu countries.  So  long  as  a  nation  has  not  become  unified,  so 
long  as  it  is  going  through  that  crisis  of  growth  that  precedes  its 
natural  development,  all  of  its  resources  are  not  too  much  to  en- 
able it  to  contend  upon  its  own  territory."*  That  is  why  England 
was  unable  to  lay  the  foundations  of  her  colonial  empire  until  after 
her  union  with  Scotland.  But  when  a  nation  has  within  herself 
that  need  of  expansion  which  is  the  source  of  the  life  of  peoples, 
she  seeks  to  substitute  lucrative  epopees  for  heroic  epopees  as  soon 
as  she  has  attained  her  natural  frontiers.  After  having  taken 
shape,  she  wishes  to  become  rich ;  and  she  demands  of  colonies  and 
over-sea  commerce  openings  for  the  overflow  of  her  energy. 

^^  It  is  none  the  less  true  that  every  country  bathed  by  the  sea  needs  a 
navy.  The  proof  of  it  is  that  the  kings  of  France  were  obliged,  so  long 
as  they  had  no  national  fleet,  to  call  for  help  from  the  Genoese,  the 
Aragonaise,  the  Spaniards  and  the  Dutch. 

296 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

Then  the  navy  appears. 

Upon  the  new  field  of  action  that  colonies  create,  peoples  meet 
with  competition.  In  those  vast  regions  with  undetermined  boun- 
daries, the  pioneers  of  civilization  end  one  day  by  finding  them- 
selves face  to  face  with  newcomers.  One  gets  along  as  best  one 
can ;  then  interests  end  by  intermingling,  and,  the  development  of 
peoples  helping,  jostlings  and  frictions  become  continual.  There  is 
a  Niger  question,  an  Egypt  question,  a  Newfoundland  question,  a 
Morocco  question,  etc.  Then  it  is  that  it  is  necessary  to  be  strong 
to  make  one's  pretensions  prevail  and  to  conserve  one's  acquisitions. 

Let  no  one  say  there  will  be  no  more  wars."°  Nine  years  after 
Fashoda,  on  the  morrow  of  the  Morocco  difficulties,  such  irony 
would  be  cruel.  Cardinal  Fleury  also  did  everything  to  avoid  it ; 
but  it  burst  forth  one  day,  inevitably.  When  we  have  drunk  the 
cup  of  bitterness  to  the  dregs,  we  throw  it  at  the  heads  of  those 
who  have  forced  us  to  drink  it. 

Does  France  wish  to  retain  her  rank  ?  Does  she  intend  to  mingle 
with  the  irresistible  current  that  draws  all  nations  towards  new 
outlets?  Does  she  desire  that  the  over-sea  markets  remain  open  to 
her?  Does  she  presume  to  make  her  voice  heard  in  the  concert 
of  nations?    Then  she  needs  a  strong  navy. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  she  considers  that  her  role  as  a  great 
power  has  ended  ;  if,  after  having  held  the  first  rank,  she  is  not 
ashamed  to  sit  in  the  lowest  place  ;  if,  in  a  word,  she  envies  the 
fate  of  Spain,  then  France  has  no  need  of  a  navy.  Taxpayers, 
save  the  three  hundred  millions  of  the  naval  budget,  rid  yourselves 
of  this  burden,  recall  us  to  our  families  to  bring  up  our  children, 
and  live  in  tranquillity  and  forgetfulness  until  the  day  when  your 
weakness  shall  tempt  the  )ieighbor  who  zvill  devour  you. 

But,  if  you  have  faith  in  the  vitality  of  your  race ;  if  you  wish 
your  sons  to  be  rich  and  respected  ;  if  you  wish  to  transmit  to  them 
the  heritage  that  you  have  amassed  bit  by  bit,  then  a  navy  is  neces- 
sary to  you. 

And  what  is  it  that  we  ask  of  you  for  this  ?  More  money  ?  No. 
We  can  be  content  with  what  we  have,  but  it  must  be  better  util- 
ized. Surveying  the  whole  past  with  a  single  glance,  we  see 
clearly  that  it  is  less  the  feebleness  of  our  means  that  has  betrayed 

^  The  Russians  did  not  believe  any  more  in  a  war,  and  this  confidence  cost 
them  their  entire  Pacific  squadron. 

297 


A  Study  of  Naval  Strategy. 

lis  than  the  manner  in  v/hich  we  have  made  use  of  them.  To-day 
it  is  still  this  that  will  cause  our  loss.  Once  again  we  pretend  to 
profit  by  victory  before  having  gained  it ;  and  supposing,  against 
all  evidence,  that  the  enemy  will  do  likewise,  we  wish  in  advance 
to  provide  against  imaginary  dangers.  Hence  that  division  of 
efforts  which  makes  us  envisage  war  from  three  different  points 
of  view :  the  offensive,  the  defensive,  commerce-destroying.  Thus 
we  have  built  three  distinct  Reets :  a  high-seas  fleet,  a  coast-defence 
fleet,  a  fleet  of  big  cruisers.  One  acts,  another  waits,  the  third 
runs  away.  To  be  strong  everywhere,  we  have  made  ourselves 
weak  everywhere.  Let  us  no  longer  be  astonished  then  that,  in 
spite  of  milliards  spent,  our  naval  power  decreases. 

The  day  when  we  shall  have  a  single  fleet — one  that  shall  have 
been  created  to  attack  the  enemy — that  day  we  shall  have  nothing 
more  to  fear. 

"  The  first  thing,"  it  has  been  said,  "  that  is  seen  to  disappear  in 
a  State  which  is  disintegrating,  is  the  navy." 

France,  wilt  thou  be  such  a  nation? 


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